Following the disclosure of archives in the former Soviet Union detailing art works taken from Germany at the end of World War II, it is now possible to reconstruct more accurately a history of those objects removed from Germany but never returned. Inconsistencies in the documentary evidence concerning both the location of objects sent West from Berlin and other repositories (particularly in the last few months of the war) and the number of objects returned to Germany indicate that the United States may have been involved in an unofficial policy of claiming as war booty art treasures form the conquered German nation. This article attempts to detail some of those inconsistencies by comparing what is known of the inventories of German museums before the war, the movements of art objects and repositories used during the war, and the inventories of the German museums today, in order to reconstruct some of this missing pact.

Legal regulation of the archaeological record has played a subtle though instrumental role in the shaping of American anthropology. Most studies of connections between politics and archaeology in analogous contexts have, however, focused on nationalisms and the popular political orchestration of archaeology. This paper grounds an analysis of the American case in legal apparatuses, disciplinary changes in anthropology, and a shift in the expression of American nationalism between the Antiquities Act of 1906 and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990. The article argues that archaeology has attained broader social significance as archaeologists now consult native peoples in the practice of archaeology. Though archaeology remains a politicized science it has become a more broadly negotiated one and the historical and cultural issues it faces may yet find resolution through laws and responsive disciplinary practices that envision a society enhanced by cultural difference.

The law of cultural property is primarily based on the interests of the states concerned. If a cultural object is of high monetary or identificatory value, states will contest the ownership, and many of these cases are resolved by compromise. If a cultural object is of less monetary or identificatory value, states often neglect its preservation. Yet the law for protection of cultural property should not only be a method for the arbitration of national interests but should also take into account the interests of humankind in general, including preservation of the object in its original context, public accessibility, and the scientific, historic and aesthetic interests that can be associated with an object. While some states are unable to protect their cultural heritage, especially in times of war, public international law does not prevent a state from destroying its cultural heritage. Cultural heritage law is developing rapidly, and national laws and international conventions are in the process of creation. At this time, the author posits, it is therefore necessary to consider the reasons for the protection of cultural objects.

This article argues that the question of whether the nation-state or the international community is the legitimate guardian of cultural property can only be answered with reference to what we expect measures of protection of our cultural heritage to accomplish. The very concept of 'protection' is at stake, and two different schools (object-centrism versus functionalism) are to be distinguished. Whereas object centrism focuses on the cultural object and its protection as a value in its own right, functionalism argues that the cultural heritage cannot even be identified as such without reference to society and its meaning for societal processes of acculturation and socialization. This article endorses functionalism and develops a perspective that includes identity and cross-cultural communication as the most important functions of all cultural heritage. These two criteria should guide our thinking about the legitimate guardian of cultural heritage in general.

This article presents a summary of the Swedish law pertaining to the treatment of the cultural heritage. After a review of the property rights implicated through such a protective scheme, the article examines the national legislation as well as its implementation at both the national and local levels through administrative procedures that define and regulate the protection of ancient sites and monuments, historic buildings, archaeological finds, church-owned property, and movable objects of cultural value.

This essay explores a number of issues concerning the relationship between works of art and cultural property. From the perspective of a museum director, it posits an ontological distinction between the idea of a work of art and the concept of cultural property. The essay concludes by arguing that to the extent that nations place restrictions on the export of their art, they inevitably affect the way their culture is understood and perceived abroad and so alter the larger metanarrative of culture.

The Supreme Court issued its decision in Spring 1998 in California and State Lands Commission v Deep Sea Research, Inc. making the noteworthy holding that treasure salvors that have 'actual possession' of shipwrecks located on a state's submerged lands will not be ousted from federal court jurisdiction on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. Calling into question the Supreme Court's previous opinion involving shipwreck litigation in Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., decided in 1982, the Court has made clear that claims for title to such submerged artifacts can now be fully adjudicated in federal court. In making this significant ruling, and in redefining what constitutes a 'colorable claim' to title in shipwrecks under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, the Court resuscitated legal precedent that predates the 1865 sinking of shipwrecked Brother Jonathan.

The 'Group of Seven' has a significant, though not totally uncontroversial, place in Canadian art. Robert McMichael's 'obsession' with the group led to the establishment of the McMichael Collection and then to an agreement between Mr. McMichael and his wife and the government of Ontario concerning the collection. The subsequent litigation as to whether the government had failed to comply with provisions in the agreement on the administration of the collection and on the policy to be followed in adding works to it did not entirely resolve these issues but highlighted a matter of importance to donors of works of art and the bodies to which donations are made: how far may donors ensure compliance with the terms on which they make donations?