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2 Patricia Risso, Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region during a Long Eighteenth Century, 12 J. World History 293, 297 (2001). Privateers were another name often used. Privateers were essentially a legalization of piracy, with explicit authorization from their government to attack enemy ships. By authorizing these pirates with “letters of marquee,” they were able to avoid being charged with piracy and its accompanying mandatory life sentence. The most famous privateer was Francis Drake, who after attacking Spanish ships and sharing his profits with Elizabeth I, was knighted. Buccaneers often were pirates who operated in the West Indies, and Corsairs were Muslim or Christian pirates operating in the Mediterranean from the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. See Piracy: A Brief History of Piracy, Royal Naval Museum Library, http://www.royalnavalmuseum.org/info_sheets_piracy.htm [hereafter Royal Navy].Google Scholar

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6 Bradford, supra note 1, at 4. Often, pirates found that selling a ships’ crew as slaves or asking for ransom was more lucrative and profitable than the ships’ cargo. Royal Navy, supra note 2.Google Scholar

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8 Ancient Pirates, supra note 4. Caesar eventually got his revenge by killing all of the pirates responsible for his kidnapping.Google Scholar

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31 Id. at 86. Pirates, as many of us already know, used flags to identify themselves. Originally flown to frighten passing ships, they were blood red to indicate no mercy would be shown and induce the passing ships into surrendering without a fight. Eventually, these flags became call signs, with the most famous of pirate flags being the skull and crossbones, a symbol used in ships’ logs to represent a death on board, was adopted by the Jolly Roger. Royal Navy, supra note 2.Google Scholar

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65 Doby, supra note 19, at 569. An obvious example of this in action is the current situation in Somalia, a coastal state with 3,025 km of coastline and also a failed state, who has no effective police power within its territorial land, let alone the abilities to effectively patrol its territorial waters.Google Scholar

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106 Id.Google Scholar

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109 Id.Google Scholar

110 UNCLOS, supra note 62, art. 101.Google Scholar

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112 Id. art. 103.Google Scholar

113 Id. art. 105.Google Scholar

114 Id. art. 105.Google Scholar

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139 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 154 (1820).Google Scholar

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148 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 10.Google Scholar

149 Smith, 18 U.S. at 156–7.Google Scholar

150 Id. at 158.Google Scholar

151 Id. at 160. With respect to crimes defined by common law, Justice Story mentions murder with “malice aforethought.” Other crimes defined by common law include larceny (see People v. Dumar, 106 N.Y. 502, 508 (1887)), burglary (see Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1039, 1126 (2002).), and rape (see Henry F. Fradella, Integrating the Study of Sexuality into the Core Law School Curriculum: Suggestions for Substantive Criminal Law Cases, 57 J. Legal Educ. 60, 71 (2007).), among many other felonies, as well as many criminal defenses.Google Scholar

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159 Id.Google Scholar

160 Id.Google Scholar

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165 18 U.S.C. §2280(a)(1)(A) “Offenses: A person who unlawfully or intentionally seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and if the death of any person results from conduct prohibited by this paragraph, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”Google Scholar

166 18 U.S.C. §2280(a)(1)(B) “Offenses: A person who unlawfully or intentionally performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and if the death of any person results from conduct prohibited by this paragraph, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”Google Scholar

167 18 U.S.C. §2280(a)(1).Google Scholar

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170 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for signature Mar. 10, 1988, art. 3(1), 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 668. The language of article 3 is “(1) Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally: (a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or (b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship of that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or (c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safer navigation of that ship; or (d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or (e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safer navigation of a ship; or (f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or (g) injures of kills any person, in connection with the commission or attempted commission of any of the offenses set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).” This is the exact language codified at 18 U.S.C. 2280(a)(1)(a)-(g).Google Scholar

171 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 10, “The Congress shall have Power to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.”Google Scholar

172 Shi, 525 F.3d at 720.Google Scholar

173 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, “The Congress shall have Power to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”Google Scholar

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175 Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820)).Google Scholar

176 Id. at 721.Google Scholar

177 18 U.S.C. §2280(b)(1)(C).Google Scholar

178 See U.S. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 88–90 (N.Y. 2003) and U.S. v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).Google Scholar

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180 Id. at 725.Google Scholar

181 Id. at 722.Google Scholar

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183 Jeffrey Gettleman, The West Turns to Kenya as Piracy Criminal Court, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 2009, at A8.Google Scholar

