¹ Loi organique n. 2009-1523 of 10 December 2009 relating to the application of art 61-1 of the French Constitution, JO 11 December 2009, 21379.

² Loi constitutionnelle n. 2008-724 of 23 July 2008 relating to the modernization of the institutions of the Republic, http://www.comite-constitutionnel.fr

³ For references to articles published in France on that topic, see Bon, P, ‘La Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité après la loi organique du 10 décembre 2009’ (2009) RFDA, 1107–1124Google Scholar, fne 2.

⁴ Decision Conseil constitutionnel 3 December 2009 no 2009-595 DC, JO 11 December 2009, 21831.

⁵ Since the 29 October 1974 reform, the Conseil constitutionnel has in effect been opened to political opposition. In 1974, 60 members of the lower house of the French Parliament or 60 members of the higher house of the French Parliament were given entitlement, together with the initial four most eminent political figures—the President of the French Republic, the Prime Minister and the President of each of the French Houses of Parliament—to submit legislation to the Conseil constitutionnel (art. 61 §2 of the French Constitution).

⁶ French ordinary judges have consistently refused to review the compatibility of French legislation with the French Constitution: cf. for administrative courts, CE 6 November 1936, S 1937, 3, 33, Conclusions X Latournerie; and for private law courts, Cass. Crim. 11 May 1833, S 1833, 1, 357.

⁷ Art 61 of the French Constitution.

⁸ See the speech of the French Prime Minister François Fillon at the Assemblée Nationale on 20 May 2008, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr.

⁹ According to art 55 of the Constitution, direct effect of international treaties is subjected to a condition of reciprocity. But this condition does not apply to treaties on human rights. See F Sudre, ‘La Dimension internationale et européenne des libertés et droits fondamentaux’ in R Cabrillac, M-A Frison-Roche and T Revet (eds), Libertés et droits fondamentaux (7th edn, Dalloz, Paris, 2001) 35–56.

¹⁰ On the origins of the reform, see below. For comments about the issue of relying on committee reports itself, Magnon, X, ‘La Composition de la Commission Balladur: brèves réflexions sur l'expertise en matière constitutionnelle’ (2008) 75–76 Revue française de droit constitutionnel 39–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ cf Nicolas Sarkozy's speech in Epinal on 12 July 2007, http://www.bfdc.org/article-11334863.html.

¹² Comité de réflexion et de proposition sur la modernisation et le rééquilibrage des institutions de la Vème République, Une V^ème République plus démocratique, (Fayard, 2008), also available at http://www.comite-constitutionnel.fr. Based on the Committee's recommendations, the government prepared a text which was adopted by Cabinet on 8 April 2008 and then submitted to Parliament (On the governmental text, see comments by B Mathieu, ‘Question préjudicielle de constitutionnalité—A propos du projet de loi organique’ (2008) JCP, AJ 214; M Verpeaux, ‘La question préjudicielle de constitutionnalité et le projet de loi organique’ (2009) AJDA, 1474; Stéfanini, M Fatin-Rouge, ‘Le Projet de loi organique relatif à la question préjudicielle de constitutionnalité (Entretiens avec A Levade et J Pini)’ (2008) AIJC, 11Google Scholar).

The National Assembly adopted the project, subject to some amendments, on 3^rd June 2008 (For an analysis of the amendments made by the National Assembly on first reading, see Mathieu, B, ‘La Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité: les améliorations apportées par l'Assemblée Nationale au projet de loi organique’ (2009) JCP, AJ 280Google Scholar).

The text was then adopted by the Senate, subject to further amendments on 24^th June 2008. The text was then considered on second reading by the National Assembly, on 9 July 2008 and by the Senate, on 16^th July. The final text adopted by both houses of Parliament separately was then referred to Parliament in Congress, the two houses sitting together in Versailles, and adopted by the required qualified majority, under art 89 of the Constitution, plus one vote (905 present; 896 votes; 539 in favour and 357 against (the required majority being of 538)).

