Part III of The Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 entered into force on 1 May 19961. As from that date2, the choice of law rules for tort developed in the common law will be abolished, in respect of most causes of action in tort3, and will be replaced by statutory rules of a radically different character4. The new choice of law rules essentially provide that, as a general rule, the law applicable to a tort is the law of the country5 in which the events constituting the tort in question occur6. This general rule may be subject to displacement where, in the light of a comparison between the significance of the factors connecting the tort with the country whose law is applicable under the general rule, and the significance of the factors connecting the tort with another country, it appears substantially more appropriate for the applicable law to be the law of that other country7. The express abolition of the common law rules is (with one significant exception)8 effected by section 10 of the Act. That section provides: the rules of the common law, in so far as they—

(a) require actionability under both the law of the forum and the law of another country for the purpose of determining whether a tort or delict is actionable; or

(b) allow (as an exception from the rules falling within paragraph (a) above) for the law of a single country to be applied for the purpose of determining the issues, or any of the issues, arising in the case in question,

are hereby abolished so far as they apply to any claim in tort or delict which is not excluded from the operation of this Part by section 13 below.

Extraterritorial application of domestic competition law is an important feature of the current regulatory framework governing anticompetitive conduct. Japan was initially hesitant to apply its Antimonopoly Act in such a manner. However, over the last two decades there has been a significant shift in its approach. Japan has gradually embraced extraterritoriality and the Japan Fair Trade Commission has actively enforced competition law in a purely offshore context. This article investigates this evolution and considered the most recent and controversial cases in which Japan has applied its laws in a distinctive fashion.

The United Kingdom (‘UK’) has indicated its intention not to opt-in to two proposals from the European Commission aimed at further developing the Common European Asylum System through the replacement of existing instruments on asylum procedures and reception conditions. The purpose of the European Union (‘EU’) amendment process is to establish rules that more closely align the legal framework for asylum in the Member States so that asylum seekers receive the same higher standard of treatment in any Member State in which they choose to make their application, and to address criticism that the Directives are incompatible with human rights obligations. The UK asserts that its asylum procedures satisfy the standards imposed by its obligations under international and European law, and does not view further harmonization of asylum matters at EU level as necessary or appropriate. Its decision not to opt-in raises issues regarding sovereignty, subsidiarity, the rule of law and European integration. This article will explore these issues, as well as provide an overview of select provisions from the proposals in light of UK asylum policy.

This article, on the basis of a consideration of the development of the law relating to the use of passports as a tool of national security in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, challenges the common law conception of passports, arguing that passports effectively confer rights and so, consequentially, that the refusal or withdrawal of a passport represents a denial of rights. From this conclusion a number of points flow. Though these consequences are most acute for the United Kingdom and Canada, in which passports remain regulated by, and are issued under, prerogative powers, there are also a number of points of significance for Australia and New Zealand, where passports have a statutory basis.

On 10 October 2002 the International Court of Justice gave its decision on the merits in the case brought by the Republic of Cameroon against the Federal Republic of Nigeria over their land and maritime boundary. The judgment, which addresses a number of issues of general international law concerning maritime boundaries and territorial sovereignty, as well as providing a detailed treatment of the particular facts, concludes a case that began in 1994 and has had an unusual history. As this background had a significant bearing on the eventual outcome, a brief recapitulation may be useful.

A feature of the new law of the sea introduced by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention),1 was the capacity for coastal states to assert vast maritime claims over waters adjacent to their coastlines. A continental shelf could be claimed out to a minimum of 200 nautical miles,2 while the newly recognized Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) also extended out to 200 nautical miles.3 The continental shelf had previously been recognized under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf4 and so the extension of coastal state sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil was consistent with already existing law of the sea principles. However the EEZ, which gave to coastal states sovereign rights over the living and non-living resources of the sea-bed and adjacent waters,5 was a new initiative of the LOS Convention and represents one of the most significant contemporary expansions of state sovereignty. By contrast with the extended continental shelf, which did not affect any significant pre-existing activities on the sea-bed, the new EEZ had a major impact upon fishing activities. As coastal states around the world eagerly proclaimed EEZs, waters previously considered high seas areas available for fishing6 were now within the reach of state fisheries’ jurisdiction and control. The result has been that under contemporary international law those waters available for the exercise of the high seas ‘freedom’ of fishing,7 have gradually been reduced. This new regime, in combination with parallel initiatives to regulate some aspects of high seas fishing activities, has meant that ‘legal’ fishing on the high seas is now subject to extensive regulation.

This article examines the compatibility of the extraterritorial application of unilateral legislation with the project of international law. Focusing on two instruments, the Dodd-Frank Act passed by the United States Congress and intended to regulate the activities of US listed companies operating in the Congo and the EU conflict minerals legislation, the article challenges their underlying premises that revenues from natural resources perpetuate conflict and resulting human rights abuses. In so far as these instruments make no provision for meaningful participation by the foreign populations which are the objects of legislation, it is argued that there is a tension between these unilateral instruments and the basic premises of law-making in international law as a democratic enterprise centred around governmental representation. By exclusively directing sanctions and other disciplinary measures at rebels, both legislative instruments have the problematic effect of strengthening the exploitation of natural resources by kleptocratic regimes and undermining the right of populations in conflict zones to civil disobedience as an inescapable component of their right of self-determination.