Article contents
Constitutional Aspects of the Independence of the European Central Bank
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 January 2008
Extract
At the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome 1957 on 26 March 1997, Romano Prodi, President of the Italian Council, said that, with the Maastricht Treaty “we are perfecting our common economic constitution”, and that this Treaty should not be seen simply as an “instrument for the introduction of the single currency, but also as the awakening of the European peoples to the necessity of setting limits on the action of governments”. This notion of constitution or of economic constitution has received much attention from European legal scholars within the ongoing debate on constitutionalism and constitutionalisation within the Community legal order. However, constitutionalisation presents us with semantic difficulties, as legal doctrine has to adapt itself to the specificity of Community law. The discussion is further complicated by the divergence of views on the subject of whether the Treaties are a constitution for Europe and, indeed, whether Europe needs a constitution. Before we consider what constitutionalisation signifies, the notion of a constitution and an economic constitution in Community law merit consideration.
- Type
- Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1998
References
1. Agences Europe, 27 Mar. 1997, p.2.Google Scholar
2. See Eleftheriadis, P., “Aspects of European Constitutionalism” (1996) 21 E.L.Rev.32Google Scholar; Grimm, D., “Does Europe Need a Constitution?” (1995) E.L.J. 282Google Scholar; Hartley, T. C., “Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: The Emerging Constitution of the European Community” (1986) 34 A.J.C.L. 229Google Scholar; Lenaerts, K., “Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism” (1990) 38 AJ.CL. 205Google Scholar; Raux, J., “La constitutionnalisation du système communautaire dans un traité fondamental de l'Union européenne”, Ed. du Juris-Classeur, Europe, Aug.–Sept 1995, p.1Google Scholar; Simon, D., Le système juridique communautaire (1997), p.33Google Scholar; Stein, E., “Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution” (1981) 75 A.J.I.L. 1Google Scholar; Streit, M. E. and Mussler, W., “The Economic Constitution of the European Community: From ‘Rome’ to ‘Maastricht’” (1995) E.L.J. 5Google Scholar; Weiler, J. H. H., “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision” (1995) E.L.J. 219.Google Scholar
3. Case 294/83 Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament [1986] E.C.R. 1339.Google Scholar
4. See Grimm, , op. cit supra n.2, at p.284.Google Scholar
5. For further explanation see idem, p 286.
6. Phillips, O. Hood and Jackson., P.O.Hood Phillips' Constitutional and Administrative Law (7th edn, 1987). p.5.Google Scholar
7. Dicey, A. V., Law of the Constitution (10th edn), pp.126et seq. 146–150.Google Scholar
8. Hood Phillips and Jackson, loc. cit. supra n.6.
9. See Arts.2, 3 and 3a EC.
10. Case 138/79 Roquette v. Council [1980] E.C.R. 3333.Google Scholar
11. See Hartley, T. C., The Foundations of European Community Law (3rd edn. 1994), chap.9, p.266.Google Scholar
12. Case 29/68 Milch-Fett-und Eierkontor [1969] E.C.R. 165.Google Scholar
13. Art.189 EC.
14. Arts.113. 238 EC; Case 2/70 Commission v. Council (“ERTA”) [1971] E.C.R. 273Google Scholar; Opinion 1/94 World Trade Agreement [1994] E.C.R. I–5267.Google Scholar
15. The ideas of Prof. Snyder, F., “The Institutions of the EU”, Lectures, College of Europe, Bruges 1996/1997 are acknowledged in the development of this list of principles, though the author alone is responsible for this article.Google Scholar
16. For an explanation of the major constitutional principles developed by the ECJ (direct effect, supremacy, expansion of direct effect, treaty-making powers, fundamental rights) see Hartley and Stein, both op. cit. supra n.2.
17. See Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administraitie der Belastingen [1963] E.C.R. 1Google Scholar; Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] E.C.R. 585.Google Scholar
18. Eleftheriadis, , op. cit supra n.2 at p.38.Google Scholar
19. Grimm, , op. cit. supra n.2, at p.287.Google Scholar
20. Arts.1, 20(1) GG; Currie, D. P., The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994), p.18.Google Scholar
21. Art.79(3) GG.
22. Weiler, op. cit. supra n.2.
23. See Arts. 3a, 102a EC.
24. Streit, and Mussler, . op. cit. supra n.2. at p.5.Google Scholar
25. Art.3(c). (g) EC.
26. See Arts.8–8e. 128, 129, 130r–t EC.
27. Raux, op. cit. supra n.2, at p.1.Google Scholar
28. EMI, The Single Monetary Policy in Stage 3: Elements of the Monetary Policy Strategy of the ESCB (02. 1997). p.3.Google Scholar
29. “Autonomy” and “independence” are used as synonyms in this article.