¹³ See for example the Vice-President of the Conseil d'Etat, Interview by Jean-Marc Sauvé on 11 September 2007, available at www.comite-constitutionnel.fr.

¹⁴ See for example, Jean-Louis Debré, Interview on 18–19 September 2007, available at www.comite-constitutionnel.fr in favour of reasserting the supremacy of the French Constitution.

¹⁵ Projet de loi constitutionnelle no 1203 portant révision des articles 61, 62 et 63 de la Constitution et instituant un contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois submitted to the French National Assembly on 30 March 1990.

¹⁶ Projet de loi constitutionnelle no 231 portant révision de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 et modifiant ses titres VII, VIII, IX et X submitted to the French Senate on 11 March 1993. This second attempt had given rise to a full Committee Report favourable to the introduction of an ex post review, Rapport au Président de la République, 15 February 1993, (Documentation française, 1993) esp 76.

¹⁷ This form of constitutional review of administrative acts remains and falls within the jurisdiction of administrative courts. For a recent example, CE 30 October 2008 Commune d'Annecy (2008) RFDA, 1156, where an administrative act was in conflict with the constitutional principle—stemming from the Environmental Charter—of participation in environmental decisions. But this form of constitutional review cannot be carried out if a statute stands in between the disputed administrative act and the Constitution. See, for a recent example, CE 26 December 2008, jurisdata no 2008-074841. Indeed, administrative courts would otherwise indirectly adjudicate upon the constitutionality of the statute itself, a task that belongs exclusively to the Conseil constitutionnel.

¹⁸ But since 1985, in the decision no 85-187 DC of 25 January 1985 Etat d'urgence en Nouvelle Calédonie, the Conseil constitutionnel has held that legislation already in force can be scrutinized if and when Acts of Parliaments purporting to complete, amend or clarify the latter are submitted to the Council for review of their compatibility with the Constitution. For an illustration of control of promulgated legislation in this way, see decision no 99-410 DC of 15 March 1999 Loi organique relative à la Nouvelle Calédonie AJDA 1999, 324, comments by J-E Schoettl where legislation scrunitized before promulation was again reviewed and two of its provisions were struck down.

¹⁹ See CE 6 November 1936 Arrighi, Lebon 966; Com. 11 May 1833, S 1933, 1, 357. And more recently, see CE 5 January 2005 Deprez et Baillard, Lebon, 1; AJDA 2005, comments by L Burgogue-Karsen; RFDA 2005, 56, comments by B Bonnet.

²⁰ Decision Conseil constitutionnel 15 January 1975 no 75–74 DC, Rec Cons Const, 19.

²¹ Art 55 of the French Constitution which states that international norms prevail could have served as a justification for including in the scope of constitutional review checking that legislation complies with international norms. But the Conseil constitutionnel took a restrictive view of constitutional review. This position was probably influenced by the circumstances of the referral at the time: the Act referred for scrutiny was the 1975 Act that legalized abortion for the first time in France. In declining to review the compatibility of the Act with art 2 of the ECHR, protecting the right to life, the Conseil constitutionnel may simply have expressed its reluctance to take political positions on highly sensitive issues democratically considered by Parliament.

²² Ch Mixte 24 May 1975 Société des cafés Jacques Vabre, D 1975, 497, Conclusions Touffait.

²³ CE Ass 20 October 1989 Nicolo, Lebon, 190.

²⁴ cf for the ECHR, CE 21 December 1990 Confédération nationale des associations familiales catholiques, Lebon, 369; AP 24 January 2003 no 497; For EU law in a broad sense, see CE Ass 28 February 1992 Sté Arizona Tobacco Products et SA Philip Morris France, no 56776.

²⁵ M Hunter-Henin, ‘France: Horizontal Application of Human Rights in France. The Triumph of the European Convention on Human Rights’ Chapter 3 in D Oliver and J Fedtke (eds), Human Rights and the Private Sphere—A Comparative Study (Routledge-Cavendish, London and New York, 2007) 98–124.

