The UN Human Rights Committee's finding in Teitiota v New Zealand has garnered widespread global attention for its recognition that the effects of climate change may put people's lives at risk or expose them to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, thus triggering States’ non-refoulement obligations. However, a secondary—and highly problematic—consequence of the decision has been its confusing and misplaced focus on ‘imminence’ of harm. This reflects a concerning, albeit uneven, trend in human rights cases generally (and cases concerning climate change and human rights, in particular) to recognize violations only where rights are immediately threatened. This short article reflects on the assumptions that Teitiota has triggered about the place of imminence in international protection claims, identifies the source of confusion, and suggests a more appropriate framework to guide a category of case that is likely to become the subject of intense litigation in the future.

European private international law has long been recognised as improperly set up to deal with cross-border collective redress. In light of this shortcoming, it seems unfortunate that the private international law implications of the Representative Actions Directive (Directive (EU) No 2020/1828) have not yet been addressed coherently by the European legislator. This article examines to what extent the policy of promoting collective redress can be supported, even if only partially, through a reinterpretation of the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Furthermore, it discusses which legislative measures need to be adopted to better accommodate collective redress mechanisms within the Brussels regime.

The traditional effective control test for determining the existence of a belligerent occupation requires boots on the ground. However, the evolution of the international law of occupation and the emergence of complex situations, particularly of a technological nature, necessitate a functional approach that protects the rights of occupied populations. The political, historical and geographical conditions of Gaza allow Israel to exert effective remote control. Despite the disengagement of Israel from Gaza in 2005 and the assumption of military and political authority by Hamas, this article argues that Israel nonetheless continues to be in effective occupation of the Gaza Strip on the basis of the following grounds: (1) the relatively small size of Gaza in connection with the technological superiority of the Israeli air force allows Israeli boots to be present in Gaza within a reasonable response time; (2) Hamas's authority and armed resistance do not impede the status of occupation; (3) the long pre-disengagement occupation and close proximity between Israel and Gaza (geography) allow for the remote exercise of effective control; and (4) all imports, exports in and out of Gaza, and any movement of persons are fully controlled and regulated by Israel.

In its Chagos Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the UK's detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from the colony of Mauritius on the eve of independence constituted a violation of customary international law (CIL). This article analyses the Court's approach to establishing the emergence and content of the right to self-determination in this frustrated case of decolonisation. It goes on to examine the argument that self-determination's peremptory character has decisive consequences in this specific context—a contention which found favour with several judges in their Separate Opinions. The article explores the extent to which the claims and counterclaims, made during the advisory proceedings, turned on countervailing readings of not only the key sources of custom but also of the principle of inter-temporal law. The final sections consider the significance of the Chagos Opinion for the Chagossians, both in relation to the Archipelago's resettlement and for their outstanding appeal in the UK courts (where the European Convention on Human Rights performs a pivotal role).

This article argues that State autonomy in setting the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims can be better operationalised in the investment treaty regime. The article draws on comparative insights from WTO law, where it is established that WTO members have the right to determine the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims, although significant disciplines are placed on the means used to achieve those aims. It is then argued that investment treaties are, properly interpreted, consistent with the idea that States retain autonomy to determine the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims. Finally, the article proposes removing from the fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation standards proportionality balancing stricto sensu, as this undermines State autonomy in setting the level of protection. Overall, this article argues for a partial reorientation of investment law, in which non-discriminatory measures that pursue a permissible regulatory aim, including at a particular level, should not amount to a breach of a treaty where a State uses the means that involve the least possible restriction of the competing interests protected by relevant investment treaty obligations.

This article considers the under-studied question of the interests that the international community may have in the protection of the marine environment within national jurisdiction. This question is addressed on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the major documents that reveal the convictions of the international community, including UN General Assembly resolutions, major international treaties and the outcomes of multilateral conferences. The core argument is that, despite the dominance of the zonal jurisdictional regime in the law of the sea, the international community has, in fact, clearly and consistently demonstrated an interest in the protection of the marine environment within national jurisdiction. Although a finding of community interest does not affect the character of the coastal State's primary environmental protection obligations, it may have implications for the rights of third States to challenge a coastal State's failure to protect its own marine environment. Whether third States choose to exercise this right in practice remains to be seen; however, this article's findings should indicate to States that their actions and policies concerning the protection of the marine environment of their own maritime zones are a matter of concern to all States.

The legal and technical issues relating to the outer continental shelf entitlements in the Central Arctic Ocean present several challenges, most of which are to be resolved in accordance with Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Recently, two coastal States in the Central Arctic Ocean have made fully fledged submissions relating to the Arctic to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Russia has made a revised submission that is currently being considered by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The submission of Denmark/Greenland will most likely only be considered in 10 or 15 years time.