184 Benjamin Weiser, Pirate Suspect Charged as Adult in New York, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 2009, at A1.Google Scholar

185 Piracy, as many hold the image out in their head to be, from its golden days in the 1700 and 1800s came to an end during the Barbary Wars. During this time, many piratical attacks occurred on the northern coast of African, distinctly close to where the attacks on Somalia currently take place. Due to this high frequency of attacks, in 1801, Yussef Karamanli, the ruler of Tripoli, decided the U.S. was not paying enough to ensure safe passage of ships in this area and declared war against Americans. What is ironic is as a result, President Thomas Jefferson deployed the USS Philadelphia, captained by William Bainbridge, the namesake for the ship responsible for the rescue of Captain Phillips. But instead of a heroic result like that with the Maersk Alabama, Bainbridge caused the single greatest pirate disaster in U.S. history by running his ship aground while chasing one of Yusuf's ship, resulting in the captain and all 307 sailors taken prisoner. They were held until Jefferson paid a ransom 19 months later, and Marines and mercenaries arrived on the shores of Tripoli. This Marine victory (known as the First Barbary War) is referenced in their hymn with the line “to the shores of Tripoli.” Patricia Hurtado, Maersk Pirate Escapes Hanging in New York Prosecution (Update 1), Bloomberg, April 29, 2009.Google Scholar

186 Muse was charged with hijacking, hostage-taking, kidnapping, conspiracy, and piracy.Google Scholar

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196 Jerika Richardson, Somali Pirate Asks for Forgiveness, Sentenced to Nearly 34 Years in Prison, ABC News, February 16, 2011, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/somali-pirate-muse-sentenced-34-years/story?id=12930166.Google Scholar

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204 Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy of the Coast of Somalia, ASIL Insights, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm.Google Scholar

205 Patrick Lennox, Contemporary Piracy of the Horn of Africa, 5, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, Dec. 2008, available at http://www.bosaso-media.com/images/right_side_ads/Contemporary%20Piracy%20off%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.pdf. The only potential ruling regimes since Barre's downfall in 1991 include the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was formed in exile under UN-backing and never had any real control over the country, and the Coalition of Islamic Courts (CIC) (also known as the Union of Islamic Courts), which was a collection of Islamic groups similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan. The CIC had a short reign—only six months—and controlled only the southern two-thirds of the country, but during their reign they cracked down severely on pirates, often launching attacks against the pirates at their home bases, resulting in a decrease in pirate attacks off Somalia's coast. Lennox, supra, at 5–6.Google Scholar

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208 Id. This “defensive” piracy was mainly the acts of the Hawiye clan, aimed at unlicensed foreign trawlers and those dumping toxic waste who exploited the absence of a functioning government in Somalia. The Hawiye clan maintained their activities until 2006 when the CIC gained control. At that time, the Darod clan took up the slack left by the Hawiye clan. No Stopping Them, The Economist, Feb 5^th–11^th 2001, at 69.Google Scholar

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211 Joe Vacarello, U.N. Passes Piracy Pursuit Powers, CNN.com, Jun. 3, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/06/02/somalia.piracy/index.html. The average hijacking lasts for 60–80 days, but that is increasing. The longest captives have been held was ten months, while the Taiwanese hostage ship, the Win Far 161, was utilized as a mother ship for the pirates. No Stopping Them, supra note 208, at 70.Google Scholar

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213 VOANews.com, supra note 203. The average ransom paid rose from $1.5 million in 2009 to $3.5 million at the beginning of 2010. The record was $9.5 million for a South Korean tanker after the pirates initially demanded $20 million. No Stopping Them, supra note 208, at 70.Google Scholar

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218 Hostage Taking at Sea Rises to Record Levels, Says IMB, ICC International Maritime Bureau, Jan. 17, 2011, available at http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/429-hostage-taking-at-sea-rises-to-record-levels-says-imb. While these figures are the worst on record, it is note-worthy that attacks in the Gulf of Aden have decreased significantly from 2009 to 2010, going from 117 to 53, with the reduction attributed to the naval coalitions that have now been regularly patrolling the area.Google Scholar