²⁶ This success is to be attributed to a more favourable political climate. Given that the present opposition had in 1990 put forward a similar proposal, political consensus was not too difficult to reach.

For a study of the change from reluctance to receptiveness in France to the idea of ex post constitutional review of legislation, see P Bon, ‘Louis Favoreu et l'exception d'inconstitutionnalité, Hommage à Louis Favoreu’ in Dits et écrits à propos de Louis Favoreu, (PUAM, 2007) 141–149.

For the reasons behind the failure of previous attemps, cf V Bernaud and M Fatin-Rouge Stefanini, ‘La Réforme du contrôle de constitutionnalité une nouvelle fois en question? Réflexions autour des articles 61-1 et 62 de la Constitution proposés par le Comité Balladur’ (2008) 75–76 Revue française de droit constitutionnel, 169–199, esp 171.

²⁷ See however for a similar system in Belgium, Loi spéciale du 12 juillet 2009 modifiant l'article 26 de la loi spéciale du 6 janvier 1989 sur la Cour d'arbitrage. The Belgium system similarly provides (since 2009) that when a party claims before a court that a legislative provision violates a fundamental right wholly or partly protected both by title II of the Belgium Constitution and international or European norms, the judge is to refer the issue of compatibility with the Constitution to the Constitutional Court first.

²⁸ See amongst many, R Badinter, ‘Protecting Human Rights: the European Perspective’ in P Mahoney (ed.), Mélanges à la mémoire de Rolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 2000) 79–85, esp 84.

²⁹ CE Ass. 30 October 1998 Sarran, RFDA 1998, 1081; JCP, G, 1999, II, 1278, M-Ch Rouault.

³⁰ AP 2 juin 2000 Delle Fraisse, Bull. Ass Plén, no 4; JCP, G, 2001, II, 10453, A-C de Foucaud.

³¹ Hence the change of name from ‘exception d'inconstitutionalité’ used in past projects (See TS Renoux, ‘L'exception, telle est la question’ (1990) RFDC, 651) which could wrongly suggest that litigants could ask ordinary judges to decide on the constitutionality of potentially applicable legislative provisions and set them aside if seen as unconstitutional, to ‘question préjudicielle de constitutionnalité’ (‘preliminary reference on constitutionality’), as adopted by the governmental text or ‘question prioritaire de constitutionnalité’ (‘constitutional question to be considered first’) as adopted by the National Assembly and in the final reform.

³² See comments by P Bon, ‘La Question préjudicielle de constitutionnalité en France: solution ou problème?’ in Contrôle de constitutionnalité par voie préjudicielle (PUAM, 2009), 231.

³³ Direct referral from lower ordinary judges to the Conseil constitutionnel was by contrast possible under the initial proposals made by the Balladur Committee (n 10).

³⁴ On this qualification, see Parliamentary debates before the French Senate (2008– 2009), Doc Parl Sénat, no 637, 43.

³⁵ cf critical comments made by Professor B Mathieu when interviewed by the Commission des lois de l'Assemblée Nationale and summarized in his article, ‘La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité: les améliorations apportées par l'Assemblée nationale au projet de loi organique’ (n 12). The main fear is that this qualification will undermine the authority of Conseil constitutionnel decisions in that a change of circumstances can easily be found in order to justify repeated challenges to Conseil constitutionnel decisions.

