1. The draft of this law was submitted to the Parliament by the Socialist Government of Greece on November 25, 1982, and passed by the Greek Parliament on January 24, 1983. The law was published in its final form in Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseos tes Ellēnikēs Dēmokratias [EKED, official law gazette of Greece], v. 1, no. 25, February 18, 1983.Google Scholar

2. A compilation of Byzantine laws divided into six books, done in 1345 at Thessalonica by a judge named Constantine Harmenopoulos.Google Scholar

3. The various Constitutions have accorded the Eastern Orthodox Church a privileged position by acknowledging its religion as the prevailing one. Until 1982, the religious ceremony was a fundamental condition for the validity of a marriage between Greeks belonging to the Church. Any marriage not solemnized according to its rites was considered ipso jure not to have existed. However, Law 1250/1982, EKED, v. 1, no. 46, 1982, introduced civil marriage, and parties now wishing to marry have the right to choose either a civil or a religious ceremony. Both types of marriage are equally valid.Google Scholar

4. These provisions are still in force for parties who wish to have a religious ceremony rather than a civil one. However, Law 1250, supra note 3, abolished the right of bishops regarding divorce.Google Scholar

5. Various sociological studies suggest that many contemporary women have changed the outlook towards marriage and family. For example, women living in cities marry at a later age than do women in rural areas; the number of extended families is declining steadily in favor of the nuclear family because women do not easily accept traditional cohabitation with members of the husband's family; and the percentage of divorced women is greater than that of divorced men, indicating, among other things, that women are perhaps more hesitant about remarrying. I. Androulidaki-Dēmētriadou, Oi Isotimoi Syzygoi [Equal Spouses] 78 (Athens, 1977).Google Scholar

6. Nine-year compulsory schooling has contributed dramatically to the economic, social, and cultural advancement of women. There has been a marked increase in the number of women graduating from universities in the last 20 years. But women still constitute a small percentage of the work force. In 1982, of 4,809,000 females in Greece, 905,4000 were employed. At the University of Athens, the teaching staff in 1980 included 32% females. In political life, 250 women candidates participated in the last parliamentary elections held in 1981, compared to 103 in 1977, and 12 were elected to the 300-member Parliament. G. Flanz, comp., Comparative Women's Rights and Political Participation in Europe, “Greece,” 208-212, by L. Pagonis (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Transnational Publishers, 1983).Google Scholar

7. Raptarchis, P., IA Diarkēs Kodix Nomothesias [DKN, Continuous Compilation of Laws] 120(a). (Loose-leaf)Google Scholar

8. Law 2159, id.Google Scholar

9. March 31, 1953, New York, 193 UNTS 135. Greece signed the Convention on April 1, 1953, and later ratified it by Legislative Decree 2620/1953, published in the official law gazette on September 28, 1953. See supra note 7, v. 1, at 49.Google Scholar

10. Laws 3075 and 3082, DKN, v. 9, at 144(e) and 6A, at 410().Google Scholar

11. Law 3192, DKN, v. 1, at 52,01(a). Article 1728, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code had prohibited women from acting as witnesses in wills.Google Scholar

12. Law 46 ratified the International Labor Agreement on Equal Pay for Equal Work for Men and Women, No. 100, signed at Geneva on June 29, 1951, 165 UNTS 303.Google Scholar

13. Law 705, DKN, v. 36, at 187(a).Google Scholar

14. Law 1288, EKED, v. 1, no. 120.Google Scholar

15. Ratified and entered into force on September 3, 1981 (not yet published, registration no. 20378). See Law 1342, EKED, v. 1, no. 1.Google Scholar

16. Law 1414, EKED, v. 1, no. 10. The service established by this law is part of the Central Service of the Ministry of Labor and is responsible for collecting information and statistical data on the status of working women and for implementing various measures to promote equal legal status and opportunities for both sexes.Google Scholar

17. The Constitution used as its pattern Article 3, paragraph 2, of the German Constitution, which contains a similar provision.Google Scholar

