1 Cotton and agriculture had constituted the bulk of the Egyptian economy since the British colonialization in 1882 and tied a new landowning class to the British presence in Egypt and the British cotton markets. Neither this class nor the British had any major incentive to promote the country's industrialization and despite modest attempts to modernize, by the end of the Second World War agriculture continued to account for about a third of the country's GDP. (John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser And Sadat; The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 51-3 (1983).Google Scholar

2 After the revolution in 1952, the Nasser regime was determined to restore Egyptian power with full independence, political sovereignty and military capacity, and avoided alliances with either superpower. The ISI project that the regime adopted meant to diversify the economy and to break the economic linkages to the British metropolis that perpetuated Egypt's backwardness. Id.Google Scholar

3 The country's heavy reliance on cotton and its market had chained the peasant, the fallah, to a never ending cycle of cotton production and made him vulnerable to the unpredictable fluctuations in cotton prices. As land and capital stayed scarce, the population grew, continually diminishing the relative value of the peasant's labor. At the time of the revolution of 1952, the per capita GNP remained the same as at end of the First World War. Id.Google Scholar

4 Cypher, James M. & Dietz, James L.: The Process Of Economics (1997)Google Scholar

5 Ikram, Khalid, The Egyptian Economy 1952–2000: Performance, Policies, And Issues, 57–84 (2006).Google Scholar

6 Id.Google Scholar

7 Id.Google Scholar

8 Id.Google Scholar

9 Ayubi, Nazih N., Overstating The Arab State: Politics And Society In The Middle East, 199–200, 298–301 (1996).Google Scholar

10 In a study on elites in Egypt, state technocrats are together with the ruling party placed in the center of elite circles. In the second circle we find influential businessmen, trade unionists and parliamentarians. In the third outer circle are the judges of the SCC and influential NGOs (Gamal Abdelnasser, Egypt in Arab Elites, Negotiating The Politics Of Change, 117–123 (Volker Perthes ed., 2004).Google Scholar

11 It was nationalist to have one's own domestic industry. In the name of socialism, the state, via its public sector, was responsible for the well-being of the new national body (AYUBI, supra note 9, at 298).Google Scholar

12 Populism is “a political movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the urban working class and /or peasantry but which does not result from the autonomous organizational power of either of these two sectors. It is also supported by non-working class sectors upholding an anti-status quo ideology” (Torcuato Di Tella quoted by Ayubi, supra note 9, at 206).Google Scholar

13 See infra.Google Scholar

14 Sulayman, Samir, Al-Nizam Al-Qawiyy Wal-Dawla Al-Dha'fiyya [The Strong Regime and the Weak State], 20–21 (2005).Google Scholar

15 Id.Google Scholar

16 Hazem Beblawi is one of the original theorists of the “rentier state”. He describes three essential features for such a state: 1) rent cannot be the only kind of income in the economy, but it should predominate; 2) the origin of the rent boils down to a situation of domestic payment transfer; and 3) a minority in the population must be engaged in the generation of the rent, while the majority is involved in the distribution or utilization of it. Hazem Beblaw, The Rentier State 12 (Hazem Beblaw & Giacomo Luciani eds., 1987), See also Sulayman, supra note 14, at 21.Google Scholar

17 Moreover, Egypt is located within an oil rich region and periodically finds itself the overseer of petrodollars searching for labor and investment opportunities. This has allowed Egypt to export its labor to these countries utilizing their remittances at opportune moments of its economic history as a source of badly needed hard currency. In the same vein, foreign investment has often meant petrodollar money for Egypt from Gulf countries looking to invest in Egypt. (Galal Amin, Egypt's Economic Predicament: A Study In The Interaction Of External Pressure, Political Folly, And Social Tension In Egypt, 1960–1990, 40–6, 53 (1995)).Google Scholar

18 In 2006, Egypt produced on average 668.22 thousand barrels oil a day 6, ranking it 26^th of world producers. The same year, the natural gas production of 1,501 billion cubic feet made it the 19^th biggest producer. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Data and Analysis for Egypt, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=EG (February 2009).Google Scholar

