1 The reference to the three distinctive features of the comparative method does not here imply any general methodological assumption: in fact there is no uniformity of views among scholars on this specific issue. Some methodological options are discussed in VAN HOECKE, M. (ed.) Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law, Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2004.Google Scholar

2 For a critical assessment of the functional pattern see in particular SAMUEL, G. “Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and Social sciences”, in VAN HOECKE, M. (2004) supra fn.l, at pp. 35–77. Samuel also accounts for the hermeneutical approach to comparative studies fostered by Pierre Legrand; the two epistemological options are definitively evaluated in view of the debate on the harmonisation of European law.Google Scholar

3 See ZWEIGERT, K. KÖTZ, H. Introduction to Comparative Law, 3^rd revised ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, at p. 45. The functional approach to comparative research is explained at pp. 43–44.Google Scholar

4 See MODUGNO, F., heading 'Sistema Giuridico', in Enciclopedia Giuridica, Vol.XXIX, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Giuridica Treccani fondata da Giovanni Treccani, 1993.Google Scholar

5 From the sixteenth century onwards the Latin word “systema” began to denote academic theories of law; later it also came to denote the law itself as both an object of systematization and its results. In Renaissance thought we may find traces of the “esprit de système” as a unitary set of elements characterized by inner rationality, even though the first account of the legal system described as a rational and stable organic body is due to Christian Wolff, in his major work “Jus Naturae methodo scientifica pertractatum “ (1740–1748) The echo of Cartesian notions, borrowed from mathematics and applied to law led to the creation of a so called mos geometricus, aimed at finding rational and immutable justifications for the sovereign authority of the state. Friedrich Carl Von Savigny referred to the law as a system, i. et an organic set of concepts, institutions, social relationships and praxes endowed with an inherent principle of order. In his view this inherent ordering principle also constituted the logical basis for the scientific systematization of legal institutions and rules; see VON SAVIGNY, F.C. System des heutigen römischen Recht (1840–1849); see LARENZ, K. Methodenlehre der Rechtswisswnschaft (1960), Italian translation Storia del metodo nella scienza giuridica, Milan, Giuffrè, 1966, p. 16. The evolution of the concept is analysed in depth by MODUGNO, F., (1993) supra fn.l, p.3–12. An account of the philosophical trajectories of civil law jurisprudence might be found also in BARBERIS, M. Filosofia del diritto, Bologne, Il Mulino, 1993. The relationship between philosophy and legal science is nevertheless complex and often debated:. As regards Italian legal science, see the impressive description provided by MERRYMAN, J. “The Italian Style I: doctrine “, 18 Stanford Law Review, 39 (1965–1966): 39–65. On this point, Merryman acknowledges the “schism” between philosophy and legal science which is still present in the Italian legal culture.Google Scholar

6 See ZWEIGERT, K. KÖTZ, H. (1998) supra fn. 3, at p. 69: “Another hallmark of a legal system or family is a distinctive mode of legal thinking… […] on the Continent the system is conceived as being complete and free from gaps, in England lawyers feel their way gradually from case to case.”. See also VAN HOECKE, M. WARRINGTON, M. “Legal cultures, legal paradigms and legal doctrine: a new model for comparative law”, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 47 (1998): 495–536: “In comparison with the other three legal cultures, we can distinguish two principal characteristics of Western legal culture: individualism and rationalism…[…] [T]he law, for Europeans, is above all a system, a form of logic, a geometry, a coherent assembly where everything can be reduce to principles, to concepts and to categories”, at p.504. For the importance of the theoretical layer of law in the development of civil law systems see, as first reference, S A WER, G. The Western Conception of Law, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, The Legal systems of the World. Their Comparison and unification, Vol.II, Chapt. I, J.C.B. Tübingen – Mohr, The Hague-Mouton, 1975: 14–48; See also DAVID, R., BRIERLEY, J.E.C., Major Legal Systems in The World Today, 3^rd ed., London, Stevens and Sons, 1985, where the paramount importance of the doctrinal formant is clearly acknowledged: “The idea of law such it was understood for centuries in European universities has not been abandoned. The legislators can, and indeed must, aid in defining the law, but the law itself is something more than legislation. It is not to be confused with the will of legislators; it can only be discovered by the combined efforts of all jurists… […] [I]n conformity with tradition, Romano-Germanic laws remain a system that can be described as a jurist's law (Juristenrecht) “ at p. 106. A historical account is provided by VAN CAENEGEM, R.C. European Law in the Past and the Future. Unity and Diversity over two Millenia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.Google Scholar

7 With reference to the Italian system, see the analysis provided by MONATERI, P.G., CHIAVES, F.A. “Shifting Frames: Law and Legal Contaminations”, in MATTEI; U:, LENA, J.S. Introduction to Italian Law, The Hague-London-New York, Kluwer Law International, 2002: 21–30.Google Scholar

8 See MATTEI, U. “Three patterns of law: taxonomy and change in the World's Legal systems “, in American Journal of Comparative Law, 45 (1997): 5–45. On the conception of law as a “system of rules” and on the problem raised by this conception at Common Law, see TWINING, W. MIERS, D. How to do things with rules, 4^th ed., London, Butterworths, 1999, at pp. 131–156.Google Scholar

9 An inventory of groupings and theories is offered by ZWEIGERT, K. KÖTZ, H. (1998) supra fn. 3, at p. 64–73. Though acknowledging the “vulnerability to alteration” of the grouping itself according to the variables of time and private law/constitutional law approaches, the authors suggest a classification in four legal families: 1. Romanistic family; 2. Germanic family; 3. Nordic family; 4. Common Law family; four other legal systems are considered in separate sections: 1. People's Republic of China; 2. Japanese law; 3. Islamic law; 4. Hindu Law. Zweigert and Kötz believe that legal style is the distinctive hallmark of each legal system and make use of the following criteria to define it: a) historical background and development; b) characteristic mode of thought in legal matters; c) distinctive institutions; d) typology of legal sources; e) ideology. David and Brierley propose the following classification criteria: a) techniques of enunciation of rules; b) types of sources of law; c) legal reasoning. Applying these criteria the authors distinguish three main legal families along with a comprehensive group of “other systems”. See DAVID, R., BRIERLEY, J.E.C., (1985) supra fn.6, at pp.20–23. More emphasis has been recently place on legal culture, especially on social practices that constitute the living layers of legal rules, institutions and doctrinal conceptions. In line with this approach four cultural families have been devised: 1. African family; 2. Asian family; 3. Islamic family; 4. Western family (that which has European roots). See VAN HOECKE, M., WARRINGTON, M., (1998) supra fn.6, at p.502.Google Scholar

10 Examples of minor stream approaches may be found in RAVA, T. Introduzione alla civiltà europea, Padua, Cedam, 1982.Google Scholar

11 In ZWEIGERT, K. KÖTZ, H. (1998) supra fn. 3, at p.250–276; in DAVID, R., BRIERLEY, J.E.C., (1985)supra fn.6, at p.97–113. In SACCO, R. Sistemi giuridici comparati, in SACCO, R. (gen. Ed.) Trattato di diritto comparato, Turin, Utet, 1996, at p.363–411.Google Scholar

