International human rights bodies with responsibility for monitoring the implementation and enforcement of rights protected by human rights treaties are usually empowered to indicate interim, or provisional, measures of protection in cases of urgency in order to safeguard the rights and persons of victims of alleged violations of human rights.1 Whether State parties are obliged to comply with a request for interim measures of protection has been the subject of some debate. The purpose of this note is to examine the issue of the binding force of interim measures of protection in the United Nations human rights system in light of the views of the Human Rights Committee (hereafter the Committee) in Piandiong, Morailos and Bulan v The Philippines.2 Before doing so, however, we need to recall briefly the Committee's role in securing the rights of the individual.

In September 1997 the government of the United Kingdom announced new policies on the dumping of offshore installations. The new policies centred on a general prohibition of dumping of offshore installations for all but those instances where there was absolutely no alternative.1 They were presented as a sea change from the policies of the previous Conservative government which had required each case to be assessed on its merits and were hailed by some at the time as a major development.2 To date this has been a development with little legislative substance at the UK domestic level.3 At the international level, however, it appears to have produced more substantive changes, primarily by enabling the government to play an important role in the development of new rules under the Ospar Convention 1992.4 And, while the full extent of the United Kingdom's influence on the exact developments is not clear, it is clear that the new rules contain developments which are of importance not only to the parties to the Ospar Convention, but to the international law on the dumping of offshore installations generally. These legal developments will be considered below.

This article discusses the data embassy, a new international legal concept created in response to a pressing problem. In 2007, Estonia fell victim to ‘distributed denial-of-service attacks’ and consequently, made Estonia's entire public sector data communications network inoperable. Their response was to strengthen their protection against and penalization for cybercrime, and to develop the concept of a ‘data embassy’. On 20 June 2017 the Republic of Estonia and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg signed an ‘Agreement on the hosting of data and information systems’, to host Estonian data in Luxembourg. Such data embassies perform a unique function and benefit from many privileges and immunities, but their legal status has been unclear. This article addresses the question concerning the legal status of the premises of the data embassy.

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS—“the Tribunal”) heard its first case at the end of 1997.1 A remarkable split judgment, which saw both the President and Vice-President of the Tribunal joining the minority judges in recording persuasive dissenting judgments, struck a harsh and discordant note, regrettable in what should have been an auspicious debut.

The title of this article is not intended to disparage the value of freedom of speech in a modern democratic society. The right freely and publicly to criticise the institutions of government, the conduct of public affairs whether by the executive or Parliament, the freedom, indeed, to criticise the performance of the judiciary—that right is one of the glories of the unwritten constitution of this country. Its importance is constantly and forcefully emphasised in our highest courts. In one of the Spycatcher cases Lord Bridge of Harwich said that the right to freedom of speech is one of the fundamental freedoms essential to a free society.1 In the same case Lord Oliver quoted Blackstone's statement that the liberty of the press is essential to the nature of a free State.2 More recently Lord Goff of Chieveley, observing that he could see no inconsistency between English law and the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to freedom of speech, added: “This is scarcely surprising, since we may pride ourselves on the fact that freedom of speech has existed in this country perhaps as long as, if not longer than, it has existed in any other country in the world.”3