19 Ayubi, , supra note 9, at 235.Google Scholar

20 In Egypt, “the main mobilization against the state bourgeoisie and its authoritarian apparatus has … so far not come from the economic private sector but rather from the socio-cultural private sector: From radical Islamic movements and from informal “Islamic business” groups with alternative network of schools, hospitals and social services.” Ayubi, supra, note 9, at 408.Google Scholar

21 Amin, , supra, note 18, at 137–40.Google Scholar

22 The nucleus of this parallel state exists in the hospitals, clinics, mosques and banks administered by Islamists and used to provide both welfare services to the poor population and investment opportunities for those with money, completely autonomously from the state. The capacity of the Islamic sector to step in during the earthquake that hit Cairo in the mid-nineties by providing badly needed services revealing the inadequacy of the public sector is well documented. (Thomas Demmelhuber, Egypt's moment of reform and its reform actors: the variety-capability gap, 16:1 Democratization, 125 (2009).Google Scholar

23 A conflict between the Islamic business sector and the state has in recent years materialized in challenges over the “legality” of the status and practices of these companies. However, as Ayubi writes, “it is likely that the state saw in … this group … the development of a civil society that was seeking genuine autonomy from the state.” AYUBI, supra note 9, at 408.Google Scholar

24 See in general Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000 in The New Law and Economic Development 19 (David M. Trubeck & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).Google Scholar

25 Judges and jurists are themselves a fraction of the state elites although they guard their autonomy from the political elites through a commitment they share to “judicial autonomy”. On judicial independence, see Adel Omar Sherif & Nathan J. Brown, Judicial Independence in the Arab World, Program of Arab Governance of the UNDP (2002), available at http://www.undp-pogar.org/publications/index.asp?tid=9&src=1&type=0&so=0.Google Scholar

26 See how the court uses a constitutional provision to deduce a new basis for discrimination through analogy (which it treats as unconstitutional), a hallmark of formalist reasoning, Case No. 11, Judicial Year 16, July 3, 1995.Google Scholar

“All Egyptian constitutions stress the principle of equality and treat it as the basis for justice freedom and social peace. …. However, these particular bases of discrimination are enumerated in the constitution by virtue of their commonality, but the list is not limited to them. … [E]ven though the list is limited it includes every aspect of differentiation, restriction, preference…. That this law privileges doctors over other lessees despite the fact that they share the same legal status, and without objective basis, renders the law unconstitutional.” (Translation by author).Google Scholar

27 As an example of the use of post-realist mode of American reasoning see the recurring use in the court's language of “balancing” and “weighing,” see Case No. 11, Judicial Year 16, July 3, 1995.Google Scholar

While it is permissible for a legislator in a state that combines individual freedom with state intervention to restrict use of property by the holder for a social purpose, this restriction however does not occur in a vacuum nor should it be conducted arbitrarily. The nature of the right itself, the purpose of this restriction, and the social circumstances under which this restriction takes place should all be taken into consideration. In this context, the legislator weighs the alternatives and chooses the interests most worthy of protection… Right of property should therefore be regulated in a manner that balances interests… Lessor and lessee should combine their interests in a manner that promotes economic development. The balance between them should not weigh in favor of one at the expense of the other; otherwise it would lead to injustice It is hard to imagine that the exploited of yesterday has become the exploiter of today as a result of the skewed balance through legislative intervention to its favor.Google Scholar

28 Odeh, Lama Abu, The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt: Court Acting Out!, forthcoming.Google Scholar

29 Abdul-Rahman, Amr, A Look at Democratic Struggle in One Year: The End of Reform or Discovering the True Path to Change, Al-Bosla (2007), at http://bosla.org/node/78.Google Scholar

30 Id.Google Scholar

31 Odeh, Lama Abu, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1043–1146 (2004).Google Scholar

32 Land reforms, starting in September 1952, and continuing over time, ended up banning land ownership in excess of 50 acres per individual and 100 per family. Land properties exceeding this was expropriated by the state and sold back to the peasants cheaply. Foreign nationals were stripped of their Egyptian holdings‥ Rent control in land tenancy gave tenures far reaching rights to the land. WATERBURY, supra note 1, 61–3: HAMID ANSARI, EGYPT: THE STALLED SOCIETY 79–87 (1986); T. Khattab, Land Law, in EGYPT AND ITS LAWS 126–7 (Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron & Baudouin Dupret eds., 2002).Google Scholar

