A fair trial is a basic element of the notion of the rule of law,1 and the principles of ‘due process’ and ‘the rule of law’ are fundamental to the protection of human rights.2 At the centre of any legal system, therefore, must be a means by which legal rights are asserted and breaches remedied through the process of a fair trial in court, as the law is useless without effective remedies.3 The fairness of the legal process has a particular significance in criminal cases, as it protects against human rights abuses. Hence, constitutional due process and elementary justice require that the judicial functions of trial and sentencing be conducted with fundamental fairness, especially where the irreversible sanction of the death penalty is involved.4

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has been the leading force of trade liberalization in services. This article attempts to decipher the implications of GATS in financial services. It explains the schedules of commitments made by Member States, and the way countries engage in commitments in financial services. These are critical in understanding how the GATS rules are applied by each Member, and whether GATS has been effective.

The so-called ‘prudential carve out’ is analysed in detail with consideration to the general prudential regime of the financial system since it has implications for the stability and integrity of the financial system. The article concludes with some policy analysis on how prudential carve out might be better implemented.

Does international law govern how States and armed groups treat their own forces? Do serious violations of the laws of war and human rights law that would otherwise constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity fall squarely outside the scope of international criminal law when committed against fellow members of the same armed forces? Orthodoxy considered that such forces were protected only under relevant domestic criminal law and/or human rights law. However, landmark decisions issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) suggest that crimes committed against members of the same armed forces are not automatically excluded from the scope of international criminal law. This article argues that, while there are some anomalies and gaps in the reasoning of both courts, there is a common overarching approach under which crimes by a member of an armed group against a person from the same forces can be prosecuted under international law. Starting from an assessment of the specific situation of the victim, this article conducts an in-depth analysis of the concepts of ‘hors de combat’ and ‘allegiance’ for war crimes and that of the ‘lawful target’ for crimes against humanity, providing an interpretative framework for the future prosecution of such crimes.

On 25 July 2011, the governments of Australia and Malaysia announced that they had entered into an ‘Arrangement’ for the transfer of asylum seekers.1 Its stated aim was to deter asylum seekers from travelling by boat to Australia by providing that the next 800 asylum seekers to arrive unlawfully would be transferred to Malaysia in exchange for the resettlement of 4,000 UNHCR-approved refugees living there.2 The joint media release by the Australian Prime Minister and Minister for Immigration lauded it as a ‘groundbreaking arrangement’ that demonstrated ‘the resolve of Australia and Malaysia to break the people smugglers’ business model, stop them profiting from human misery, and stop people risking their lives at sea’.3 The success of the Arrangement relied on Malaysia being perceived as an inhospitable host country for asylum seekers, with the Australian Government emphasising that it provided ‘the best course of action to make sure that we sent the maximum message of deterrence’.4 The Government also made clear that those transferred to Malaysia would ‘go to the back of the [asylum] queue’.5

In February 2011,2 an uprising began in Benghazi in eastern Libya against the long-established Gaddafi3 Government. After initial military success by the rebels in the east, the government responded forcefully. In the light of threats made by the government to the lives of people in Benghazi, the Security Council authorized ‘any necessary measures’ to protect civilian lives in Libya and to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya's air space.4 Acting on this authorization, NATO forces intervened to enforce the no-fly zone and to protect civilians. The resolution precluded the occupation of Libya, so the NATO action was confined to aerial and some naval bombardment of regime targets in Libya. The combined effects of operations by the irregular forces of the rebels and the bombing by NATO eventually led to the defeat of Government forces and the death of President Gaddafi on 20 October 2011. However, the overthrow of the regime was principally the work of groups in the west and south-west, not formally associated with the original insurrection in the east. This note is not concerned with matters of legality of the use of force or the way in which the campaign was conducted by any of the participants.5 It deals with the diplomatic aspects of the development of relations between the United Kingdom, the Gaddafi Government of Libya and the ‘National Transitional Council’ (NTC). It raises some speculation about the implications in domestic law of the way British policy was conducted.

