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AN EXPLORATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP WITH UNILATERAL SANCTIONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 February 2021

Rebecca Barber Open the ORCID record for Rebecca Barber [Opens in a new window]
Rebecca Barber*
Affiliation:
Researcher, Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, University of Queensland; PhD candidate, TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland, [email protected].
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Abstract

This article seeks to make sense of two seemingly contradictory aspects of the General Assembly's practice: its history of recommending to States that they impose unilateral sanctions; and its series of resolutions denouncing unilateral coercive measures as illegal. It examines the seeming discrepancy between the customary international law position regarding unilateral sanctions, and the position asserted by the Assembly, and argues that on a nuanced reading of the Assembly's resolutions, these positions are not so divergent as is often supposed. The article concludes by examining the scope for the Assembly to make future sanctions recommendations, consistently with its prior condemnation of unilateral coercive measures.

Keywords

public international lawhuman rightsUnited NationsGeneral Assemblysanctionsunilateral coercive measuresnon-interventioneconomic intervention
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 70 , Issue 2 , April 2021 , pp. 343 - 378
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law

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Footnotes

The author is grateful to Professor Alex Bellamy, University of Queensland, for comments on an earlier draft of this article.

References

1 See generally: Hufbauer, G, Schott, JJ and Elliot, KA, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd edn, Petersen Institute for International Economics 2007) 1–42Google Scholar; Haass, RN, ‘Sanctions as an Instrument of American Foreign Policy’ (2000) 32(1) Law and Policy in International Business 1Google Scholar; Parker, RW, ‘The Cost Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions’ (2000) 32(1) Law and Policy in International Business 21Google Scholar; Cleveland, S, ‘Norm Internalization and US Economic Sanctions’ (2001) 26 YaleJIntlL 1Google Scholar (focusing on the effectiveness of sanctions on promoting and protecting human rights); Blanchard, JF and Ripsman, NM, Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy: Sanctions, Incentives, and State Calculations (Taylor & Francis Group 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 This article examines the role of the General Assembly in relation to sanctions, rather than the effectiveness of such measures in promoting and protecting human rights. Research on the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving their objectives has generally found that sanctions can in some circumstances influence State behaviour, although success rates are limited. One major study of 174 sanctions regimes from the First World War through to 2000, for example, found that sanctions were ‘at least partially successful’ in 34 per cent of cases: Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (n 1) 158.

3 ibid 17.

4 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’ (17 September 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 418.

5 See UNSC Res 2140 (26 February 2014), imposing an asset freeze and travel ban on individuals and/or entities associated with the conflict in Yemen, to be designated by a Sanctions Committee. For the designation of Houthi-aligned individuals see UNSC, ‘Security Council 2140 Sanctions Committee Designates Three Individuals as Subject to Assets Freeze, Travel Ban’ (7 November 2014) Press Release SC/11636; and for the findings of the UNSC's Panel of Experts regarding the Saudi-led Coalition see UNSC, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen’ (31 January 2017) UN Doc S/2018/193.

6 See eg UNGA Res 2107 (XX) (21 December 1965) on the Portuguese Territories; UNGA Res 2383 (XXIII) (7 November 1968) on Southern Rhodesia; UNGA Res 1899 (XVIII) (13 November 1963) on South West Africa.

7 UNGA Res 36/172 D (17 December 1981); UNGA Res 41/35 A-B (10 November 1986).

8 See eg UNGA Res 36/27 (13 November 1981); UNGA Res 42/209 B (11 December 1987); UNGA Res 46/82 A (16 December 1991).

9 See Higgins, R et al. , Oppenheim's International Law: United Nations (Oxford University Press 2017) 963–73Google Scholar; Petersen, MJ, ‘General Assembly’ in Weiss, TG and Daws, S (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 124–8Google Scholar; Klein, E and Schmahl, S, ‘Ch. IV The General Assembly, Functions and Powers, Article 10’ in Simma, B et al. (eds), The Charter of the United Nations (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) vol 1Google Scholar; R Barber, ‘A Survey of the General Assembly's Competence in Matters of International Peace and Security: In Law and Practice’ (2020) JUFIL 4–8.

