Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-06T02:43:45.621Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF OUTSIDE POWERS FOR ACTS OF SECESSIONIST ENTITIES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2009

Stefan Talmon
Stefan Talmon
Affiliation:
Professor of Public International Law, University of Oxford, and Fellow of St Anne's College, Oxford. [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In August 2008, Georgia instituted proceedings against the Russian Federation before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to establish its international responsibility for alleged acts of racial discrimination against the ethnic Georgian population in South Ossetia and Abkhazia by ‘the de facto South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatist authorities […] supported by the Russian Federation’. In order to establish the international responsibility of an outside power for the internationally wrongful conduct of a secessionist entity, it must be shown, inter alia, that the acts or omissions of the secessionist entity are attributable to the outside power. International tribunals usually determine the question of attribution on the basis of whether the authorities of the secessionist entity were ‘controlled’ by the outside power when performing the internationally wrongful conduct. Attribution thus becomes a question of how one defines ‘control’. The test of control of authorities and military forces of secessionist entities has become perhaps the most cited example of the fragmentation of international law. The ICJ, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the European Court of Human Rights have all developed and applied their own tests in order to establish whether a secessionist entity has been ‘controlled’ by an outside power. There is a lot of confusion about the various tests, usually referred to as the ‘effective control’, ‘overall control’ and ‘effective overall control’ tests. This article sets out the various control tests, their requirements and areas of application, and asks which test or tests should be applied to attribute the internationally wrongful conduct of a secessionist entity to an outside power.

Type
Article
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 58 , Issue 3 , July 2009 , pp. 493 - 517
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 British Institute of International and Comparative Law

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The outside involvement in the case of Kosovo which seceded from Serbia in February 2008 differs from the cases discussed here. While a causal link might be established between the NATO bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the emergence of Kosovo as an independent State in 2008, the creation of Kosovo was ultimately made possible by the inaction of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), that is, the failure to fulfil their mandates under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999.

2 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), Application Instituting Proceedings, 12 Aug 2008, para 2. See also ibid para 81. All ICJ cases and documents are available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/>.

3 The question of extraterritorial application of an obligation may, as in the case of obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), depend on whether the outside power exercises ‘jurisdiction’ over a person inside the territory of the secessionist entity. The question of jurisdiction must not be confused with the question of attribution of conduct. See (n 98–n 100) below.

4 cp Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (hereinafter ‘Georgia v Russian Federation’), Order of 15 Oct 2008, para 108.

5 For the text of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, see Annex to General Assembly Resolution 56/83 of 12 Dec 2001. For the requirement of attribution, see Art 2(a) of the ILC Articles. Cp also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (hereinafter ‘Bosnian Genocide’), Judgment of 26 Feb 2007, ICJ Rep 2007, para 379.

6 cp Bosnian Genocide (n 5) paras 385, 398, 401, 407; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (Judgment) (hereinafter ‘Armed Activities’) [19 Dec 2005] ICJ Rep, para 160.

7 See Art 4(2) ILC Articles on State Responsibility: ‘An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.’

8 cp Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 388; Georgia v Russian Federation (n 4) CR 2008/27, 10 Sep 2008, 18, para 46 (A Zimmermann).

9 See Art 5 ILC Articles on State Responsibility.

10 cp Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 386.

11 See Art 6 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.

12 Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 389 (emphasis added). In the Bosnian Genocide case, the ‘public authority’ in question was first, the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina and later the Republika Srpska, both of which had not been recognized internationally as a State; they enjoyed however some de facto independence (ibid, para 233).

13 cp Prosecutor v Tadić ICTY-94-1-T (1997) 36 ILM 908, 931, para 601. All ICTY cases are available at <http://www.un.org/icty/>.

14 See Art 11 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. See also Military und Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (hereinafter ‘Nicaragua’), ICJ Pleadings, Vol IV (Memorial of Nicaragua (Merits)) paras 270–274. The ICJ did not deal with this question.

15 See eg Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) ECtHR Ser A, Vol 310, 1, para 47. In this case Turkey submitted that the TRNC was an independent State established in the north of Cyprus with which it had close and friendly relations. See also Solomou and Others v Turkey, Application No 36832/97, Judgment of 24 Jun 2008, para 37. All decisions of the ECtHR are available at <http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc>.

