This collection of articles arises from a conference held in Tel Aviv in 2009 at the Concord Research Centre for the Integration of International Law in Israel, School of Law, College of Management Academic Studies. Delegates to the conference came from a variety of professions and areas of expertise and included academics and legal and welfare practitioners. What was common among us, however, was our interest in the international dimensions of both understandings of the family and of the normative systems that define and regulate it. We all believed that understandings of family are situated in and across cultural and economic manifestations of reproduction, dependency and care relations in a global context and that they are regulated in international and regional as much as in domestic law.

This article examines the representations of law and legal actors offered within two classic American films: To Kill a Mockingbird and Judgment at Nuremberg. It has previously been argued that these films belong to a ‘heroic tradition’ within American cinema; one that idealises both men of law and man-made law and that had its golden age from the mid-1950s through to the end of the 1960s. It is argued here that these films offer a more complex and far less certain portrayal of the law and legal actors. This is examined first by considering the context in which these films were made, and second, the depictions of law and legal actors that they offer.

In his tale of the struggles and privations of the mining community in the industrial south of Wales in the early decades of the twentieth century, Lewis Jones, ex-miner and socialist activist, put aside the usual tools of political activism – of oratory and pamphlet propaganda – and instead turned to fiction as a means of educating and mobilising the political energy of the workforce. In doing so, Jones represented the extent to which the law was pivotal to the social organisation delivering injustice to working people. When one turns to history and to the legal record, the contestable accounts, elisions and absences from the record speak eloquently of the extent to which selective doctrine contributes to that injustice. The resultant message resonates with debates on the relationship between society, politics and the rule of law itself.

The approach taken by English courts to the duty of care question in negligence has been subject to harsh criticism in recent years. This article examines this fundamental issue in tort law, drawing upon Canadian and Australian jurisprudence by way of comparison. From this analysis, the concept of vulnerability is developed as a productive means of understanding the duty of care. Vulnerability is of increasing interest in legal and political theory and it is of particular relevance to the law of negligence. In addition to aiding doctrinal coherence, vulnerability – with its focus on relationships and care – has the potential to broaden the way in which the subject of tort law is conceived because it challenges dominant assumptions about autonomy as being prior to the relationships on which it is dependent.

This article sets out a sociological reconstruction of the constitution of the European Union (EU). Utilising a methodology derived from historical-functionalist sociology, it explains the distinctive court-led, judicial form of this constitution within a wide comparative-sociological framework, and it cites earlier examples of judicialised constitutions to elucidate the adaptive functions performed by judicial actors in the EU constitution. The article proposes a new method for analysing constitutions in general and that of the EU in particular, and it offers an encompassing sociological perspective for addressing the increasing preponderance of judicial institutions in contemporary democratic polity building.

Contemporary initiatives to address civilian victimisation in armed conflict increasingly focus on international criminal justice institutions, rules and practices. These institutions are now expected to construct legal recognition of civilian victims of armed conflict, as well as prosecute the perpetrators. This article uses a case-study of the Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević heard by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to explore the concept of the civilian. It first examines the international legal frameworks and obligations that enforce the protection of civilians. It then explores the concept of the civilian as defined by the rules of humanitarian law, and the different approaches to defining civilians utilised by the parties to the Milošević trial. The article argues that the current ‘negative’ definition of civilians creates significant difficulties for understanding civilians as a distinct category of persons, and does not adequately capture their choices, actions and experiences in armed conflict.

In a number of European countries there are fears that foreign, particularly Islamic, family law is becoming entrenched. All parties to this discussion see themselves as under threat. Migrant populations claim their right to cultural identity, while their host countries' domestic populations see a risk to social cohesion. Family law brings the underlying tensions into sharp focus. Cultural and religious identity and family law are interrelated in a number of ways and raise various complex issues. European legal systems have taken various approaches to meeting these challenges, many of which have been apologetic, and few of which have been informed by theory. I propose to examine this complexity and indicate areas in which conflicts may arise by analysing a family-law case involving migrants living transnationally. I will include questions of international private law, comments on the various degrees of consideration accorded to cultural identity within substantive family law, and remarks on models of legal pluralism and the dangers that go along with them. I will conclude with an evaluation of approaches which are process-based rather than institution-based.