³⁶ cf de la Rosa, S, ‘Droit constitutionnel et CEDH. L'article 6 §1 de la Convention européenne, le Conseil constitutionnel et la question préjudicielle de constitutionnalité’ (2009) 80 Revue française de droit constitutionnel 817–837CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁷ In the Senate, an amendment had been voted in order to change the title of the Conseil constitutionnel from Constitutional Council to Constitutional Court (additional art 24 ter adopted by the Senate in the debates dated 24 June 2008). The amendment as to the change of name was dropped by the National Assembly (July 2008, Rapport AN, commission des lois) 163. But behind the issue of denomination, the problem of ensuring that the composition and procedure before the Conseil satisfy the requirements of a fair hearing remains. One may for example wonder to what extent automatic membership of the Conseil for ex Presidents of the French Republic would be compatible. The Balladur Committee had suggested abolishing automatic membership, a suggestion not followed in the government's text but introduced again by the Senate on 24 June 2008 before finally being rejected by the National Assembly on second reading. The Minister of Justice (before the Senate, on 24 June 2008) justified keeping automatic membership for ex Presidents of the Republic on the tenuous ground that Presidents of the French Republic whilst in office are entrusted with the mission under art 5 of the Constitution to protect the Constitution. See however how the appointment procedure for members appointed to the Council by the President of the Republic is now restricted by a possible veto exercisable by committees composed of members of Parliament (art 13 of the Constitution).

³⁸ In that sense, see Drago, G, ‘Réformer le Conseil constitutionnel’ (2003) 105 Pouvoirs 81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ See the parliamentary debates relating to the stricter criteria to be applied by the highest courts, JOAN CR, Session of 14 September 2009, 7052.

⁴⁰ In that sense, see Rousseau, D, ‘La Question préjudicielle de constitutionnalité: une belle question?’ (25 juin 2009) LPA, 7Google Scholar.

⁴¹ C Harlow and R Rawlings, Law and Administration (3^rd edn, CUP, Cambridge, 2009), 689.

⁴² It is true that at first sight, decisions by the Cour de cassation will also look very abstract. Indeed, Cour de cassation judges will not examine the facts of the case put before them but rather rely on the findings made by the lower courts. Moreover, their ruling will be based on a particular interpretation of the law and not on factual considerations. There is no doubt however that facts do play an important role in the Cour de cassation's decisions. Commentators always refer to the facts of a case in order to ascertain the ambit of a particular ruling by the Cour de cassation and to determine the underlying justification of a particular decision. Facts are more remote from the Conseil constitutionnel's ex ante decisions, as reviews of constitutionality do not stem from a dispute, from litigation but from a complaint made about a piece of legislation which has not been implemented and has never yet been applied. Facts will enter into the reasoning to some extent as French constitutional judges will speculate on the various potential factual implications of the text, but the perspective will in any case remain vertical. The question put to the Conseil constitutionnel is indeed whether the State (or more specifically Parliament) has violated Constitutional rights in passing the piece of legislation in question.

⁴³ M Mangent, ‘Le Conseil d'Etat et l'Europe. Conditions et effets d'un ralliement’ in P Raimbault (ed), La Puissance publique à l'heure européenne, (Actes de colloques, Dalloz, 2006) 173–190.

⁴⁴ A few derogations have been put in place to this scheme. The conduct of the trial will thus not be suspended where a person is deprived of his/her liberty because of the trial or when someone's liberty is at stake in the trial.

⁴⁵ Cf. http://www.senat.fr/bulletin/20090921/lois.html, First President of the Cour de cassation before the Commission des lois du Sénat on 23 September 2009.

⁴⁶ The Conseil constitutionnel has had a good record of respecting the strict time limits set to its members (one month only under art 61 para 3 of the Constitution) in the context of the traditional ex ante constitutional review. One may hope that the same would apply under the new constitutional review. But the combination of the ex ante and ex post review will cause a steep increase in the Conseil constitutionnel's workload. Moreover, the requirements of a fair trial and the necessity to take into account the context are likely to be more time consuming than the abstract evaluation undertaken under the ex ante review. Even if time limits are respected, the maximum time frame of 3 months is therefore likely to be needed. Given the huge pressure that already lies on ordinary courts, the same is likely to be true for the highest ordinary courts. We are therefore realistically looking at least at a 6 month delay.

