Over the last 30 years, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1 has emerged as one of the most influential instruments of modern international law. The Convention, which was adopted at the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980 and has meanwhile been ratified by more than 80 States.2 Yet, as it does not operate retroactively,3 the scope of application is growing only slowly and its practical importance stems, rather, from the fact that the Convention is widely considered a restatement of customary international law. As early as 1971 the International Court of Justice referred to the articles governing termination for breach of treaty as a codification of the existing law on the subject.4 Since then both international tribunals and national courts have more and more habitually relied on the material provisions of the Convention to ascertain traditional rules of the law of treaties.5

This article ponders the possibilities existing for legal re-understandings of vulnerability and adopts the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters (2016) as its principal discursive context. Despite some promise and potential, the draft Articles retreated to conservative understandings of disaster-vulnerability and missed an opportunity for a sophisticated formulation. This article argues for disaster law's engagement with contemporary social science research. The work of critical geographers, historians and anthropologists in political ecology is particularly apposite. By rejecting geophysical outlooks in favour of structuralist understandings of disaster-vulnerability, such research facilitates consideration of interrelated histories and the role of economics in producing disaster-vulnerability. This article argues that such perspectives allow for reconsideration of current legal understandings regarding disaster-vulnerability (particularly in relation to international cooperation and risk and reduction) and thereby offer some promise for enriching disaster law's comprehensiveness and relevance.

The continuous transfer of authority from the national sphere to inter-governmental organizations gives rise to an increasing risk that States may be mandated by their obligations under these organizations to take measures that are inconsistent with their obligations under International Human Rights Law. Drawing on the approaches of various international, regional and national jurisdictions, this article explores two possible models for restructuring International Law that could ensure that human rights obligations remain effective. The ‘international constitutional’ approach would ensure that human rights are enshrined within the ‘constitutional’ instruments of IGOs, preventing incompatible rules from emerging. The ‘parochial’ approach would ensure that human rights as protected at the national or regional level would take precedence over conflicting international obligations.

It is generally accepted that, in actions in personam, the foundation of the court's jurisdiction at common law is the service of process.1 To this extent the rules as to service define the limits of the court's jurisdiction. So, for a claimant to establish the jurisdiction of the English court over an overseas company2 he must be able to serve process on the company in accordance with the rules of service. The general rule is that an overseas company, like an individual, may be served with process in England if present within the jurisdiction.3 However, since a company is only a legal (not natural) person, it cannot be present in the same way as an individual. It has therefore been necessary for special rules to be laid down by which it can be determined whether or not an overseas company is present in England and therefore may be served with process here. Before 1992 those rules were contained in sections 691 and 695 of the Companies Act 19854 (the pre-1992 regime). However, in 1992 the law was amended and a separate provision was laid down in section 694A of the Companies Act 1985 to regulate the service of process on any overseas company with a branch in Great Britain (the 1992 regime).

This case deals with the use of the English law anti-suit injunction in combination with the Brussels Convention.2 That Convention has since been replaced by the so-called Brussels I Regulation.3 The Regulation kept the structure and basic rules of the Convention so that this judgment will stay effective and the rule established by it will apply equally under the Regulation.

On 17 December 2002 the International Court gave its judgment in a dispute over two small islands in the Celebes Sea claimed by both Indonesia and Malaysia. The islands in question, Ligitan and Sipadan, are located off the north-east coast of Borneo and lie approximately 15.5 nautical miles apart. Both are very small and Ligitan is uninhabited; Sipadan, on the other hand, was developed by Malaysia into a tourist resort for scuba diving in the 1980s. In 1998 Indonesia and Malaysia referred the dispute to the Court by means of a Special Agreement, asking for a decision ‘on the basis of the treaties, agreements and any other evidence furnished by the Parties’ on whether sovereignty over the islands belonged to Indonesia or to Malaysia.

After almost two years of uncertainty, the EU is now progressing towards the adoption of harmonized rules on the law applicable to divorce through the activation, for the very first time, of the enhanced cooperation mechanism.

Of all the rights of indigenous people, none is more central to the survival of their culture than the claim to their ancestral lands. The resolution of their claims to ancestral lands is one of the fundamental issues of our time—indeed of all time. Often called a human rights issue—a description apt to reinforce the strong moral foundations of the claims of the indigenous peoples—it is an issue which we cannot ignore. Throughout the world people of all races and all colours have a powerful emotional attachment to their ancestral lands. That attachment is the very core of a people's culture and is vital to the survival of the culture. As the UN Human Rights Committee has recognised, in the context of the exercise of cultural rights protected by Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources”.

On 27 February 2011, it was reported in the media that the United Kingdom had revoked the diplomatic immunity of Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qaddafi and his family.1 Earlier that day, the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, told BBC1's Andrew Marr Show:

The other development under the justice and home affairs pillar of the Union relevant to European civil procedure is the so-called Brussels II Convention: the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters signed on 28 May 1998. This Convention continues the work of the 1968 Brussels Convention by extending similar principles to the field of matrimonial matters. The earlier Convention is seen as the general convention and the 1998 Convention as a lex specialis which follows the principles of the earlier Convention as far as possible.

The extent to which judicial review is granted and effectively exercised is a key element for the evaluation of any modern legal system. The principle of judicial review provides a basic protection for individuals and prevents those exercising public functions from abusing their powers to the disadvantage of the public. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the circumstances in which the courts in the United Kingdom have been prepared to intervene in order to provide relief for unlawful administrative action have expanded in spectacular fashion.2 The incorporation in the UK of the European Convention on Human Rights on 2 October 2000 in the UK marks a significant change in this field.