12 See WATKIN, T.G., The Italian legal tradition, Aldershot-Sydney, Ashgate, 1997.Google Scholar

13 See WATKIN, T., (1997), supra fn.12, at p.1.Google Scholar

14 See LUPOI, M. Alle radici del mondo giuridico Europeo, Rome, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1994. BELTON, A. (trans.) The origins of European Legal Order New York, Cambridge Uuniversity Press, 1999.Google Scholar

15 See BERMAN, H.J. Law and Revolution The formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge, Massachussets, Harvard University Press, 1983.Google Scholar

16 See MONATERI, P.G. “Black Gaius A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the “Western Legal Tradition”, in Hastings Law Journal 51 (2000): 479–555 and references there contained. For the echo in Italian doctrine see also COSTANTINI, C., “L ‘anima apologetica della comparazione e la ‘geopolitica’ del diritto. Riflessioni in margine alla fondazione della Tradizione Giuridica Occidentale” in Rivista critica del diritto privato (2005): 183–190. The author also reviews further publications concerning Roman Law and the critical analysis of its findings in the light of comparative science: see ibidem, fn. n. 3, 13 and 18.Google Scholar

17 See ZIMMERMANN, R. The law of Obligations: Roman foundation of the Civilian Tradition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996; idem, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law. The Civilian Tradition today, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, especially at 108–189.Google Scholar

18 See for instance LEGRAND, P. “European Legal systems are Not converging”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 45, (1996): 52–81. For a paradigmatic exercise in comparison between the structure of Gaius’ Institutiones and the systématisation of English Common Law, see BIRKS, P. “This heap of good learning: the Jurist in the common Law tradition”, in MARKESINIS, B. (ed.), Law making, Law finding and Law Shaping. The diverse influences “, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, 113–138.Google Scholar

19 The variety of practical solutions offered by European legal systems to a given issue in contract law, for instance, has been explained by appealing to historical arguments, such as the different layers contained in the Digest, the interpretation of classical jurists offered by Justinian and the process of “generalization of rules and institutions, concepts and criteria [which] is a characteristic feature of the civilian tradition”: see ZIMMERMANN, R. (2001) supra fn.17, at p. 113.Google Scholar

20 See ZIMMERMANN, R. (2001) supra fn. 17, at p. 187–189.Google Scholar

21 See ZWEIGERT, K. And KÖTZ, H. (1998) supra fn. 3, at p. 259. Anyhow “ one of the weaknesses of many traditional accounts of legal interpretation is that they concentrate, explicitly or implicitly on a single standpoint – typically that of the impartial judge or of a neutral expositor”: in TWINING, W. MIERS, D.(1999) supra fn.8, at p.171.Google Scholar

22 See ASCHERI, M. Tribunali, giuristi e istituzioni. Dal Medioevo all ‘Eta moderna, Bologne, Il Mulino, 1989.Google Scholar

23 See RESCIGNO, G. U. “Il giurista come scienziato”, in Diritto Pubblico (2003):833–864. The paper describes the general outlines of a jurist's work in order to show it has scientific status. As pivotal characteristics of jurists’ discourse, Rescigno examines: a. philological enquiry; b. logic test; argumentative exposition: at pp.841–847.Google Scholar

24 The process of logic applied is known as “subsumption” and it aims at bringing the case under a rule. For a clear picture of methods and problems concerning the interpretation and application of legal rule at Common Law, see TWINING, W. MIERS, D. (1999) supra fn.8, at p. 157–220.Google Scholar

25 See TWINING, W. MIERS, D. (1999) supra fn.8, at p.163–164. An illustration of examples is provided in ZWEIGERT, K. And KOTZ, H. (1998) supra fn. 3, at p. 259.Google Scholar

26 My claim here is that the formal theory of the sources of law does not provide an illuminating picture of the legal system in action, thus it cannot be used heuristically in the framework of this study. However, the standpoint taken by constitutional lawyers on this point has to be assessed with a view to clearing fundamental issues about competence, hierarchy, validity and conflict. On this point see PIZZORUSSO, A, FERRERI, S. Le fonti del diritto Italiano. vol.I, Le fonti scritte, in SACCO, R. (gen. ed.) Trattato di diritto Civile, Turin, UTET, 1998, at p.37–39.Google Scholar

27 The analytical description of the written sources of law see PIZZORUSSO, A, FERRERI, S., (1998) supra, fn.26, at pp. 16–27 and at pp.73–187.Google Scholar

28 See the analysis by SACCO, R. “Il Codice Civile: un fossile legislativo? “, in PIZZORUSSO, A, FERRERI, S., (1998) supra, fn.26, at pp.441–470.Google Scholar

29 The Italian Constitution provides for fundamental principles at art. 1-12. The first part, (art. 13-54) enshrines constitutional rights and duties in social, economic and political relationships. This part follows the traditional distinction between liberty rights (simply granted to the individual) and welfare rights (obliging the State to take positive action to provide the individual with the necessary means to exert the right). The second part of the Constitution (art.55-139) deals with the organization of the State, setting the fundamental framework rules defining the limits and form of legislative power, executive power and the judiciary to exert their functions‥ In the fifth title of the second part fundamental provisions concerning Regions, provinces and city councils are laid down. In this part a system of check and balances on the Parliamentary form of Government is also established. A. direct democracy instruments: referendum (art.75) and citizens’ right to propose a statute (art.71, 2^nd paragraph). B. Judiciary C. Constitutional Court. Provisional dispositions for implementation and interpretation are also provided. The text of the Constitution is available at the following website: www.quirinale.it Google Scholar

30 For an analytical description of the constitutional text, see COMBA, M “Constitutional Law“, in MATTEI; U., LENA, J.S. (2002) supra fn.7, 31–62. See also WATKIN, T.G., supra fn. 13, at p.77–95. However, far from being rigid in a technical sense, the procedure for constitutional amendment has proven to be dependent upon political conjunctures. for an impartial description of the political processes connected with recent constitutional reforms see D'ATENA, A. “LA nuova riforma del titolo V, la Costituzione a rigidità debole ed il bipolarismo di coalizione”, in Atti del seminario “Disegno di legge costituzionale contente modifiche alla parte II della Costituzione”, Rome, LUISS Guido Carli, 16th of May 2005, available at: http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it.Google Scholar

31 See briefly, PIZZETTI, F. “La ricerca del giusto equilibrio tra uniformità e differenza: il problematico rapporto tra il progetto originario della Costituzione del 1948 ed il progetto ispiratore della riforma costituzionale del 2001”, in Le Regioni, 4 (2003): 599–627.Google Scholar

32 See BIGLIAZZI GERI, BRECCIA, BUSNELLI, NATOLI, Diritto Civile, vol.II, Turin, UTET, 1997. MAUGERI, R.M., Le immissioni, Padua, Cedam, 1999. For the latest case law see, among others, TAMPIERI, M, “Il danno esistenziale da immissioni acustiche nell ‘universo del danno alla persona”, in Responsabilità civile e previdenza, 4–5 (2003): 1209–1217.Google Scholar

33 See Constitutional Court, decisions n. 122/1970 and n. 88/1979. Case law of the Constitutional Court is available, though in Italian only, at the following website: www.cortecostituzionale.it.Google Scholar

