¹ G de Búrca, ‘Unpacking the Concept of Discrimination in EC and International Trade Law’ in C Barnard and J Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing 2002) 181, 182.

² Adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980: 1155 UNTS 331.

³ As a notable exception N DiMascio and J Pauwelyn, ‘Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ (2008) 102 AJIL 48.

⁴ Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, (concluded 15 April 1994) 1867 UNTS 14; including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) (concluded 15 April 1994) Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (concluded 15 April 1994) Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, (1994) 33 ILM 1168.

⁵ Consolidated version, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, OJ 2008 C 115, 47–199; formerly Treaty establishing the European Community ‘TEC’ (Consolidated version, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam), OJ 2002 C 325, 33–184.

⁶ Concluded 17 December 1992 by the US, Canada and Mexico, in force 1 January 1994: 107 Stat 2057; (1993) 32 ILM 605.

⁷ BITs referred to in this paper are available at <http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx>.

⁸ The approach of considering different elements on a case-by-case basis in order to assess whether a measure amounts to unlawful discrimination has been supported most prominently by J Pauwelyn, ‘The Unbearable Lightness of Likeness’ in M Panizzon and others (eds), GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services (CUP 2008).

⁹ See also Qin, JY ‘Defining Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade Organization’ (2005) 23 Boston U Intl LJ 215, 223Google Scholar.

¹⁰ WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC—Asbestos) (adopted 5 April 2001) WT/DS135/AB/R [100].

¹¹ Ehring, L, ‘De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law; National and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment—or Equal Treatment?’ (2002) 36 J of World Trade 921; Pauwelyn (n 8) 358CrossRefGoogle Scholar; F Ortino, ‘From “Non-discrimination” to “Reasonableness”: A Paradigm Shift in International Economic Law’ (Jean Monnet Working Paper 2005), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=922524>.

¹² De Búrca (n 1); Horn, H and Weiler, J H, ‘European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products’ (2004) 3 World Trade Rev 129, 131ff; Ortino (n 11) 14CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ See art III:2 (second sentence) GATT in connection with Ad art III:2 GATT.

¹⁴ For an overview of comparator clauses in BITs see eg Newcombe, A and Paradell, L, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties—Standards of Treatment (Kluwer 2009) 160Google Scholar; UNCTAD, National Treatment (NY/Geneva: United Nations Publication 1999)Google Scholar 28ff, <http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=191&intItemID= 2322&lang=1>.

¹⁵ UK-Belize BIT (1982) art 3(1).

¹⁶ US-Honduras BIT (1995) art II(1); US-Senegal BIT (1983), art II(2).

¹⁷ China-Iran BIT (2000) art 4(1).

¹⁸ Ethiopia-Turkey BIT (2000) art 3(1).

¹⁹ On the tertium comparationis for non-discrimination in trade law see English, J, Wettbewerbsgleichheit im grenzüberschreitenden Handel: Mit Schlussfolgerungen für indirekte Steuern (Mohr Siebeck Gmbh & Co 2008) 293Google Scholar, 412 ff; in constitutional law see Oesch, M, Differenzierung und Typisierung—Zur Dogmatik der Rechtsgleichheit in der Rechtsetzung (Stämpfli Verlag; Auflage 2008) 34–38Google Scholar, with references.

²⁰ For an overview see also Melloni, M, The Principle of National Treatment in the GATT: A Survey of the Jurisprudence, Practice and Policy (Emile Bruylant 2005) 122–25Google Scholar.

²¹ GATT Panel Report, Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines (Germany—Sardines), G/26 (adopted 31 October 1952) BISD 1S/53 [13]; GATT Panel Report, Canada/Japan—Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber (Japan—SPF Dimension Lumber), L/6470 (adopted 19 July 1989) BISD 36S/167 [5.13]ff; GATT Working Party Report, The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate (EEC—Animal Feed Proteins), GATT/CP.4/39 (adopted 3 April 1950) BISD II/188, [4.2].

²² GATT Working Party Report, Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464 (adopted 2 December 1970) BISD 18S/97, [18].

²³ eg Case 27/67 Fink-Frucht [1968] ECR 223.

²⁴ LCIA Arbitral Tribunal, Arbitral Award, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, LCIA Case No UN3467, 1 July 2004 (US-Ecuador BIT).