10 ‘Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States’, UNGA Res 2131 (XX) (21 December 1965); ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States’, UNGA Res 26/25 (24 October 1970); ‘Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States’, UNGA Res 3281 (XXIX) (12 December 1974); ‘Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States’, UNGA Res 36/103 (9 December 1981); ‘Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing Countries’, UNGA Res 46/210 (20 December 1991) and subsequent annual resolutions with the same title; ‘Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures’, UNGA Res 51/103 (12 December 1996) and subsequent annual resolutions with the same title.

11 See Tzanakopolous, A, ‘Sanctions Imposed Unilaterally by the European Union: Implications for the European Union's International Responsibility’ in Marossi, AZ and Bassett, MR, Economic Sanctions under International Law (TMC Asser Press 2015) 147Google Scholar; International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session’ (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/10, 75.

12 See Reisman, MW and Stevick, DL, ‘The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes’ (1998) 9 EJIL 87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lowenfeld, AF, International Economic Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 698Google Scholar; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (n 1) 3.

13 UNGA, ‘Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary General’ (14 October 1997) UN Doc A/42/459, 16.

14 UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights’ (30 August 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/39/54, 3.

15 Hovell, D, ‘Unfinished Business of International Law: The Questionable Legality of Autonomous Sanctions’ (2019) 113 AJIL Unbound 140, 141CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Joyner, DH, ‘International Legal Limits on the Ability of States to Lawfully Impose International Economic/Financial Sanctions’ in Marossi, AZ and Bassett, MR (eds), Economic Sanctions under International Law (TMC Asser Press 2015) 84Google Scholar. See also Hofer, A, ‘The Developed/Developing Divide on Unilateral Coercive Measures: Legitimate Enforcement or Illegitimate Intervention?’ (2017) 16 ChinJIntlL 177Google Scholar.

17 UNGA, ‘Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion: Report of the Secretary General’ (1997) (n 13) 21–2.

18 UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, Idriss Jazairy’ (10 August 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/30/45, 5.

19 UNGA, ‘2018 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 13) 3.

20 Hovell (n 15); Tzanakopoulos, ‘Sanctions Imposed Unilaterally’ (n 11).

21 European Commission, ‘Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)’ (2020) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/international-relations/restrictive-measures-sanctions_en> (emphasis added).

22 UNGA, ‘2015 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 18) 9–10.

23 See R Barber, ‘Revisiting the Legal Effect of General Assembly Resolutions: Can an Authorising Competence for the Assembly be Grounded in the Assembly's “Established Practice”, “Subsequent Practice” or “Customary International Law”?’ (2020) JCSL <https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jcsl/kraa025/6044451>; M Ramsden, ‘“Uniting for Peace” and Humanitarian Intervention: The Authorising Function of the UN General Assembly’ (2016) 25(2) WashIntlLJ.

24 UNGA, ‘Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing Countries: Note by the Secretary General’ (25 October 1993) UN Doc A/48/535, 1.

25 Hovell (n 15) 145. See also Helal, M, ‘On Coercion in International Law’ (2019) 52 NYUJIntL&Pol 2Google Scholar; Doraev, M, ‘Comment: The “Memory Effect” of Economic Sanctions against Russia: Opposing Approaches to the Legality of Unilateral Sanctions Clash Again’ (2015) 37 PaJIntlL 373Google Scholar; Porotsky, R, ‘Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo against Cuba’ (1995) 28 VandJTransnatlL 930Google Scholar.

26 Charter of the United Nations 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (‘UN Charter’).

27 See Elagab, OY, ‘Coercive Economic Measures Against Developing Countries’ (2008) 41 ICLQ 688Google Scholar; Porotsky (n 25) 920; Henderson, CJ, ‘Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The Case of Nicaragua’ (1986) 43 Wash&LeeLRev 181Google Scholar.

28 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, 1927 PCIJ Rep Series A, No 10, paras 44–47.

29 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (‘Nicaragua’), para 276.

30 See also Porotsky (n 25) 918; Joyner (n 16) 86; Tzanakopoulos, A, ‘The Right to be Free from Economic Coercion’ (2015) 4 CJIntl&CompL 620Google Scholar; Henderson (n 27) 179; Elagab (n 27) 691.

31 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (adopted 30 October 1947, entered into force 1 January 1948) 64 UNTS 187.