33 Waterbury lists the following as falling in the hands of the state as a result of measures Nasser took when he came to power: Banking and insurance, foreign trade, all “strategic” industries, maritime and air transport, urban mass transport, modest public housing, some urban retail trade, major department stores, hotels, cinemas and theatres, all newspapers and publishing houses, all reclaimed land, irrigation and drainage canals, major construction companies, High dam and Suez Canal. Only the following escaped: private cultivators, small scale retail and service firms, wholesale traders, small manufacturers (WATERBURY, supra note 1, at 76).Google Scholar

34 Id., at 61, 66.Google Scholar

35 Id., at 66.Google Scholar

36 During an initial stage of ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ regimes, the demands of the “popular classes” are to some degree met. But after a “ceiling” is reached, a new “alliance between the military-technocracy and the upper bourgeoisie in cooperation with (subordination to) international capital” is reached and seeks to constrain the demands of the popular classes by exclusionary measures. (Ayubi, supra note 9, at 277).Google Scholar

37 In corporatism, “the tendency is to move downward through the restratification of the public into corporate functional groupings relevant to development and system-maintenance. Not class, but corporate grouping, is characteristic: hence a kind of “corporate representation” in primary stage modernizing, mobilization systems is seen as the means of reconciling populism with functional expertise.” David Apter, quoted by Ayubi, supra, note 9, at 207.Google Scholar

38 Sequestration was not only used to force a change in the social order but was also used against what the regime considered increasing security threats. Law 119 of 1964 was aimed against the increase in of activity by the Muslim Brotherhood and a third type of sequestration was aimed against a rising left. (Ansari, supra note 39, at 173–83).Google Scholar

39 Sulayman, , supra, note 14, at 15–6.Google Scholar

40 Revenue growth passed that of nominal GDP during the 1960s (Ikram, supra note 5, at 11).Google Scholar

41 Id.Google Scholar

42 Sunar in Ayubi, supra note 9, at 208.Google Scholar

43 US's antagonism to Nasser forced him internationally to an alliance with the Soviet Union and domestically to increase political repression against forces he feared might be allied with the US (Waterbury, supra note 1, at 399).Google Scholar

44 Even before the costly 1967 war with Israel, Egypt's defense expenses had in 1965 risen drastically to 12% of the GDP, much spent on the prolonged war in the Yemen and the war of attrition against Israeli forces (Waterbury, supra note 1, at 94–100, 331).Google Scholar

45 “Conservative/reactionary social forces”, i.e. the former landowning aristocracy in alliance with the foreign business, were disenfranchised economically and politically by Nasser. Ayubi, supra note 9, at 17, 209–16 However, “Unlike South East Asia, Egypt is not represented by a situation of social conflict and polarization. The Nasserist regime in 1952 ended an active period of such polarization. The Egyptian case, then represents a different model from that of third world countries that have succeeded in capitalism: the military dictatorship it witnessed came earlier than its counterparts”, giving the Nasser regime a great deal of autonomy from the society. (Sulayman, supra note 14 at 15–6. Translation by author).Google Scholar

46 Ansari, , supra note 39, at 177–8.Google Scholar

47 The Soviet military mission was ended in 1971 and Sadat purged the figures who were pro-soviet in the regime, attempting to liberalization. See Malak Zaalouk, Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The Rise Of The New Bourgeoisie, 57 (1989).Google Scholar

48 A policy of de-sequestration was implemented by which land was to return to its rightful owners. All sequestrations that had occurred 1961–64 were annulled, former owners granted full restoration of the property or full economic compensation, and third parties who had benefited or received property through the sequestration were taken into consideration. Just as the sequestration policies coincided with political ambitions and security concerns [under Nasser], so did the laws on de-sequestration mirror Sadat's crackdown on opposition forces. Depending on the time and reason for sequestration, different laws of compensation applied. (Ansari, supra note 39, at 173–83).Google Scholar

