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²⁹ Arguments to this effect are advanced from a range of different political and theoretical vantage points.Google Scholar See, eg, Wedgwood, ibid; Slaughter, , Präzisionswaffe, above n 11; Buchanan and Keohane, above n 11. See also US Security Strategy, above n 4, at 14. For a discussion, see below, nn 100–11 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

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⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid at 3. For a good discussion of the continuing pertinence of the requirements of imminence and proportionality, see Sapiro, M ‘The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense’ (2003) 97 AJIL 599 at 603–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁵⁷ The Corfu Channel case (Merits), ICJ Reports (1949) 4, at 22–3; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (adopted at the 53rd session, Nov 2001) Arts 49, 50. See generally Travalio and Altenburg op cit.Google Scholar

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⁵⁹ See ibid at 112–14.

⁶⁰ Ibid at 112.

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⁷⁸ It might be objected that NATO's intervention in Kosovo is an example where a selfappointed coalition achieved a degree of legitimacy. However, the Kosovo intervention can be distinguished from the invasion of Iraq on a number of counts. First, in Kosovo there was credible evidence of actions amounting to a continuing, even escalating, genocide. Secondly, the inability of the Security Council to act resulted from the threatened veto of a single State, and not from a broader resistance to the proposed use of force. The reasons for that threatened veto are complex, and cannot be considered here. Thirdly, the NATO intervention took place after an extended and intense multilateral effort to broker a peaceful settlement. See also Farer, above n 62 at 625–6.Google Scholar

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⁹² Ibid at XII.

⁹³ Ibid at XII, 32.

⁹⁴ Ibid at XII, 35–7.

⁹⁵ Ibid at XII, 47–55. However, the ICISS report also reminds the Security Council that ‘if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation’, ibid at XIII.

⁹⁶ Ibid at XIII, 51. As Tanguy, above n 90 at 145 points out, while this proposal was guided by the need for political buy-in, it does not suggest how the international responsibility to protect might be exercised vis-à-vis the Chechens or Tibetans, to take but two contemporary examples.

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¹⁰¹ Feinstein, L and Slaughter, AM ‘A Duty to Prevent’ (2004) 83/1 Foreign Affairs 136 at 137.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰² Ibid at 142.

¹⁰³ Ibid at 137.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid at 138.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid at 145–6.

¹⁰⁶ Feinstein and Slaughter do outline a series of precautionary principles, but they largely address the extent of allowable force, rather than providing limits on the initial triggering: ‘Force must be exerted on the smallest scale, for the shortest time, and at the lowest intensity necessary to achieve its objective; the objective itself must be reasonably attainable when measured against the likelihood of making matters worse. Finally, force should be governed by fundamental principles of the laws of war…’ ibid at 149.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid at 142.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid at 139.

¹¹⁰ US Security Strategy, above n 1 at 13–14.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ See Feinstein, and Slaughter, , above n 101 at 136 and 137.Google Scholar

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