²⁵ ibid paras 168, 173, 176ff.

²⁶ ibid paras 79, 168. The Occidental award has been subject to substantial criticism, see eg Kurtz, J, ‘The use and abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents’ (2005) 20 EJIL 749CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 764ff; McLachlan, CQ, Shore, L and Weiniger, M, International Investment Arbitration—Substantive Principles (Gruyter; Auflage 2007) 252CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Newcombe and Paradell (n 14) 169–70; Franck, SD, ‘Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v Republic of Ecuador. Final Award. London Court of International Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467’ (2005) 99 AJIL 675CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 679; DiMascio and Pauwelyn (n 3) 85.

²⁷ For the WTO see eg GATT Panel Report (n 21) [4.3]; for the EU see eg Case 170/78 Commission v UK, para 14 (competitive relationship between wine and beer).

²⁸ At least for purposes of art III:2 GATT it appears that the ‘like products’ concept is interpreted more narrowly than the ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ standard in that it requires both a competitive relationship and physical similarities between the products.

²⁹ EC—Asbestos (n 10) [99]: ‘a determination of “likeness” under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among products’.

³⁰ See on this issue Diebold, NF, ‘Assessing Competition in International Economic Law—A Comparison of “Market Definition” and “Comparability”’ (2011) 32 L Issues of Economic Integration 115Google Scholar, 123.

³¹ Case 106/84 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 833, para 12: ‘it is necessary first to consider certain objective characteristics … , and secondly to consider whether or not both categories of beverages are capable of meeting the same need from the point of view of consumers’.

³² See also Diebold, NF, Non-discrimination in International Trade in Services—‘Likeness’ in WTO/GATS (CUP 2010)Google Scholar 117ff; Englisch (n 19) 414; PC Mavroidis, ‘“Like Products”: Some Thoughts at the Positive and Normative Level’ in T Cottier and PC Mavroidis (eds), Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law: Past, Present, and Future (University of Michigan Press 2000) 126–27; Marchetti, JA and Mavroidis, PC, ‘What Are the Main Challenges for the GATS Framework? Don't Talk About Revolution’, (2004) 5 Eur Business Organization L Rev 511, 533Google Scholar; Bhala, R, International Trade Law: Interdisciplinary Theory and Practice, (3^rd edn, LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2007), 1589Google Scholar; EC submission in WTO Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US—Gambling) (20 April 2005) WT/DS285/R [4.40].

³³ In the more recent cases ‘likeness’ was either undisputed among the parties or the measure differentiated on the basis of origin; the adjudicating bodies thus refrained from ruling on the issue of ‘like products’; with regard to border measures see eg WTO Panel Reports, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada—Autos) (19 June 2000) WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R [10.16]; European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas [Complaint by the United States] (EC—Bananas III [US]) (25 September 1997) WT/DS27/R/USA [7.62]; with regard to internal measures see eg WTO Panel Report, United States—Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities (US—Certain EC Products) (10 January 2001) WT/DS165/R and Add.1 [6.53]f; with regard to both internal and border measures see eg WTO Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Indonesia—Autos) (23 July 1998) WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R and Corr.1 and 2, and Corr. 3 and 4, [14.113].

³⁴ RE Hudec, ‘“Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III’, in Cottier and Mavroidis (eds) (n 32) 108–09; WJ Davey and J Pauwelyn, ‘MFN Unconditionality’, in Cottier and Mavroidis (eds) (n 32) 35; Jackson, JH, Davey, WJ and Sykes, AO, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations—Cases, Materials and Text (5^th ed, West 2008) 489Google Scholarin fine; more nuanced Trebilcock, MJ and Howse, R, The Regulation of International Trade (3^rd ed, Routledge 2005) 66–67Google Scholar; Choi, WM, ‘Like Products’ in International Trade Law—Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO Jurisprudence (OUP 2003) 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar; sceptical also Charnovitz, S, ‘Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and their Application to Environmental Trade Measures’ (1994) 7 Tulane Environmental LJ 299, 323; Qin (n 9) 241Google Scholar.

