There is a large gap between the proportion of employed and well-educated women and those sitting on the boards of EU companies. However, the Commission's proposal for a Directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges does not constitute an appropriate legal solution for this problem. The Commission's reasoning underlying the draft Directive is so strongly pervaded by economic considerations that it gives the impression that women are merely instruments useful to attain economic objectives. By contrast, the need for enhancing women's representation in the boards of companies is justified by much more fundamental and incomparably higher-ranked values, and including equality between women and men and the need for democratic legitimization of the EU and of its economic governance. These fundamental values, however, must be achieved in accordance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. The present article proposes some alternatives to compulsory gender quotas that might be used by EU institutions to promote more gender-balanced boards of EU companies.

One of the asserted advantages and goals of the unification of substantive law lies in the prevention of ‘forum shopping’,1 ie the lawyer's act of seeking the forum that is most beneficial to his client's interest.2 This has been pointed out not only in discussions on unification of law in general,3 but also in discussions on specific international uniform contract law conventions, such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods4 (hereinafter CISG),5 the Geneva Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road6 (hereinafter CMR)7 and the UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring8 (hereinafter IFC).9

Increased policy harmonization on refugee matters in the European Union (EU), namely the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), has created the imperative for a transnational judicial comparative dialogue between national courts. This article is based on a structured, focused comparison approach to examining a key element of a transnational European legal dialogue, namely, the use of foreign law by national judges when making their own decisions on asylum. It does so by examining two countries, France and Britain, as representative of the difference in legal tradition and culture within the EU in terms of the civil–common law divide. Both case studies are structured around a common set of empirical and jurisprudential research questions. The empirical findings reveal a surprising lack of transnational use of national jurisprudence on asylum between judges. Nonetheless, a slight but noticeable increase in the use of transnational asylum jurisprudence in the British and French courts must be noted. Two broad accounts—one rational, the other cultural—are applied in each of the case studies to explain this empirical finding. This article concludes on the broader implications of these findings for the establishment of a CEAS by 2012.

In both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, legal reform efforts have invariably relied on Western models and in administrative law this model has been the French. The first such effort was with the Tanzimat (The Charter of Reformation) in 1839, though these reforms did not have deep effect until the 1860s when the bases of the main administrative institutions such as the Turkish Conseil d'Etat were laid down.1 However, the Conseil d'Etat was not the only institutional model taken from France. The French layer of Turkish administrative law includes other institutions such as the Cour des Comptes, the Tribunal des Conflits, some financial organisations, the system of autonomous provincial and local administration and administrative tutelage.2

In the LaGrand case, the United States found themselves for the second time within three years before the International Court of Justice dealing with the death penalty imposed on foreign nationals in the United States.1 In contrast to the earlier case filed by Paraguay, the German-sponsored LaGrand case survived the provisional measures phase and went on to the merits stage. In its judgment of 27 June 2001, the Court largely affirmed all four German submissions and ruled that the United States had violated international law.

An injunction to restrain foreign proceedings is probably the most powerful remedy available in an English court for dealing with a jurisdictional dispute. It is certainly the most controversial because the court is interfering with proceedings in another jurisdiction and no comparable remedy exists in civil law systems. The influence of European Community law has intensified the controversy because it has become increasingly doubtful whether the remedy is compatible with the scheme for allocating jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention (or its successor, the Brussels I Regulation) The House of Lord's decision in Turner v Grovit is an important development because their Lordships have made a reference to the European Court of Justice asking, ‘Is it consistent with the Brussels Convention for the courts of the United Kingdom to grant restraining orders against defendants who are threatening to commence or continue legal proceedings in another Convention country when those defendants are acting in bad faith with the intent and purpose of frustrating or obstructing proceedings properly before the English courts?’ (The issue is probably identical to that which would arise under the Brussels I Regulation and references herein to the Convention are generally equally applicable to the Regulation).

The conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam and its progress through the ratification procedures of the 15 member States of the European Union provides an occasion to re-examine a familiar question. What is meant by the claim by the European Court of Justice that the European Com-munity Treaties have created “a new legal order of international law”1 or, more radically, “a new legal order”?2 Is EC law to be regarded as a particularly effective system of regional international law, or has it been created as, or mutated into, an entirely new species of law? If there are indeed two legal orders, to what extent are they still capable of cross-fertilisation? What about “European Union law”? Have the Treaty on European Union and now the Treaty of Amsterdam eroded the dichotomy between the two legal orders of public international law and EU law? Is public international law itself taking on some of the characteristics which have made EC law an attractive as well as an effective system for regulating relations between sovereign States? Are the two streams converging?

The technique of ‘evolutive interpretation’ is well known in public international law.2 It is particularly associated with treaty regimes like that of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).3 The currency of this technique of interpretation has, however, been less evident in general public international law. It is not insignificant therefore that the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in a case about navigational and related rights has now made unambiguously clear that, where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty is one of continuing duration, the parties as a general rule must be presumed to have intended those terms to have an ‘evolving meaning’.4

Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

In recent years there has been a trend towards independent and more transparent ethical regulation for sitting judges, which is said to promote public confidence in the judicial institution, and reflect a move towards accountability and transparency as judicial values. However, regimes governing sitting judges largely fall away when the judge retires from the bench. Increasing longevity and rising numbers of former judges raise complex ethical regulation questions. Drawing on judicial ethics regimes in England and Wales, Australia, the United States and New Zealand, and instances where the conduct of former judges has reflected poorly on the integrity of the judiciary, this article argues that there are strong reasons for extending ethics regulation beyond judicial retirement. By reference to the principles that inform the rules regulating the conduct of sitting judges, we investigate the extent to which misconduct and disciplining regimes should extend to former judges, and whether there is a stronger role for soft instruments and more formalized processes for regulating former judges. In doing so, we propose a model for the development of ethical regulation for former judges.

International law recognizes two mechanisms for the protection of individuals in case of violations of peremptory norms affecting individuals: invocation of State responsibility erga omnes and diplomatic protection. While they share some fields of applications and are both based on some measure of indirect injury, there are important differences between these two mechanisms. This paper analyses and discusses these differences and similarities, and concludes by demonstrating that the essential distinction is to be found in the legal interest in the claim and the nature of the claim. The traditional conditions for the bringing of a claim based on indirect injury that are applicable to diplomatic protection (exhaustion of local remedies and nationality of claims) are not applicable to invocation of responsibility erga omnes. This paper will argue that the latter is based on an obligation owed to the community as a whole, including the claimant State, and therefore constitutes a direct claim. In the interest of enhancing protection of individuals against violations of peremptory norms, the simultaneous existence of these two mechanisms should be welcomed.