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222 Id. While there have been some calls to arms, this has mostly been ruled out because it risks civilian crews will become embroiled in firefights with the pirates. Instead, the naval forces and shipping industry has worked together to develop “best management practices” that detail how ships should prepare their vessels when travelling through the Gulf of Aden. These practices include maintaining a high cruising speed (no ship travelling over 18 knots has ever been successfully boarded by pirates), evasive maneuvers, erecting physical barriers and using hoses and foam cannons when pirates are close. These tactics seem to be working, with three-quarters of attacks ending in failures, whereas in 2008 pirates were successful 50% of the time. No Stopping Them, supra note 208, at 71.Google Scholar

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239 Id.Google Scholar

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244 VOANews.com, UN Security Council Approves Anti-Piracy Measure, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-12-16-voa62-66619017.html.Google Scholar

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246 S.C. Res. 1838 (2008), S/RES/1838 (2008), adopted by the Security Council at its 5987th meeting on 7 October 2008.Google Scholar

247 S.C. Res. 1844 (2008), S/RES/1844 (2008), adopted by the Security Council at its 6019th meeting on 20 November 2008.Google Scholar

248 S.C. Res. 1846 (2008), S/RES/1846 (2008), adopted by the Security Council at its 6026th meeting on 2 December 2008.Google Scholar

249 Id.Google Scholar

250 S.C. Resolution 1918 (2010), S/RES/1918 (2010), adopted by the Security Council at its 630 1st meeting, on 27 April 2010.Google Scholar

251 S.C. Resolution 1950 (2010), S/RES/1950 (2010), adopted by the Security Council at its 6429th meeting, on 23 November 2010.Google Scholar

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253 Id. Three main naval task forces now operate in the area: Operation Atalanta, the EU contingent; Operation Ocean Shield, the NATO maritime group; and CTF-151, a 25-nation coalition under American command. In addition, many countries have deployed ships under national command, including China, Japan, India, Iran, Russia and Saudi Arabia. These naval forces have been able to help World Food Programme supplies to now get through with fewer attacks (it is estimated these flotillas disrupt around a fifth of the attacks); however, the naval forces have also contributed to the pirates beginning to roam further out using “mother ships.” No Stopping Them, supra note 208, at 70.Google Scholar

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259 Gettleman, supra note 183, at A8. As an example, the EU has invested around $3 million in Kenya's judicial system, with some of those funds going towards building a special court for piracy trials. However, In September 2010, Kenya announced it was ending the agreement with the EU, accusing it of failing to keep its side of the bargain. No Stopping Them, supra note 208, at 71.Google Scholar

260 VOANews.com, supra note 203.Google Scholar

261 Gettleman, supra note 183, at A8. Kenya is not the only foreign state trying pirates even without a nexus. Other regional countries of note include Tanzania and the Seychelles, but Kenya has experienced the largest influx of piracy trials and convictions. No Stopping Them, supra note 208, at 71.Google Scholar

262 Kontorovich, supra note 204Google Scholar

263 Kayleigh Shebs, EU, Kenya Reach Pirate Prosecution Agreement, Jurist Legal News and Research, Mar. 6, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/-2009/03/eu-kenya-reach-pirate-prosecution.php.Google Scholar

264 James Thuo Gathii, Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-National Pirates Captured by Third States Under Kenyan and International Law 4 (March 16, 2009), available at http.//works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=james_gathii.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

265 Id.Google Scholar

266 Constitution of Kenya §60(1).Google Scholar

267 Gathii, supra note 264, at 7.Google Scholar

268 Id. at 8.Google Scholar

269 Id. at 9.Google Scholar

270 Azim, supra note 3.Google Scholar

271 Azim, supra note 3.Google Scholar

272 Personal conversation with Professor James Gathii, Albany Law School Oct. 5, 2009 [hereinafter Conversation].Google Scholar

273 Id.Google Scholar

274 VOANews.com, supra note 203.Google Scholar

275 Azim, supra note 3.Google Scholar

276 VOANews.com, supra note 203.Google Scholar

277 See generally, Murquand, supra note 224.Google Scholar

278 Id.Google Scholar

279 Id.Google Scholar

280 Id.Google Scholar

281 Azim, supra note 3.Google Scholar

282 Azim, supra note 3. Some other options are to use the court systems of those countries that initially capture the pirates, often due to the fact that in those specific attacks the citizens of that country are the ones who were threatened. Examples of countries that have done this include the United States and South Korea. Hyung-Jin Kim, 5 Somalis Brought to South Korea on Piracy Charges, Associated Press, Jan. 30, 2011, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41337648/ns/world_news-asiapacific/.Google Scholar