³⁵ Favouring an economic interpretation of ‘likeness’ in GATS art II: Diebold (n 32) 135ff; Lang, A, ‘The GATS and Regulatory Autonomy: A Case Study of Social Regulation of the Water Industry’ (2004) 7 J of Intl Economic L 822 822–23Google Scholar; C Pitschas, ‘GATS’, in J Prieß and GM Berrisch (eds), WTO-Handbuch—World Trade Organisation (Beck Juristischer Verlag 2003) 495, 514.

³⁶ SD Myers v Canada, para 244; Pope & Talbot v Canada, para 78; Feldman v Mexico, para 171; ADM v Mexico, paras 198ff; Corn Products v. Mexico, paras 121–22; but see UPS v Canada, paras 102, 173ff; Methanex v US, part IV(B), paras 30ff, in particular para 37; all available at <www.naftaclaims.com>.

³⁷ Note that some commentators understand the aim and effects test as a self-standing substantive element within non-discrimination, as opposed to a variation of the ‘likeness’ element as suggested here; see eg Krajewski, M, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services—The Legal Impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy (Kluwer 2003) 100Google Scholar.

³⁸ GATT Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (US—Malt Beverages) (19 June 1992) DS23/R, BISD 39S/206 [5.23–26], [5.70–77]; see also GATT Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Automobiles (US—Taxes on Automobiles) (11 October 1994 unadopted) DS31/R [5.10]; both cases commented by Hudec, RE, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test’ (1998) 32 Int'l Law 619, 627Google Scholar.

³⁹ WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II) (1 November 1996) WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R [8]; EC—Bananas III (US) (n 33) [241].

⁴⁰ WTO Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US—Clove Cigarettes) (2 September 2011) WT/DS406/R [7.244]: ‘As we have explained, we believe that such legitimate objective must permeate and inform our likeness analysis’.

⁴¹ On chapter 12 trade in services NAFTA Arbitral Panel, Final Report in the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services (6 February 2001) USA-MEX-1998-2008-01 [249]ff; on chapter 11 investment protection Pope & Talbot v Canada, para 78; SD Myers v Canada, paras 248ff; Feldman v Mexico, paras 181ff; Corn Products v Mexic, paras 120, 136; T Weiler, ‘Prohibitions Against Discrimination in NAFTA Chapter 11’, in T Weiler (ed), NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects (Transnational Publishers 2004) 37ff, referring to a ‘like circumstances exception’.

⁴² Norway withdrew its model-BIT in June 2009, see Investment Treaty News, June 2009, <http://www.iisd.org/itn/?view=archives>; former draft version available at <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/hoeringer/Utkast%20til%20modellavtale2.doc>.

⁴³ See eg art 3 of the German model-BIT (1998), reproduced in UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, vol VII (NY/Geneva: United Nations Publisher 2002), 298Google Scholar, available at <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dite3vol7_en.pdf>; also Switzerland-India BIT (1997) art 4.

⁴⁴ In this sense see eg Nykomb Synergetics v Latvia, 34 (on art 10[1] of the Energy Charter Treaty): ‘in evaluating whether there is discrimination in the sense of the Treaty one should only “compare like with like”’; Consortium RFCC v Morocco, para 53 (on Italy-Morocco BIT (1990)); also Newcombe and Paradell (n 14) 160; OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Commentary to the Consolidated Text, Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV1 (1998) 11, <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng988r1e.pdf>.

⁴⁵ In this sense Adlung, R and Molinuevo, M, ‘Bilateralism in Services Trade: Is There Fire Behind the (BIT-) Smoke?’ (2008) 11 J of Intl Economic L 365, 383–84Google Scholar; Stadler, C, Die Liberalisierung des Dienstleistungshandels am Beispiel der Versicherungen: Kernelemente bilateraler und multilateraler Ordnungsrahmen einschliesslich des GATS (Duncker & Humblot 1992) 141Google Scholar; UNCTAD (n 14) 34.

⁴⁶ The first report to adopt this standard was GATT Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery (Italy—Agricultural Machinery), L/833 (23 October 1958) BISD 7S/60 [12]; see also Zdouc, W, Legal Problems Arising under the General Agreement on Trade in Services—Comparative Analysis of GATS and GATT (Difo-Druck 2002) 172–73Google Scholar; F Ortino, ‘The Principle of Non-Discrimination and its Exceptions in GATS’ in K Alexander and M Andenas (eds), The World Trade Organization and Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 175.