49 The Open Door Policy prioritized export related projects and was meant to bring in advanced technology and enhance Egypt's strategic position: Foreign investors could now take majority interests in some firms that had been reserved for the public sector monopoly of banking; Arab investment was granted special privileges to attract Arab petrodollars; any project approved within its terms would automatically be considered part of the private sector; 49 percent of all equity in public sector firms to be put up for private subscription; weak companies would be sold off or liquidated, while strong would be put up for general share subscriptions. Private investment projects were not subject to labor laws, stipulations of worker representation on management boards, profit-sharing formulae, and salary ceilings applied to the public sector. (Waterbury, supra note 1, at 131–9).Google Scholar

50 Ansari, , supra note 39, at 237–8.Google Scholar

51 Amin, , supra note 18, at 40.Google Scholar

52 Id.Google Scholar

53 Amin, , supra note 18, at 47; Ikram, supra note 5 at 214–6.Google Scholar

54 In other words, the transition to market at that period included trade liberalization without the privatization of public sector companies. While Sadat's Open Door policy set the tone for forthcoming privatization, actual legal steps for privatization did not occur until the 1990s (Ikram, supra note 5, at 18).Google Scholar

55 Despite liberalizing measures, the trade deficit rose under Sadat from $E260 million in 1972 to $1,000 in 1975, depending heavily on foreign loans. Zaalouk, supra note 55, at 58.Google Scholar

56 Waterbury, , supra note 1, at 95–6.Google Scholar

57 40–65, Zaalouk, , supra note 55, at 58.Google Scholar

58 Amin, , supra note 18, at 131–40.Google Scholar

59 Id.Google Scholar

60 Id.Google Scholar

61 Most of the state expenditure was spent on the military. (Sulayman, supra, note 14, at 81).Google Scholar

62 $14.3 billion external debt – an eightfold increase from Nasser's days. (Amin, supra note 18. at 12).Google Scholar

63 Oil, labor remittances, the Suez Canal and tourism accounted for 75% of Egypt's total current receipts of foreign exchange in 1981. (Amin, supra note 18, at 12, 40).Google Scholar

64 With oil prices collapsing, Egyptian oil income declined from 2.26 Billion dollars in 1985 to 1.2 in 1986 and income from Suez Canal declined in 1000m to 900m. In addition to the collapsing oil prices, the US government decided at this time to condition its economic aid to Egypt on implementing reforms advocated by IMF. Sulayman, supra note 14, at 54.Google Scholar

65 Amin, , supra, note 18, at 135.Google Scholar

66 Sulayman, , supra, note 14, at 59.Google Scholar

67 Id., at 54.Google Scholar

68 Id.Google Scholar

69 However, the deal of 1987 proved to be a gross failure: public expenditure as a ratio of GDP increased by 5 4% in 1986/87, 57.2% for the year 1987/88. Net deficit increased from 5.3% in 1986/87 to 8.6% in 87/88. The regime went on financing its deficit by printing money, which reflected on the rate of inflation increasing it by 20% late eighties. (Id.).Google Scholar

70 Sulayman, , supra, note 14, at 56.Google Scholar

71 Id.Google Scholar

72 Id.Google Scholar

73 Id.Google Scholar

74 Since 2004, the privatization scheme has included selling shares in Suez Cement Company, telecom Egypt, department store Omar effendi and there are plans to sell shares in Egypt air. (OECD, Development Center, Working paper No. 261, Privatization in the MEDA Region: Where Do We Stand?, DEV/DOC (2007)4, (July 24, 2007) (prepared by Celine Kauffmann & Lucia Wegenr). See infra, note 117 on the privatization of banks.Google Scholar

75 Amin, , supra note 18, at 21.Google Scholar

76 Demmelhuber, , supra note 25 at 122; The Economist: Will the Dam Burst? Sep 11, 2008, at http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12202321.Google Scholar

77 A recent increase in revenues is due primarily to a doubling of income from the Suez Canal and a doubling of tourists (The Economist, Id.).Google Scholar

78 Sulayman, , supra note 14, at 39, 51, 64–5.Google Scholar

79 In the 2005 parliamentarian elections, the Muslim Brotherhood, running as independents, gained 88 seats, or 20%, which was an increase from 17 seats in 2000. (Abdel-Moneim Said, What lies ahead?, Ahram Weekly, 1–6 Jan, 2009 at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/928/eg3.htm).Google Scholar