34 See Constitutional Court, decisions n. 156/1971 and 177/1984.Google Scholar

35 See Constitutional Court, decision n.333/1991.Google Scholar

36 See Constitutional Court, decision n.34/1973.Google Scholar

37 See Constitutional Court, decision n.313/1990.Google Scholar

38 The Corte di Cassazione is the Italian Supreme Court, which serves as a court of last resort for criminal and civil disputes. For a brief description of functions performed by Corte di Cassazione, see TARUFFO, M. “Civil procedure and the path of a civil case”, in MATTEI, U., LENA, J.S., (2002) supra fn.7, 159–180, at pp. 176–177. The Corte di Cassazione applied the argument on the grounds that art.2 Italian Constitution, which affords protection to human rights and provides a legal basis for the direct effect principle. See Corte di Cassazione, case n.3775/1994. In reference to contract law, see case n.10511/1999; in relation to personal injury (the so called “danno alla persona”) see cases n.7713/2000, n.8828/2003 and 233/2003.Google Scholar

39 The proposal procedure may be initiated either by five Regional Councils or 500.000 voters. The proposal is reviewed by Corte di Cassazione which checks procedural legitimacy. Then it is sent to the Constitutional Court for a substantial control of compatibility with the limits set in art.75. Not every piece of legislation is suitable for legislative intervention by means of a referendum, since the institution is bound both by formal limits and by limits concerning regulated matters. Hence, by means of a referendum it is possible to repeal (partially or totally) only statutes and government acts provided which have the force of law. As regards the limits ratione materia, tax or budget laws, amnesties or pardons as well as laws authorizing ratification of international treaties are not subject to referendum.Google Scholar

40 See Constitutional Court, case n. 16/1978.Google Scholar

41 Two clusters of parameters come into play in the exercise of constitutional control over the legitimacy of referendum proposals: one concerning the limits posed by art.75 of the Italian Constitution, the other concerning the result of the referendum, which must conform to the constitution and be compatible with an efficient legislative framework. Ten are the criteria deployed by the Constitutional Court in order to evaluate referendum proposals in relation to the aforementioned parameters; for an analytical description of more than 20 decisions and a tentative reading of the Court's orientation, see MODUGNO, F. “Ancora una rassegna sull'ammissibilità dei referendum abrogative vent ‘anni dopo “, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 3 (2001): 1785–1799.Google Scholar

42 The doctrine is known as “principio di continuità” and is to be applied in case of succession of laws; see Constitutional Court, decisions n. 13/1974 and 376/2002. The comparison between legitimacy control on referendum and legitimacy control of national and regional statutes is made explicit in LUCIANI, M. “L'autonomia legislativa”, in Le Regioni, 2/3 (2004):355–380, at p.363.Google Scholar

43 Divorce was introduced into the framework of Italian family Law in 1970, after a long political debate that took place at the levels both of parliament and civil society. L.898/1970 was finally enacted, with a majority vote of 33 votes only. As a consequence Catholic pressure groups have challenged the statute many times proposing referenda aimed at repealing the statute. At last a referendum was held in 1974 and 59.3 per cent of voters expressed their will (desire / determination)to keep the statute. Later the so-called Fortuna-Baslini Act was amended by the Act n. 436/1978 and the Act 74/1987. For a brief introduction to Italian family law see FERRANDO, G. “Famiglia e Matrimonio “in Familia,, 4 (2001): 939–965. See also BIANCA, C. M. Diritto Civile, vol.II La Famiglia. Le successioni, 4th revised ed., Milan, Giuffre, 2005.Google Scholar

44 Law n. 194/1978 acknowledged an individual's right to interrupt a pregnancy under strict medical control but only under definite circumstances, mainly related to the protection of her physical or mental health and well-being. Three referendum proposals have been put forward in order to repeal the statute. In 1981 68 per cent of the voters expressed their desire to maintain Law n.194 in force.Google Scholar

45 An analysis of the political dynamics connected with referendum voting is to be found in ULERI, P.V. “On referendum voting in Italy: YES, NO or non-vote? How Italian Parties learned to control referendum”, in European Journal of political research, 41(2002): 863–883; “One peculiarity that sets the Italian referendum experience apart from that of most other democracies is that the decision to hold referendum generally has been taken not by government or governing parties, but rather by non –governing parties or political groups “, at p.868.Google Scholar

46 See also the conclusions presented by ECONOMIDES, C. Rule of Law and independent courts, CSCE Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions, (Oslo, 4–15 November 1991) in Appendix II to the General Report. The Works of the Conference took place withinin the general framework of the institutional activities held by the Venice Commission, Council of Europe. The functions of the Constitutional Courts are expressly linked to the ‘rule of law’ principle and are described as being functional to the preservation of democratic dynamics between institutional powers: “……[…] 4. It is consequently imperative that the jurisdictional power shall be independent of the other two State functions-legislative and executive – if it is to be able to carry out its mission freely, objectively, impartially and effectively, in the common interest. We can go so far as to say that this independence is the prime condition for the rule of law. It is guaranteed in fact first by a set offunctional guarantees, then by a set ofpersonal guarantees for magistrates, and lastly by means of guarantees which for the most part are inherent in jurisdictional proceedings. A. Functional guarantees The jurisdictional function is exercised by courts established by the law, made up of independent magistrates. Their mission is to settle on the basis of the law, and in accordance with organized judicial proceedings, any question coming within their sphere, by means of decisions which are binding on the parties. The functional independence of the courts is ensured vis-à-vis the other two State powers as follows: a. Vis-à-vis the legislative power 1. Whenever the courts are confronted with legislative enactments whose contents are contrary to the constitution, they must either, depending on circumstances, set in motion through the intermediary of the competent organ the procedure for the jurisdictional verification of the constitutionality of those enactments, or themselves carry out such verification-if they are empowered to do so – and refuse to apply the anti-constitutional laws. Verification of the constitutionality of laws by the courts is a fundamental function in a State based on the rule of law. “ Google Scholar

47 The Court exercises its judicial functions by two main procedures of adjudication: a) Ricorso in via principale: the government or the Regions challenge the constitutionality of a statute having the force of law, with a view to proving that Parliament has illegitimately taken away their normative power; b) Ricorso in via incidentale: either the parties to a case or the judge may question the legitimacy of a statute that should be applied in the case. If the judge believes that the legitimacy problem is relevant to the case and well-grounded, the ‘question of constitutionality’ is sent to the Court to be examined.Google Scholar

For a comparative survey on European Constitutional Courts and their compositions, see Council of Europe, Venice Commission, Revised Report on the Composition of Constitutional Courts, Strasbourg, 3rd of July 1997/CDL-JU(1997)010, available on http://venice.coe.int/docs/1997/CDL-JU(1997)010rev-prove.asp.Google Scholar

48 An illuminating reading of the role played by the Italian Constitutional Court in policy making processes is offered by VOLCANSEK, M, L. “Constitutional Courts as veto players: Divorce and decrees in Italy “, European Journal of Political Research, 39 (2001): 347–372. The figures prove the assumption: a complete data set is contained in ULERI, P.V. (2002) supra fn 45.Google Scholar

49 The former theory is advocated by Hans Kelsen; the latter by Jurgen Habermas. An inventory of the judicial reviews of Constitutional Courts is given and analysed in SADURSKI, W. (ed.) Constitutional Justice, East and West. Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a comparative perspective, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002. As regards the Italian Constitutional Court, see, ROLLA, G. GROPPI, T. “Between Politics and the Law. The development of Constitutional review in Italy”, in SADURSKI, W. (2002):143–161. See also GROPPI, T. “Verso una giustizia costituzionale’ mite'? Recenti tendenze dei rapporti tra Corte Costituzionale e Giudici Comuni. “ In Politica del Diritto, 2 (2002):217–235.Google Scholar

