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Institutional Developments within the Antarctic Treaty System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Extract

In July 2001, 40 years after the entry into force of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) decided to establish a Permanent Secretariat to the Treaty. This latest development within what has been described as ‘an evolving international institutional structure’ will undoubtedly serve to strengthen the Treaty, as well as provide support for the wider Antarctic system, in particular, the 1991 Environmental Protocol. Its impact within the wider environmental institutional context will depend to an extent upon the grant of legal personality to the secretariat, and the definition of its functions, rights and privileges. Described as an historic and landmark decision, the establishment of a permanent secretariat has the potential indirectly to provide an additional line of defence in the fight to preserve and protect the Antarctic environment. The purpose of this article is to consider the future impact of, and issues relating to, this significant institutional development.

Type
Shorter Articles, Comments, and Notes
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2003

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References

1 (Washington) in force 1961; 402 UNTS 71.

2 Decision XXXIV-1 (2001) reproduced in the Final Report of the Twenty-Fourth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting,St. PetersburgRussian Federation9–20 July 2001 (hereinafter Report of the Twenty-Fourth ATCM).Google Scholar

3Arthur, Watts, International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Ltd, 1992), at 12.Google Scholar

4 See the ATCM XXIV Declaration contained in Appendix I of the Final Report of the Twenty-Fourth ATCM.

5 As a result of Antarctica's ice sheet the continent has an average elevation of 5,550 feet. Known as a white desert, Antarctica receives less rainfall than the Sahara Desert (although its icecap contains 75 per cent of the world's fresh water supplies). The lowest temperature on Earth ever recorded (–128.6 °F) was measured in 1983 at Vostok Research Station in the Eastern Antarctic interior. See Joyner, Christopher C, Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), at 27.Google Scholar

6 During the summer months Antarctica is home to approximately 4,000 scientific research and support staff from twenty-nine states. However, this number falls to approximately 1,000 over the Winter. Source: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/goes/ay.html>.

7 On the 1959 Antarctic Treaty see John, Hanessian, ‘The Antarctic Treaty 1959’ (1960) 9 ICLQ 436;Google ScholarHayton, Robert D, ‘The Antarctic Settlement of 1959’ (1960) 54 American Journal of International Law 349; Watts, op cit, n 3, ch 2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Art V.

9 Art I.

10 Argentina, Chile, and Great Britain claim an overlapping section of the West Peninsular of Antarctica. Claims are also maintained by Australia, France, New Zealand, and Norway. The area between 90° west and 150° west is unclaimed. The USA and Russia have reserved a right to make a future claim to territory. See generally, Auburn, FM, Antarctic Law and Politics (London: C Hurst & Co, 1982), chs 2 and 3;Google ScholarCasarini, Maria Pia, ‘Activities in Antarctica Before the Conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty’, in Francioni, and Scovazzi, (eds), International Law for Antarctica, 2nd edn (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 627.Google Scholar

11 Stokke, Olva Schram and Divas, Davor ‘Conclusions’, in , Stokke and , Vidas (eds), Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 432 at 443.Google Scholar

12 The term ‘Antarctic Treaty System’ is used to describe the 1959 Antarctic Treaty plus those measures concluded by the ATCPs under Art IX of the Treaty. Although these instruments may include Treaties, Measures, Decisions and Recommendations (on which see below at n 34 and accompanying text), the term will be used here as a reference to the Antarctic Treaty and its additional treaty-based components. On the Antarctic regime as a ‘system’ see Alfred, Van dar Essen, ‘The Origin of the Antarctic System’, in Francioni, and Scovazzi, (eds), International Law for Antarctica, 2nd edn (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 17 at 25–9; Davor Vidas, ‘The Antarctic Treaty System in the International Community: an Overview’, in Stokke and Vidas op cit, 35.Google Scholar

13 But note the prohibition of nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material as provided for under Art V(1) of the Antarctic Treaty (subject to Art V(2)).

