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Of Code and Consequence: Assessing the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on International Criminal Law Norms Governing the Direct and Public Incitement to Genocide

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2024

Naman Anand
Naman Anand*
Affiliation:
Visiting Fellow, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law (LCIL), University of Cambridge; NYU Law (2024); Attorney, Legacy Law Offices LLP, New Delhi; I would like to thank Professor Theodor Meron CMG (Charles L Denison Professor of Law Emeritus, NYU Law) for his valuable comments and supervision of this article. Naman Anand. E-mail: [email protected].
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Abstract

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and its seamless integration with today's defense technologies and equipment raise concerns about how this may impact the application of international legal norms related to the direct and public incitement of genocide. This work elaborates on the potential difficulties resulting from the rise of AI vis-à-vis the enforcement of the Rome Statute, specifically focusing on Article 25(3)(e) and interconnected soft law instruments such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the Genocide Convention. The work concentrates on how the Rome Statute, which was designed during (and catered to) a pre-digital era, falls short in addressing the complex challenges posed by AI-driven portals. These types of portals can be utilized to plan and amplify calls for genocide in a manner that is not fully protected by the existing legal framework.

By looking at case law and engaging in theoretical and speculative analysis, this work delves into the various ways in which AI and virtual private networks (VPNs) can influence the dissemination of genocidal speech—specifically, by prioritizing user engagement over truthfulness or accuracy, necessitating a relook at what constitutes “direct and public incitement” under international law. The work also raises the question of attribution and how the atrocities committed due to such incitements might be prosecuted. Lastly, the work focuses on proposed amendments to the Rome Statute that could answer these new legal challenges while safeguarding freedom of expression.

Type
Article
Information
International Journal of Legal Information , Volume 52 , Issue 2 , Summer 2024 , pp. 166 - 175
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by International Association of Law Libraries

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References

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