16 cp United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (USA v Iran), [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para 59. But see also ibid paras 74–75.

17 cp Nicaragua (n 14) para 277. The importance of the element of ‘control’ is also shown by the standard reference to Russia's ‘direction and control’ of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatist authorities in Georgia's Application Instituting Proceedings (paras 2, 81, 82) and its (Amended) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection (paras 3, 17, 21 and paras 16, 17, respectively) in Georgia v Russian Federation (n 4). See also ibid, CR 2008/22, 8 Sep 2008, 43–44, paras 18–20 (P Akhavan). The question of ‘control’ will have to be decided at the merits stage of the proceedings.

18 See Speech by HE Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the ICJ, at the Meeting of Legal Advisers of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 29 Oct 2007, 4. See also the Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalized by M Koskenniemi on ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 13 Apr 2006, 31–32, paras 49–52.

19 That the ICJ formulated two tests was recognized by the Prosecution and Judge McDonald in her dissent in the Tadić case; see Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) paras 22, 34 (sep and diss op McDonald); Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY-94-1-A (1999) 38 ILM 1518, paras 106, 111 (‘both an “agency” test and an “effective control” test’). The Prosecution had termed what is here called the ‘strict control’ test the ‘agency’ test. For the literature, see Milanovic, M, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide’ (2006) 17 EJIL 553–604, 576.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 For some examples from the most recent literature, see Abass, A, ‘Proving State Responsibility for Genocide: The ICJ in Bosnia v Serbia and the International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur’ (2008) 31 Fordham ILJ 871, 890–896Google Scholar; Groome, D, ‘Adjudicating Genocide: Is the International Court of Justice Capable of Judging State Criminal Responsibility?’ (2008) 31 Fordham ILJ 911, 923, 947–948Google Scholar; Barbour, SA and Salzman, ZA, ‘“The Tangled Web”: The Right of Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors in the Armed Activities Case’ (2008) 40 NY Univ JILP 53, 70–79Google Scholar; Cassese, A, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia’ (2007) 18 EJIL 649, 653CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tyner, DB, ‘Internationalization of War Crimes Prosecutions: Correcting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's Folly in “Tadić”’ (2006) 18 Florida JIL 843, 850.Google Scholar

21 See Armed Activities (n 6) para 160 (‘the requisite tests are met for sufficiency of control’ [emphasis added]).

22 Military und Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA), (Merits, Judgment) (hereinafter ‘Nicaragua’) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.

23 See above (n 5).

24 The FRY became ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ with effect from 4 Feb 2003, and the ‘Republic of Serbia’ with effect from 3 Jun 2006.

25 Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 233.

26 cp Nicaragua (n 22) para 277.

27 Nicaragua (n 22) para 109.

28 See Nicaragua (n 22) paras 109, 111–113, 115; Bosnian Genocide (n 5) paras 391, 393.

29 The ‘strict control’ test is sometimes also referred to as the ‘dependence and control’ test, the ‘complete dependence’ test or the ‘agency’ test.

30 Counsel for Nicaragua had spoken of ‘total or predominant control’; see Nicaragua (n 14) ICJ Pleadings, Vol V, 162 (I Brownlie).

31 cp Bosnian Genocide (n 5) paras 391, 397; Nicaragua (n 22) para 109. See also Armed Activities (n 6) para 160.

32 cp Nicaragua (n 22) paras 109–110; Bosnian Genocide (n 5) paras 392, 393.

33 cp Nicaragua (n 22) para 114; Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 394 and para 392.

34 cp Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) paras 601–606.

35 cp Armed Activities (n 6) CR 2005/3 (translation), 12 Apr 2005, 27, para 10 (O Corten); Bosnian Genocide (n 5) CR 2006/8 (translation), 3 Mar 2006, 23, para 57 (A Pellet). See also Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) para 604.

36 cp Nicaragua (n 22) paras 93, 94, 108. In Armed Activities (n 6) para 160, the Court also examined the question of whether the Congo Liberation Movement (MLC) had been ‘created’ by Uganda, a question ultimately denied.