32 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), for example, permits a State to take ‘any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests’: ibid, art XXI.

33 Helal (n 25) 104; see also UNGA, ‘Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion: Report of the Secretary General’ (1997) (n 13). For a contrary view see Vázquez, CM, ‘Trade Sanctions and Human Rights – Past, Present, and Future’ (2003) 6 JIEL 797CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Nicaragua (n 29) para 202.

35 ibid para 205.

36 ibid.

37 ibid para 245.

38 Hofer (n 16) 181; Jamnejad, M and Wood, M, ‘The Principle of Non-intervention’ (2009) 22 LJIL 347CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Joyner (n 16) 89; Lowe, AF and Tzanakopoulos, A, ‘Economic Warfare’ in Wolfrum, R (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2012)Google Scholar <https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e292>; Helal (n 25) 1.

39 Nicaragua (n 29) para 205.

40 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Judgment) [1970] ICJ Rep 3 (‘Barcelona Traction’) para 33.

41 Institute of International Law, ‘The Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of Non-intervention in Internal Affairs of States’ (13 September 1989) Session of Santiago de Compostela, art 2.

42 ibid.

43 Barcelona Traction (n 40) para 33.

44 Cleveland (n 1) 29, referring to The American Law Institute, Restatement, Third, of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) para 102.

45 UNGA, ‘Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion: Report of the Secretary General’ (1997) (n 13) 22.

46 Tzanakopoulos, ‘The Right to be Free’ (n 30) 623, (emphasis added); see also Hofer (n 16) 191.

47 See Jamnejad and Wood (n 38) 348; Hofer (n 16) 181; Helal (n 25) 72.

48 Reisman and Stevick (n 12) 87; D Hawkins and J Lloyd, ‘Questioning Comprehensive Sanctions: The Birth of a Norm’ (2003) JHumRts 441, 446; Jamnejad and Wood (n 38) 349; Henderson (n 27) 176.

49 See US Department of the Treasury, ‘Sanctions Programs and Country Information’ (Financial Sanctions 2020) <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx>.

50 European Commission (n 21).

51 On Australia see Australian Government, ‘Australia and Sanctions’ (2020) <https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/Pages/about-sanctions#types>; on Canada see M Nesbitt, ‘Canada's “Unilateral” Sanctions Regime Under Review: Extraterritoriality, Human Rights, Due Process, and Enforcement in Canada's Special Economic Measures Act’ (2017) 48 OttLRev 509; on Russia see Doraev (n 25); on Japan see M Kanetake, ‘Implementation of Sanctions: Japan’ in M Asada (ed), Economic Sanctions in International Law and Practice (Routledge 2019); on Norway see Global Legal Group, ‘Norway: Sanctions 2021’ (International and Comparative Legal Guide 5 October 2020) <https://iclg.com/practice-areas/sanctions/norway>; on Switzerland see Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, ‘Situation in Ukraine: Federal Council Decides on Further Measures to Prevent the Circumvention of International Sanctions’ (Press Release, 27 August 2014) <https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/en/home/seco/nsb-news/medienmitteilungen-2014.msg-id-54221.html>; on Ukraine see M O'Kane, ‘Ukraine and Other Countries Align with EU's Extension of its Ukraine Territorial Integrity Sanctions’ (EU Sanctions, Press Release, 6 November 2019) <https://www.europeansanctions.com/2019/11/ukraine-and-other-countries-align-with-eus-extension-of-its-ukraine-territorial-integrity-sanctions/>.

52 US Department of the Treasury (n 49); European Commission (n 21).

53 For discussion of these sanctions see Criddle, EJ, ‘Standing for Human Rights Abroad’ (2015) 100 CornellLRev 271Google Scholar; UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights on his Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic’ (11 September 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/39/54/Add.2.

54 See Council of the European Union, ‘EU Adopts a Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime’ (Press Release, 7 December 2020) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/07/eu-adopts-a-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EU+adopts+a+global+human+rights+sanctions+regime#>; UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘UK Announces First Sanctions Under New Global Human Rights Regime’ (Press Release, 6 July 2020) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-first-sanctions-under-new-global-human-rights-regime>; Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law) SC 2017 c 21 (Canada); Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Public Law 114–328) (2017) (US).