30. See Arts.3a. 102a, 105 EC.
31. Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of 5 Dec. 1978. Bull EC 12–1978.Google Scholar
32. Commission Guidelines concerning the conditions and arrangements for the “enhanced co-operation” instrument to be included in the revised Maastricht Treaty. Agences Europe Documents No.2022, 29 Jan. 1997.
33. See Financial Times, 18 Mar. 1997, p.1.Google Scholar
34. See idem, p.3.
35. See idem, 20 May 1997, p.4.
36. Lenaerts, K., “Regulating the Regulatory Process: ‘Delegation of Powers’ in the European Community” (1993) 18 E.L.Rev. 23, 42.Google Scholar
37. See Snyder, F., “EMU—Metaphor for European Union? Institutions. Rules and Types of Regulation”, in Dehousse, R. (Ed.), The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1993).Google Scholar
38. See Agences Europe. 7/8 04. 1997, p.9.Google Scholar
39. The Executive Board will be appointed immediately after 1 July 1998 under Art.1091 (1) EC.
40. Art 109a(1) EC: see discussion of proposal to reserve a seat on the Executive Board of the European Central Bank for the UK. Financial Times. 7 11. 1997, p.2.Google Scholar
41. Agences Europe Documents No.2015/16, 18 Dec. 1996.Google Scholar
42. Arts.1091(3), 1091(5), 109k EC; Arts.47.1, 44 ESCB Statute. Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of an exchange rate mechanism in the third stage of economic and monetary union, Amsterdam, 16 June 1997, OJ ] C236/5.
43. Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Florence of 21 and 22 June 1996, SN 300/96.
44. Arts.108, 109a(1) EC; Art.12 ESCB Statute.
45. See Art.12, ibid.
46. Friedman, M.. “Should There be an Independent Monetary Authority”, in Yeager, L. B. (Ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution (1962).Google Scholar
47. Eijffinger, S. and de Haan, J.. “The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence”. Special Papers in International Economics, International Finance Section. Princeton University. No. 19. May 1996. p.54.Google Scholar
48. Gormley, L. and de Haan, J.. “The Democracy Deficit of the European Central Bank” (1996) 21 E.L.Rev. 95, 101.Google Scholar
49. Idem. p.102.
50. See Art. 3.1 ESCB Statute.
51. Art. 105(5) EC Art.3.3 ESCB Statute.
52. Idem, Arts.105(4), 4 respectively.
53. Art.5 ESCB Statute.
54. Art.109 EC. Art.6 ESCB Statute.
55. Eijffinger, and de Haan, , op. cit. supra n.47, at p.1.Google Scholar
56. EMI, The Single Monetary Policy in Stage 3: Specification of the Operational Framework (Jan. 1997) and op. cit supra n.28.Google Scholar
57. See Art.155 EC.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Art.162(1) EC.
61. Art.109f(1) EC.
62. Art.109a(1) EC.
63. Financial Times, 22/23 02. 1997, p.2.Google Scholar
64. Verioren van Themaat, P., “Some Propositions on the Legal Aspects of the Planned Economic and Monetary Union in its Political, Economic and Social Context before and after the Ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht”, in Snyder, F. (Ed.). Constitutional Dimensions of European Economic Integration (1996), pp.3–22, at p.13.Google Scholar
65. EMI, op. cit. supra n.56.
66. See comments on “hawkish culture in European central banking circles” in Financial Times, 8 Aug. 1997.Google Scholar
67. Smaghi, L. B.. “How Can the ECB be Credible?”. EUI Working Paper RSC No.96/24. p.12.Google Scholar
68. See Editorial Comments, “Executive Agencies within the EC: The European Central Bank—a Model?” (1996) C.M.L.Rev. 626.Google Scholar
69. Art. 105(6) EC.
70. Art.105a(2) EC.
71. Art.106(5) EC.
72. Art. 106(6) EC.
73. That fines would be the ultima ratio is clear from the recitals of the Commission Proposal for a Council Reg. on the speeding up of the excessive deficits procedure. Agences Europe Documents No.2010.6 11. 1996. pp.6–9.Google Scholar
74. Art.104c(7) EC.
75. Art.104c(11) EC measures are as follows: publication of additional information specified by the Council before issuing bonds and securities: invitation of the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy towards the member State concerned: and requiring the member State concerned to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of an appropriate size with the Community until the excessive deficit has. in the view of the Council, been corrected.