37 cf Nicaragua (n 22) para 108.

38 cp Nicaragua (n 22) paras 109–110, 111.

39 Nicaragua (n 22) paras 110, 111.

40 cp Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 394.

41 cp Nicaragua (n 22) para 109; Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 391.

42 cp Nicaragua (n 22) para 111.

43 cp. Nicaragua (n 22) para 109; Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 391.

44 Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 394 (emphasis added); Nicaragua (n 22) para 111.

45 Nicaragua (n 22) para 110; Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 393. See also Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) para 588.

46 cp Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) paras 602, 605.

47 cp Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) para 598.

48 cp Nicaragua (n 22) paras 102–106, 108 and 110.

49 cp Nicaragua (n 22) paras 104, 106.

50 cp Nicaragua (n 22) para 103.

51 On the ‘effective control test’, see below sec II.B.

52 Art 4(1) provides: ‘The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions […].’ Art 7 reads: ‘The conduct of an organ of a State […] shall be considered an act of that State under international law if the organ […] acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.’ For the view that de facto organs fall under Art 4 of the ILC Articles, see A de Hoogh ‘Articles 4 and 8 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the Tadić Case and Attribution of Acts of Bosnian Serb Authorities to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (2001) 76 BYBIL 255, 268, 269, 289–290.

53 cp Nicaragua (n 22) para 116 and para 277 (‘any acts they have committed are imputable to that State’); Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 397 (‘all their actions performed in that capacity would be attributable to the State’). See also Bosnian Genocide (n 5) CR 2006/8 (translation), 3 Mar 2006, 22, para 55 (A Pellet); CR 2006/9 (translation), 6 Mar 2006, 50, para 13 (L Condorelli). See further Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) para 586 (‘imputing the acts […] as a whole’), and Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 121.

54 Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 393.

55 cp Nicaragua (n 22) para 111 (‘adequate direct proof […] has not been, and indeed probably could not be, advanced in every respect’). See also Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) para 585 (the ICJ ‘set a particularly high threshold test for determining the requisite degree of control’).

56 For a similar view, see Milanovic (n 19) 577.

57 cp Armed Activities (n 6) para 160. See also Bosnian Genocide (n 5) CR 2006/9 (translation), 6 Mar 2006, 49, para 11; CR 2006/10 (translation), 6 Mar 2006, 21, para 43 (L Condorelli); CR 2006/10 (translation), 6 Mar 2006, 29, para 4 (A Pellet). See further Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) para 22 (sep and diss op McDonald).

58 For the contrary view, see eg Cassese (n 20) 650.

59 See Nicaragua (n 22) para 112; Bosnian Genocide (n 5) paras 241, 388, 394.

60 Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 397.

61 Art 8 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (emphasis added). Art 8 is sometimes—mistakenly—referred to as laying down the ‘very strict standards’ for ‘the theory of de facto agents’; see Armed Activities (n 6) CR 2005/11 (translation), 22 Apr 2005, 14, para 9 (O Corten). Corten was responding to I Brownlie who had used the term ‘de facto organs’ (ibid CR 2005/7, 18 Apr 2005, 20 para 39).

62 cp Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 400. See also Nicaragua (n 22) para 113. This shift in focus is overlooked by Griebel, J and Plücken, M ‘New Developments Regarding the Rules of Attribution? The International Court of Justice's Decision in Bosnia v Serbia’ (2008) 21 Leiden JIL, 601, 606–610CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who wrongly conclude that the ICJ no longer regards Art 8 as ‘an attribution rule’. For a response, see M Milanovic, “State Responsibility for Acts of Non-State Actors”: A Comment on Griebel and Plücken (2009) 22 Leiden JIL 307, 309–314.

63 cp Nicaragua (n 22) para 115; Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 399.

64 See Bosnian Genocide (n 5), CR 2006/16, 13 Mar 2006, 39, para 116 (I Brownlie).

65 cp Nicaragua (n 22) para 112.

66 See Nicaragua (n 22) para 115; Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 400.

67 cp Armed Activities (n 6) CR 2005/3 (translation), 12 Apr 2005, 27, para 10 (O Corten).