80 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, members of the Muslim Brotherhood won majority or absolute majority in the elections for the boards of the Engineers', Doctors', Lawyers', Pharmacists', and Scientists’ Syndicates (Demmelhuber, supra note 25, at 125) Although most active and present in student politics like at Cairo University, Muslim Brotherhood students have been banned from participating in student unions. (Mustafa el-Menshaw,: A Different Kind of Fraternity, Ahram Weekly, Nov 24–30 2005, available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/770/eg10.htm).Google Scholar

81 Successful Islamist businessmen have given the regime hiccups, which has moved to confiscate business assets and to prosecute successful Islamist businessmen under charges of money laundering, terrorism and plotting to overthrow the regime. In 2007, 40 businessmen and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including deputy leader Khairat al-Shatir, were tried before a military tribunal. (Jailan Halawi, All's Not Well on the Domestic Front: A Force to Reckon With, Ahram Weekly, Dec 17 2007–Jan 2 2008, available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/877/eg2.htm.Google Scholar

82 The Muslim Brotherhood has never enjoyed a strong base in the industrial working class, possibly due to reluctance from affluent businessmen who dominate the leadership to mobilize workers. (Joel Beinin & Hossam el-Hamalawy, Strikes in Egypt Spread from Center of Gravity, MERIP, May 9, 2007, available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero050907.html).Google Scholar

83 Ikram, , supra note 5, at 7–8.Google Scholar

84 E.g. Law 21/1958 on the regulation of the Egyptian industry stipulated a five year plan for industry in which the state financed 60% (Ikram, supra, note 5 at 5); Presidential Decree 44/1961 provided annexation of the capital of National Bank of Egypt.Google Scholar

85 According to the National Charter, economic infrastructure and a majority of heavy and medium industries should be public. (Ikram, supra note 5, at 7) E.g. Laws 69, 70, 71 of 1961 nationalized the cotton market.Google Scholar

86 Tax laws are not found in a single act of legislation, but in a wide range of laws. E.g. see Law 7/1953 transferring existing law on taxation of capital income to commercial and industrial profit; Law 254/1954 on income tax; Law 370/1953 on taxation relief for small agricultural landowners; Law 463/1953 on taxation of arable land; Law 202/1960 imposed tax on inheritance.Google Scholar

87 E.g. Laws 156/1953, 475/1954 on foreign capital in investment; Presidential decree 581/1969 on the non-exchange income from the Suez Canal in foreign currency; Presidential decree 1037/1960 on the establishment of a ministerial committee of foreign trade and exchange; Ministerial decree 34/1956 on the determination of the Egyptian pound exchange rate for foreign currencies.Google Scholar

88 E.g. Laws 513/1954, 365/1956, 482/1955 on tariff and excise duties, Laws 602/1953 & 173/1956 amending Law 2/1930 on customs tariff.Google Scholar

89 E.g. Law 476/1959 provided the establishment of a Central Administration of Customs.Google Scholar

90 E.g. Land Reform Decree 178/1952 set the limit of individual ownership at 200 feddans; Law 152/1957 took over public waqf land; Law 24/1958 set a family limit at 300 feddans; Law 127/1961 reduced the individual ownership to 100 feddans; Laws 37/1951 & 15/1963 banned foreigners from owning agricultural land; Law 150/1964 transferred sequested property to public ownership.Google Scholar

91 E.g. Land Reform Law 178/1952 regulated prices and terms of leases; Article 29 of Law 49/1977 stipulated that a lease contract would not be terminated with the death of a tenant if dependants are remaining in the premises.Google Scholar

92 E.g. Tenancy regulation within Law 178/1952; Article 29 of Law 49/1977; Law 199/1952 brought tenancy agreements from 1944–52 under rent control, freezing them at a reduced level; Laws 55/1958, 168/1961 reduced the rent level further; Law 7/1965; Law No. 52/1969 as amended with Military Regulation 4/1976, Law 49/1977 & 136/1981: See Betsy Birns McCall; The Effects of Rent Control in Egypt, 3(2) ALQ, 151–66 (1988).Google Scholar