⁴⁷ Other provisions of the reform illustrate the wish to involve citizens in the promotion of the rule of law and of the Constitution. The reform has thus created new possibilities for holding referenda, on the initiative of Parliament or citizens. Furthermore, it has entitled citizens to address petitions to the Conseil économique, social et environemental or to seize the ‘Conseil supérieur de la magistrature’ or the ‘Défenseur des droits’. On these, see Roblot-Troizier, A, ‘L'Impact de la révision constitutionnelle sur les droits et libertés’ (2008) AJDA, 1866–1871Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ cf art 12 CPC.

But in administrative litigation, the Conseil d'Etat considered that the issue of compatibility of legislation with international norms did not fall within the ambit of the ≪correct application of the law≫. As such, issues of compatibility of legislation with international norms similarly need to be raised by litigants. See R Chapus, Droit du contentieux administratif, (13th edn, Montchrestien, 2008) 825. This is not true before private law courts. See for example, Soc. 5 June 2001, Bull, no 208; Com. 31 March 2004, Bull, no 66.

⁴⁹ See for example, D de Béchillon, ‘Plaidoyer pour l'attribution aux juges ordinaires du pouvoir de contrôler la constitutionnalité des lois et la transformation du Conseil constitutionnel en Cour suprême’, in Renouveau du droit constitutionnel, Mélanges en l'honneur de Louis Favoreu (Dalloz, 2007) 109–129.

⁵⁰ See however presenting the reform as having effected a radical change in French dominant legal philosophy, Fabbrini, F, ‘Kelsen in Paris: France's Constitutional reform and the Introduction of A Posteriori Constitutional Review of Legislation’ 9 German Law Journal 10 1297–1312Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Doc Parl Ass Nat, no 1898 (13^ème législature) 183 and 171.

⁵² With the limited exception of parties who represent group interests: unions, associations, etc.

⁵³ See, critical of the restriction in scope of the review to ‘rights and liberties’ because of the indeterminate nature of this category, F Mélin-Soucramanien, ‘Du Déni de justice en droit public français’, in Renouveau du droit constitutionnel, Mélanges en l'honneur de Louis Favoreu, (Dalloz, Paris, 2007) 277–290, esp 284–285. See, regretting that the whole of the Constitution has not been placed ‘in the hands of citizens’, Cassia, P, ‘Le Renvoi préjudiciel en appréciation de constitutionnalité, une question d'actualité’ (2008) RFDA 877Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ For example, individual liberty guaranteed by art 66.

⁵⁵ Redécouvrir le préambule de la Constitution, Rapport au Président de la République au nom du Comité présidé par Mme Simone Veil, (La Documentation française, Paris, 2009), (also available on line at: http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/084000758/000.pdf). Comments by J-P Feldman, D 2009, 1036–1039 and JCP 2008, AJ 50; Hennette-Vauchez, S, ‘Nouvelles modifications de la Constitution? Redécouvrir le préambule de la Constitution ou l’éthique minimale appliquée à l'expertise constitutionnelle’ (2009) RFDA 397–406Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ With the exception of one proposed addition: the reference at art 1 of the French Constitution to dignity.

⁵⁷ ‘Le vice principal de l'arsenal des droits fondamentaux n'est pas d’être insuffisant mais d'être méconnu' Veil Comittee Report (n 54) 98.

⁵⁸ cf CE 9 April 1999, no 19 0749.

⁵⁹ For example, see the right to access to courts, more restrictively construed under art 6 of the ECHR than it is under art 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.

⁶⁰ Around 10 exclusively constitutional rights have been identified, see Cassia, P, ‘Le Renvoi préjudiciel en appréciation de constitutionnalité, une question d'actualité’ (2008) RFDA, 877Google Scholar. For example, the principle of the independence of lecturers and researchers.

⁶¹ Decision no 2010-1 QPC Conseil constitutionnel 28 May 2010, JO 29 May 2010, 9728.

⁶² Art 14 ECHR is not free standing. Discriminatory measures will only infringe ECHR requirements if the measures are first proven to fall within the ambit of one of the other Convention rights.