68 Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 401.

69 See Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 124.

70 Art 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S/RES/827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, Annex.

71 See Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 83.

72 The Trial Chamber in fact imported the requirement of effective control into the ‘strict control’ test by using the ‘effective control’ test to determine whether the relationship of the Republika Srpska to the FRY was ‘so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other’, that it was right to equate the armed forces of the Republika Srpska with a de facto organ of the FRY that acted on its behalf. See Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) paras 588, 595. This interpretation was also confirmed by Presiding Judge McDonald in her separate and dissenting opinion, ibid, para 19. See also de Hoogh (n 52) 280.

73 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 98. See also Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) para 585 (‘applying general principles of international law relating to State responsibility for de facto organs’).

74 See eg Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 123 and paras 103, 104. Cp also the dissenting opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh in Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 38, and the judgment itself, ibid para 402.

75 See Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) paras 120, 131, 144. See also Prosecutor v Rajić (Decision) ICTY-95-12-R61 (13 Sep 1996) paras 22–32, where the ICTY Trial Chamber disregarded the tests enunciated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case and found that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was of an international character on the basis that the Bosnian Croats were ‘agents’ of Croatia as Croatia ‘exercised a high degree of control over both the military and political institutions of the Bosnian Croats’ (ibid para 26).

76 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 115. See also ibid para 124. The ICJ got its own back by finding in the Bosnian Genocide case that the argument put forward by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in favour of the overall control test was ‘unpersuasive’ (Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 404).

77 Contrary to the claim by M Koskenniemi (n 18), the ICTY did not seek ‘to replace [the ‘effective control’] standard altogether.' (UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 13 Apr 2006, 32, para 50). For the view that what was intended was a partial replacement, see Cassese (n 20) 654, 657.

78 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 117. See also ibid para 137.

79 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 124.

80 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) paras 120, 124, 125, 128, 145.

81 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 122, and also para 120.

82 See Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) paras 131, 137, 138, 145.

83 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) ICTY-95-14/2-T (26 Feb 2001) para 115, and (Judgment) ICTY-95-14/2-A (17 Dec 2004) para 361. See also Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic (Judgment) ICTY-98-34-T (31 Mar 2003) para 198.

84 See Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) paras 130, 131, 137. See also Prosecutor v Delalić (Judgment) ICTY-96-21-A (20 Feb) 2001 (2001) 40 ILM 630, para 15.

85 See Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic (n 83) para 198.

86 See Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) paras 131, 132, 137, 145. See also Prosecutor v Aleksovski (Judgment) ICTY-95-14/1-A, (24 March 2000) para 143 (‘specific instructions or orders as a prerequisite for attributing the acts […] is not required under the test of overall control.’); Prosecutor v Delalić (n 84) para 41. See also Milanović (n 62) 317.

87 cp Prosecutor v Delalić (n 84) para 47.

88 Prosecutor v Delalić (n 84) para 20. See also Prosecutor v Aleksovski (n 86) para 145 (‘the standard established by the “overall control” test is not as rigorous as [the “effective control” test]’); Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez ICTY-95-14/2-T (n 83) para 112 (‘it is clear that the test of overall control is a lower standard than that of effective control’).

89 See Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 406. The ILC in the commentary on its Articles on State Responsibly also mistakenly deals with the ‘overall control’ test in the context of Article 8; see Report of the ILC, 53rd session, UN Doc A/56/10, 2001, 106, para 5.

90 See Kress, C, ‘L'organe de facto en droit international public, réflexions sur l'imputation à l'Etat de l'acte d'un particulier à la lumière des développements récents’ (2001) 105 RGDIP 93, 131.Google Scholar

91 See Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 167 (‘the Bosnian Serb forces acted as de facto organs of another State, namely, the FRY’). See also ibid, paras 137, 145, 147, 156. See further Prosecutor v Aleksovski (n 86) para 129.

92 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 121.

93 See above, section II.A.

94 See Prosecutor v Tadić (n 13) para 16 (sep and diss op McDonald). See also Milanovic (n 19) 581 (‘dramatically misread Nicaragua’); de Hoogh (n 52) 290.

