This paper introduces a symposium on socio-legal studies and the humanities, justifying the originality of a dedicated special issue on this topic. The paper identifies and critically examines themes and problems in the literature before introducing the articles in the symposium and, finally, discussing areas for future research.

This paper was delivered as a plenary lecture, designed to respond to the one-day special conference focus upon links between socio-legal studies and the humanities.1 The paper focuses in particular upon the relationship between law and the humanities. It may be argued that the role of empirically sourced socio-legal research is well accepted, given its tangible utility in terms of producing hard data which can inform and transform policy perspectives. However, scholarly speculation about the relationship between law and the humanities ranges from the indulgent to the hostile. In particular, legal scholars aligning themselves as ‘black letter’ commentators express strong opinions about such links, suggesting that scholarship purporting to establish links between the two fields is essentially spurious, bearing in mind the purposive role of law as a problem-solving mechanism. The paper sets out to challenge such assertions, indicating the natural connections between the two fields and the philosophical necessity of continued interaction, given the fact that certain aspects of human experience and nature cannot be plumbed by doctrine or empiricism or even by combinations of the two. Law must be understood to stand at the nexus of human experience, in a relationship of integrity, where the word is understood to mean both morally principled and culturally integrated. In particular, the development of human qualities, of character and moral sensibility informing normative values – and, ultimately, engagement with the world of law – is a process of subtle cultural as well as psychological significance, and may benefit from interrogation deriving from the wider fields of human discourse.

This paper argues that law and society are disconnected in practice, and that this is attributable, in part, to law’s disconnection from the arts and humanities in our schemes of formal education. When we draw out the legal yarn from its cultural fabric, we find that it is remarkably thin. It is especially inadequate to describe the complexity of human interconnection, and even lacks a language to express such commonplace connections as unmarried romantic cohabitation and non-profit clubs. To understand human interconnection and the law’s connection to society, we must read the law ‘in context’ – as being one fabric, one textile, with other literatures – and we must read with an appropriate ethic. To that end, this paper reads the law in the context of Dickens’s Bleak House, which has been called ‘a novel of connections’, and Forster’s Howards End, which exhorts us to ‘connect the prose and the passion’.

This paper builds on a developing field of enquiry regarding the potency of film as an intervention into normative patterns in popular culture which are recognisable in a legal pluralist sense, and that relate to more standard legal analyses of constitutional development. The argument is developed that Steve McQueen in Hunger has made a film which marries a particular filmic formal device of lingering on highly aestheticised details of human behaviour with an overall filmic sensibility of refusing ‘politics’ in favour of ‘humanity’. The film demonstrates a resounding success, both in critical terms and in having the film accepted on its own terms of ‘humanity’. The suggestion in this paper is that the ongoing processes of ‘dealing with the past’ in Northern Ireland and other post-conflict societies may have something to learn from the marriage of idea and aesthetic form in Hunger.

This essay is about portraits: judicial portraits. It offers a case study of the interface between law and visual culture. Its object of enquiry is a collection of pictures (painted and photographic), depicting the sixteen Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia, from 1824 to the present day. The original paintings hang in the Banco Court, Sydney. The photographs and digital copies of all the images are on the Court’s website. Beginning with a brief review of socio-legal scholarship on the judiciary, the essay explores existing work on the visual image of the judge. In response to the limitations of that research, the paper turns to art historical scholarship to facilitate an analysis of the aesthetic and technological factors (the continuities and changes) that shape and generate the meaning of these judicial images. It explores the relevance of context upon meaning. The paper demonstrates a number of methodological approaches and reflects upon the contribution that a study of judicial pictures may make to socio-legal scholarship.

While legal practice and scholarship are driven by the use and understanding of complex legal terminology, there has been little effort to incorporate the humanistic scholarship of anthropologists and historians into theoretical or practical accounts of these words and their usages. This paper attempts to historicise and complicate a term that serves as a bridge or meeting point between the legal and the political; sovereignty has been conceptualised since the sixteenth century as both a framing device that produces unity within the state while establishing mutual equality within the interstate order, and as the capacity to make law without being subject to that law. Recent anthropological literature has challenged the personification implicit in political–theoretical definitions of sovereignty, arguing instead for a theory of sovereignty that can be applied to ‘complicated’, post-colonial contexts, where legal orders are plural or overlapping and the state is weak or non-existent. What such critiques cannot explain, however, is how the concept of the ‘sovereign state’ became so central to political discourse on a global scale. This paper draws upon legal historical case-studies concerned with the production of the colonial or post-colonial state or the deployment of ‘sovereignty’ as a justificatory concept in colonial settings. In doing so, this paper argues for understanding sovereignty both as a practice across time and space that organises legal institutions and as a justificatory strategy in the intellectual and social history of those institutions, an approach that allows scholars to draw upon the insights of political theorists, anthropologists and historians. While primarily intended to instigate a broader interdisciplinary conversation, this paper also suggests a preliminary conclusion: sovereignty has historically been deployed as a means of including that which cannot be considered the same, mediating the colonial tension between ‘otherness’ and legal homogeneity.

To paraphrase Barack Obama, cause lawyers aren’t supposed to make any money: ‘their poverty is proof of their integrity’ (Obama, 2007, p. 135). Integrity and its insignia are, of course, sought-after signifiers not only in the field of community organising that Obama was describing, but in all professions, not least that of cause lawyers that is the focus of this book. The Cultural Lives of Cause Lawyers is the fifth in a series of essays edited by Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold on the activities of cause lawyers. Previous collections set the scene for the nature and aims of cause lawyering, analysing their professional and political commitments in theory and in practice, and their relationship to the state and to social movements in a global era. It is a series that almost single-handedly, quickly and efficiently helped define, as well as develop, this exciting new field.