55 Cleveland (n 1) 53.

56 BE Carter, ‘Economic Sanctions’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2011) <https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1521?rskey=X8wVBV&result=1&prd=OPIL>.

57 Tzanakapoulos, ‘The Right to Be Free’ (n 30) 633.

58 UNGA Res 500 (V) (18 May 1951).

59 UNGA Res 1474 (ES-IV) (20 September 1960).

60 UNGA Res 2107 (XX) (21 December 1965).

61 UNGA Res 2262 (XXII) (3 November 1967). See also: UNGA Res 2383 (XXIII) (7 November 1968); UNGA Res 2508 (XXIV) (21 November 1969); UNGA Res 2765 (XXVI) (16 November 1971); UNGA Res 2796 (XXVI) (10 December 1971); UNGA Res 3298 (XXIX) (13 December 1974); UNGA Res 3397 (XXX) (21 November 1975); UNGA Res 31/154(B) (20 December 1976); UNGA Res 33/38B (13 December 1978).

62 See eg UNGA Res 1761 (XII) (6 November 1962); UNGA Res ES-8/2 (14 September 1981); UNGA Res 41/35 A-B (10 November 1986).

63 UNGA Res 36/27 (13 November 1981).

64 See eg UNGA Res 42/209 B (11 December 1987).

65 The UNSC did impose mandatory sanctions in relation to Southern Rhodesia in 1968 (SC Res 253 (29 May 1968)), however the UNGA had by that stage already called upon States to impose sanctions (UNGA Res 2262 (XXII) (3 November 1967)). The UNGA continued to recommend sanctions after the UNSC's imposition of sanctions: see UNGA resolutions cited at n 61.

66 UNGA Res 2131 (XX) (21 December 1965); UNGA Res 26/25 (24 October 1970); UNGA Res 3281 (XXIX) (12 December 1974).

67 UNGA Res 36/103 (9 December 1981).

68 UNGA Res 46/210 (20 December 1991) and subsequent annual resolutions with the same title.

69 UNGA Res 51/103 (12 December 1996) and subsequent annual resolutions with the same title.

70 See UNGA Verbatim Records, 25th Session, 1928th Plenary Meeting (14 December 1970) UN Doc A/PV.1928.

71 UNGA Res 2707 (XXV) (14 December 1970).

72 UNGA Res 3281 (XXIX) (12 December 1974).

73 UNGA Res 3324 (XXIV) E (16 December 1974).

74 UNGA Verbatim Records, 29th Session (16 December 1974) UN Doc A/PV.2320, 1500.

75 UNGA Verbatim Records, 36th Session (9 December 1981) UN Doc A/36/PV.91, 1631.

76 UNGA Verbatim Records, 36th Session (17 December 1981) UN Doc A/36/PV.103, 1980.

77 UNGA Res 36/226 A (17 December 1981).

78 On the sanctions against Burundi see UNSG, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Burundi’ (3 May 1996) UN Doc S/1996/335; for the voting record on UNGA Res 51/103 (12 December 1996) on human rights and unilateral coercive measures see UNGA Verbatim Records, 51st Session (12 December 1996) UN Doc A/51/PV.82, 17.

79 Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Coercive Measures for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation Collection of Legislation, 2012, No. 53, Item 7597.

80 For voting data on UNGA Res 67/170 (20 December 2012) on human rights and unilateral coercive measures see UNGA Verbatim Records, 67th Session (20 December 2012) UN Doc A/67/PV.60, 14.

81 On sanctions against Qatar see: UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), ‘Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures: UN Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, Ms Alena Douhan, Concludes her Visit to Qatar’ (Press Release, 12 November 2020) <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26495&LangID=E>. For the voting records on the UNGA's resolutions on unilateral coercive measures see: UNGA Verbatim Records, 72nd Session (19 December 2017) UN Doc A/72/PV.73, 16; UNGA Verbatim Records, 73rd Session (17 December 2018) UN Doc A/73/PV.55, 26; UNGA Verbatim Records, 74th Session (18 December 2019) UN Doc A/74/PV.50, 23.