95 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 112.

96 In Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 406, the ICJ held, assuming that the ‘effective control’ test had been replaced by the ‘overall control’ test, that the letter ‘stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the connection which must exist between the conduct of a State's organs and its international responsibility.’ This is even more true where the ‘overall control’ test is to replace the much more stringent ‘strict control’ test.

97 See Arts 33 and 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done on 4 Nov 1950, as amended by Protocols 3, 5, 8, and 11.

98 cp Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, Application No 48787/99, Judgment of 8 Jul 2004, ECHR Rep 2004-VII, 179, para 311; Solomou and Others v Turkey (n 15) para 43 (‘The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention’).

99 The extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction in the sense of Art 1 ECHR is not limited to secessionist entities situated in the convention area, that is the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting Parties of the ECHR; see Issa v Turkey, Application No 31821/96, Judgment of 16 Nov 2004, para 74.

100 Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (Judgment) Application No 15318/89 (18 Dec 1996) ECHR Rep 1996-IV, 2216, para 56. See also Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (n 15) para 64. On the question of imputability or attribution, see also the note on the Loizidou case by B Rudolf in (1997) 91 AJIL 528, 534 and Cassese (n 20) 658, fn 17, and 662, fn 22; de Hoogh (n 52) 272.

101 See Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (n 15) paras 59–64, and Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) paras 49–57, and in particular para 57 (‘is a matter which falls within Turkey's “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 and is thus imputable to Turkey’).

102 See Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) para 52. See also ibid, para 49. See further Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (hereinafter ‘Behrami and Saramati’), Applications Nos 71412/01 and 78166/01, Decision of 2 May 2007, para 122 (‘determine State responsibility in conformity and harmony with the governing principles of international law’). Contra Milanovic (n 15) 586 who states that the case does ‘not revolve around the general law on state responsibility’.

103 Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) para 56. See also Cyprus v Turkey, Application No 25781/94, Judgment of 10 May 2001, ECHR Rep 2001-IV, 1, para 77; Bankovic and Others v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, Application No 52207/99, Decision of 12 Dec 2001, ECHR Rep 2001-XII, 333, para 70; Solomou and Others v Turkey (n 15) para 47.

104 Ilaşcu v Moldova and Russia (n 98) para 384. See also ibid, para 385 (‘In the Court's opinion, all of the acts committed by Russian soldiers with regard to the applicants […], in the context of the Russian authorities' collaboration with that illegal regime, are capable of engaging responsibility for the acts of that regime.’ [emphasis added]).

105 Ilaşcu v Moldova and Russia (n 98) paras 392, 393.

106 See Kress (n 90) 108.

107 See Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) paras 52, 56.

108 See Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia (n 98) para 392. See also ibid, paras 316, 341, 382; Cyprus v Turkey (n 103) para 77. See further Assanidze v Georgia, Application No 71503/01, Judgment of 8 Apr 2004, ECHR Rep 2004-II, 221, para 139 (territories with ‘secessionist aspirations’).

109 The ‘effective overall control’ test must be distinguished from the ‘ultimate (overall) authority and control’ test which was applied by the ECtHR in Behrami and Saramati (n 102) paras 133, 134 when attributing conduct to an international organization. For an assessment of the latter test, see Larsen, KM ‘Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The “Ultimate Authority and Control Test”’ (2008) 19 EJIL 509, 520–522CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Milanović, M and Papić, T ‘As Bad As It Gets: The European Court of Human Right's Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 267, 285–286CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In Dušan Berić and Others v Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application Nos 36357/04 et al, Decision of 16 Oct 2007, paras 27–28, the ECtHR employed the ‘effective overall control’ test to determine whether conduct was to be attributable to the United Nations.

110 See Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (n 15) para 62; Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) para 52; Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia (n 98) para 314.

111 Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) para 56.

112 See Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) para 16; Issa and Others v Turkey (n 99) para 75. In Georgia v Russian Federation (n 4) CR 2008/27, 10 Sep 2008, 12, para 20 (A Zimmermann), Counsel for Russia seized on ‘the ratio of Turkish troops per square kilometre in northern Cyprus’.

