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The Swedish Institution of Justice Ombudsman

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2019

Fariborz Nozari
Fariborz Nozari*
Affiliation:
European Law Division, Law Library, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
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Extract

I. The Institution of Justice Ombudsman has its origian in Sweden. The term “ombudsman” in Swedish means a representative or an agent. In practice the Justice Ombudsman has come to be described as the protector of people's rights and the watchman over central and local administrations and courts. He is the commissioner of justice, elected by the Parliament to ensure that the laws of the country are properly observed by the State and local authorities.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Legal Information , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , Spring 1990 , pp. 1 - 16
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by The Institute for International Legal Information 

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References

1. Bexelius, A., Vår Förste JO, Stockholm (1981), p. 13.Google Scholar

2. The 1809 Constitution did not require that the JO should be a jurist. Ability to understand and appreciate the concept of law was deemed to be adequate. Even today the Constitution does not require the JO to be a lawyer. However, except for the first JO, Lars August Mannerheim, who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Constitution in 1809, the Justice Ombudsmen throughout the two centuries have been successfully selected from among lawyers.Google Scholar

3. Note that the Office of Chancellor of Justice with somewhat limited functions still exists in Sweden.Google Scholar

4. See Note 1, at 14–18. Note that under a short period of time in the middle of the 18th century, the parliament seized the opportunity to appoint the Chancellor of Justice.Google Scholar

5. See Note 1, at 16–18.Google Scholar

6. Id. at 22.Google Scholar

7. Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU 1939: 7), p. 25 ff.Google Scholar

8. SOU 1965: 64, pp. 39–41.Google Scholar

9. Note that in Sweden some members of the elected councils perform active administrative duties in various boards and committees of the local government. In that capacity the elected members of the councils are subject to JO's supervision.Google Scholar

10. Lundvik, U., et al., The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman, Stockholm (1974), p. 3.Google Scholar

11. SOU 1965: 64, pp. 60–63.Google Scholar

12. SOU 1975: 23. Note that during the first hundred years, the JO received a total of 7000 complaints. This number had risen to over 3000 a year by 1972.Google Scholar

13. SOU 1975: 23, pp. 230–232.Google Scholar

14. See Note 3.Google Scholar

15. Svensk Författningssamling (SFS 1975: 1056).Google Scholar

16. al-Wahab, I., The Swedish Institution of Ombudsman, Stockholm (1979), pp. 46–67.Google Scholar

17. SFS 1986: 764, Chapter 8: 10.Google Scholar

18. Act of Instructions for the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, SFS 1986: 765, Section 15.Google Scholar

19. SFS 1974: 152. The present Swedish Constitution, which replaced the 1809 Constitution, entered into force on January 1, 1975.Google Scholar

20. SFS 1974: 153. See also Note 17.Google Scholar

21. See infra on Annual Reports.Google Scholar

22. Infra, p. 6.Google Scholar

23. Supra, p. 4.Google Scholar

24. The rules on public responsibility in connection with the exercise of authority are stipulated in the Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 20, on Abuse of Public Authority.Google Scholar

25. See Note 18, Section 2 (as amended by SFS 1987: 995).Google Scholar

26. Id., Section 8.Google Scholar

27. Id., Section 2.Google Scholar

28. See Note 19.Google Scholar

29. See Note 18, Section 10.Google Scholar

30. See Note 19, Chapter 12: 3.Google Scholar

31. Act of Parliament, Chapter 9: 8, SFS 1974: 153.Google Scholar

32. See Note 18, Section 4.Google Scholar

33. See Note 19.Google Scholar

34. See Infra concerning the JO's investigations and inspections.Google Scholar

35. See Note 18, Section 5.Google Scholar

36. Id., Section 20. This is for the reason of preventing the unnecessary increase of the JO's work-load.Google Scholar

37. Id., Section 21.Google Scholar

38. SOU 1965: 64, p. 94; SOU 1975: 23, pp. 87–89; and Justitie-ombudsmännens Ämbetsberättelse 1987–88, pp. 10–12.Google Scholar

39. SOU 1975: 23, pp. 99–101 and 277.Google Scholar

40. See Note 10, pp. 5–9.Google Scholar

41. See Note 18, Section 17.Google Scholar

42. See Note 18, Section 18.Google Scholar

43. Id.Google Scholar

44. Id., Section 19. In order to provide the JO with the opportunity to concentrate on the most essential cases, the law permits an Ombudsman to dismiss a complaint if he finds it to be of minor importance or is unfounded. Grounds for reaching such a conclusion would be a reasonable assumption that no error has been made by the respective authority.Google Scholar

45. Id., Section 23.Google Scholar

46. Id., Section 21.Google Scholar

47. SOU 1975: 23, pp. 70–73 and 93–95.Google Scholar

48. See Note 10, pp. 4–9.Google Scholar

49. Id. at 9.Google Scholar

50. This is the case that brought about the concept which is known as “Stockholm syndrome.”Google Scholar

51. See Note 10, p. 12 ff.Google Scholar

52. Justitieombudsmännens Ämbetsberättelse, 1976–77, pp. 471–472. See also Note 16, pp. 127–128. It should be noted that in principle an authority follows the JO's opinion expressed in a statement such as above.Google Scholar

52. SOU 1975: 23, p. 111ff.Google Scholar

54. Supra, p. 3.Google Scholar

55. See Note 10 at 10–11.Google Scholar

56. Id.Google Scholar

57. Justitieombudsmännens Ämbetsberättelse, 1987–88, pp. 134–136.Google Scholar

58. See Note 18, Section 6, Parag. 1.-Google Scholar

59. See Note 10, p. 8.Google Scholar

60. See Note 18, Section 6, Parag. 2.Google Scholar

61. Id., Section 22.Google Scholar

62. SOU 1975: 23, pp. 79–81.Google Scholar

63. See Note 18, Section 6, Parag. 2.Google Scholar

64. Id., Section 6, Parag. 3.Google Scholar

65. Id., Section 6, Parag. 4.Google Scholar

66. Id., Section 7.Google Scholar

67. See Note 18, Section 4.Google Scholar

68. See Note 10, p. 5.Google Scholar

69. See Supra, p. 4.Google Scholar

70. See Supra, p. 5.Google Scholar

71. See Note 18, Section 14 and 15.Google Scholar

72. Id. Section 13.Google Scholar

73. Id., Section 11.Google Scholar

74. Supra, p. 5.Google Scholar

75. See Note 16, Section 25.Google Scholar

76. Justitieombudsmännens Ämbetsberättelse, 1987–88, p. 331. Note that some of these cases may require several years of investigation.Google Scholar

77. Justitieombudsmännens Ämbetsberättelse, 1987–88, pp. 263–64.Google Scholar

78. Id., p. 341.Google Scholar