18. To Syntagma tíes Ellados [The Constitution of Greece], with commentary by A. Dervenagas [hereafter Dervenagas] 42 (Athens, 1976). The limitation imposed by Article 4, paragraph 2, refers to rights granted only to nationals, such as appointment to public office or obligations such as military service, etc. Even though equality of the sexes in the eyes of the law is not guaranteed to foreigners, such equality serves as guiding principle of Greek law and as a natural human right that extends also to foreigners. This has important significance in the Private International Law of the Greek Civil Code of 1946 and specifically in article 4, which states that foreigners enjoy the same civil rights as do nationals.Google Scholar

19. Id. at 426.Google Scholar

20. Id. at 421.Google Scholar

21. For instance, Decision 4024/1979 of the Court of Appeals of Athens, published in 28 Nomikon Vema [NV, Legal Tribune] 525, stated that article 4 of the Commercial Law of 1825, as amended and replaced by later enactments that prevented a married woman from running a business, was unconstitutional. Decision 3330/1978 of the same Court, id., v. 27, 575, also declared invalid the provision of the same article that a married woman could not run a business without her husband's consent. Decision 3217/1977 of Symboulio Epikrateias, the highest administrative court, id., v. 26, 270, declared unconstitutional a provision of article 3, paragraph 1, of Royal Decree 83/1972 stating that only men could be appointed to positions in the aviation field.Google Scholar

22. Dervenagas, supra note 18, at 427.Google Scholar

23. Many Greek conservatives, with the strong support of the Greek Orthodox Church, protested that the proposed bill would destroy the position of men as legal head of the family and asked how a family could exist without a head. Praktika Voulēs [Parliament Recordings] 2348 (Athens, 1982).Google Scholar

24. The composition of this committee was strongly criticized because no judge was appointed to it. It was felt that drafts of such tremendous importance should not be made without at least one participant from the judiciary.Google Scholar

25. Various countries have enacted laws promoting equality of the sexes: 1957 and 1976, Germany; 1965 and 1970, France; 1975, Italy, Spain, and Austria.Google Scholar

26. Although the accusation was made that the final draft was almost identical to both previous ones, it was, in fact, much more advanced than the others because it adopted more progressive solutions. Praktika Voulēs, supra note 23, at 2352.Google Scholar

27. Judicial or administrative codes that are drafted by special committees appointed under special laws may be passed in a full assembly of the Parliament by a special law ratifying them in their entirety without any changes.Google Scholar

28. Dervenagas, supra note 18, at 308.Google Scholar

29. From 1975, when the Constitution containing the principle of equality of the sexes was ratified, until 1981, when the Socialist Government came to power.Google Scholar

30. Law 1329, arts. 14-15.Google Scholar

31. The retroactive effect of Law 1329 does not apply to the surnames of the spouses (see p. 19).Google Scholar

32. Decision 5/1970 of the Supreme Court, in conformance with article 55 of the Civil Code, stated that the wife “kept her husband's domicile even after a divorce suit had been filed until she acquired a new one ….” 16 NV 95 (1970).Google Scholar

33. Until recently, housework has been the wife's exclusive task. Such an assignment was unconstitutional not only because it curtailed the wife's efforts to engage in economic activities and was a barrier to her own advancement, but also because it freed the husband from participating in household chores.Google Scholar

34. Greek Civil Code of 1946 [CivC], Bk. 1, art. 281. 4’ Astikos Kodix [Civil Code] with commentary by I. Spyridakis and E. Perakis [hereafter Spyridakis] (Athens, 1977).Google Scholar

35. Article 4 of the Commercial Code required the wife to have her husband's consent to conduct a business. Law 1329 abolished this provision.Google Scholar

36. Even the courts had acknowledged the husband's right to open his wife's correspondence and to eavesdrop on her telephone calls if he had sound reasons: for example, Decision 23195/1963 of the Court of First Instance at Athens, Supreme Court Decision 60/1969 determined that each spouse had the right to interfere in private matters of the other, such as telephone calls or correspondence, when marital fidelity is in question.Google Scholar

37. Decision 46/1966 of the Supreme Court, published in 14 NV 725 (1966), defined the wife's power to administer the household in these words: “… the wife manages the marital residence; this includes food preparation, housework, child care and, in general, any activity necessary to maintain the household and the family's social status. The question of whether or not the wife is obliged to perform the housework herself or can hire a maid is a matter determined by [the husband's concept of] the specific social and economic conditions of the spouses.” Under the same decision, transactions that could be performed by the wife were those related to shopping.Google Scholar