82 Carter (n 56) (emphasis added).

83 Doraev (n 25) 374–5; see also Happold, M, ‘Economic Sanctions and International Law: An Introduction’ in Eden, P and Happold, M (eds), Economic Sanctions and International Law (Hart Publishing 2016) 3; Hofer (n 16) 176Google Scholar.

84 Hofer (n 16) 176.

85 Doraev (n 25) 373.

86 Porotsky (n 25) 920; see also Elagab (n 27) 692.

87 UNGA, ‘2015 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 18) 14.

88 See UNGA, ‘1997 Report of the Secretary General on Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion’ (n 13) 21.

89 UNGA Res 26/25 (24 October 1970) (emphasis added).

90 P Kunig, ‘Intervention, Prohibition of’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (2008) <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1434?rskey.V5a1XH&result.2&prd.EPIL>.

91 Jamnejad and Wood (n 38) 355; see also Hofer (n 16) 185.

92 UNGA Res 36/103 (9 December 1981).

93 UNGA Res 36/172 (A) (17 December 1981).

94 UNGA Res 36/226 (A) (17 December 1981).

95 See, eg, UNGA Res 74/154 (18 December 2019) on human rights and unilateral coercive measures, para 1.

96 See, eg, UNGA Res 74/200 (19 December 2019) on unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries.

97 See, eg, UNGA Res 74/154 (18 December 2019) on human rights and unilateral coercive measures, para 2.

98 See, eg, UNGA Res 74/200 (19 December 2019) on unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries.

99 UNGA, ‘2015 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 18) 4.

100 See eg UNGA Res 74/154 (18 December 2019) preambular paras and paras 1, 2, 4, 15–16.

101 UNGA Res 74/200 (19 December 2019) preambular paras (emphasis added).

102 UNGA, ‘Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion: Report of the Secretary General’ (1997) (n 13).

103 UNGA, ‘Thematic Study of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights’ (11 January 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/19/33, 7.

104 UNHCHR (n 81).

105 UNGA, ‘2018 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 14) 7.

106 UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights’ (26 July 2017) UN Doc A/HRC/36/44, 6; UNGA, ‘2018 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 14) 12.

107 UNGA, ‘2017 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 106) 10.

108 UNGA, ‘2018 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 14) 8.

109 UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights’ (15 July 2019) UN Doc A/74/165, 5.

110 UNHCHR (n 81).

111 UNGA, ‘2018 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 14) Annex, 18–19. The principles in the Draft Declaration explicitly rely upon the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right (CESCR), ‘General Comment No. 8: The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (4 December 1997) UN Doc E/C.12/1997/8. In particular, the Draft Declaration cites the statement of the CESCR that ‘when an external party takes upon itself even partial responsibility for the situation within a country …, it also unavoidably assumes a responsibility to do all within its powers to protect the economic, social and cultural rights of the affected population’: at Annex, 18.

112 UNGA, ‘2018 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 14) Annex, 19.

113 ibid at Annex, 19 (emphasis added).

114 ibid 18.

115 See discussion in CESCR (n 111); Razavi, SMH and Zeynodini, F, ‘Economic Sanctions and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights: A Review of the ICJ's Ruling on Alleged Violations of the Iran-US Treaty of Amity’ (2020) 29 WashIntlLJ 327Google Scholar; Howlett, A, ‘Colloquium: Deborah L Rhodes Access to Justice: Getting “Smart”: Crafting Economic Sanctions that Respect all Human Rights’ (2004) 73 FordhamLR 1217Google Scholar.

116 UNHCHR (n 81).

117 See CESCR (n 111); F Coomans, ‘The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011) 11 HRLRev 1 (albeit observing that the CESCR has failed to elaborate the ‘theoretical legal basis’ of extraterritorial obligations in the field of economic, social and cultural rights: at 34); Razavi and Zeynodini (n 115); ETO Consortium, Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2013) <https://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23>.

118 UNHCHR (n 81).

119 European Union, ‘European Union Sanctions’ (3 August 2016) <https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/sanctions-policy/423/european-union-sanctions_en>.

120 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Office of Foreign Assets Control – Sanctions Programs and Information’ (2020) <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx>; see also statement at UNGA, ‘Summary Record of the 52nd Meeting of the Third Committee’ (20 November 2015) UN Doc A/C.3/70/SR.52, para 32.