93 E.g. Law 244 of 1953 on the employment of workers; Law 46 of 1958 on the employment of workers in mines and quarries; Law 91 of 1959 was the first comprehensive labor law, replacing all previous labor laws.Google Scholar

94 E.g. Presidential Decree 319 of 1952 on trade unions.Google Scholar

95 On the Egyptian food subsidy system, see Ahmed et al., The Egyptian Food Subsidy System, Structure, Performance, And Options For Reform, Research Report 119, International Food Policy Research Institute, (2001); Also see Ikram, supra note 5 at 14–5, 307; Sulayman, supra, note 14, at 52–3.Google Scholar

96 E.g. Law 32/1952 & 254/1954 on cotton prices; Law 296/1952 on prices for the crop of 1952.Google Scholar

97 Sulayman, , supra, note 14, at 24.Google Scholar

98 The de-sequestration policy was complicated due to the multiple types of sequestration and came to reflect the security interest of Sadat. Law 49/1971 called on speedy settlements of claims of compensation, Law no 69/1974 annulled all sequestrations that had occurred 1961–4 and granted full restoration of the property or full economic compensation. (Ansari, supra, note 39, at 173–83) Law no. 43/1974 laid the foundation of Sadat's Open Door Policy (see supra, note 57) But while Sadat's Open Door policy set the tone for forthcoming privatization, actual legal steps for privatization did not occur until the 1990s (Ikram, supra, note 5, at 18).Google Scholar

99 E.g. Law 32/1977 aimed to facilitate capital transfers; Law 8/1997 on investment guarantees and incentives; Law 13/2005 on Investment.Google Scholar

100 E.g. Ministerial Decree 149/1996 on the organization of procedures for the nomination and election of employee representatives bodies of corporate governance; Dispute Settlement Law 27/1994 as amended 9/1997.Google Scholar

101 E.g. Presidential Decree 262/1975 authorized 49 percent of all equity in public sector firms to be put up for private subscription; Law 111/1975 provided that weak companies would be sold off or liquidated, while strong would be put up for general share subscription; Privatization laws were more Law 203/1991 stipulated a sale of assets and shares in public enterprises and during the 1990s profitable companies in industrial market were sold.Google Scholar

102 In 1998, the legal preparations for privatizing the banking system took off. The process was initially slow and as of June 2005, state-owned banks accounted for more than 60% of total assets, and 85% of branch network. (See, Mahmoud Mohieldin & Sahar Nasr, On bank privatization: The case of Egypt, 46 5 QREF, 707–725, (Feb 2007). However, in 2003 a new law on Central Bank was issued with Law 88/2003 and in October 2006, the state sold the smallest of its banks, Bank of Alexandria, with Italian Sanpaolo IMI acquiring an 80% share. In 2007, there was talk of a merger of the two state owned Banque du Caire and Banque Misr, but in July of the same year the government announced instead that 80% of Banque du Caire was up for sale. (Bank Information Center, WB, IMF and AfDB-backed program to privatize Egyptian banks arouses controversy, Aug 1 2007, available at http://www.bicusa.org/en/-Article.3455.aspx). According to the Word Bank Country Assistance Strategy for 2006–8, the government is to sell off its shares in 13 of the 17 joint venture banks (World Bank Group, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Country Assistance Progress Strategy Report, for the Arab Republic of Egypt, for the period FY06-08, Jun. 9, 2008, Report No. 43476-EG).Google Scholar

103 Labor Code 137/1981; Labor Code 12/2003.Google Scholar

104 E.g. Unified Income Tax Law 157/1981; Sales Tax Law 11/1991; Article 2 of Investment Law 8/1997 authorizing fields of tax holiday; Income Tax Law 91/2005.Google Scholar

105 E.g. Law 494/1953, amended by 524/1954 on courts to hear disputes over land reform law; Law 476/1953 & 529/1954 on courts to hear disputes over farmland leases; Laws 160/1952, amended by 105/1953 on judicial committees in ministries to consider the disputes of civil servants; Ministerial Laws 2–4/1953 on Workers District Court; 119/1957 on a Court of Accounts.Google Scholar