⁶³ CE avis 18 july 2006 and CE section GISTI, Lebon 350 and 353; AJDA 2006, 1833; RFDA 2006, 1201.

⁶⁴ The disputed legislative provision allowed for differing modes of calculation of pensions for people who had served and fought for France depending on whether or not they were French citizens.

French veterans were entitled to higher pensions than foreign veterans. This was held by the Conseil constitutionnel to violate the principle of equality guaranteed under art 6 of the Declaration of the righs of man and the citizen.

⁶⁵ See O Dutheillet de Lamothe, ‘Conseil constitutionnel et Cour européenne des droits de l'homme: un dialogue sans paroles’ in Le Dialogue des juges. Mélanges en l'honneur du Président Bruno Genevois (Dalloz, Paris, 2009) 403–417.

⁶⁶ See the two recent references made by the Conseil d'Etat to the Conseil constitutionnel following allegations made by private parties of unconstitutionality in respect of legal provisions restricting handicapped children's right and their parents' to claim compensation against medical bodies and staff for failing to detect the handicap in utero (case no 329290) and of legal provisions relating to calculation of retirement allowances (case no 336753). Both references were made on 14 April 2010 and are available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/cde.fr.

⁶⁷ CE 14 April 2010 case no 323830, available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr in which the association known as Union for Families in Europe, affiliated to ‘Union nationale des associations familiales et des unions départementales’ (UNAF and UDAF) raised the constitutionality of legal provisions from the French Code for Social Action and Families.

⁶⁸ Under art 31 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. See L Boré, La Défense des intérêts collectifs par les associations devant les juridictions administratives et judiciaires, (LGDJ, 1997, foreword G Viney).

⁶⁹ See for example Wilkinson v Kitzinger, [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam) where the challenge brought by Mrs Wilkinson and Mrs Kitzinger against the Civil Partnership Act was financially supported by gay rights movements.

⁷⁰ See 1975 Decision above. The solution was reiterated in Decision Conseil constitutionnel 30 March 2006 no 2006-535 DC, Rec Cons Const, 19; AJDA 2006, 1961, comments by C Geslot.

⁷¹ Cass. QPC, 16 April 2010, no. 10-40002, D 2010, 1254, A Levade; RFDA 2010, 445 contrary Conclusions by M Domingo, 449, note M Gautier; 458, note P Gaia; AJDA 2010, 1023, note P Manin.

⁷² Most commentators were indeed critical: G Carcassonne and N Molfessis, ‘La Cour de cassation à l'assaut de la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité’, Le Monde 23 April 2010; Mathieu, B, ‘La Cour de cassation tente de faire invalider la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité par la Cour de Luxembourg’ (2010) JCP, G, 464Google Scholar; Rousseau, D and Lévy, D, ‘La Cour de cassation et la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité: pourquoi tant de méfiance?’ (2010) GP 25–27Google Scholar April, 20; D Simon & A Rigaux, ‘Drôle de drame: la Cour de cassation et la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité’ (2010) Europe, May, 5. For more favourable appraisal, see Cassia, P and Sauvier-Cassia, E, ‘Imbroglio autour de la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité’ (2010) D, 1234Google Scholar; P Manin, AJDA, 2010, 1023.

Moreover, both the Conseil d'Etat and the Conseil constitutionnel rejected the Cour de cassation's reasoning: CE 14 May 2010 Rujovic no 312 305; AJDA 2010, 1408, comments by S Brondel; D 2010, 1228, comments by P Fombeur and 1234 comments by P Cassia and E Saulnier-Cassia and Décision n.2010-605 DC Conseil constitutionnel 12 May 2010, Cahiers conseil constitutionnel no 29; P Fombeur, ‘Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, droit constitutionnel et droit de l'Union européenne’ (2010) D 1229; P Cassia and E Sauvier-Cassia, ‘Imbroglio autour de la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité’, (2010) D, 1234; A Levade, D 2010, 1321.