50 See GROPPI, T. “Verso una giustizia costituzionale mite?”, (2002) fn.44, at p.225–230. As for the doctrine of continuità, see infra fn. 42.Google Scholar

51 See FIORILLO, M. “La Corte Costituzionale nella transizione infinita”, in Quaderni Costituzionali, 1 (2005): 144–147. See also DI COSIMO, G. “Delegificazione e tutela giurisdizionale” in Quaderni Costituzionali, 2 (2002): 241–254.Google Scholar

52 The Constitutional reform draft, Disegno di Legge Costituzionale n.2544, XIV legislatura, is available at www.senato.it [Note the Constitutional draft has been approved by Italian Senate on the 16th of November 2005. The text however is not yet in force. On the 23th of November the Chancery of the High Court (Suprema Corte di Cassazione) received a referendum proposal, pursuant to art.138 Italian Constitution, aimed at repealing the constitutional reform. The text of the referendum proposal is published in the Official Bulletin of the State, 24^th of November 2005]. Art.51 runs as follows:” 1. L'articolo 135 della Costituzione è sostituito dal seguente: «Art. 135. – La Corte costituzionale è composta da quindici giudici. Quattro giudici sono nominati dal Presidente della Repubblica; quattro giudici sono nominati dalle supreme magistrature ordinaria e amministrative; tre giudici sono nominati dalla Camera dei deputati e quattro giudici sono nominati dal Senato federale della Repubblica, integrato dai Presidenti delle Giunte delle Regioni e delle Province autonome di Trento e di Bolzano.Google Scholar

I giudici della Corte costituzionale sono scelti fra i magistrati anche a riposo delle giurisdizioni superiori ordinaria ed amministrative, i professori ordinari di università in materie giuridiche e gli avvocati dopo venti anni di esercizio. I giudici della Corte costituzionale sono nominati per nove anni, decorrenti per ciascuno di essi dal giorno del giuramento, e non possono essere nuovamente nominati.Google Scholar

Alla scadenza del termine il giudice costituzionale cessa dalla carica e dall ‘esercizio delle funzioni. Nei successivi tre anni non può ricoprire incarichi di governo, cariche pubbliche elettive o di nomina governativa o svolgere funzioni in organi o enti pubblici individuati dalla legge.Google Scholar

La Corte elegge tra i suoi componenti, secondo le norme stabilite dalla legge, il Presidente, che rimane in carica per un triennio, ed è rieleggibile, fermi in ogni caso i termini di scadenza dall ‘ufficio di giudice.Google Scholar

L'ufficio di giudice della Corte è incompatibile con quello di membro del Parlamento, di un Consiglio regionale, con l'esercizio della professione di avvocato e con ogni carica ed ufficio indicati dalla legge.Google Scholar

Nei giudizi d'accusa contro il Presidente della Repubblica intervengono, oltre i giudici ordinari della Corte, sedici membri tratti a sorte da un elenco di cittadini aventi i requisiti per l'eleggibilità a deputato, che la Camera dei deputati compila ogni nove anni mediante elezione con le stesse modalità stabilite per la nomina dei giudici ordinari».Google Scholar

2. All'articolo 2 della legge costituzionale 22 novembre 1967, n. 2, le parole: «dal Parlamento» sono sostituite dalle seguenti: «dalla Camera dei deputati».Google Scholar

3. L'articolo 3 della legge costituzionale 22 novembre 1967, n. 2, è sostituito dal seguente: Google Scholar

«Art. 3. – 1. I giudici della Corte costituzionale nominati dal Senato federale della Repubblica e quelli nominati dalla Camera dei deputati sono eletti a scrutinio segreto e con la maggioranza dei due terzi dei componenti la rispettiva Assemblea. Per gli scrutini successivi al terzo è sufficiente la maggioranza dei tre quinti dei componenti la rispettiva Assemblea».Google Scholar

As regards the legislative draft n.2544, see also the opinion given by the Italian association of Constitituional lawyers at the request of the Senate Committee: D'ATENA, A, “Pareri resi richiesti all'AIC dalla prima Commissione del Senato della Repubblica in merito al disegno di legge di riforma costituzionale AS 2544 “, available at: http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/materiali/speciali/pareri2544/datena.html.Google Scholar

53 See DI COSIMO, G. (2002) supra fn. 51, at p.251: “‥[…] la Corte dovrebbe applicare la Costituzione in funzione di limite esterno all ‘azione normativa del regolamento.‥[omissis]. La condizione principale per attivare il libero scambio fra giurisdizione amministrativa e giurisdizione costituzionale si ricollega all'idea che l'istituzione della Corte serva a tutelare interessi lesi da atti che nel precedente ordinamento sfuggivano a qualsiasi controllo in quanto espressione di potere politico”.Google Scholar

54 See VOLCANSEK, M. L. (2001) supra fn.48, at p.347–351 for the definition of “veto player”: “constitutions enumerate the rules for what the executive and parliament can or cannot do, but ‘someone is required to keep an eye on them ‘, and that is how courts enter the political space. Where courts with the power to review legislation exist to monitor the rules, the bargaining becomes three-way”, at p.352. As for the portrait of the staple features of the Italian system, see ibidem, at pp.364–367. The role of the Constitutional Court is also examined in relation to the major phenomena of the “presidentialization of parliamentary regimes”.Google Scholar

55 This opinion is fleshed out in a synthetic paper by MANFRELLOTTI, R. “Esercizio di funzioni mormative e partecipazione dei soggetti privati: a proposito dei regolamenti della società di gestione della borsa”, in Rivista Italiana di diritto pubblico e comunitario, 5 (2000): 1007–1021. See also the references to a vast literature concerning the transformation of the State, its impact on the balance between institutional powers and the system of sources of law, fns. N19-27.Google Scholar

56 Legislative procedure is set forth in art.70-74 and can be divided in four stages, as follows. Legislative procedure begins with a proposal of a legislative draft: this can be proposed either by single deputies or senators, by the Government or by 500.000 citizens. After a parliamentary session in which the draft is discussed and if necessary amended, the approval of both chambers is needed. Once the draft law is passed by Parliament, a further step required for the law to be enacted is its promulgation by the President of the Republic, who may send the law back to the Chambers if a clash with constitutional provisions is expected from the implementation of the act. However, the President's denial of the promulgation may be overturned by a second vote of both Chambers with a simple majority. The final phase of legislative procedure consists in the publication in the Official Bulletin of the State: then the act is ready to come into force automatically in 30 days after the publication, unless expressly provided for otherwise.Google Scholar

57 Art 117 Italian constitution lays down as follows: “La potestà legislativa è esercitata dallo Stato e dalle Regioni nel rispetto della Costituzione, nonché dei vincoli derivanti dall'ordinamento comunitario e dagli obblighi internazionali.Google Scholar