113 Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia (n 98) 332 at 342 (diss op Kovler).

114 Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) para 56; Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia (n 98) para 315.

115 Contra Lemaître, R ‘Transdniestria before the European Court of Human Rights’ (2004) 6 International Law Forum du droit international 111–115, 113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

116 See the Report of 4 June 1999 of the European Commission of Human Rights in Cyprus v Turkey (Report), Application No 25781/94, 169, where Commissioner Rozakis held in his partly dissenting opinion that ‘the authorities in the northern part of Cyprus […] are, as a fictio juris, Turkish authorities’. In Solomou v Turkey (n 15) para 51, the ECtHR referred to the Turkish-Cypriot forces as ‘agents’ of Turkey. See also de Hoogh (n 52) 271 and 273.

117 Cyprus v Turkey (Report) (n 116) para 102 (emphasis added). See also Cyprus v Turkey (n 103) para 74.

118 cp Kress (n 90) 108 (‘une réduction significative des conditions de l'imputation’).

119 cp Armed Activities (n 6) paras 178–180.

120 cp the diss op of Judge Bernhardt joined by Judge Lopes Rocha in Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) para 3 (‘I feel unable to base a judgment of the ECtHR exclusively on the assumption that the Turkish presence is illegal and that Turkey is therefore responsible for more or less everything that happens in northern Cyprus’). See also the 1st Report on State Responsibility by James Crawford who places the Loizidou case ‘in the shadowland between issues of attribution and causation’ (UN Doc A/CN.4/490/Add.5, 22 Jul 1998, 21, para 211).

121 Cyprus v Turkey (n 103) para 78. See also Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) para 49 where the ‘vacuum argument’ had been put forward by the applicant.

122 cp Nicaragua (n 22) paras 110, 116. This approach was followed by the ECtHR in the Ilaşcu case; see above at nn 104, 105. See also Milanovic, M, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-up’ (2007) 18 EJIL 669, 694.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

123 The ECtHR considered Turkey to be an occupying power in northern Cyprus. See eg Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 100) para 13 (‘Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus’) and para 16 (‘Turkish armed forces […] are stationed throughout the whole of the occupied area of northern Cyprus’).

124 Armed Activities (n 6) para 178. See also ibid, CR 2005/05 (translation), 13 Apr 2005, 48, para 11 (J Salmon).

125 cp Armed Activities (n 6) para 179. See also the Award of the German-Portuguese Arbitral Tribunal in the Award of 30 June 1930 concerning Portuguese claims against Germany: ‘[T]he occupying State incurs responsibility for any act contrary to the law of nations ordered or tolerated by the military or civilian authorities in occupied territory.’ (2 RIAA 1040 (emphasis added)).

126 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) paras 90–92.

127 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 95.

128 Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 98.

129 Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 405. See also the declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen in Prosecutor v Blaskić (‘Lasva River Valley’)(Judgment) ICTY-95-14-T, (3 March 2000).

130 Jorgić, Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 4. Strafsenat [Higher Regional Court of Appeal of Düsseldorf, Criminal Division, 4th Chamber], Judgment of 26 Sep 1997—IV—26/96, unpublished typescript on file with author, 160 (translation provided). Parts of the judgment are also reproduced in Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 129, fn 155. The judgment was upheld by the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) without specifically addressing the question of the nature of the conflict; see BGH, Urteil v 30.4.1999—3 StR 215/98, BGHSt 45, 65–91. The Supreme Court of Bavaria in the Djajić case also held that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was of an international character referring to ‘the close organizational, logistical, financial and military connection [Verknüpfung] between the armies of the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY; see Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, 3. Strafsenat, Judgment of 23 May 1997—3 St 20/96, unpublished typescript on file with author, 15 (translation provided). See also ibid, 108–113.

131 Jorgić (n 130) 159. The same approach was taken by the Court in the Sokolović case; see Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 4. Strafsenat, Judgment of 29 Nov 1999—IV—9/97, unpublished typescript on file with author, 108 (translation provided).

132 Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Judgment) ICTY-94-1-AR72 (2 Oct 1995) 35 ILM 32, para 72.

