It was a hot afternoon on 10 April 1950, in the town of Chapra in the eastern Indian province of Bihar. As most people had retired indoors to avoid the heat, the women's clothing store run by Kedar Nath had suddenly become a hive of activity. His munib (accountant) had gone home early on receiving news of the sudden illness of his son, and his shop had been visited by the local Magistrate and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the leading figures in the district administration. The Magistrate, Mr S. K Ghatak, ordered Kedar Nath to open up his stores and make his registers available, and in this process discovered that Nath had twenty-five more saris than were accounted for in the stock register. Kedar Nath's relation protested that the saris had been bought that very morning, and that his munib's unexpected absence had resulted in the stocks not being updated immediately. The district officials were not convinced and Kedar Nath was arrested for not having proper accounts of the clothes in his stock. The district court convicted Kedar Nath for violating the terms of Bihar Cotton, Cloth and Yarn (Control Order) 1948, and the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 (ESA), and sentenced him to a fine and a month of rigorous imprisonment.

This paper examines the criminalisation of symbols of the past. It considers the 2011 judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. In this compact and well-ordered decision, the Tribunal, with reference to key European examples, assessed critically the constitutionality of criminal law provisions that prohibit the dissemination and public use of symbols of the past pertaining to fascist, Communist or other totalitarian content. Its ruling, which found amendments to the law in Poland that tightened up restrictions on the use of totalitarian symbols to be unconstitutional, is considered within three important contexts: first, the broad European context, where the concept of totalitarian crimes has become subject to EU human rights legislation relating to the freedom of expression; second, the context of post-dictatorial Europe, where specific states have addressed the use of totalitarian symbols in their respective criminal laws; and finally, the context of transitional justice, where criminalising symbols of the past has become a central and permanent feature in European narratives about justice. Significantly, these cases reveal the temporal element of transitional justice. The paper discusses the two case-studies most relevant to Poland, namely those in Germany and Hungary. Reference is also made to the Baltic States, which, together with Poland, have made a concerted effort to bring the notion of totalitarian crimes and histories to the attention of Europe. The paper concurs with the contention that cases concerning the use of symbols provide an excellent illustration of where memory and law intersect. Using historical, comparative and contextual methodologies the paper demonstrates the legal and philosophical complexities of criminal uses of symbolism, the political realities, and the key dimension of transitional justice and its relationship to expression, law and memory.

For some time now, there has been a perceived need to prepare law students to handle legal issues beyond national borders. Much has been written on how globalisation should shape legal education, but no clear direction has emerged. There is also a contrary impulse to retain a focus on domestic law in order to prepare students for practice in their home jurisdiction. One way of addressing these apparently contrary impulses is to take a skills approach that articulates the analytical processes distinctively active in a more global context. Some of these skills could then be integrated into a variety of courses. However, skills in the global context should not merely replicate domestic conceptions of skills. This paper proposes that students develop abilities in comparative thinking and heuristic question framing, and reviews the advantages and disadvantages of a course in Comparative Advocacy designed to accomplish these goals.

This paper shows how international law scholarship might adopt a constructivist interdisciplinary research design to better engage with the political and social context of legal rules and institutions. In 2005 the Asia-Pacific Partnership was launched by the United States and Australia as a climate change institution outside the UN climate process. Controversially, the Member States claimed the Asia-Pacific Partnership was complementary to the UN climate process. This paper investigates the veracity of this claim by analysing the normative compatibility of the Partnership and the UN climate process. The paper adopts Dryzek's discourse theory to analyse the shared ideas and assumptions underlying both institutions. This analysis indicates that the Asia-Pacific Partnership embodied a deep market-liberal discourse that is in significant tension with the more interventionist and equity-based principles underpinning the UN climate process. This market-liberal discourse is important for understanding recent developments in global climate governance.

Using an approach derived from sociological functionalism, this paper proposes a distinctive reconstruction both of the history of constitutionalism and of the changing form of constitutional law in global society. It argues that constitutional norms form adaptive principles for stabilising the inclusionary legal and political functions of society. Classical patterns of legal/political inclusion tended to rely on democratic forms of will formation (constituent power). Contemporary patterns of legal/political inclusion rely, in contrast, on rights. The shift in emphasis from constituent power to rights forms the constitutional foundation for the emerging global political system.

This paper surveys recent trends in the development of the sociology of law in Denmark. The overall argument of the paper is that, currently, the sociology of law in Denmark is marked by a striking sociological and more specifically institutional and empirical turn. This new direction in scholarship suggests not only a renewed research focus on the institutional dimensions of law but it also – and very differently from work from the 1980s and 1990s – suggests a re-orientation towards sociology more generally. A clear consequence of this return to the sociological core of the sociology of law has been an empirical orientation towards how law is practised, how legal institutions work and, as part of that, how the legal profession takes part in both legal change and transformations of state and society. This new research relies not only on general sociological theory and method but also on the more specific elite sociology, sociology of professions and sociology of knowledge.