Lo Stato ha legislazione esclusiva nelle seguenti materie: Google Scholar

a) politica estera e rapporti internazionali dello Stato; rapporti dello Stato con l'Unione europea; diritto di asilo e condizione giuridica dei cittadini di Stati non appartenenti all'Unione europea; Google Scholar

b) immigrazione; Google Scholar

c) rapporti tra la Repubblica e le confessioni religiose; Google Scholar

d) difesa e Forze armate; sicurezza dello Stato; armi, munizioni ed esplosivi; Google Scholar

e) moneta, tutela del risparmio e mercati finanziari; tutela della concorrenza; sistema valutario; sistema tributario e contabile dello Stato; perequazione delle risorse finanziarie; Google Scholar

f) organi dello Stato e relative leggi elettorali; referendum statali; elezione del Parlamento europeo; Google Scholar

g) ordinamento e organizzazione amministrativa dello Stato e degli enti pubblici nazionali; Google Scholar

h) ordine pubblico e sicurezza, ad esclusione della polizia amministrativa locale; Google Scholar

i) cittadinanza, stato civile e anagrafi; Google Scholar

l) giurisdizione e norme processuali; ordinamento civile e penale; giustizia amministrativa; Google Scholar

m) determinazione dei livelli essenziali delle prestazioni concernenti i diritti civili e sociali che devono essere garantiti su tutto il territorio nazionale; Google Scholar

n) norme generali sull'istruzione; Google Scholar

o) previdenza sociale; Google Scholar

p) legislazione elettorale, organi di governo e funzioni fondamentali di Comuni, Province e Città metropolitane; Google Scholar

q) dogane, protezione dei confini nazionali e profilassi internazionale; Google Scholar

r) pesi, misure e determinazione del tempo; coordinamento informativo statistico e informatico dei dati dell'amministrazione statale, regionale e locale; opere dell'ingegno; Google Scholar

s) tutela dell'ambiente, dell'ecosistema e dei beni culturali.Google Scholar

Sono materie di legislazione concorrente quelle relative a: rapporti internazionali e con l'Unione europea delle Regioni; commercio con l'estero; tutela e sicurezza del lavoro; istruzione, salva l'autonomia delle istituzioni scolastiche e con esclusione della istruzione e della formazione professionale; professioni; ricerca scientifica e tecnologica e sostegno all'innovazione per i settori produttivi; tutela della salute; alimentazione; ordinamento sportivo; protezione civile; governo del territorio; porti e aeroporti civili; grandi reti di trasporto e di navigazione; ordinamento della comunicazione; produzione, trasporto e distribuzione nazionale dell'energia; previdenza complementare e integrativa; armonizzazione dei bilanci pubblici e coordinamento della finanza pubblica e del sistema tributario; valorizzazione dei beni culturali e ambientali e promozione e organizzazione di attività culturali; casse di risparmio, casse rurali, aziende di credito a carattere regionale; enti di credito fondiario e agrario a carattere regionale. Nelle materie di legislazione concorrente spetta alle Regioni la potestà legislativa, salvo che per la determinazione dei principi fondamentali, riservata alla legislazione dello Stato.Google Scholar

Spetta alle Regioni la potestà legislativa in riferimento ad ogni materia non espressamente riservata alla legislazione dello Stato.Google Scholar

Le Regioni e le Province autonome di Trento e di Bolzano, nelle materie di loro competenza, partecipano alle decisioni dirette alla formazione degli atti normativi comunitari e provvedono all'attuazione e all'esecuzione degli accordi internazionali e degli atti dell'Unione europea, nel rispetto delle norme di procedura stabilite da legge dello Stato, che disciplina le modalità di esercizio del potere sostitutivo in caso di inadempienza.Google Scholar

La potestà regolamentare spetta allo Stato nelle materie di legislazione esclusiva, salva delega alle Regioni. La potestà regolamentare spetta alle Regioni in ogni altra materia. I Comuni, le Province e le Città metropolitane hanno potestà regolamentare in ordine alla disciplina dell'organizzazione e dello svolgimento delle funzioni loro attribuite.Google Scholar

Le leggi regionali rimuovono ogni ostacolo che impedisce la piena parità degli uomini e delle donne nella vita sociale, culturale ed economica e promuovono la parità di accesso tra donne e uomini alle cariche elettive.Google Scholar

La legge regionale ratifica le intese della Regione con altre Regioni per il migliore esercizio delle proprie funzioni, anche con individuazione di organi comuni.Google Scholar

Nelle materie di sua competenza la Regione può concludere accordi con Stati e intese con enti territoriali interni ad altro Stato, nei casi e con le forme disciplinati da leggi dello Stato.Google Scholar

58 See PIZZETTI, F., (2003) supra fn.31, at p.601: “i vincoli ed i limiti indicati dalla nuova norma costituzionale si rivolgono infatti esplicitamente alla potestà legislativa e non alla fonte legge, e men che mai alla legge statale o a quella regionale considerate nella loro specificità di fonti normative individuate, tipizzate e distinte.” Google Scholar

59 Foreseeable problems of implementation are connected with the promulgation of concurrent legislation in matters where State framework legislation is still – illegitimately-lacking; see, as a an example of how to detect possible consequences in the area of health protection and clinical trials on drugs: DEL NEVO, A. “Sperimentazione clinica “, in CENDON, P (ed.), I nuovi contratti nella prassi civile e commerciale, vol.III, T.1 Persone e Famiglia., Turin, Utet, 2004, pp.3–55, at p.8–15.Google Scholar

60 See Constitutional Court, decision n.303/2003. In the same decision the Court also clarified that the principle underpinning the reform is that of subsidiarity, thus rejecting the academic querelle on the differentiation of principles governing legislative and administrative functions in the design of the devolution system. But for an academic assessment of this provision as a suitable means to avoid excessive internal regulatory differentiation and the subsequent discontinuities, see PIZZETTI, F., (2003) supra fn. 31 at p.609. See also CARETTI, P. “La Corte e la tutela delle esigenze unitarie: dall'interesse nazionale al principio di sussidiarietà”, in Le Regioni, 2–3 (2004):381–389.Google Scholar

61 See for instance Constitutional Court, decision n.303/2003, where the Court advocates the need to foster a systematic interpretation of the Constitutional text, with express reference to art. 117 and 118. In 2004 alone, the Court gave 18 decisions concerning art. 117, 11 of which concerned the amended text of the provision. In particular see decision n.6/2004, where the systematic interpretation argument is deployed to attract subject matters in the sphere of State competence.Google Scholar

62 On this point see the possible related risks for the Constitutional Court in CARETTI, P., (2004) supra fn. 60, at p.388.Google Scholar

63 See FRIEDMAN, M.L. “Is there a Modern Legal Culture? “ in Ratio Juris, 7/2 (1994):117–131.Google Scholar

64 See CAPPELLETTI, M. “The Law-making power of the judges and its limits”, in Monash University Law Review 8 (1981–1982): 15–67, in particular at p.31. See also GUARNIERI, C., PEDERZOLI, P. The Power of Judges. A comparative Study of Courts and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001: “The gap between the traditional notion of the judicial role and its present political significance is most obvious in civil law countries. The declaratory approach has been much more persistent in continental Europe, where it is connected to the bureaucratic structure of the judiciary”, at p.5. GUARNIERI and PEDERZOLI agree with Cappelletti's main conclusion, that is a renewed emphasis on the promotional function of the Law via judicial activity. The authors also maintain that the development of a ‘third giant’ is more likely to be a politically sensitive issue in Continental Europe than in the USA, where a more effective system of checks and balances is provided.Google Scholar

65 The term validity does not here refer to formal requirements conferring force of law to the norm. It rather indicates that, despite a given list of formal sources of law, these norms deploy their efficacy in the realm of law in action by: a) raising spontaneous compliance; b) conforming interpretation; b) fostering similar practices by means of suasion and/or auctoritas. In relation to the law-shaping power of judges, for instance, trends of case law and cross referenced decisions are to be taken into consideration.Google Scholar

