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SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS DURING ECONOMIC CRISES: A CHANGED APPROACH TO NON-RETROGRESSION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2016

Ben TC Warwick Open the ORCID record for Ben TC Warwick [Opens in a new window]
Ben TC Warwick*
Affiliation:
Graduate Teaching Assistant and Doctoral Candidate, Durham Law School, [email protected].
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Abstract

When the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) released a letter in early 2012 addressing the financial and economic crises, it was long overdue. Finally, and around four and a half years after the crises began, the body responsible for monitoring those rights that had been most severely impacted had spoken. But what had been said? This article examines the alterations to the doctrine of non-retrogression that the 2012 Letter instigated. It does so by reference to the ‘Business as Usual’ and ‘accommodation’ theories of emergency response. The Letter to States is argued to have taken the Committee away from an approach to non-retrogression that treated times of normality and emergency in a similar way, and towards an approach that allows derogation-style deviations from the Covenant. This, it is argued, could have detrimental effects for the protection of economic and social rights. The difficulties in applying such an approach are considered.

Keywords

derogationeconomic and social rightseconomic crisisemergencyenforcementlimitationretrogressionUN Committee on EconomicSocial and Cultural Rights
Type
Shorter Articles and Notes
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 65 , Issue 1 , January 2016 , pp. 249 - 265
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2016 

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References

1 Reproduced below at Annex I; Chairperson of the CESCR, ‘Letter Dated 16 May 2012 Addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) UN Doc HRC/NONE/2012/76, UN reference CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW.

2 Letter to States (n 1) Annex I, para 1.

3 For a sample, see CESCR, ‘General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (art 2, para 1 of the Covenant)’ (1990) UN Doc E/1991/23, para 9; CESCR, ‘General Comment 15: The Right to Water (arts 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2002) UN Doc E/C12/2002/11, para 19; CESCR, ‘General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security (art 9)’ (2007) UN Doc E/C12/GC/19, para 42. See further A Nolan, NJ Lusiani and C Courtis, ‘Two Steps Forward, No Steps Back? Evolving Criteria on the Prohibition of Retrogression in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in A Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 132.

4 The term ‘socio-economic rights’ is used here to cover the full range of economic, social and cultural rights as expressed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Letter to States applies equally to ‘cultural’ rights as to ‘social’ and ‘economic’ rights. There are a number of terms used in this area of study which are largely interchangeable; P O'Connell, Vindicating Socio-Economic Rights: International Standards and Comparative Experiences (Routledge 2012) 3–4.

5 Bilchitz, D, ‘Socio-Economic Rights, Economic Crisis, and Legal Doctrine’ (2014) 12 ICON 710, 719Google Scholar.

6 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR).

7 The Letter has been referred to as an ‘Open Letter’ and a ‘Letter to States’ in the literature. The Letter's designation on the UN's webpages has changed from ‘Open Letter on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of the Economic and Financial Crisis’ to ‘Letter by the Chairperson of the Committee on austerity measures’ (a change highlighted by; Aoife Nolan (in discussion, ESRAN-UKI workshop, Swansea, April 2015)). This change may indicate a desire of the CESCR's to focus the Letter upon ‘austerity’ rather than ‘economic and financial crisis’ more broadly. Differing titles available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12173&LangID=E> and <http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=9&DocTypeID=68> respectively.

8 The terms ‘emergency’ and ‘crisis’ are used interchangeably here to reflect their general interchangeability in scholarship and public discourse.

9 Ní Aolain and Gross describe this difference as ‘rule and exception’ (O Gross and F Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (CUP 2006) 172); see also Posner, EA and Vermeule, A, ‘Accommodating Emergencies’ [2003] StanLRev 605, 606Google Scholar.

10 Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 88–9.

11 Scheuerman, WE, ‘The Economic State of Emergency’ (1999) 21 CardozoLRev 1869Google Scholar; Belknap, MR, ‘New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine’ (1983) 62 TexLRevGoogle Scholar; Kahan, RM, ‘Constitutional Stretch, Snap-Back, & Sag: Why Blaisdell Was a Harsher Blow to Liberty than Korematsu’ (2004) 99 NWULRev 1279Google Scholar.

12 Posner and Vermeule (n 9) 606.

13 Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 88.

14 ibid 86–8.

15 ibid 86.

16 ibid. There are, within this Business as Usual approach, varying degrees of stringency. Here the ‘soft’ Business as Usual approach is referred to, which demands consistency of law, but not necessarily of results. ibid 89.

17 Posner and Vermeule (n 9) 606.

18 Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 66.

19 ibid 77.

20 ibid 80–1, 69.

21 Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 95.