This article analyses two nearly identical lawsuits regarding the actions of UN peacekeepers during the Srebrenica genocide. The decisions are of importance as a matter of international law for three reasons. First, the Court applied human rights obligations abroad, not by holding that the relevant treaties have extraterritorial effect, but by finding the ICCPR to have been incorporated into the domestic law of the host state (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and determining that the standards codified in the relevant provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR were rules of customary international law that were binding extraterritorially (whether or not the treaty obligations themselves would extend abroad). Second, in finding those obligations to have been breached, the Court relied on the Dutch battalion's eviction of the victims from its UN compound, not on any responsibility to protect those already outside the compound. Finally, on the issue of attribution, the Court of Appeal developed the doctrine of ‘effective control’ in several key respects. I argue that the Court was largely correct in its attribution analysis and that this may prove to be a landmark in the development of international law on attribution in such contexts. Most important among the issues addressed in the Court's discussion of attribution are its findings that: (i) the ‘effective control’ standard applies equally to the contributing state and the receiving international organization; (ii) ‘effective control’ includes not just giving orders, but also the capacity to prevent the wrongdoing; and (iii) troop-contributing states may sometimes hold that ‘power to prevent’ by virtue of their authority to discipline and criminally punish their troops for contravening UN orders.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the first international instrument that includes a general provision on the mental element required before criminal responsibility for an international crime attaches (Article 30). This article analyses that provision from a comparative perspective, drawing on common law and civil law understandings of intent. It analyses the jurisprudence and commentary concerning Article 30 in detail, and attempts to draw some conclusions as to what aspects of the common law and civil law concepts of intent are covered by it.

Since the Canada – Renewable Energy (2013) dispute at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) has been the focal point of academic debate on the trade-environment interface, with a growing consensus that WTO subsidy rules need to be revisited with a view to securing ‘policy space’ for government support for renewable energy. This article explores whether, as suggested by some scholars, the European Union (EU)’s system of justifications for renewable energy aid could serve as a source of inspiration for the WTO. While this proposition may appear attractive at first sight, it is hardly conceivable, or even desirable, that the EU's approach to sheltering government support for renewable energy could be transposed to the WTO. This is because the two systems of subsidy control are fundamentally different in both substantive and procedural terms and, importantly, these differences reflect distinct objectives and political/institutional contexts. Nonetheless, this comparative analysis sheds light on where the key challenges lie for the WTO in ensuring that international trade rules and climate change mitigation objectives are mutually supportive. It is argued that the case for reviewing the SCM Agreement cannot be made by simply forging parallels with the EU's regulatory model, but needs to be carefully construed on the basis of a proper understanding of whether and how green policy space is actually constrained under the current WTO subsidy and trade remedy rules. However, this requires better information on existing WTO members’ practice in relation to renewable energy subsidies, as well as on their environmental effectiveness and possible trade-distortive impact. In this sense, the most valuable lesson that the WTO can draw from the EU's regulatory experience is the imperative of improving the transparency and knowledge-enhancing elements of its subsidy control system.

The current relationship between UK and Strasbourg is politically fraught, which presents inevitable challenges for both jurisdictions. This article will analyse how the Strasbourg Court has responded to these challenges when dealing with applications against the UK, particularly when an application is brought following determination by the UK Supreme Court. It will be argued that there is some evidence that the Strasbourg Court has recently been using the admissibility stage as a novel site for effecting strategic behaviour, in order to moderate and influence UK–Strasbourg relations. The effect of this recent inclination, and some possible justifications for it, will then be set out.

Against a background of increasingly intense legal harmonisation and with the prospects of Central European accession to the EU drawing ever closer, a recent decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, Dec.30/1998 (VI.25) AB1 has highlighted the constitutional implications of applying EC law in the domestic system of an associate state. The judgment itself concerned the constitutionality of the competition provisions of the EC-Hungary Europe Agreement (“EA”) together with Decision 2/96 of the Association Council on the relevant Implementing Rules (“IR”). While the Hungarian court is not the first of its type in an associate state to deal with the effect internally of an Association Agreement,2 nevertheless its decision offers certain insights into the judicial response to the integration process in Central Europe.

This paper examines the current European private antitrust enforcement policy. The European Commission's White Paper of 2008, the unofficial Draft Directive of 2009 and the collective redress consultation of 2011 consider a facilitated access to private actions for all types of antitrust violations under articles 101 and 102 TFEU in order to effectively compensate the victims of anticompetitive conduct. Assuming that changes are necessary, the paper argues that it might be worthwhile to limit this policy to damages claims against hardcore violations such as cartels. This suggestion is based on two main arguments. Firstly, the current European private antitrust policy probably underestimates the risks of more damages actions against all types of infringements neglecting insights from the economic analysis of law. Secondly, a revised approach is not only in line with the thinking that underpins the reform but also addresses an actual need as revealed by a comparison of litigation data from different jurisdictions. Refining the European private antitrust policy, it is argued that a focus on hard-core anticompetitive constraints such as price fixing would mitigate the potential for a strategic use of antitrust litigation and reduce the likelihood that the reform of European antitrust damages actions will lead to negative outcomes.