14 Art IX(1)(f).

15 In force 1978. 11 ILM (1972), 251.Google Scholar

16 In force 1982. 19 ILM (1980), 841.Google Scholar For a recent assessment of CCAMLR See Molenaar, Erik Jaap, ‘CCAMLR and Southern Ocean Fisheries’ (2001) 16(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 465.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 27 ILM (1988), 868. CRAMRA has not entered into force, and, in the light of the support for the 1991 Environmental Protocol, is unlikely to do so in the near future. See Rothewell, Donald R, ‘The Antarctic Treaty System: Resource Development, Environmental Protection or Disintegration?’ (1990)43(3) Arctic 284. However, since the prospect of mining in Antarctica is not permanently precluded under the Environmental Protocol, (the prohibition under Art 7 of the Environmental Protocol is subject to a 50-years review under Art 25(2)), CRAMRA should not be entirely discarded. A condition for the lifting of the mining ban is that a mineral resource regime should be operational (Art 25(5)(a) Environmental Protocol 1991).Google Scholar On the Prospects and implications of Antarctic mining see Floren, David W, ‘Antarctic Mining Regimes: An Appreciation of the Attainable’ (2001) 16 Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 467;Google ScholarWard, Joseph J, ‘Black Gold in a White Wilderness—Antarctic Oil: The Past, Present and Potential of a Region in Need of Sovereign Environmental Stewardship’ (1998) 13 Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 363.Google Scholar

18 In force 1998. 30 ILM (1991), 1461. See generally SK in Blay, , ‘New Trends in the Protection of the Antarctic Environment: The 1991 Madrid Protocol’ (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 377;CrossRefGoogle ScholarCatherine, Redgwell, ‘Environmental Protection in Antarctica: The 1991 Protocol’ (1994) 43 ICLQ 599;Google ScholarRothwell, Donald R, ‘Polar Environmental Protection and International Law: The 1991 Antarctic Protocol’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 591.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Russia (formally the USSR), United Kingdom, and USA.

20 Art IX(1) and (2). Art IX(2) stipulates that the establishment of a scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition demonstrates a substantial commitment to Antarctic research. However, it was noted in the Final Report of the Twenty-Fourth ATCM at para 138 in relation to the Czech Republic's professed aim to become an ATCP, that the establishment of a scientific research station is not necessary in order to conduct a substantial scientific research programme.

A total of forty-five states are currently party to the Antarctic Treaty. The remaining eighteen states which do not fall within the remit of Art IX(2) have been entitled to attend the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM) since 1983 (Recommendation XIII-15), but are unable directly to participate within the decision-making process. All ATCM Documents subsequently cited are reproduced in the Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System which is also available online at: <http://webhost.nvi.net/aspire/>.

21 Jorge, Berguño, ‘Institutional Issues for the Antarctic Treaty System with the Protocol in Force: An Overview’, in Davor, Vidas (ed), Implementing the Environmental Protocol Regime for the Antarctic (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 93 at 96. See also ibid., n 12 at 51.Google Scholar

22 Berguño, in ibid. On the application of Common Heritage of Mankind to the Antarctic see Chopra, Sudhir K, ‘Antarctica as a Commons Regime: A Conceptual Framework for Co-operation and Coexistence’, in Joyner, and Chopra, (eds), The Antarctic Legal Regime (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), 163;Google ScholarEllen, Tenenbaum, ‘A World Park in Antarctic: The Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1990) 10 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 109.Google Scholar

23 A/RES/38/77 See Beck, Peter J, ‘Antartica: A Case for the UN?The World Today (04 1984) 165;Google ScholarHayashi, , ‘The Antartica Question in the United Nations’ (1986) 19 Cornell International Law Journal 275. UN trusteeship of Antartica was not of course a new idea, having been suggested as llong ago as 1948 by the US and again in 1956 by New Zealand.Google Scholar See Hanessian, , op cit, n 7 at 437 and Jenks, C Wilfred, The Common Law of Mankind (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1958), at 367.Google Scholar

24 See A/RES/39/152, A/RES/40/156, A/RES/41/88, A/RES/42/46, A/RES/43/83, A/RES/44/124 and A/RES/45/78. The Question of Antartica also appeared on the UN General Assembly Agenda in 1994 (see A/Res/49/80), 1996 (see A/RES/51/56) and 1999 (see A/RES/54/45). It will be further discussed during the 57th General Assembly meeting due to take place in Sept 2002.