⁴⁷ But see, Pope & Talbot v Canada, para 57.

⁴⁸ This test is also referred to as ‘asymmetric impact test’, ‘disparate impact view’, ‘discriminatory effect test’, ‘aggregate comparison approach’ or ‘narrow’ standard of de facto discrimination; see eg Ehring (n 11) 924–25; Regan, DH, ‘Regulatory Purpose and “Like Products” in Article III:4 of the GATT (With Additional Remarks on Article III:2)’ (2002) 36 J of World Trade 443, 470Google Scholar; Davey and Pauwelyn (n 34) 38–41; Pauwelyn, J, ‘Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms Still Haunt the WTO’ (2004) 15 EJIL 575CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 583; F Ortino, ‘WTO Jurisprudence on De Jure and De Facto Discrimination’ in F Ortino and EU Petersmann (eds), The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995–2003 (Kluwer 2004) 260; Krajewski (n 37) 108–09.

⁴⁹ WTO Panel Report, EC—Asbestos WT/DS135/R and Add. 1 [8.155], as modified by WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Asbestos (n 10) [100] (emphasis partly added); also US—Clove Cigarettes (n 40) [7.269].

⁵⁰ Comprehensively English (n 19) 394, 428ff; also Ehring (n 11), 942–46; Davey and Pauwelyn (n 34) 38–41, discussing whether the ‘discriminatory effect’ should play a role in the analysis of arts III and I GATT; Ortino (n 4848) 258–62; Ortino (n 46) 179–85; DiMascio and Pauwelyn (n 3) 66; Ortino, F, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade—A Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO Law (Hart Publishing 2004)Google Scholar 336ff; Puth, S, WTO und Umwelt: Die Produkt-Prozess-Doktrin (Duncker u. Humblot GmbH 2003) 251Google Scholar; Pauwelyn (n 8) 364.

⁵¹ Case 168/78 Commission v French Republic [1980] ECR 00347, para 41; (nb ‘come’ should read ‘comes’). For an overview and references to ECJ jurisprudence see Ehring (n 11) 948–49.

⁵² This test is also referred to as ‘diagonal test’.

⁵³ Same opinion Ortino (n 11) 22–24; TJ Grierson-Weiler and IA Laird, ‘Standards of Treatment’ in P Muchlinski and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 293; DiMascio and Pauwelyn (n 3) 77; Bjorklund, AK, ‘National Treatment’ in A Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment Protection (OUP 2008) 54–56Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Grierson-Weiler and Laird (n 53) 293.

⁵⁵ Pope & Talbot v Canada, paras 42, 43–72; see also ADM v Mexico, para 205: ‘Claimants and their investment are entitled to the best level of treatment available to any other domestic investor or investment operating in like circumstances’; Loewen v US, para 140: ‘What Article 1102(3) requires is a comparison between the standard of treatment accorded to a claimant and the most favourable standard of treatment accorded to a person in like situation to that claimant’; Methanex v US, part IV(B), para 21: ‘the investor or investment of another party is entitled to the most favourable treatment accorded to some members of the domestic class’; less clear Thunderbird v Mexico, para 177, but see Separate Statement by TW Wälde, Thunderbird v Mexico, para 105.

⁵⁶ Note, however, that in certain circumstances a foreign producer of products may also suffer actual damages, for instance if goods or services imported by a state-controlled entity remain unpaid.

⁵⁷ See eg DAR Williams, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ in Muchlinski and others (eds) (n 53) 878ff, referring to awards qualifying promissory notes, loans and bank guarantees as investment; see also V Heiskanen, ‘Of Capital Import: The Definition of “Investment” in International Investment Law’ in AK Hoffmann (ed), Protection of Foreign Investment through Modern Treaty Arbitration, ASA Special Series No 34 (2010) 56, arguing that in certain cases an investment claim may arise out of an ordinary commercial transaction.

⁵⁸ WTO Panel Report (EC—Asbestos) (n 49) [8.155]ff; Ehring (n 11) 942–43.

⁵⁹ See SD Myers v Canada, para 252; similarly also Corn Products v Canada, para 138, which examined both effect and intent of the measure.