66 Law-shaping functions can be performed not only by judges but also by other classes of jurists such as academics, lawyers or notaries: for an analysis of the law making power of notaries, see for instance RICHTER, G-J. “The notarial function in making law”, XXIII International Congress of Latin Notaries, Athens, 2001. Papers presented by the German delegation are available in English at: http://www.bnotk.de/BNotK-Service/Publikationen/UINL-Berichte/XXIII.kongress/Berichte_EN.htm. Private parties also shape the law when establishing good practices, codes of conduct or standards not formalized in trade usages.Google Scholar

67 See art. 1 Swiss Civil Code 1901: “La loi régit toutes les matières auxquelles se rapportent la letter ou l'esprit de l'une de ses dispositions. A défaut d'un disposition légale applicable, le juge prononce selon le droit coutoumier, et, à défaut d'une coutume, selon les règlesqu ‘il établierait s'il avait à faire acte de législateur ». See the comparative analysis conducted by GORLA, G. « La giurisprudenza come fattore del diritto », in GORLA, G. Diritto Comparato e diritto Comune Europeo, Milan, Giuffrè, 1981, pp.263–301. A study of the role of the Italian Courts (Siena and Florence) in a historical perspective is also carried out in ASCHERI, M., (1989) supra fn. 22.Google Scholar

68 As regards Italy, see GORLA, G., (1981) supra fn.67; the essays presented in the book however date from the early ‘60s.Google Scholar

69 See GUARNIERI, C., PEDERZOLI, P. (2001) supra fn.64, at pp.7–12.Google Scholar

70 Useful representations of the judiciary by means of flowcharts are contained in PASCUZZI, G. “How to find the law”, in MATTEI, U., LENA, J.S. (eds), (2002) supra fn.7, pp.455–472, at 457; GUARNERI, C., PEDERZOLI, P., (2001) supra fn.64, at p.91. Analytical description, although not updated, is to be found in WATKIN, T.G., (1997) supra fn. 12, at pp.96–157. A complete outline of the system is offered by Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (the independent governing body of the judiciary) at: http://www.csm.it/documenti%20pdf/sistema%20giudiziario%20italiano/italiano.pdf. Acts, Statutes and regulations concerning the Judiciary, together with a brief description of the Courts system can be found on the of the Ministry of Justice website: http://www.giustizia.it.Google Scholar

71 The basic principles there established deal with the constitution of the fundamental conditions for the judiciary to both exercise its control functions and ensure the impartiality of the performance of ordinary judicial activity: the organizational and functional independence of the judiciary (art. 104), the subjection of the judge to the law and to the law only (art. 101) and the status of the judiciary as an independent power. The fundamental principles concerning the appointment of magistrates of higher jurisdictions are also provided in the Constitution, though detailed provisions are to be found in ordinary acts.Google Scholar

72 For a general description of the role played by lay judges in criminal proceedings, see WATKIN, T.G.,(1997) supra fn. 12, at p.128–137.Google Scholar

73 See GUARNIERI, C., PEDERZOLI, P. (2001) supra fn.64, at p.50.Google Scholar

74 Not every single magistrate is entitled to raise the conflict of attribution in the Constitutional Court: in the case in point the conflict was raised by a pubblico ministero. In the Italian system of Criminal procedural Law a public prosecutor (pubblico ministero) is entrusted with the investigation about crimes and the prosecution of the responsible. This magistrate cannot select crimes to be investigated; he is bound by the duty to investigate and prosecute all the crimes that are notified to him either by private individuals or by the Police. For this reason the impartiality and independence of public prosecutors are sentive issues in the organization of judiciary. See for instance Constitutional Court, decision n.420/1995 and decision n.497/2000, in which the Governing body of the judiciary raised the problem of the constitutionality of the provisions that did not grant the magistrate the right to receive professional defence in the course of disciplinary proceedings. See also Constitutional Court, decision n. 270/2002, annotated by LOY, F. in Giustizia Civile, 11 (2002):2719–2723; GIACOBBE, G., “Autonomia della magistratura, indipendenza del giudice, poteri del ministro di grazia e giustizia “, in Giustizia civile, 5 (1999):233–237.Google Scholar

75 See Constitutional Court, decision n.379/1992. The decision concerned the refusal of the Minister of Justice to proceed to the approval of the designation of a magistrate to a directive assignment. The governing body of the Judiciary raised the conflict of attribution among powers and asked the Court to take a deliberation on the legitimacy of the Minister's refusal. The key point of the decision is the focus on a procedural cooperation model for shaping the relationship between the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary. See also Constitutional Court, decision n.380/2003.Google Scholar

76 The reform is contained in Law n.44/2002, which reduced the number of members sitting in Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura and changed the composition of the disciplinary section.Google Scholar

77 See Draft Law n. 1296-B/bis, approved by the Italian Senate on the21^st of January 2004. At art 1 of the draft proposal the scope of the reform is provided as follows: “Art. 1. (Contenuto della delega) I. Il Governo è delegato ad adottare, entro un anno dalla data di entrata in vigore della presente legge, con l'osservanza dei princìpi e dei criteri direttivi di cui all'articolo 2, commi 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 e 8, uno o più decreti legislativi diretti a: Google Scholar

a) modificare la disciplina per l'accesso in magistratura, nonché la disciplina della progressione economica e delle funzioni dei magistrati, e individuare le competenze dei dirigenti amministrativi degli uffici giudiziari; Google Scholar

b) istituire la Scuola superiore della magistratura, razionalizzare la normativa in tema di tirocinio e formazione degli uditori giudiziari, nonché in tema di aggiornamento professionale e formazione dei magistrati; Google Scholar

c) disciplinare la composizione, le competenze e la durata in carica dei consigli giudiziari, nonché istituire il Consiglio direttivo della Corte di cassazione; Google Scholar

d) riorganizzare l'ufficio del pubblico ministero; Google Scholar

e) modificare l'organico della Corte di cassazione e la disciplina relativa ai magistrati applicati presso la medesima; Google Scholar

f) individuare le fattispecie tipiche di illecito disciplinare dei magistrati, le relative sanzioni e la procedura per la loro applicazione, nonché modificare la disciplina in tema di incompatibilità, dispensa dal servizio e trasferimento d'ufficio; Google Scholar

g) prevedere forme di pubblicità degli incarichi extragiudiziari conferiti ai magistrati di ogni ordine e grado.” Google Scholar

For an earlier assessment of the difficulties that might arise from the change of status of judges and public prosecutors in the context of Criminal proceedings, see, in a comparative perspective, AMODIO, E., “The Accusatorial System Lost and Regained: Reforming Criminal Procedure in Italy”, in American Journal of Comparative Law 52 (2004):489–500Google Scholar

78 See supra fn. 52. The reform touches upon the whole structure of representative institutions: it changes the composition, structure and functions of both the Parliament and the Senate; the role and powers of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. More than 60 constitutional lawyers have expressed concerns about the future of the constitutional design and democratic guarantees in connection with the weakening of the separation of powers. Comments and critiques are available at www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it and at www.astrid-online.it.Google Scholar