133 But see Sassòli, M and Olson, L ‘Case Report: Prosecutor v Tadić’ (2000) 94 AJIL 571, 575Google Scholar, who argue in favour of such a nexus. See also Spinedi, M ‘On the Non-Attribution of the Bosnian Serbs' Conduct to Serbia’ (2007) 5 J of Int Crim Justice 829, 837CrossRefGoogle Scholar (the two questions are ‘not totally separate and independent’ of each other).

134 Prosecutor v Delalić (n 84) para 20 (italics added). See also Prosecutor v Delalić (Judgment) ICTY-96-21-T (16 Nov 1998) paras 230–235, and especially para 230 (‘A lengthy discussion of the Nicaragua Case is also not merited’). The same approach was followed by the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court in Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges of 29 Jan 2007, paras 208–211.

135 cp Common Art 2(1) of the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 1949 (75 UNTS 31, 85, 135 and 287, respectively). See also Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (n 134) para 209; Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 84, and the sep op of Judge Shahabuddeen, ibid paras 7, 24, 26.

136 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, A/RES/2625 (XXV) of 24 Oct 1970, Principle 1, para 9.

137 See Declaration on the Definition of Aggression, A/RES/3314 (XXIX) of 14 Dec 1974, preamble, para 5. For the customary international law status of Art 3(g) of the Definition, see Nicaragua (n 22) para 195; Armed Activities (n 6) para 146.

138 See Nicaragua (n 22) para 228 and paras 205 and 195. See also Armed Activities (n 6) paras 161–165.

139 See Nicaragua (n 22) para 228.

140 Tyner (n 20) 877–879 finds the ‘overall control’ test still too stringent a test to determine when an armed conflict is international in character and argues for a still lower standard of control. For a similar view, see Griebel/Plücken (n 62) 621 (‘both standards are in principle too restrictive’).

141 For the same view, see the declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen in Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskić (n 129). See also Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 84 (‘an internal armed conflict […] may become international […] if […] some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of [another] State’). For the view that substantial outside involvement may transform an internal armed conflict into an international one, see I Detter, The Law of War (2nd edn, CUP, Cambridge, 2000) 47, 82.

142 On this point, see Spinedi (n 133) 837–838.

143 See Meron, T ‘Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout’ (1998) 92 AJIL 236, 238.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Meron and others regarded the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single international conflict; see ibid 241.

144 For a similar view, see the sep op of Judge Shahabuddeen in Prosecutor v Tadić (n 19) para 14. See also Prosecutor v Delalić (Judgment) ICTY-96-21-T (16 Nov 1998) para 209 (‘We are not here examining the Konjić municipality and the particular forces involved in the conflict in that area to determine whether it was international or internal. Rather, should the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina be international, the relevant norms of international humanitarian law apply throughout its territory […], unless it can be shown that the conflicts in some areas were separate internal conflicts, unrelated to the larger international armed conflict.’). But see Nicaragua (n 22) para 219 where the ICJ seems to distinguish between two conflicts, one international (between the USA and Nicaragua) and one non-international (between the contras and Nicaragua). According to Spinedi (n 133) 836 the ‘importance of this passage of the Nicaragua judgment should however not be overestimated.’

145 Bosnian Genocide (n 5) CR 2006/8 (translation), 3 Mar 2006, 23, para 57; 26, paras 65–67; 27, para 70 (A Pellet); CR 2006/10 (translation), 6 Mar 2006, 27, para 20 (A Pellet). See also the diss op of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh in Bosnian Genocide (n 5) paras 36, 39.

146 Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 401.

147 See Report of the ILC, 53rd session, UN Doc A/56/10, 2001, 103–109.

148 cp Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 406. See also Art 8(a) of the ILC Draft Articles on the Origin of State Responsibility, provisionally adopted in 1980 and the commentary thereto: ILC Yb 1974 II/1, 283–285.

149 For the same view, see Milanovic (n 18) 577, 587. See also Tyner (n 20) 874–875.

150 cp Bosnian Genocide (n 5) CR 2006/16, 13 Mar 2006, 39, para 112 (I Brownlie).

151 Contra Griebel/Plücken (n 62) 620–622.