⁶⁰ R Howse and E Tuerk, ‘The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations’ in G De Búrca and J Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal Constitutional Issues (Hart Publishing 2001) 299; Howse, R, ‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A new Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate’ (2002) Columbia J of Environmental L 493Google Scholar, 515; Porges, A and Trachtman, JP, ‘Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection of Aim and Effects’ (2003) 37 J of World Trade 783Google Scholar, 796; Trebilcock and Howse (n 34) 103; Horn and Weiler (n 12) 147; Lang (n 35) 831; see also Ortino (n 48) 261.

⁶¹ Also rejecting this interpretation Ehring (n 11) 945–46.

⁶² WTO Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (21 November 2006) WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1 [7.2514] (emphasis added).

⁶³ United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (DS381), Answers of the US to the Second Set of Questions from the Panel to the Parties, 19 January 2011, paras 32ff, <http://www.ustr.gov/node/5714>.

⁶⁴ WTO Panel Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US—Tuna II) (15 September 2011) WT/DS381/R [7.305] (emphasis added).

⁶⁵ ibid [7.310].

⁶⁶ De Búrca (n 1) 191, speaks of ‘definitional stage’ and ‘justificatory stage’.

⁶⁷ According to WTO jurisprudence on GATT art III:2, second sentence, the element ‘applied so as to afford protection’ is incorporated in the legal test by reference to paragraph 1 of art III and must thus be separately analysed, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II (n 39) 25ff.

⁶⁸ ibid 29: ‘It is irrelevant that protectionism was not an intended objective if the particular tax measure in question is nevertheless, to echo Article III:1, “applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production”. This is an issue of how the measure in question is applied’; confirmed in WTO Appellate Body Reports, Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile—Alcoholic Beverages) (12 January 2000) WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R [61]f, [71]; Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea—Alcoholic Beverages) (17 February 1999) WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R [149].

⁶⁹ WTO Panel Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages (Mexico—Taxes on Soft Drinks) (24 March 2006) WT/DS308/R [8.91]: ‘the declared intention of legislators and regulators of the Member adopting the measure should not be totally disregarded’; Chile—Alcoholic Beverages (n 68) [71]: ‘The conclusion of protective application reached by the Panel becomes very difficult to resist, in the absence of countervailing explanations by Chile’; WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada—Periodicals) (30 July 1997) WT/DS31/AB/R [30]ff, referring to statements by the Canadian government about the protectionist purpose of the measure.

⁷⁰ On the general exceptions clause see eg Diebold, NF, ‘The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law’ (2008) 11 J of Intl Economic L 43CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 44.

⁷¹ See eg Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) (concluded 15 April 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 UNTS 401; 33 ILM 1226 (1994), art 3.2 in fine: ‘Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.’

⁷² Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649; T Cottier, P Delimatsis and NF Diebold, ‘Commentary to Article XIV’ in R Wolfrum and others (eds), WTO—Trade in Services: Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, vol 6 (Brill 2008) 287, 297–98.

⁷³ See Parts II.A.3, II.B.3 and II.C.1.

⁷⁴ Scholars oftentimes criticize the implicit consideration of a measure's regulatory purpose in a non-discrimination analysis, see eg Roessler, F, ‘Beyond the Ostensible—A Tribute to Professor Robert Hudec's Insight on the Determination of the Likeness of Products under the National Treatment Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (2003) 37(4) JWT 771Google Scholar, 781; Diebold (n 32) 84, with references.

⁷⁵ See eg Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand (17 December 2010) WT/DS367/AB/R [173]: the purpose of a measure is to be determined ‘not only from the objectives of the measure as expressed by the responding party, but also from the text and structure of the relevant measure, its surrounding regulatory context, and the way in which it is designed and applied.’ (concerning the SPS Agreement); also Diebold (n 32) 87ff, with references.

⁷⁶ See (n 72).

⁷⁷ Art 56 TFEU reads: ‘restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended’.

⁷⁸ Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd. [1991] ECR I-04221, para 12 (emphasis added); Case C-17/00 De Coster v Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort [2001] ECR I-9445, para 29; Case C-43/93 Vander Elst v Office des Migrations Internationales [1994] ECR I-3803, para 14; S O'Leary, ‘The Free Movement of Persons and Services’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999) 402; M Holoubek, ‘EGV Artikel 49/50’ in J Schwarze and others. (ed), EU-Kommentar (2^nd ed, Nomos Verlagsges.Mbh 2009), 726ff.