38. Marriages that were performed before Law 1329 came into effect are not subject to this provision. However, the new Law offered to women already married the opportunity to resume their surname by making a statement to the appropriate registrar. This statement had to be made within one year of promulgation of Law 1329 on February 18, 1983, and noted in the margin of the marriage contract.Google Scholar

39. In legal relations, a husband named Papas and a wife named Markaki will use their own surnames. In social relations, husband Papas and wife Markaki have the following options: husband: Papas or Markaki or Papas-Markaki; wife: Markaki or Papas or Markaki-Papas.Google Scholar

40. In regard to the use of combined parental surnames for the children, a proposal was made, but not adopted, that sons would have their father's surname in the initial position, while daughters would have their mother's first.Google Scholar

41. Law 1250/1982 on the Establishment of Civil Marriage places no limit on the number of civil marriages permitted, EKED, v. 1, no. 46, 1982.Google Scholar

42. It was felt that use of the wife's surname would generate problems in her transactions with third parties.Google Scholar

43. Koumantos, G., 1 Paradoseis Oikogeneiakou Dikaiou [Teachings in Family Law] 130 (Athens, 1977).Google Scholar

44. This was a matter of interpretation, depending on the financial situation of the husband, general or local custom, existing concepts of marriage, the like.Google Scholar

45. For instance, the spouse entitled to support may not demand a house in an affluent suburb when, during marriage, the marital dwelling was located in an average economic neighborhood. If such spouse has contributed monetarily to family needs, he or she will retain that amount when marital cohabitation ceases, and the difference between that and the amount needed for reasonable expenses will be covered by the spouse who has the obligation of support. If the spouse entitled to support has not contributed monetarily, the support owed must be paid in full. A. Tomproῠ, Ē Telesē Tou Gamou kai oi Scheseis Syzygωn kai Goneωn—Teknωn [The Performance of Marriage Relations Between the Spouses and Relations Between Parents and Children] 90 (Athens, Tzaka, 1983).Google Scholar

46. Law 1329, art. 1495.Google Scholar

47. Id. art. 1500.Google Scholar

48. Koumantos, supra note 43, at 134-135.Google Scholar

49. Law 1329, arts. 1392, 1889, 612, and 612A. According to the Law Drafting Committee, the reason for the detailed provisions concerning the family dwelling is to cover cases where its retention by one spouse appears necessary, regardless of who the owner is or who has the right to use it.Google Scholar

50. Art. 612, as amended in Law 1329.Google Scholar

51. Art. 612A, new provision in Law 1329.Google Scholar

52. CivC, Bk. 4, art. 1394, para. b; Spyridakis, supra note 34.Google Scholar

53. Id., art. 1424.Google Scholar

54. On the face of it, the system of separate property appears to be fair. But in the past it generated problems in divorce cases in which the wife was restricted to household activities, the husband was the main supporter of the family, and everything acquired during marriage was under his ownership. The new Law adopted an egalitarian solution by allowing the spouses to participate in each other's assets.Google Scholar

55. The introduction of community property as an optional system affecting the financial autonomy of each spouse was strongly criticized in the Parliament by the right-wing New Democracy Party and by the Communist Party, each expressing different opinions. New Democracy believed that the system of community property should not be introduced because of its rather unfamiliar and novel approach, a system irrelavant to the Greek tradition and to the socioeconomic conditions of the country. Part of its argument was the fact that under the former law the spouses also had the right to introduce the system of community property through a marriage contract but seldom did so. The Communist Party claimed that the reasons for women's inequality, oppression, and subjugation in society are largely economic. It argued that only the system of community property and common management should be adopted to establish equality of the spouses and protect women more effectively. Praktika Voulēs, supra note 23, at 3139.Google Scholar

56. CivC, Bk. 4; Spyridakis, supra note 34.Google Scholar

57. The most common marriage contract was the one that referred to dowry.Google Scholar

58. This presumption existed even after the marriage ended.Google Scholar

59. Tomproῠ, supra note 45, at 109.Google Scholar

60. The husband acquired ownership of all dotal movables and had management and usufruct of all immovables, unless determined otherwise.Google Scholar