⁷³ The Cour de cassation in a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice queried whether the priority to be granted under the reform to a constitutional issue which also raised a question of compatibility with EU Law respected the supremacy to be conferred in Member States on EU law. Cf Cass. QPC, 16 April 2010, no. 10-40002.

⁷⁴ Art 88-1 of the French Constitution states that ‘the French Republic takes part in the EU, formed of States which have freely agreed to jointly exercise certain of their powers’. On that art, see J Rideau and F Picot, ‘Article 88-1’, in F Luchaire, G. Conac and X Pretot (eds), La Constitution et la République française (3^rd edn, Economica, Paris, 2009) 1864–1916.

⁷⁵ See below.

⁷⁶ CE 22 December 1978 Cohn-Bendit, Lebon, 524; GAJA, 644.

⁷⁷ CE 30 October 2009 Perreux, JCP, G, 2009, 592, comments by S and V Corneloup; JCP, S, 2009, 1569, comments by J Cavallini.

⁷⁸ Decision no 2004-496 DC of 10 June 2004 Loi pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique, Rec Cons Const 101; AJDA 2004, 1534; D 2005, 199, comments by S Mouton; RFDA 2004, 654, comments by B Genevois.

⁷⁹ Decision no 2006-540 DC of 27 July 2006 Loi relative aux droits d'auteur et droits voisins de la société d'information, Rec Cons Const 88; JCP, G, 2007, II, 10 066, comments by M Verpeaux. See also for an illustration of legislation held to be in manifest violation of an EU directive Decision no 2006-543 DC 30 November 2006 Loi relative au secteur de l'énergie, JO 8 December 2006, 18544; JCP, G, 2006, AJ 567.

⁸⁰ cf (n 72).

⁸¹ cf Décision n.2010-605 DC Conseil constitutionnel 12 May 2010 (n 72).

⁸² CE Ass 8 February 2007 Arcelor, Lebon, 55; RFDA 2007, 384, Conclusions Guyomar; D 2007, 2272, comments by M Verpeaux.

⁸³ On this question of acquiring constitutional standing through reference in the French Constitutional text, see A Roblot-Troizier, Contrôle de constitutionnalité et normes visées par la Constitution française. Recherches sur la constitutionnalité par renvoi (Dalloz, Nouvelle Bibliothèque des thèses, 2007) esp 31–116.

⁸⁴ Decision Conseil constitutionnel no 71-44 DC of 16 July 1971 Liberté d'association, JO 18 July 1971, 7114.

⁸⁵ See Rivero, J, ‘Commentaire de la décision du 15 janvier 1975’ (1975) AJDA, 136Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ See Roux, J, ‘Le Conseil constitutionnel, le droit communautaire dérivé et la Constitution’ (2004) Rev droit public, 923Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ Veil Committee (n 54) 45.

⁸⁸ In that sense Geslot, C, ‘Normes constitutionnelles et normes de référence du contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois’ (2007) JCP, G, I, 149Google Scholar, 11–25, esp 15.

⁸⁹ See Pernice, I, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union’ (2002) Eu Law Rev, 511Google Scholar; Krisch, N, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ 71 (2008) Mod L Rev, 183, esp 189CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁰ cf Haltern, U, ‘Pathos and Patina. The Failure and Promise of Constitutionalism in the European Imagination’ (2003) 9 Eu Law J 2003, 14; O Cayla, ‘La Négation de toute possible identité européenne par la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux’ in G Lebreton (ed), Regards critiques sur l'évolution des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine, (L'Harmattan, 2002) 103–113Google Scholar.

⁹¹ Since 1985, in the decision no 85-187 DC of 25 January 1985 Etat d'urgence en Nouvelle Calédonie, the Conseil constitutionnel has held that legislation already in force can be scrutinized if and when Acts of Parliaments purporting to complete, amend or clarify the latter are submitted to the Council for review of their compatibility with the Constitution. See above (n 19).