25 In 1983 Recommendation XII-6 expanded the circulation of documents to Antarctic Treaty Parties other than ATCPs, the Secretary General of the United Nations and other appropriate specialised agencies. From the mid-1980s onwards the ATCM meetings permitted non-ATCP state and certain NGO observers. The current Revised rules of Procedure (1997) (attached to Decision XXI-1) allows representation of the CCAMLR Commission, SCAR and the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) as well as other invited experts. On the role of NGOs within the Antarctic Treaty System see Richard A Herr, ‘The Changing Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in the Antarctic Treaty System’, in Stokke and Vidas (eds), op cit, 91; Lee Kimball, ‘The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Antarctic Affairs’, in Joyner and Chopra (eds), op cit, 33.

26 Additionally, the accession of India and Brazil (in 1983) and China and Uruguay (in 1985) to ATCP status divided the united developing country position on the internationalisation of Antartica, resulting in diminished demands for such a change. See Vidas, op cit, n 12, at 55.

27 ATCM XXIV Declaration appended to the Final Report of the XXIV ATCM.

28 See Dagmar, Butte, ‘International Norms in the Antarctic Treaty1990 3 International Legal Perspectives 1; Jonathan I Charney, ‘The Antarctic System and Customary International Law’, in Francioni and Scovazzi (eds), op cit, 51; Watts, op cit, n 3, ch 11.Google Scholar

29 See generally, Berguñ, op cit, n 21; Phillippe Gautier, ‘Institutional Developments in the Antarctic Treaty System’, in Francioni and Scovazzi (eds), 31; Watts, op cit, n 3, chs 2 and 3.

30 Auburn, op cit, n 10, at 155.

31 Hanessian, op cit, n 7, at 462.

32 Francesco Francioni, ‘Establishment of an Antarctic Treaty Secretariat: Pending Legal Issues’, in Vidas (ed), op cit, 125, and 125.

33 Art IX refrains from stipulating the regularity of ATCM meetings that must be held at ‘suitable intervals’. Originally held biannually, the ATCPs decided to meet annually from 1991 onwards.

34 Art IX(1). This Article in fact refers only to measures and recommendations. The definition of, and distinction between, measures, decisions, and resolutions as Treaty instruments and their normative consequences, was made at the XIXth ATCM in 1995 (see Decision 1(1995)).

35 Rule 7, Revised Rules of Procedure 1997, attached to Decision XXI-1.

36 The USA (the depositary government for the Antarctic Treaty), for example, responsible for the publication of the Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System.

37 Since 1987 SCAR has been able to attend ATCMs in the capacity of Antarctic Treaty System Observer. See the ATCM Rules of Procedure (Revised 1997) attached to Decision XXI1, Rules 2 and 30.

38 See in particular Recommendations I-I and I-IV made at the First ATCM held in 1961. Hayton, op cit, n 7, at 370; Watts, on cit, n 3, at 33. SCAR's website can be found at: <http://www.scar.org/>.

39 Berguño, op cit, n 21, at 100.

40 Arts 6(1)(b) and (c)(ii). The absence of commercial sealing has meant that neither of these institutions has been established to date.

41 Art XIV.

42 Art XVII.

43 The Commission and Secretariat is headquartered at Hobart, Tasmania, Australia (Art XIII(1)). The Commission's website can be found at <http://www.ccamlr.org/>

44 Art 18.

45 A Scientific, Technical, and Advisory Committee was established under Art 23 and a Regulatory Committee was provided for under Art 29.

46 Art 33.

47 Art 1 of the Annex to CRAMRA.

48 Art 11.

49 Art 12(1). See further Olav ‘The Committee for Environmental Protection: Its Establishment, Operation and Role within the Antarctic Treaty System’ in Vidas (ed), op cit, 107. The CEP website that is currently hosted by the Norwegian Polar Institute in Tromso can be found at: <http://cep.npolar.no//cephome.htm>.

50 1985 Recommendation XIII-2. The ATCM receives reports from the CEP the CCAMLR Commission and the Seals Convention in addition to reports from SCAR and the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP). In 1999 the XXIII ATCM took the unprecedented step of addressing CCAMLR directly (see the Final Report of the Twenty-Third ATCM, Lima, Peru, 24 May—4 June, para 42 and Resolution 3 (1999). Resolution 3 stated that the Representatives ‘recommend that Consultative parties which are Members of CCAMLR take action within their competence to support strongly the CCAMLR Commission in its efforts to deal with the problem of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Convention area, including adoption of catch documentation scheme at the Commission's XVIII meeting in Hobart, 1999, and to consider further measures consistent with the obligations each contracting party has under CCAMLR’.