76. Art.34.3 ESCB Statute: EMI (01. 1997). op. cit. supra n.56. Annex 12. at p.85.Google Scholar
77. Council Reg. 17/62 implementing Arts.85 and 86 EC (1962) O.J. Sp. Ed. No.204/62. p.87 (as amended).Google Scholar
78. Infra n. 129.
79. Joined Cases C–178, 179, 188, 189 and 190/94 Dillenkofer & Others v. Germany (8 Oct. 1996. not yet rep.), para 20.Google Scholar
80. Commission Memorandum of 21 Aug. 1996. on applying Art.171 EC (1996) OJ. C242/6.Google Scholar
81. Wägenbaur, R., “How to Improve Compliance with European Community Legislation and the Judgments of the European Court of Justice” (1996) 19 Fordham int L.J. 936, 950.Google Scholar
82. Editorial Comments, op. cit. supra n.68, at p.628.Google Scholar
83. Hood, Phillips and Jackson, , op. cit. supra n.6, at. p.33.Google Scholar
84. Dicey, A. V., Law of the Constitution (8th edn. 1914), p.xvii.Google Scholar
85. Arts.173, 175, 177(b), 184, 215 para.2 EC; Art.35 ESCB Statute.
86. Louis, J. V., “L'Union Economique et Monétaire” (1992) C.D.E. 251, 296.Google Scholar
87. See Eijffinger, and de Haan, . op. cit supra n.47. at p.2.Google Scholar
88. EMI. op. cit. supra n.28 at p.6.Google Scholar
89. Idem. p. 15.
90. See Louis, , op. cit. supra n.86. at p.285.Google Scholar
91. EMI (01. 1997) op. cit. supra n.56. at p.16.Google Scholar
92. Reverse transaction: an operation whereby the central bank buys or sells assets under a repurchase agreement (arrangement whereby an asset is sold while the seller simultaneously obtains the right and obligation to repurchase it at a specific price on a future date or on demand or conducts credit operations against collateral (assets pledged as a guarantee for the repayment of the short-term liquidity loans which credit institutions receive from central banks in order to absorb liquidity from the market).
Outright transaction: a transaction where the central bank buys or sells (spot and forward) assets in the market.
Foreign exchange swap: simultaneous spot and forward transactions of one currency against another. The ESCB will execute open market monetary policy operations in the form of foreign exchange swaps where the national central banks (NCBs) (or the ECB) buy (or sell) euro spot against a foreign currency and at the same time sell (or buy) it back forward.
Collection of fixed-term deposits: a monetary policy instrument that may be used by the ESCB for fine-tuning purposes where the ESCB offers remuneration on counterparties' fixed-term deposits on accounts with the NCBs in order to absorb liquidity from the market.
93. Main-refinancing operation: a regular open market operation executed by the ESCB in the form of a reverse transaction. Main refinancing operations are executed through weekly standard tenders (a tender procedure to be used by the ESCB in its regular open market operations, carried out within a time frame of 24 hours, and in which all counterparties—opposite parties in a financial transaction with the central bank—fulfilling the general eligibility criteria are entitled to submit bids) and have a maturity of two weeks.
Longer-term financing operation: a regular open market operation to be executed by the ESCB in the form of a reverse transaction, executed through monthly standard tenders and having a maturity of three months.
Fine-tuning operation: a non-regular market operation executed by the ESCB in order to deal with unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the market.
Structural operation: an open market operation to be executed by the ESCB mainly in order to adjust the structural liquidity position of the banking system vis-à-vis the ESCB.
94. EMI (01. 1997) op. cit. supra n.56. Annex 8, at p.63.Google Scholar
95. Art.30.4 ESCB Statute.
96. See idem. Art.31.3.
97. Agences Europe. 7/8 04. 1997, p.10.Google Scholar
98. Agences Europe Documents No.2015/16, 18 12 1996. p.3.Google Scholar
99. EMI (01. 1997) op. cit. supra n.56, at pp.25–26.Google Scholar
100. Art.105(2) EC.
101. Art.12.1 ESCB Statute.
102. Ibid.
103. Majone, G.. “Independence vs. Accountability? Non-Majoritarian Institutions and Democratic Government in Europe”. EUI Working Paper SPS No.94/3. p.2.Google Scholar
104. Smits, R., “The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects” (1996) 45 I.C.L.Q. 319, 338.Google Scholar