79 See RUBIN, P. “Why is the Common Law efficient?”, in Journal of legal studies, 6 (1977), 1:51–63.Google Scholar

80 See SHAPIRO, M., STONE SWEET, A. On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, at p.96.Google Scholar

81 See SHAPIRO, M., STONE SWEET, A. (2002) supra fn.80, at p.98. The path dependence of the judiciary is defined by STONE SWEET as follows: “Legal institutions are path dependent to the extent that how litigation and judicial rulemaking proceeds, in any given area of the law at any given point in time, is fundamentally conditioned by how earlier legal disputes in that area of law have been sequenced and resolved”. See STONE SWEET, A. “Path Dependence, Precedent and Judicial Power”, in SHAPIRO, M., STONE SWEET, A., (2002) supra fn.80, at p. 113. On this issue I assume that path dependence and the adjustment of the law to the emerging regulatory needs are complementary phenomena; in doing so, I exclude a radical opposition between the two. This view is supported by the consideration of the cooperative relationship between institutional and quasi-institutional actors in law shaping.Google Scholar

82 The obligation to appear in Court assisted by a professional lawyer is set at art. 82 Code of Civil procedure. The real possibility of being assisted by professional lawyers is granted directly by the State to citizens whose annual income is proved to be lower than euro 9.296, 22 and is regulated by art.74-141 (“Patrocinio a spese dello Stato“) of T.U. n.115/2002 regarding legislative provisions and regulations concerning the costs of the administration of justice.Google Scholar

83 See D'ANGELO, A. “La deontologia dell'avvocato” in ZATTI, P. “Le fonti di autodisciplina. Tutela del consumatore, del risparmiatore, dell'utente”, Padua, Cedam, 1996, pp. 12–161 Google Scholar

84 The basic discipline is to be found in Regio Decreto Legislativo, n.1578, 22^nd of November 1933 and subsequent amendments (henceforth RDL n.1578/1933); important modifications and updating are contained in D.Lgs. n.96, 2^nd of February 2001 which, at art. 4 and 5, also provides for the applicability of this legal regime to lawyers who have obtained an equivalent professional qualification in a EU member State; D.P.R. n.115, 30^th of May 2005.Google Scholar

85 See art.8, 3^rd par. and art. 12, RDL n.1578/1933.Google Scholar

86 See art. 10, 12, 1^st par., art. 17, 1^st par. N.3, RDL n.1578/1933 as well as the limits contained in the Code of Conduct enacted by the National Bar association in 1997, Codice di deontologia professionale.Google Scholar

87 See art. 57, 2nd par. RDL n.1578/1933. Every two years the National Bar Association drafts a new table of tariffs and presents it to the Ministry of Justice for approval.Google Scholar

88 The examples of the use of prudential concepts are several. In the Lawyers’ Code of Conduct (1997) for instance, see art.5 that runs as follows: “Doveri di probità, dignità e decoro. – L'avvocato deve ispirare la propria condotta all'osservanza dei doveri di probità, dignità e decoro.” The provision binds the lawyer to act in his capacity conforming to the duties of probity, dignity and propriety. In the State legislation, see art. 12 R.D.L. 1578/1933: “Gli avvocati debbono adempiere al loro ministero con dignità e con decoro, come si conviene all'altezza della funzione che sono chiamati ad esercitare nell'amministrazione della giustizia (co. 1°); – “… ≪Giuro di adempiere i miei doveri professionali con lealtà, onore e diligenza per i fini della giustizia e per gli interessi superiori della Nazione> (co. 3°); similar expressions are contained in art. 12, 14 and 38 R.D.L. 1578/1933, as well as in the Criminal Code, at art.88 and 105, 4th par. The Code of Conduct has been “enacted” in 1997. It has been amended in 2002. The full text is published in Foro Italiano., 2003, I, c.244. It is also available at http://www.consiglionazionaleforense.it/visualizzazioni/vedi_elenco.php?areanumber=10.+(co.+3°);+similar+expressions+are+contained+in+art.+12,+14+and+38+R.D.L.+1578/1933,+as+well+as+in+the+Criminal+Code,+at+art.88+and+105,+4th+par.+The+Code+of+Conduct+has+been+“enacted”+in+1997.+It+has+been+amended+in+2002.+The+full+text+is+published+in+Foro+Italiano.,+2003,+I,+c.244.+It+is+also+available+at+http://www.consiglionazionaleforense.it/visualizzazioni/vedi_elenco.php?areanumber=10.>Google Scholar

89 See art. 37-48 RDL n. 1578/1933. The scarce availability of detailed case law and reports of disciplinary cases is indeed a problem which led to the enactment of the Code of Conduct, which also contains some provisions concerning the principled behaviour to be kept by the lawyer in his relationships with colleagues, clients, judges and alike. As the Corte di Cassazione repeatedly stated, these provisions must be interpreted as mere examples, thus implying that behaviours not comprised in the Code might be considered as disciplinary infractions: on this point see Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Un. Decision n.8225/2002.Google Scholar

90 The acknowledgement of the nature of the function enacted by lawyers is vaguely underpinned in the order given by Constitutional Court, ord. n. 359/1999, issues in a conflict of attributions between powers raised by a lawyer. In the same decision, the Court does not take a clear stand on the problem, thus leaving unsolved two major issues: a) a clear definition of the scope and the nature of the lawyer's function within the system of Justice administration and his legitimisation to raise the conflict in Court. The order of the Court is commented by RESCIGNO, F. and CELOTTO, A. in Giurisprudenza Italiana, 2000, at pp. 1570–1576.Google Scholar

91 See D'ANGELO, A. (1996) supra fn.83, at p. 147–151. According to the author the lawyers’ behaviour is oriented towards the fulfilment of the clients’ interest.Google Scholar

92 See also BARCA, A. “La responsabilità contrattuale dell'avvocato nell'espletamento dell'incaricato ricevuto”, in Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata (2001) II, p.483–505.Google Scholar

93 The problem that may possibly arise from the obligation to pursue the client's interest is that of independence. In point see D'ANGELO, A, (1996) supra fn.83, at p. 151–155.Google Scholar

94 On this specific point see D'ANGELO, A. (1996) supra fn.83, at p.147.Google Scholar

95 This peculiar type of contract is called “anticresi” and is regulated at art. 1960-1964 Italian Civil Code.Google Scholar

96 See art. 1515 and 1516, art. 1686 and 1687, Italian Civil Code. See also art. 1500-1509 Italian Civil Code which constitute the legal basis for the contract of “sale and lease back “.Google Scholar

97 Mediation Centres have been set up in Chambers of Commerce, pursuant to Law n. 580/1993.Google Scholar

98 According to art. 2784 of the Italian Civil Code, securities consisting of cash collaterals or movable goods are attached to the goods, so that the pledged collateral becomes the object of the security offered against a debt. See also art. 2742 and 2743 Italian Civil Code (hence “ICC”); art. 2795 ICC; art. 2802 and 2803 ICC; art.2815 and 2816 ICC; art.2825, 2^nd par. ICC.Google Scholar

99 See GABRIELLI, E. Il pegno anomalo, Padua, Giuffrè, 1990.Google Scholar

100 The decisions are widely reported and commentated on: see for instance Tribunale di Roma (Lower Court of Rome), 21^st of July 1993, but also Tribunale di Torino (Lower Court of Turin), 1^st of June 1991 and 22^nd of July 1992.Google Scholar

