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Separating Law From Facts: The Difficulties Faced By The Italian Corte Di Cassazione In An Appeal For Illogicality Of Reasoning
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 January 2008
Extract
The recent judgment of the Corte di cassazione, Italy's highest appeal court in civil and criminal matters, in the so-called “jeans rape case” has caused much controversy and attracted much media attention both in Italy and abroad. The Corte di cassazione has been showered with criticism for purportedly establishing a “jeans alibi”, according to which a woman cannot be raped if she is wearing jeans as she must have consented to their removal. However, this judgment is of significance not merely for this statement but because it is particularly demonstrative of the difficulties faced by the Corte di cassazione in separating law from fact in an appeal on the grounds of illogicality of the reasoning given by the lower court. The Corte has been subject to academic criticism recently for exceeding its competence to review on a question of law and entering into the realm of the merits, criticism which this judgment has undoubtedly fuelled. The aim of this article is to explore the nature of the Corte di cassazione and, in providing a critical analysis of the “jeans rape” judgment, to examine the difficulties inherent within this particular ground of appeal.
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References
1. The facts are taken from judgment of the Corte di cassazione of 6 Nov. 1998–10 Feb. 1999, No.1636, reported in Guida at diritto, 27 Feb. 1999, No.8, pp.85–86. Hereafter the judgment will be cited as Sentenza 1636/99.
2. A.519 criminal code— codice penale (c.p.). The crime of violenza carnale was constituted by the use of violence or threat, in order to force congiunzione carnale. Congiunzione carnale translated literally means a “joining of the flesh” and therefore required some form of penetration. Sexual acts without penetration were covered by A.521 c.p. and defined as acts of lust or sexual harassment— atti di Ibid line. It is important to note that L. 15 febbraio 1996 n.66 (Law No.66 of 15 Feb. 1996) abolished the distinction between violenza carnale and atti di Ibid line and that now there is only one crime, that of violenza sessuale which is contained in A.609 bis c.p. committed by a person who adopts the use of violence, threat or abuse of authority in order to force another to perform or submit to sexual acts. In this case the defendant had been charged before this law came into force although the judgments were given afterwards. For a detailed commentary of.L. 15 febbraio 1996 n.66, see Cadoppi, A. (a cura di), Commentari delle Norme Conlro la Violenza Sessuale e delta Legge Conlro la Pedofilia (Cedam, Padova, 1999, 2nd ed.).Google Scholar
3. A.610 c.p. This is coercion between private individuals, committed when a person uses violence or threat in order to coerce another into doing or not doing something or into enduring something.
4. A.523 c.p. This was the abduction or holding of a minor or a woman for sexual purposes by means of violence, threat or deception. This crime was abolished by L. 15 febbraio 1996 n.66.
5. A.582 c.p. This is the crime of causing a personal injury which leads to physical or mental illness.
6. A.527 c.p. This is the crime of committing obscene acts in an open or public place. Obscene acts arc defined by A.529 c.p. as those which offend common decency.
7. This is a collegiate court of first instance composed of three professional judges and which has specialist competence—such as for organised crime.
8. Setenza 29 febbraio 1996.
9. This is the court of appeal from the tribunale, composed of three professional judges.
10. Sentenza 19 marzo 1998.
11. This court sits with a panel of five professional judges as a sezione or a sezioni unite with a panel of nine professional judges when the case is of special importance or when there is a need lo settle contrasts between differentiating decisions of the single sections (A.610(2) c.p.p.).
12. “… organo supremo delta giustizia”, A.65, r.d. 30gennaio 1941 n.12. Ordinamento giudizario. Although at this point in time it should be noted that the Constitutional Court was not yet in existence.
13. “… assicura l'esatta osservanza c l'uniforme interpretazione della legge, l'unità del diritto oggettivo nazionale”, Ibid.
14. Siracusano, D. et al. , Diritto Processuale Penale (, Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 1994) Vol.2, p.510.Google Scholar
15. The use of the singular “judge”—giudice in this context indicates the court.
16. A.544 c.p.p.
17. A.546(3) c.p.p., A.125(3) c.p.p. Indeed it is a constitutional requirement that all judgments be reasoned—“Tutti i provvedimenti giurisdizionali devono essere motivati”, A.111 Costituzione.
18. Illuminati, G, “Giudizio” in Conso, G. and Grevi, V. (Eds), Profili del Nuovo Codice di Procedura Penale (Cedam, Padova, 1996), pp.550–610, at p.607.Google Scholar
19. Dottrina refers to academic opinion and writings.
20. G., Spangher, “Impugnazioni” in Ibid, pp.665–741Google Scholar, at pp.703–704. See also Siracusano et al. op. cil. supra n.14, at pp.516–521.