61. CivC, Bk. 4, art. 1401; Spyridakis, supra note 34.Google Scholar

62. This step was usually avoided because such complaint expressed hostility towards the husband and became a cause of friction between the spouses. Ministry of Justice, Administration of Justice, Eisagogi Eisotitos Dikaiωmatωn Kai Ypochreoseon Ellénon Kai Ellénidon Eis to Astikon Dikaion [Introduction of the Principle of Equality of the Sexes in the Civil Law] 123 (Athens, 1979).Google Scholar

63. If the marriage is dissolved by the death of a spouse, the right to participate in the increase in property arises then. If the marriage is dissolved by divorce, the right to participate arises when the court decision on divorce becomes final; if the spouses have been separated for 3 years, it arises on the date of completion of the 3-year period. This is a rather unfair solution for the spouse who cares for the children during the separation because he or she continues contributing to the increase in property of the other spouse. A. Gazis, “Problimata Apo to Neo Oikogeneiako Dikaio” [Problems Arising from the New Family Law] 31 NV 1094 (1983).Google Scholar

64. If the marriage is dissolved by the death of a spouse, the surviving one has the right to participate in the increase. If both spouses die simultaneously, the right to participate is not transferable to their heirs. Since the surviving spouse receives one-third of the contribution plus one-fourth of his or her inheritance share when called to the succession with descendants in the first class, or one-half of the estate when called with relatives of the second class, plus the preferential allocation in all classes to which that spouse is called (furniture, appliances, clothing, and other domestic items), he or she is well protected.Google Scholar

65. Members of the Parliament felt that this assumption of a one-third share did not effectively protect women in rural areas. These women are likely to face greater difficulty because they lack the means to go to court to prove that a disputed parcel of land or a house was purchased with the help of their personal work. Praktika Voulēs, supra note 23, at 3140.Google Scholar

66. Uncertainty will arise in some cases, such as winnings from lotteries, bets, or games of chance, and the like. It is likely that winnings from a lottery will not be included in the disputed property because the other spouse did not contribute to it. Gazis, supra note 63.Google Scholar

67. If the system of community property was selected and later terminated, the first assessment of the disputed property will ensue upon termination of the system of community property.Google Scholar

68. Contracts unrelated to marriage are subject to the general and special provisions on contracts.Google Scholar

69. Claims closely connected with the creditor are nontransferable. The nature of the close connection can be personal or financial. Claims not subject to seizure are also nontransferable.Google Scholar

70. Enochikon Dikaion Eidikon Meros [Law of Obligations, Special Part], art. 787, CivC, Bk. 2/2, Spyridakis, supra note 34.Google Scholar

71. Id., art. 788.Google Scholar

72. Id., art. 790.Google Scholar

73. Id., art. 792.Google Scholar

74. Supra note 70, art. 794.Google Scholar

75. Id., arts. 786 and 792, para. 2.Google Scholar

76. The creditors, however, bear the burden of proof.Google Scholar

77. I. Spyridakis, Oikogeneiakon Dikaion [Family Law, Bk. 4 of the Civil Code] 128 (Athens, A. Sakkoula, 1983).Google Scholar

78. Id. at 144.Google Scholar

79. A brief comparative survey reveals that the system of dowry has been abolished in the last several decades in Germany (1957), France (1965), and Italy (1975). Ministry of Justice, supra note 62, at 122.Google Scholar

80. The number of court decisions on the matter was relatively small, usually not more than ten annually. But the number of legal suits that ended in out-of-court settlement was significantly higher.Google Scholar

81. A proposal to abolish the parents’ obligation to endow their daughters was made by the committee appointed to draft the Civil Code in 1915 but was not adopted.Google Scholar

82. In 1972, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to 30 drachmas. Pick's Currency Yearbook 1975-1976 at 238.Google Scholar

83. Even in ancient Greece most philosphers and scholars (Menander, Plutarch, Euripides) had a negative attitude towards the widespread institution of dowry. They believed that the institution of dowry was pejorative for men and interfered with their judgment and appreciation of the true qualities of their brides. Lawmakers also strongly criticized the custom of dowry, among them the Athenian lawgiver Solon, who introduced provisions to limit the size of the dowries and curb expansion of the custom. H. Schamps, Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh, 1979).Google Scholar