106 E.g. Decisions by the Egyptian Court of Cassation refusing to overturn legislation on agricultural reforms in the name of “Public Order”: Decision No 235, Judicial Year 23, 1957; Decision No 1865, Judicial Year 50, 1987; Decision No 597, Judicial Year 48, 1983; Decision No 459, Judicial Year 50, 1981; Decision No 107, Judicial Year 25, 1959.Google Scholar

107 Article 175 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971 and Law 48/1979 set out that the SCC is “an independent judicial entity” whose jurisdiction includes judicial review of laws and decrees, interpretation of legislation according to the provisions of the constitution, and resolution of conflicts over judicial jurisdiction and decisions. The President of the Republic appoints the chief justice. As for the other justices the court, the High Judicial Council and the chief justice each nominates a member and the President picks one.Google Scholar

108 See for example a series of cases in which the SCC dismantled rent control regulations in residential buildings on the basis that many such regulations violate the property rights of the landlord: Case No 3, Judicial Year 18, 1997 in which the Court invalidated Art 29 of Law 49/1977 that allows relatives of the tenant to inherit the tenancy contract; Case No 71, Judicial Year 19, 1996 invalidating Art 7 of Law 29/1977 allowing tenants to exchange their tenancies in rental units; Case No 21, Judicial Year 7, 1989, invalidated Law 136/1981 because it prohibited lessor of noncommercial, no-industrial and non-professional premises from receiving annual increments in rent.Google Scholar

109 According to Al-Morr, chief justice of the SCC 1991–1998 “The adoption of the constitutional jurisprudence of the US and that of other foreign countries comes from the court's belief that it has at its disposal a huge tradition of constitutional judicial review that should be made use of. “Science” evolves as a result of a cumulative effort, of each benefiting from the work of others, adding to it and developing it further. The work of the court in this context is no more than a form of participation in values (rights and freedoms) shared by all countries no matter what the unique culture of each might be.”Google Scholar

110 The Law on Parties 40/1977 was issued under Sadat, but only three parties were created at this time. The creation of parties is subjected to approval by Political Parties Committee, which is effectively in control by the regime. Decisions by the PPC may be appealed in court. Given that the PPC has granted only one party license for 25 years, most of the 24 currently existing political parties are thus creations of courts. (See Joshua Stacher, The Demise of Egypt's Political Parties, 31(2) British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 218–22 (Nov 2004).Google Scholar

111 First parliamentarian election under President Mubarak was in 1984; following elections 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005.Google Scholar

112 The elections in 1987 and 1990 were called on by the SCC. See Case No 37, Judicial Year 9, 1990 in which the SCC invalidated the law that reserved only one seat in each constituency to be contested by both non-party candidates and candidates of political parties, while more than one seat was reserved for candidates belonging to political parties arguing that it discriminated against independents.Google Scholar

113 Case No 56, Judicial Year 6, 1986 in which Court invalidated Law 33/1978 because it excluded from joining existing political parties those who “had corrupted political life” prior to the Revolution of 1952 on the basis that it violated Art 62 of the Constitution that provides for the right to participate in public life; Case No 23, Judicial Year 8, 1989 in which the Court invalidated Art 8 of Law 120/1980 which excluded independent candidates from being nominated for the Shoura Council; Case No 55, Judicial Year 7, 1988 in which the Court invalidated a law that allowed for the exclusion from party creation leaders who were critical of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.Google Scholar

114 See supra note 10; An ethic of autonomy is manifest in a continuing power struggle over election supervision: In an interpretation of article 88 of the Constitution, the SCC found in July 2000 that election required judicial supervision. However, the 2007 amendments of the Constitution removed this requirement. See infra note 143.Google Scholar

115 See generally, Duncan Kennedy: The Rise And Fall Of Classic Legal Thought (1975).Google Scholar

116 Kennedy, Duncan, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000 in The New Law And Economic Development 19 (Duncan Kennedy, 2006).Google Scholar

117 Articles 47, 48, 54, 55, 45, 36 of the Constitution.Google Scholar

118 Supra note 128, 129.Google Scholar

119 Supra note 123.Google Scholar

120 Law 139/1981 grants the right to 8 years of free education for all Egyptian children over six years of age, See Case No 20, Judicial Year 16, 2 Sep 1995 referring to the right of education in finding differentiation between medical insurances for students unconstitutional.Google Scholar