21. See infra n.45.
22. As stated by the President of the court “… la giurisprudenza della cassazione presenta frequentie gravi oscillazioni, anche non giuslificate dall'interprctazione evolutiva, e spesso essa si occupa indirettamente anche del fatto, attraverso un non corretto esercizio dei potcri di conlrollo dei vizi di motivazione della sentenza impugnata”. Relazione al progetto preliminare del codice di procedura penale, in Gazzetta Ufficiale 24 ottobre 1988 n.25O, Supplemento ordinario n.2, pp.3–158 at p. 132.
23. I can find no translation for nomofilachia and have decided to use nomothetic.
24. Op. cil. supra n.22.
25. Ibid., at p.133.
26. A.609(l) c.p.p.
27. This phrase, for which I can find no suitable translation, explains the situation whereby the parties act equally, in par condicio, in opposition to each other. The parties therefore have equal powers and rights to contest and contradict that put forward by the other side. It is one of the “key” phrases used by Italian dottrina in regard to the functioning of the new code of criminal procedure 1989.
28. N., Giaravolo, “La Corte di cassazione non può ricercare alternative alle risultanze processuali” in Guida al Diritto. 27 febbraio 1999 n.8 pp.87–88, at p.87Google Scholar. For an analysis of the distinction between law and fact in English law see J., Beatson, “The Scope of Judicial Review for Error of Law”, (1984) 4 O.J.L.S. 22.Google Scholar
29. “…la Corte di merito avrebbe dovuto procedere a una rigorosa analisi in ordine alla attendibilità delle dichiarazioni accusatorie rese dalla (A) …” Sentenza 1636/99, op. cit. supra n.l, at p.86.
30. Ibid.
31. This argument could also be applicable to the judgment of the Corte di Appello, but it must be considered that this court has more access to the facts of the trial (A.602(3) c.p.p.) and also that the trial stage can be renewed, for the re-taking of evidence already taken at trial and also for the taking of new evidence (A.603 c.p.p.).
32. A. 192 c.p.p.
33. “Una tale considerazione non può condividersi sol che si consideri che la ragazza potrebbe avere accusato falsamente il (B) di averla violentata, per giustificare con i genitori l'amplesso carnale avuto con una persona molto più grande di lei per età e per di più) sposata, amplesso che non si sentiva di tener celato perchè preoccupata delle possibili conseguenze del rapporto carnale”. Sentenza 1636/99, op. cit. supra n.l, at p.86.
34. See Giaravolo, op. cit. supra n.28, at p.87.
35. “Non si vede infatti quale vergogna o senso di colpa la (A) potesse avvertire, se effettivamente vittima di una violenza carnale”. Sentcnza 1636/99, op. cit. supra n.l, at p.86.
36. Ibid.
37. Sec Giaravarolo, op. cit. supra n.28, at p.88.
38. Sentenza 1636/99, op. cit. supra n.l, at p.86.
39. Ibid.
40. “Deve poi rivelarsi che è un dato di comune esperienza che è quasi impossibile sfilare anche in pane i jeans ad una persona senza la sua fattiva collaborazione, poiché trattasi di una operazione che è già assai difficoltosa per chi li indossa.” Ibid.
41. See The Times, 18 Feb. and 19 Mar. 1999.
42. Sentenza 1636/99, op. cit. supra n.l, at p.86.
43. Ibid.
44. This is not the only outcome of the appeal to the Corte di cassazione. It may also proceed to rectify errors of law in the motivazione or errors in the law applied, if such errors have not affected the outcome, thus, for example, it may substitute passages of the motivazione—A.619 c.p.p. The judgment may also be annulled without the case being remitted for a decision—AA.620, 621 c.p.p.
45. La Repubblica, 13 Oct. 1999. The judgment has not yet been published.
46. A.627 c.p.p.
47. Siracusano et al. op. at. supra n.14, at p.538.
48. It can also be opposed for reasons which have not been the subject-matter of the decision by the Cone di cassazione—A.628(2) c.p.p.
49. Sec Ferdinando, ZucconiGalli, Fonseca, “Un Nuovo Articolo 111 della Costituzione per Salvare la Suprema Corte di Collasso”, in Guida al Diritto 8 maggio 1999 n.18, at pp.110–113.Google Scholar
50. The credibility of the rape victim when consent is in issue is of topical importance in England with reference to previous sexual history—see the sexual history provisions of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. For a detailed analysis of these provisions see Kibble, N., “The Sexual History Provisions: Charting a course between inflexible legislative rules and wholly untrammelled judicial discretion?” [2000] Crim.L.R. 274.Google Scholar