⁷⁹ Note that some commentators suggest ‘necessity’ as an independent substantive standard, while others see ‘necessity’ as an additional element to ‘less favourable treatment’ and ‘likeness’ within non-discrimination; see eg Mattoo, A, ‘National Treatment in the GATS—Corner-Stone or Pandora's Box?’ (1997) 31(1) J of World Trade 107Google Scholar, 131ff; Mattoo, A and Subramanian, A, ‘Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Dilemma and a Possible Resolution’, (1998) 1 JIEL 303, 315–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A Mattoo, ‘Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (2001), 15, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=632665>; Verhoosel, G, National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement—Adjudicating the Boundaries of Regulatory Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2002)Google Scholar, 51ff; M Cossy, ‘Some Thoughts on the Concept of “Likeness” in the GATS’ in Panizzon and others (eds) (n 8) 327, 346ff; A Mattoo, ‘MFN and the GATS’ in Cottier and Mavroidis (eds) (n 32) 78; on this issue in general but rejecting a broad ‘necessity’ approach Krajewski (n 37) 109–10; M Krajewski and M Engelke, ‘Commentary to Article XVII’ in Wolfrum and others (eds) (n 72) 396, 412.

⁸⁰ See eg art 16 of the EC Services Directive 2006/123/EC, OJ 2006 L 376/36.

⁸¹ Pauwelyn (n 8) 361–62, 366–67; DiMascio and Pauwelyn (n 3) 83; see also Lester, S and Mercurio, B, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (Hart 2008) 321Google Scholar.

⁸² GNS, Report to the Trade Negotiations Committee meeting at Ministerial level, Montreal, December 1988, MTN.GNS/21, 25 November 1988, para 11.

⁸³ In case of de facto discrimination, it could even be argued that the standard of ‘less favourable treatment’ for art III:2, first sentence, follows the diagonal test, meaning that the tax violates GATT even if only one imported product is taxed more heavily. This broad interpretation of ‘less favourable treatment’ is counterbalanced with a very narrow interpretation of ‘likeness’.

⁸⁴ Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II (n 39) 28.

⁸⁵ At least one WTO Panel considered this aspect of ‘adaptation costs’ under the element of ‘less favourable treatment’, US—Tuna II (n 64) [7.342]: ‘We do not exclude that costs of adaptation to a technical regulation may be pertinent to an examination of whether less favourable treatment is being afforded with respect to a technical regulation’; see also Diebold (n 30) 129ff.

⁸⁶ See Howse, R and Regan, DH, ‘The Product/Process Distinction—An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 EJIL 249CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 265, who argue that objective evidence by itself may be sufficient, but that all evidence—subjective and objective—must be ‘carefully evaluated’.

⁸⁷ Chile—Alcoholic Beverages (n 68) [62]; commented by Horn, H and Mavroidis, PC, ‘Still Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-law on Tax Discrimination’ (2004) 15 EJIL 39CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 49; on objective assessment of intent also Cossy (n 79) 348.

⁸⁸ WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia—Salmon) (6 November 1998) WT/DS18/AB/R [170].

⁸⁹ ibid [176]: ‘The Panel merely stated its doubts on whether Australia applies similarly strict sanitary standards on the internal movement of salmon products within Australia as it does on the importation of salmon products and considered that as a factor which can be taken into account in the examination under the third element of Article 5.5’.

⁹⁰ Such an evaluation of domestic values may also be required under current general exceptions clauses, for instance when the adjudicating bodies are asked to decide whether a protected value falls under the public morals or public order, see Diebold (n 70) 60ff.

⁹¹ Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US—Shrimp) (6 November 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R [33].

⁹² See eg GATT Panel Report, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Thailand—Cigarettes) (7 November 1990) DS10/R, BISD 37S/200 [81].

⁹³ WTO Appellate Body Reports, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea—Various Measures on Beef) (10 January 2001) WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R [164]; EC—Asbestos (n 10) [172]; United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US—Gambling) (20 April 2005) WT/DS285/AB/R [306]; Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, (Dominican Republic—Import and Sale of Cigarettes) (19 May 2005) WT/DS302/AB/R [70].

⁹⁴ For a different categorization see eg Horn and Weiler (n 12) 131ff; Ortino (n 11), 14; Diebold (n 32) 94ff.