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Love is ever-present in the debate for the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. Its importance, however, is often underestimated. I will show in this article that much can be gained by viewing this issue through the analytical lens of romantic love. This analysis will show that romantic love is a contested idea. On the one hand it claims to embody a radical and permissive ideology that is capable of penetrating established social and cultural divides. On the other hand, however, love has been accused of replicating patriarchy, and of being ideologically heteronormative. As such, love is not necessarily the answer needed to win the legal argument for same-sex marriage – not unless we begin a process of redefining love for our times.

This article attempts to unravel the universal human rights implications of family law in the three monotheisms – Jewish, Christian and Muslim. At issue is the requirement of gender equality as justice in the family. This requirement is inherent in the human rights agenda, a novel point of departure in political philosophy and antithetical to the patriarchal family sacralised in the monotheistic religions.

This article considers and assesses pseudo-public spaces, considering both physical and non-physical spaces. Presenting perspectives from law, geography, architecture and communication studies, it is argued that there are links between the conditions pertaining to shopping centres, redeveloped city centres, Internet service providers and websites. Particular attention is paid to unfulfilled claims regarding the promise of new spaces, or inconsistencies as between the form and substance of a given space. The owners of pseudo-public physical spaces use legal tools such as the right to exclude from private property, while the owners of pseudo-public virtual spaces often base the relationship with a user on contractual agreements; in both cases, concepts of fundamental rights are also affected, if not often vindicated. The consequences of these approaches are assessed, drawing on critical legal geography and the history of ‘common carriers’ and other forms of regulation.

This article presents an empirical study of Jewish and Muslim women who go through divorce in Canada, drawing on a ‘left law and economics’ methodology. Religious law and family law have long been considered outside the market and, as a result, are more rarely accounted for in the law and economics literature. According to dominant narratives, religious family law is experienced by women either as an exceptional form of oppression or as a form of spiritual religious identity. In this article, I apply a ‘left law and economics’ approach to deconstruct these notions. On the basis of my socio-legal fieldwork with Jewish and Muslim women in three Canadian cities, I identify the background formal and informal legal rules, social norms and distributional practices that help produce asymmetric bargaining locations for women. I employ the economic language of costs/benefits to illustrate the ways in which religious parties bargain strategically upon divorce, although these market claims are surprisingly underrecognised by the legal system. Such empirical knowledge helps disenchant the idea that religious law is systematically used as punishing forces that make women worse off economically or morally inferior. It also allows for a distributive analysis which reveals how husbands and wives negotiate economic resources, desires and day-to-day decisions in all kinds of fair and unfair ways, flying in the face of conventional narratives surrounding women and religion.

This article analyses the structures and substances of personal systems of family law based on religious affiliation within their social, political and historical contexts, and explores the varied ways in which they implicate the human rights of those governed by these systems, and the way international law and jurisprudence of human rights respond to these challenges. This analysis suggests that looking at the specific manifestations of personal family law systems in concrete contexts illuminates significant human rights implications which have not received sufficient attention in mainstream human rights discourse, for various legal, cultural and political reasons. The contexts which this article will draw on are personal family law systems in Israel, India, Lebanon and Morocco, which comprise a varied sample of family law structures and legal, cultural, social and political contexts.

Hospitality is a self-contradictory concept. Both inclusionary and exclusionary forces are present at the very threshold of hospitality. This article shows how this contradiction works in the practice of migration law. The author takes a Dutch case, the case of Abdirizaq Salah Sheekh, to reveal the force of this contradiction from the moment the asylum seeker arrives on the territory, all the way through to the end of his story at the European Court of Human Rights. The case is, in fact, a symptomatic indictment of how aliens are treated in the Netherlands and, in a more general sense, in Europe as a whole. This article not only demonstrates how the question of hospitality commences with language − the moment we start communicating with the alien − the author also argues that in the violent collision produced by the the two contradictory demands of hospitality, a new subject is created. Not only is the migration procedure questioned, but also the subject of migration law.