51 Francioni, op cit, n 32, at 125

52 Statement by SirEsler, Dening, reproduced in Conference Documents, The Antarctic Treaty and Related Papers (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1960), Doc No 15.Google Scholar

53 Hanessian, op cit, n 7, at 462.

54 Berguñ, op cit.

55 Final Report of the First ATCM,Camberram,07 10–24, 1961, Recommendation I-XIV.Google Scholar

56 A factor that was noted on a number of occasions during the XIVth, XVth, and XVIth ATCMs by states who took the view that the establishment of a permanent secretariat was unnecessary. See the Final Report of the Fourteenth ATCM, Rio, 1987, paras 27–8; Final Report of Fifteenth ACTM, Paris, 1989 para 30; Final Report of Sixteenth ATCM, Bonn, 1991, para 39.

57 Francioni, op cit, n 32, at 128.

58 Para 25 of the Final Report of the Thirteenth ATCM, Brussels, 1985.

59 Para 26 of the Final Report of the Fourteenth ATCM, Rio, 1987.

60 Para 30 of the Final Report of the Fifteenth ATCM, Paris, 1989.

61 Para 35 of the Final Report of the Fifteenth ATCM, Bonn, 1991.

62 See paras 41–50 of the Final Report of the Seventeenth ATCM, Venice, 1992.

63 See Final Report of the Eighteenth ATCM, Kyoto, 1994 paras 64–70; Final Report of the Nineteenth ATCM, Seoul, 1995 paras 65–7; Final Report of the Twentieth ATCM, Utrecht, 1996, para 52; Final Report of the Twenty-First ATCM, Christchurch 1997, paras 85–6 Final Report of the Twenty-Second ATCM, Tromso, 1998, paras 23–33; Final Report of the Twenty-Third ATCM, Lima, 1999 paras 19–30.

64 Documents were submitted by the Netherlands (XVII ATCM/ WP 7), Australia (XVII ATCM/WP 19), Uruguay (XVII ATCM/INFO 33) and USA (XVII ATCM / INFO 36) to the Venice ATCM in 1992; Australia (XVIII ATCM/WP 8), Belgium (XVIII ATCM/WP 15) and Italy (XVIII ATCM/WP d16) to the Kyoto ATCM in 1994; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay (XXI ATCM/INF 117) and Norway (XXI ATCM/INF 76) to the Christchurch ATCM in 1997; Australia (XXII ATCM/WP 8) and Argentina (XXII ATCM/WP28) to the Tromso ATCM in 1998.

65 See Annex E of the Final Report of the Seventeenth ATCM, Venice, 1992 and Annex D of the Final Report of the Eighteenth ATCM, Kyoto, 1994.

66 Francioni, op cit, n 32, at 126.

67 Final Report of the Seventeenth ATCM, Venice, 1992, at para 44.

68 Ibid, at para 47.

69 Final Report of the Twenty-First ATCM, Christchurch, 1997, at para. 86.

70 On the impact of the Falklands/Malvinas War on British Antarctic policy see Beck, Peter J, ‘Britain's Antarctic Dimension’ (1983) 59 International Affairs 429.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

71 Dodds, Klaus J and Laa, Manóvil, ‘Recent Developments in Relations Between Argentina, Britain, and the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic’ (2002) 38(205) Polar Record 153, at 156.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

72 Working Paper XXII ATCM/EP8 introduced by Australia at the Tromso ATCM in 1998. See also Final Report of the Twenty-Second ATCM, Tromso, 1998, at para 25.

73 See Dodds, Towards Rapprochement? Anglo-Argentine Relations and the Falklands/Malvinas in the Late 1990s’ (1995) 74(3) International Affairs 617; Dodds and Manóvil, op cit, n 71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

74 ‘UK Response to Argentine Defence Minister's Statement of 6 July 2001’ reproduced in Appendix 3 of the Final Report of the Twenty-Fourth ATCM, St. Petersburg, 2001. The statement welcomed the Argentinian government's decision to strengthen the regulatory control of Argentinian Antarctic activities, the greater emphasis on Argentine civilians within both the Direccion Nacional Antarctic and Argentine Antarctic Stations, and the legislative initiatives that will allow Argentina to better meet its obligations under both CCAMLR and the Environmental Protocol.