84. Only the Church was somewhat in favor of preserving dowry. But after a meeting between the Holy Synod and the Minister of Justice, the Church suddently announced that it was no longer interested in the question. The reasons are rather vague for this change in position.Google Scholar

85. Ministry of Justice, supra note 62, at 118.Google Scholar

86. Ministry of Justice, supra note 62, at 249.Google Scholar

87. Transitional and Final Provisions of Law 1329, art. 56, EKED, supra note 1.Google Scholar

88. Id., art. 57.Google Scholar

89. Supra note 87, art. 58.Google Scholar

90. Id., art. 59.Google Scholar

91. Id., art. 60.Google Scholar

92. Refers to those deposits made under article 7, line d', of the Legislative Decree of July 17/August 13, 1923, on Special Provisions on Societes Anonymes. Under this Decree, dowry could be constituted by depositing an amount at the National Bank of Greece expressly for that purpose. The depositor had to state that these deposits were inalienable. Although the law did not determine who the owner of such deposits was during the marriage, it is likely that the husband, who had the right to the interest, was the owner as well. He was not entitled, however, to dispose of these deposits.Google Scholar

93. Supra note 87, art. 63.Google Scholar

94. If the dowry was bestowed by a third person, the contract was made only between that person and the husband without the wife's participation. Even if she had a serious reason for not accepting the dowry, she could not rescind the contract; if she signed it, which in practice usually happened, her signature had no effect upon it.Google Scholar

95. Defined under arts. 1402, paras. 2 and 3, through 1405.Google Scholar

96. Koumantos, supra note 43.Google Scholar

97. CivC, Bk. 4, art. 1412; Spyridakis, supra note 34.Google Scholar

98. Koumantos, supra note 43.Google Scholar

99. Koumantos, supra note 43.Google Scholar

100. Both of these arguments were logical and persuasive. A preference for the second one was based on the fact that it protected dowry more effectively.Google Scholar

101. CivC, art. 1414; Spyridakis, supra note 34.Google Scholar

102. Koumantos, supra note 43.Google Scholar

103. CivC, Bk. 4, art. 1415; Spyridakis, supra note 34.Google Scholar

104. Decision 514/1968 of the Supreme Court, 17 NV 33.Google Scholar

105. CivC, Bk. 4, art. 1416; Spyridakis, supra note 34.Google Scholar

106. Evidence of inevitable need could be insufficient income to support the spouses and their children, debts, medical expenses, education, etc. An example of obvious profit would be a lucrative offer for purchase of a property.Google Scholar

107. A serious problem with significant socioeconomic consequences arose at the end of World World II, when Law 18/1944 devalued the drachma and virtually wiped out all prewar debts (one postward drachmas for 50,000,000 prewar drachmas). As a result, questions often arose with regard to the time when a wife's claim for restitution of dowry began. Did it commence when the dowry was constituted or when the marriage ended? If the right arose when dowry was bestowed, it meant that all prewar dowries were to be extinguished. But if it arose when the marriage ended, a large number of dowries had to be compensated in considerable amounts. In an effort to reach a fair and equitable solution in such cases, the court decided that the wife's claim for the restitution of dowry arose when the marriage ended, inasmuch as such claim existed during the marriage only as a right to be exercised if the marriage was dissolved. The court took a step beyond this decision in making a courageous application of article 288 of the Civil Code, under which the contractual performance of an obligation must take place in good faith and be consistent with existing conditions on transactions. As a result, prewar dowries were monetarily adjusted so that the amount returned to the wife had almost the same purchasing value as the dowry had at the time it was settled. Koumantos, supra note 43, at 195. *Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseωs tēs Ellēnikēs Dēmokratias [official law gazette of Greece], Vol. 1, No. 25, February 18, 1983.Google Scholar

¹ Articles 464-465 deal with nontransferable claims. See the analysis given on page 22.Google Scholar

² Articles 785-792 deal with co-ownership.Google Scholar

³ Articles 793 and 794 deal with disposal of one's own share.Google Scholar