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The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Lands Once Part of the Old Dominions of the Crown

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Anthony Mason
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Extract

Of all the rights of indigenous people, none is more central to the survival of their culture than the claim to their ancestral lands. The resolution of their claims to ancestral lands is one of the fundamental issues of our time—indeed of all time. Often called a human rights issue—a description apt to reinforce the strong moral foundations of the claims of the indigenous peoples—it is an issue which we cannot ignore. Throughout the world people of all races and all colours have a powerful emotional attachment to their ancestral lands. That attachment is the very core of a people's culture and is vital to the survival of the culture. As the UN Human Rights Committee has recognised, in the context of the exercise of cultural rights protected by Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources”.

Type
Article
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , October 1997 , pp. 812 - 830
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1997

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References

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