See also the statement by the Minister of Defence of Argentina of 6 July 2001 reproduced in Appendix 2 of the Final Report of the Twenty-Fourth ATCM, St Petersburg, 2001.

75 Decision 1 (2001) reproduced in Annex B of the Final Report of the Twenty-Fourth ATCM, St. Petersburg, 2001. See further paras 20–9 of the above report.

76 Schermers, Henry G and Blokker, Niels M, International Institutional law, 3rd edn (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), at §435.Google Scholar

77 Ibid. Footnote omitted.

78 Among the many examples which could be cited here see the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, 1971 (11 ILM (1972) 963) Art 8. It should be noted that the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention is in fact termed the ‘Bureau’ and was maintained on an interim basis until 1988. See also the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 1973 (12 ILM (1973) 1055) Art XII; Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, London, 1972 (11 ILM (1972) 1294) Art XIV (2) and (3); Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 (26 ILM (1987) 1529) Art 7; Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Basel, 1989 (28 ILM (1989) 657) Art 16;; UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 (31 ILM (1992) 849) Art 8; UN Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 (31 ILM (1992) 822) Art 24. On the phenomenon of international environmental institutions see Churchill, Robin R and Ulfstein, Geir, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 American journal of International Law 623.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

79 A point made by Simon Lyster with specific reference to biodiversity regimes and Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein in relation to international organisations generally. See Simon, Lyster, International Wildlife Law (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1985), at 301–2 andGoogle ScholarSands, and Klein, , Bowett's Law of International Institutions, 5th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), at 302.Google Scholar

80 Schermers and Blokker, op cit, n 76, at §439.

81 See nn 63 and 64 above.

82 Final Report of the Twenty-Fourth ATCM, St. Petersburg, 2001, para 29.

83 See generally, Sands, and Klein, , op cit, n 79, ch 15; Schermers, and Blokker, , op cit, n 76, ch 11; Nigel White, The Law of International Organisations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), ch 2.Google Scholar

84 Robert, Jennings and Arthur, Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, Volume 1 (London: Longman, 1992) at 119.Google Scholar

85 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, 174, at 178.

86 Schermers and Blokker, op cit, n 76, at § 1565.

87 See Jan Klabbers, ‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’, in Koskenniemi (ed), op cit, 231, at 234–8.

88 Seyersted, F, ‘Objective Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations’ (1964) 34 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret 1;Google ScholarSeyersted, F, ‘The Legal Nature of International Organisations’ (1982) 51 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret 205.Google Scholar See also Ian, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), at 679–80.Google Scholar

89 In the Opinion of Schermers and Blokker op cit, n 76, at §1565.

90 For an extended analysis of presumptive personality see Klabbers, op cit, n 87.

91 Schermers and Blokker op cit, n 76, at /WP036 submitted by Uruguay on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.

92 Reparations for Injuries Case, op cit, n 85.

93 Ibid, n 85 at 179.

94 See Annex D of the Final Report of the Twenty-Fourth ATCM, St. Petersburg, 2001. This expression might be read as investing the secretariat with international legal personality, an interpretation supported by Gautier op cit, 29, at 36. This was an expansion on a text submitted to the ATCM one year earlier in Venice, where the approach of restricting personality to the host state was adopted.

95 XXIV ATCM/WP036 submitted by Uruguay on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.

96 The assignment of such a function to the secretariat may indirectly support advocates of international legal personality by means of an inductive analysis as articulated by ICJ in the Reparations Case, op cit, 85. Whilst it is not impossible to argue that the reasoning in the Reparations Case may be applied to organisations such as the Antarctic Secretariat by analogy, it should be noted such an application would represent a relatively radical step.

97 On the possibility of founding an Antarctic Organisation see below n 105 and accompanying text.

98 For a discussion of its functions see below.

99 At para 28.

100 XXIV ATCM/WP035 was submitted by Italy and New Zealand. XXIV ATCM/WP037 submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, New Zealand, Peru, and Uruguay.