101 See Corte di Cassazione, decision 28^th of May 2005, n.5264. The first comments on the decision of the Corte di Cassazione underscore the fact that the High Court caved in on this type of floating charge under the pressure of the doctrinal formant. See AZZARO, A.M. “Il pegno ‘rotativo’ arriva in Cassazione: ovvero ‘come la dottrina diventa giurisprudenza'”, in Banca Borsa e Titoli di Credito, 5 (1998): 1; MAIMER, F. “Pegno rotativo: la dottrina ispira la Cassazione. Prime osservazioni”, in Giustizia Civile, 9 (1998): 2159. See also RESCIGNO, M. “Le garanzie ‘rotative ’ convenzionali: fattispecie e problemi di disciplina “, in Banca, Borsa e Titoli di credito, 1 (2001):1.Google Scholar

102 See also art. 34, 2^nd par., D.Lgs 24^th of June 1998, n.213 (so-called “Decree on the Euro”).Google Scholar

103 As for the principle in question, there is an increasing awareness of the path dependence to be traced in Italian case law; the phenomenon is multifaceted and involves both elements of legal culture and of ideology, referring, with this latter term, to the confines marked (by legislator but also by academics and judges) for judicial interpretation within the legal system. Positive legal constraints and judicial standards of civil liability for the judge are also part of the framework that shapes path dependence in Italian case law. The investigation of the (supposed) presence/absence of the stare decisis principle in the Italian legal system is beyond the scope of this paper. For further references on this issue see VISINTINI, G. La giurisprudenza per massime ed il valore del precedente con particolare riguardo alla responsabilità civile, Padua, Cedam, 1988; GALGANO, F. “L'efficacia vincolante del precedente di Cassazione”, in Contratto e Impresa, 1999, 889–904.; MAZZAMUTO, S. “Certezza e prevedibilità: nuove frontiere della nomofilachia e tentativi di enforcement del precedente”, in Politica del diritto, 2 (2003): 157–176.Google Scholar

104 See also ALPA, G., MONATERI, P.G., GUARNIERI, A. Le fonti del diritto italiano. Le fonti non scritte Turin,. Utet, 1999. The awareness of the relevance of case law for law-finding purposes has given way to a relatively new genre of legal literature, i.e. that of the commentaries on case law. As regards contract law, see for instance DOGLIOTTI, M., FIGONE, A. Giurisprudenza del contratto Milan“ Giuffrè, 2000.Google Scholar

105 See BIRKS, P., (1997) supra fn. 18, at p. 114.Google Scholar

106 See HARTKAMP, A. “Interplay Between Judges, Legislators and Academics. The case of the New Civil Code of the Netherlands.”, in MARKESINIS, B., (1997) supra fn. 18, p.91–112, at p.91Google Scholar

107 See GORLA, G. (1981) supra fn. 67, at p.273.Google Scholar

108 See Constitutional Court, decision n.404/1988.Google Scholar

109 See, for instance, Corte di Cassazione, decision n.376/1999; decision n. 10797/1998; decision n.10538/1996.Google Scholar

110 The case which gave way to the pivotal revirement is well known: Corte di Cassazione, 26^th of January 1971, n. 174 (the “Meroni case”). A summary of the case is offered in BUSSANI, M., POZZO, B, VENCHIARUTTI, “Tort Law”, in MATTEI, U., LENA, J.(2002) supra fn.7, pp.217–246, at p.236–238.Google Scholar

The same doctrine is at the basis of the possibility of granting compensation for economic losses. The scholar who has forecast this legal change is F.D. BUSNELLI, in La lesione del credito da parte di terzi, Milan Giuffrè, 1964.Google Scholar

111 See BELLANTUONO, G. I contratti incompleti nel diritto e nell'economia, Padua Cedam, 2000.Google Scholar

112 See SCHWARTZ, A., “Relational Contracts in the Courts: An analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies “, in Journal of Legal Studies, 21 (1992), 2: 271–318.Google Scholar

113 As regards Italian Contract law, see BELLANTUONO, G. “Contratti incompleti e norme sociali”, in Rivista Critica del Diritto Privato, 2001, p261–294, at p.275, and further references contained therein.Google Scholar

114 Art. 23, 24, 25 and 28, as well as 102, 111 and 113 are also important, since they provide the institutional framework for the exercise of judiciary power, especially by determining legal sanctions for the abuse of powers or for judges’ liability(see also L.n117, 13^th of April 1988, in particular art. 2, 3. This statute cleared the opposite interpretations provided by two judgements of Corte di Cassazione on the subject: Cass. Sez. Un. 6^th of November 1975 and Cass. Sez. Un. 24^th of March 1982 n.1879).Google Scholar

115 See Corte di Cassazione, decision n.22661/1999 and decision n.8153/2000.Google Scholar

116 See Corte di Cassazione, decision n.325771983, interpreting the part of the provision which establishes that the particular kind of warranty must be agreed upon by the parties, unless usages provide that the warranty is to be acknowledged implicitly.Google Scholar

117 See ALPA, G. “Autonomia privata e ‘garanzie’ commerciali”, in Contratto e Impresa Europa, 2001, pp.455–496.Google Scholar

118 See art. 116 Code of Civil Procedure and art.2729 Civil Code. See also Corte di Cassazione, decision n.4333/1983.Google Scholar

119 See Corte di Cassazione, decision n.10511/1999; decision n.14172/2000 and recently decision n. 18128/2005. All the above-mentioned decisions concerned the interpretation of art. 1384 of the Italian Civil Code, which runs as follows: “Riduzione della penale. La penale può essere diminuita equamente dal giudice, se l'obbligazione principale è stata eseguita in parte ovvero se l'ammontare della penale è manifestamente eccessivo, avuto sempre riguardo all'interesse che il creditore aveva all'adempimento “.Google Scholar

120 For the concept of “implicit constitutional change” in a Law & Economies’ perspective see the model of institutional interaction presented by VOIGT, S. “Implicit Constitutional Change – Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document”, in European Journal of Law & Economics, 7 (1999): 197–224. However, it must be noted that the idea of a de facto constitution has been widely discussed and accepted in Italian Constitutional theory.Google Scholar

121 See PIZZORUSSO, A., FERRERI, S., supra fn. 26, at p.46–47.Google Scholar

122 See LIJPHART, A. “Majority Rule in Theory and Practice: the Tenacity of a Flawed Paradigm”, in International Social science Journal, 129 (1991):483–493. For a description of the majoritarian model as opposed to a non majoritarian (madisonian) model, see DAHL, R.A. A preface to Democratic theory, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1956.Google Scholar

123 See SMITH, A. Lectures on Jurisprudence, in The Glasgow edition o the works and correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. 1–6, Oxford, Clarendon Press, New York, OUP, 1976–1983, vol.5.Google Scholar

124 In regulation theory, see MAJONE, G. Lo Stato Regolatore, Bologne, Il Mulino“ 2000, at p. 167–173.Google Scholar

125 On this issue as a first reference, see the picture provided by KAHN, A.E. The economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions. Vol.1 Economic principles, NY-London-Sidney – Toronto, John Wiley & Sons. Inc., 1970, at p. 12–14. A discussion of the unitary theories of regulation and a vast array of bibliographical reference is provided by STEWART, R.B. “Regulation in a Liberal State: the Role of Non-Commodity Values”, in Yale Law Journal, 92 (1982–1983): 1537–1590.Google Scholar