105. Arts.103, 103a, 104c, 105(6), 105a(2), 106(5), (6), 109(1). (4), 109j(2), (4), 109k, 1091 EC.
106. Arts. 105A(2), 109, 109k(5) EC.
107. Smits, op. cit. supra n.104, at p.340.Google Scholar
108. Walsh, C., “Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers” (1995) 85 American Economic Rev. 150Google Scholar, cited in Briault, C., Haldane, A and King, M.. “Central Bank Independence and Accountability: Theory and Evidence” (1996) 36 Bank of England Quarterly Bull 63, 65.Google Scholar
109. Lohmann, , “Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy” (1992) 82 American Economic Rev. 273. cited in Briault et al. ibid.Google Scholar
110. See Svensson, L. E. O., “Optimal Inflation Targets, ‘Conservative’ Central Banks and Linear Inflation Contracts”. Institute for International Economics. University of Stockholm. 1995.Google Scholar
111. Eijffinger, and de Haan, , op. cit supra n.47. at pp.15, 54.Google Scholar
112. Majone, , op. cit. supra n.103, at p.26.Google Scholar
113. Scharpf, F. W., “Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State” (1997) 4 J. European Public Policy 18, 19.Google Scholar
114. Majone, op. cit supra n.103.
115. Weasels, W., “Theories and Strategies for European Integration: The Fusion Thesis as an Offer”. UACES Annual Conference, Cambridge, 01 1995.Google Scholar
116. de Tocqueville, A., Democracy in America (Mayer, J. P. (Ed.), 1969), p.164.Google Scholar
117. Weiler, J. H. H., “The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism” (1981) Y.E.L. 268.Google Scholar
118. See Cases 26/62 and 6/64, supra n.17, and 2/70, supra n.14.
119. See Case 70/88 European Parliament v. Council (“Chernobyl”) [1991] E.C.R. I–2041.Google Scholar
120. See Joint Declaration on Measures to Improve the Budgetary Procedure, 30 06 1982 (1982)Google ScholarO.J. C194; Inter-institutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure (1988) O.J. L185/33.Google Scholar
121. Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral A G v. Bundesmonopol für Brantweinn(“Cassis de Dijon”) [1979] E.C.R. 649Google Scholar; Commission Communication concerning the Consequences of the Judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 Feb. 1977 in Case 120/78 (“Cassis de Dijon”) (1980) O.J. C256/2.Google Scholar
122. See Snyder, F., “The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques” (1993) M.L.R. 19, 36.Google Scholar
123. See Weiler, J. H. H., “The Transformation of Europe” (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 2403.Google Scholar
124. See Council Decision 87/373 (1987) O.J. L197/33.Google Scholar
125. Joined Cases C–181 and 248& Commission (“Bangladesh”) [1993] E.C.R. I–3685.Google Scholar
126. See Snyder, , op. cit. supra n.122, at p.40.Google Scholar
127. See Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] E.C.R. 1337Google Scholar; Case C-188/89 Foster v. British Gas plc [1990] E.C.R. 3314Google Scholar; Case C-91/92 Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl [1994] E.C.R. I–3325.Google Scholar
128. See Case C-106/89 Marleasing v. La Comercial International de Alimentacion SA [1990] E.C.R. 1.Google Scholar
129. See Joined Cases C–8 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy [1992] E.C.R. I–5357; Joined Cases C–46 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pécheur v. Germany and R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame (26 Mar. 1996. not yet rep.).Google Scholar
130. See Case C–221/89 R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame [1990] ECR. I–2433Google Scholar; Case 222/84 Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] E.C.R. 1651.Google Scholar
131. Verloren van Themaat. op. cit supra n.64, at p.14.Google Scholar
132. Art.106 EC.
133. Arts.108, 109a(1) EC.
134. Agences Europe Documents No.2010, 6 11 1996; Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council. Dublin. 13 and 14 Dec 1996.Google Scholar
135. Per Tietmeyer, H.. in Financial Times, 13 03. 1997. p.1.Google Scholar
136. Snyder, op. cit supra n.37.
137. See Art.102a EC reference to Art.3a EC; paras. 10–12. Section 4, “Problems and Perspectives”, Report of the Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (the Delors Plan), 12 Apr. 1989Google Scholar, Agences Europe Documents No.1550/1551, 20 Apr. 1989.Google Scholar
138. See Art.105(1) EC.
139. Art.103(1) EC.
140. Art.103(2) EC.
141. Art.103(3) EC.
142. Art.104c EC.
143. Ibid.
144. Council Decision 64/300 of 8 May. 1964, on co-operation between the Central Banks of the Member States of the EEC (1964) O.J. 21.05.64, p. 1206Google Scholar, as amended by Council Decision 90/142/EEC of 12 Mar. 1990 (1990) O.J. L.78/25.Google Scholar
145. Council Decision of 18 03. 1958, Rules concerning the Monetary Committee (1958) O.J. 06.10.58, p.390.Google Scholar
146. See Council Reg.907/73, establishing a European Monetary Co-operation Fund (1973) O.J. L89/2.Google Scholar
147. Agences Europe, 7/8 04. 1997, p.9.Google Scholar
148. Arts.106(3). 109a(1), 109a(2) EC.
149. Arts.1091(3). 1091(5). 109k EC: Arts.47.1.44 ESCB Statute.
- 6
- Cited by