German sociology of law has developed along a peculiar path which is still shaping its development today. Unlike other special areas of sociology that extended sociologists' inquiry to new fields, the sociology of law was founded mainly by lawyers in the early twentieth century as a tool for enhanced professional practice. The sociology of law became part of a struggle over the academic identity of jurisprudence. This first wave of German sociology of law was then overshadowed by a second wave in the 1960s and 1970s along the lines of legal reform and radical scholarship. Today, the sociology of law in Germany is receiving renewed interest under the labels of empirical legal research and of inter- and transdisciplinarity, and scholars are to a large degree still driven by political interests.

This article provides a politico-jurisprudential account of the corporate personality which develops contemporary thinking about collective and shared intentions and their practical applications. It provides a model of corporate personality that is based on recent work by Bratman, Hurley, Raz and Sugden on the issues of shared intentions, interlocking preferences, and other supporting attitudes. The article will additionally detail issues of choice, coercion and will in relation to the work of scholars such as Dworkin and Velleman.

As the many pages of law journals, monographs and textbooks demonstrate, the complex interface between law and visual culture continues to be a marginal aspect of legal study, research and scholarship. To paraphrase sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1965/1990, p. 1) there exists a hierarchy of legitimate objects of study. The orthodoxy continues to be preoccupied with the ways in which the written texts of law make the world. The multifarious gatekeepers of legal studies have responded in a variety of ways to scholarly and pedagogic projects that turn away from law's written text and its operationalisation. In my experience from giving papers and talking to lawyers and judges, these range from bewilderment, disbelief and passive aggressive indifference to more open attacks and withering denunciations that dismiss work that touches on the visual aspects of law as esoteric, trivial, ‘not law’. The publication of these three books exploring various dimensions of the interface between law and visual culture does not herald the death of the written text of law, but they do point to the long history and contemporary significance of visual culture for law. Their publication provides an opportunity to examine a body of work that takes this interface seriously. Each of these studies demonstrates the need to qualify the legal obsession with the word and for legal scholars to pay due regard to a wider range of visual cultural forms and practices that shape and represent law and legal practice. They also provide an opportunity to reflect on apparent resistance to taking the visual dimensions of law more seriously. In combination, these three monographs illustrate the substantive, jurisdictional, disciplinary and methodological diversity of current research on the visual dimensions of law and its historical range.

In recent years there has been an increased interest in mediumship. This has been part of a broader fascination with paranormal issues that has been fostered by new modes of dissemination and communication. This article focuses upon attempts made by the criminal law to regulate mediums, and, in particular, the disjunction between the ‘genuine medium’ and the ‘vulnerable consumer’. It charts historical approaches of the law and provides a critique of the current legal landscape, including the new regulatory framework under the Unfair Commercial Practice Regulations 2008, and the possibility of an action under the Fraud Act 2006. It concludes that the law has continually struggled to adequately deal with this phenomenon, and that the current regime is likely to prove similarly ineffective given the fundamental conceptual legal problem of proving what may be un-provable.

The practice of Arab women voluntarily renouncing their shares in the family inheritance is well known, having been noticed in several Mediterranean and African countries, including Israel and the West Bank. This practice seems grossly inegalitarian, reflecting many Muslim women's social and economic inferiority and their dependent status. Some Islamic feminists argue that the practice contradicts not only the letter of the sharia, which guarantees women shares in the family inheritance, but also fundamental Islamic principles. Conservatives, however, see the practice as cohering with the spirit of Islam (though not with the letter of sharia), as a voluntary choice by many Muslim women to let their brothers or husbands fulfil their traditional role of providing for their sisters or wives. International institutions concerned with enhancing gender equality have taken the latter view seriously enough to refrain from judging the practice negatively. Our article highlights the Israeli civil courts' diverse responses to the practice: some judges criticise it while others choose a policy of non-interference. The article further discusses the practice and Israeli civil courts' responses in the comparative perspective of Jewish women's practice of renouncing their property and other rights on divorce. Some Jewish husbands make such renunciation a condition of their dissolving the marriage. Israeli civil courts often see such renunciation as an effect of extortion and permit women to rescind it once divorced. We thus conclude with a plea to the civil courts to encourage gender equality among the Arab population to the same extent, at least, to which they promote it among Israel's Jews.