This paper examines women’s entry and advancement within Québec’s, civil law tradition of a dual system of notaires and avocats in law practice. The two arms of the profession have developed along exclusive legal jurisdictions codified through law, contrasting professional structures, and different styles of legal practice. Yet, they share a common foundation through law school and professional training and their respective practices of law occasionally overlap and conflict in the competition for clientele, services and professional status. Women’s representation in Québec law practice has risen to nearly fifty percent and their entry to law in large numbers coincides with the emergence of exclusionary processes within and across the professional divide. Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital provides new insight to gendered career dynamics in law practice, specifically an understanding of cultural repertoires of resources mobilised in successful careers, resources that are also at the centre of disputes over the professional status and legal jurisdictions between notaires and avocats. The analysis demonstrates that women and men within these two professional groups are not only equipped with differential stocks of capital, but that the conversion rates also differ. Particularly among the avocats, men receive greater exchange on their investments in human and social capitals and their cultivated ‘habitus’ also better enables men to garner enhanced job rewards.

The 1987 film RoboCop is not just a science fiction action story; it is also a critique of the neoliberal resurgence in law and politics at the end of the twentieth century. In particular it critiques the privatisation of police services, and the expansion of private property claims to cover a cyborg policeman, notwithstanding its human components. I connect the critique in the film with the broader academic literature dealing with the privatisation of police forces and the expansion of private property claims, particularly copyright and patents. Finally, I consider whether, as a result of the neoliberal expansion of private property rights over the last few decades, the law could now justify a private property claim over a cyborg like the one in the film.

World War II genocide in Germany, the Rwanda genocide in the early 1990s and the Darfur genocide today are visceral reminders of the devastation and senselessness in the breakdown of human order, a poignant but sad insight into the nature of man and politics. Yet the international community, and by extension the United Nations (UN), have shown a remarkable reluctance to address rape and other forms of gender violence perpetrated during militarised conflicts. Given the psychological toll and devastating effect of rape and the growing number of conflicts, this effort does not speak well to the UN’s commitment to problems that destabilise international peace. It does however raise concerns in the minds of those who see the UN as cherrypicking which conflicts to address while sidestepping others until it is too late. With a view to the Allies’ response to genocide during World War II, this article argues that the realist analytical framework of world politics provides the most plausible basis for explaining variations in international response in militarised conflicts such as Rwanda and Darfur. We present testable hypotheses to conclude that while rape in itself may not be the sole trigger for interventions, states with unstable regimes or sovereign capacity whose government has been deposed are more likely to be the object for interventions or held accountable than those with otherwise stable governments who benefit from the support of a hegemonic power. To victims of crimes of rape caught in militarised conflicts, and to whom justice may come only after a perpetrator regime has been deposed, the conclusion that the decision to intervene is predicated more on political might than justice is disquieting.

Legislators around the world are grappling with the question of whether or not the criminal law should be deployed in order to punish HIV transmission that is the result of voluntary sexual encounters between competent, consenting adults. A few years ago, when I was working in South Africa, that country’s Law Reform Commission proposed to declare HIV transmissions that are the result of voluntary sexual encounters among competent consenting adults a criminal offence that ought to fall under the category of rape (Schüklenk, 2003). Rape and voluntariness do not go too well together, so – not being a lawyer – I was surprised about the seemingly otherworldly machinations of legal minds in the context of HIV/AIDS. Matthew Weait points out in his book Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission that many liberal democracies have made HIV transmission a criminal offence, among these Canada, Sweden, Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK and many others. In most countries, HIV infected people who demonstrably knew about their infection have been successfully prosecuted for transmitting HIV to their sexual partners.