121 Cleveland (n 1) 75.

122 UNGA Res 74/154 (18 December 2019).

123 UNGA, ‘2018 Report of the Special Rapporteur’ (n 14) para 35.

124 UNGA Res 74/154 (18 December 2019).

125 UN Charter (n 26), art 10.

126 See UNGA Res 36/172 D (17 December 1981) (recommendation for ‘comprehensive and mandatory sanctions’) and UNGA Res 2107 (XX) (21 December 1965) (recommendation for ‘appropriate measures’). For a discussion of the General Assembly's practice of making recommendations to the Security Council see Barber, ‘A Survey of the General Assembly's Competence’ (n 9) 37–40.

127 On the UNGA's competence to recommend coercive measures see: White, N, ‘The Relationship between the UN Security Council and the General Assembly in Matters of International Peace and Security’ in Weller, M (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 305Google Scholar; Johnson, LD, ‘“Uniting for Peace”: Does it Still Serve Any Useful Purpose?’ (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound 110CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Talmon, S, ‘The Legalizing and Legitimizing Function of UN General Assembly Resolutions’ (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound 123CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Higgins et al. (n 9) 977.

128 See: D Psaledakis and S Lewis, ‘US Slaps Sanctions on Myanmar Military Chief over Rohingya Atrocities’ (Reuters, 11 December 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-myanmar-sanctions/us-slaps-sanctions-on-myanmar-military-chief-over-rohingya-atrocities-idUSKBN1YE1XU>; Government of Canada, ‘Canadian Sanctions Related to Myanmar (14 January 2020) <https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/myanmar.aspx?lang=eng>; European Council, ‘Myanmar/Burma: Council Prolongs Sanctions’ (29 April 2019) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/04/29/myanmar-burma-council-prolongs-sanctions/>.

129 ILC (n 11) 75.

130 ibid 129–35 (arts 49, 51); ICJ, Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 56–7.

131 ILC (n 11) 75 (emphasis added).

132 ibid 76, 137 (art 54).

133 ibid 139.

134 White, N, ‘Sanctions and Restrictive Measures in International Law’ (2018) 27(1) ItYBIL 8Google Scholar.

135 Kaplan, M, ‘Using Collective Interests to Ensure Human Rights: An Analysis of the Articles on State Responsibility’ (2014) 79(5) NYULRev 1930Google Scholar.

136 Bederman, DJ, ‘Counterintuiting Countermeasures’ (2002) 96(4) AJIL 827CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Sicilianos, L-A, ‘Countermeasures in Response to Grave Violations of Obligations Owed to the International Community’ in Crawford, J et al. (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2010) 1146–7Google Scholar; Tzanakopoulos (n 11) 156; Kaplan (n 135).

137 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para 105.

138 White, N, The Law of International Organisations (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 2005) 179Google Scholar.

139 ibid.

140 Ramsden, M, ‘“Uniting for Peace” in the Age of International Justice’ (2016) 42 YJIL 15Google Scholar.

141 UNGA Res 37/233 A (20 December 1982) on Namibia; UNGA Res 36/172 C (17 December 1981) on South Africa; UNGA Res 3061 (XXVIII) (2 November 1973) on the Portuguese Territories; UNGA Res 36/27 (13 November 1981) on Israel/Iraq.

142 UNGA Res ES-8/2 (14 September 1981) on Namibia; UNGA Res 35/6 (22 October 1980) on Kampuchea; UNGA Res 36/27 (13 November 1981) on Israel; UNGA Res 46/242 (25 August 1992) on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

143 UNGA Res 39/50 A (12 December 1984) on Namibia.

144 UNGA Res 47/121 (18 December 1992) on Bosnia and Herzegovina; UNGA Res ES-10/12 (19 September 2003) on the occupied Palestinian Territory.

145 UNGA Res 47/121 (18 December 1992) on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

146 UNGA Res 40/6 (1 November 1985) on Israel and Iraq; UNGA Res 41/38 (20 November 1986) on the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

147 Johnson, DHN, ‘The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations’ (1955–6) 32 BYIL 118Google Scholar.

148 White, International Organisations (n 138) 178.