101 XXIV ATCM/P035, Art 5; XXIV ATCM/WP037, Ar 4.

102 XXIV ATCM/WP037. See the Final Report of the Twenty-Fourth ATCM, at para 29.

103 Art IX(1) Antarctic Treaty.

104 Emphasis added.

105 Arts VII, VIII, and XVII of CCAMLR, 1980.

106 Such an arrangement features within inter alia the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (161 UNTS 72), the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR) (362 ILM (1993) 1068) and the 1992 Convention on the protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki) (BNA 35:0401).

107 New Zealand and Uruguay in particular appeared to oppose the proposition.

108 This function was noted in Annex E of the Seventeenth Final Report, Venice, 1992, annex D of the Eighteenth Final Report, Kyoto, 1994, and in all of the working papers submitted to subsequent ATCMs.

109 Davor Vidas and Birgit Njåstad, ‘The ATS on the Web: Introducing Modern Information Technology in Antarctic Affairs’, in Vidas (ed), op cit, 141, at 145.

110 Francioni, op cit, n 32, at 128.

111 See XXIV ATCM/WP037, Art 2.

112 For further information on the history of the web presence of the Antarctic Treaty see Davor Vidas, and Njåstad, op cit, n 116. The host state of each ATCM has, since 1999 maintained an Antarctic Treaty website containing information on, and documents related to the current plenary session. Access to documents by the general public is though limited, and to an extent, sporadic. The site of the XXVth ATCM is currently available at: <http://www.25atcm.gov.pl/>.

113 This responsibility was provided for XXIV ATCM/WP037, Art 2(iv), but omitted from XXIV ATCM/WP035. A wider responsibility to conclude international agreements was also provided for in XXIV ATCM/WP036, Art 4(iv), although this is unlikely to receive the support of a number of the ATCPs, notably the UK and Italy.

114 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985, Art 7(1)(e); UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992, Art 8(2)(e); UN Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, Art 24(1)(d). See also the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 1979, Art IX(4)(b); Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Basel, 1989, Art 16(1)(d).

115 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, 1971 has concluded Memoranda with five conventions (including the Biodiversity, Migratory Species and World Heritage Conventions), and twelve non-governmental organisations. See Resolution VII.3 on Partnerships with International Organisations. Texts are available at <http://www.ramsar.org/>. The Convention on Biodiversity 1992 has concluded Memoranda with three conventions (including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 1973) and seven international organisations. See Decisions I/9 and II/13 available online at <http://www.biodiv.org/>.

116 The obligation to negotiate a liability regime (or regimes) is provided for in Art 16 of the 1991 Environmental Protocol and negotiations are currently ongoing. See generally René Lefeber, ‘The Legal Need for a iability Regime’, at 181, ead, ‘The Prospects for an Antarctic Liability Regime’ at 199, and Skåre, ‘Liability Annex or Annexes to the Environmental Protocol: A Review of the Processes within the Antarctic Treaty System’ at 163, all in Vidas (ed), op cit. On the prospects of a liability fund see Francioni, ‘Liability for Damage to the Antarctic Environment’, in Francioni and Scovazzi (eds), op cit, 581, at 595–7.

117 During the 2000/1 season 12,248 tourists visited the continent, a substantial increase from 6,704 tourists who visited in the 1992/3 season. Source: International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. Statistics available online at <http://www.iaato.org/tourismstatistics/index/.html>.

118 The IAATO tabled a report (XXIV ATCM IP/73) and working paper (XXIV ATCM/IP72) at the Twenty-Fourth ATCM in St Petersburg 2001.

119 On Antarctic tourism see Mike G Richardson, ‘Regulating Tourism in the Antarctic: Issues of Environment and Jurisdiction’, in Vidas (ed), op cit, 71 and Scott, Shirley V, ‘How Cautious is Precautious?: Antarctic Tourism and the Precautionary Principle’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 963.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

120 For a discussion of these options, see Francioni, op cit, n 32, at 132–5 and Gautier, op cit, n 29, at 36–40.

121 Which may be adopted pursuant to Art IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty 1959.

122 This distinction was made in Decision XIX-I.

123 As does Francioni who points out that a Decision that relates to an internal organisational matter would be a very narrow instrument with which to establish a secretariat capable of influencing external matters, op cit, n 32, at 133.

124 The approval of Antarctic Measures has been described as ‘a notoriously slow process’. Francioni, op cit, n 32, at 133.

125 Such legal capacity was suggested in XXIV ATCM/WP037 submitted to the Twenty-Fourth ATCM in 2001.