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Law is not (best considered) an essentially contested concept

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2011

Kenneth M. Ehrenberg
Kenneth M. Ehrenberg*
Affiliation:
University at Buffalo, SUNY
*
[email protected]
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I argue that law is not best considered an essentially contested concept. After first explaining the notion of essential contestability and disaggregating law into several related concepts, I show that the most basic and general concept of law does not fit within the criteria offered for essential contestation. I buttress this claim with the explanation that essential contestation is itself a framework for understanding complex concepts and therefore should only be applied when it would yield a greater understanding of uses of the concept to which it is applied. I then show that, even if law meets some basic criteria of essential contestation, applying the appellation does not helpfully illuminate the most general concept of law and therefore it should not be used, while allowing that it might be more useful for the related concept of the rule of law.

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Articles
Information
International Journal of Law in Context , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , June 2011 , pp. 209 - 232
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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