121 See Case No 17, Judicial Year 14, 14 Jan 1995 preventing high level administrative employees in the public sector from being nominated to membership of their companies’ boards of directors; Case No 6, Judicial Year 15, 15 April 1995 limiting the right of members of professional syndicates to serve on the board of a workers’ syndicate.Google Scholar

122 See Case No 332, Judicial Year 23, 8 May 2005; Case No 129, Judicial Year 22, 12 Jan 2003; Case No 250, Judicial year 23, 8 Feb 2004; Case No 86, Judicial Year 17, 7 feb 1998; Case No 125, Judicial Year 18, 11 Dec 2005; Case No 33, Judicial Year 16, 3 Feb 1996; Case No 54, Judicial Year 19, 7 Mar 1998; Case No 26, Judicial Year 16, 16 Nov 1996; Case No 6, judicial Year 2, 9 May 1981; Case No 5, Judicial Year 10, 19 Jun 1993; Case No 43, Judicial Year 13, 6 December 1993 on the taxation of Egyptians working abroad.Google Scholar

123 See generally, Abu Odeh, supra, note 37.Google Scholar

124 See Case No 20, Judicial Year 1, 1985 in which the SCC argued that Art 2 of the Constitution was limited in its application to legislation passed after 1980 when this article was introduced through an amendment to the constitution. The SCC thereby refused to declare interest rate unconstitutional as provided by Art 266 of the Egyptian Civil Code, as the Rector of El-Azhar University, the claimant in the case, requested.Google Scholar

125 See Case No 7, Judicial Year 8, 1993 in which the court refused, among other things, to declare art 18 of the Personal Status Code, awarding women divorced against their wishes alimony for two years (Motaa), unconstitutional according to Art 2 of the Constitution, arguing that only legislation that violated the foundational “Islamic Sharia principles” violated such article. All other legislation is within the discretion of the modern state to legislate for the interest of all.Google Scholar

126 Moustafa, Tamir, The Struggle For Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, And Economic Development In Egypt, esp 5–9, 41–6, 118–77 (2007).Google Scholar

127 Id.Google Scholar

128 Id.Google Scholar

129 Al-Morr was replaced in 1998 by Muhammed Wali al-Din Jalal 1998–2001, Muhammed Fathi Naguib 2001–3, Mamdouh Muhi al-Din Muri'2003–6 and Mahir Said Ibrahim abd al-Wahid 2006- See http://www.hccourt.gov.eg/CourtMembers/-SupremeCourtChairmans.asp.Google Scholar

130 Among the thirty-four constitutional amendments, introduced by President Mubarak, are provisions that prohibit parties from using religion as a basis for political activity; provide for drafting of a new anti-terrorism law which will replace the emergency legislation; makes it easier for the president to dissolve parliament; and end judicial monitoring of election. Opposition members of parliament withdrew from voting on the proposed changes, and only 27% of the registered voters went to the polling stations in the referendum. For Commentary on the Amendments see, Nathan Brown, Michael Dunne & Amr Hamzawy: Egypt's Controversial Constitutional Amendments, Carnegie Endowment, March 23, 2007, see http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf.Google Scholar

131 See Waterbury, supra, note 1, at 40.Google Scholar

132 See supra note 117.Google Scholar

133 Samir Sulayman, State And Industrial Capitalism 28–35(1997)Google Scholar

134 Sulayman, supra, note 14, at 65–66.Google Scholar

135 Today, reform minded politicians, cabinet members and parliamentarians surrounding Gamal Mubarak come from the business sector and there is a great overlap of people in business and NDP politics. (Demmelhuber, supra, note 25, at 122; Issandr el-Amrani, Controlled Reform in Egypt: Neither reformist nor Controlled, Merip, Dec 15, 2005, available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero121505.html).Google Scholar

136 E.g. Health Sector Reform, Airport Development Project, etc. See website of the World Bank for a list on projects and programs: www.worldbank.org/egypt.Google Scholar

137 The argument made in the conclusion is an adaptation of the argument made by Amr Abdel-Rahman, Supra, note 29.Google Scholar