22 Scheuerman (n 11) 1873.

23 Greene, A, ‘Questioning Executive Supremacy in an Economic State of Emergency’ [2015] LS 10–16Google Scholar.

24 ibid especially 16–26.

25 ibid 27.

26 Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 99.

27 ibid 99–101.

28 F Schauer, ‘Easy Cases’ (1985) 58 SCalLRev 399, 439; Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 101.

29 Desierto, DA, ‘ICESCR Minimum Core Obligations and Investment: Recasting the Non-Expropriation Compensation Model during Financial Crises’ (2012) 44 GeoWashIntlLRev 473, 493Google Scholar.

30 MM Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2003) 281 (fn 132), 293. Indeed there was no specific discussion of such a provision during the drafting process; Alston, P and Quinn, G, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 HRQ 156, 217CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 Leckie, S, ‘Another Step towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 HRQ 81, 94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Müller, A, ‘Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9 HRLR 557, 654Google Scholar.

33 See eg International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 4.

34 ibid art 4.

35 ICESCR (n 6) art 4.

36 Alston and Quinn (n 30) 194.

37 ibid.

38 CESCR, ‘General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2000) UN Doc E/C12/2000/4, para 28. See also Sepúlveda (n 30) 278.

39 ICESCR (n 6) art 4. Sepúlveda suggests the synonym ‘essence’ here to imply that measures should not be contrary to the ‘essence’ of the Covenant rights; Sepúlveda (n 30) 281.

40 Alston and Quinn (n 30) 202. Except, as Sepúlveda notes, ‘where such a situation is “genuinely synonymous” with general welfare of society’; Sepúlveda (n 30) 282.

41 Sepúlveda (n 30) 296. See also CESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 3) paras 11–12, or in the context of the right to water, CESCR, ‘General Comment 15’ (n 3) para 22.

42 CESCR, ‘Report on the Forty-Fourth and Forty-Fifth Sessions’ (2011) UN Doc E/2011/22, para 150. See further A Müller, The Relationship between Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Humanitarian Law: An Analysis of Health Related Issues in Non-International Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 139.

43 CESCR, ‘General Comment 19’ (n 3) para 42.

44 ibid.

45 ibid.

46 The term ‘backwards step’ is used synonymously with ‘retrogressive measure’ in eg Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona (Fiscal Policy and Human Rights)’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/28, para 28; Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque (Common Violations of the Human Rights to Water and Sanitation)’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/55, para 46. The term ‘backsliding’ is also used; Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), ‘Mauled by the Celtic Tiger: Human Rights in Ireland's Economic Meltdown’ (2012) 6 <http://www.cesr.org/downloads/cesr.ireland.briefing.12.02.2012.pdf>; Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 3) 125.

47 CESCR, ‘General Comment 19’ (n 3) para 42.

48 Letter to States (n 1) Annex I, para 1.

49 The other letter being; Chairperson of the CESCR, ‘Letter Dated 30th November 2012 Addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) UN Doc CESCR/49th/AP//MAB.

50 Statements are formatted differently, and generally come from the CESCR as a whole, having been ‘adopted’ in one of the CESCR's sessions, rather than from the Chairperson ‘on behalf of’ the Committee.

51 A Nolan, ‘Putting ESR-Based Budget Analysis into Practice: Addressing the Conceptual Challenges’ in A Nolan, R O'Connell and C Harvey (eds), Human Rights and Public Finance: Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Hart 2013) 50.

52 ibid 51.

53 R McCorquodale, ‘The Individual and the International Legal System’ in M Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 294–5.

54 Mechlem, K, ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’ 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 905, 919Google Scholar.

55 ibid. A function also with some grounding in the ICESCR itself; ICESCR (n 6) art 21.

56 International Law Association, ‘International Human Rights and Practice: Final Report on the Impact of the Findings of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2004) para 22; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT) art 31(3)b.

57 Crystallization into customary international law is also possible. See generally M Shaw, International Law (CUP 2014) 201.

58 In the CESCR's Concluding Observations on Ireland ((2015) UN Doc E/C.12/IRL/CO/3, para 11), Slovenia ((2014) UN Doc E/C.12/SVN/CO/2, para 8), Romania ((2014) UN Doc E/C.12/ROU/CO3-5, para 15), Czech Republic ((2014) UN Doc E/C.12/CZE/CO/2, para 14), Ukraine ((2014) UN Doc E/C.12/UKR/CO/6, para 5), Japan ((2013) UN Doc E/C.12/JPN/CO/3, para 9), New Zealand ((2012) UN Doc E/C.12/NZL/CO/3, para 17), Iceland ((2012) UN Doc E/C.12/ISL/CO/4, para 6), Bulgaria ((2012) UN Doc E/C.12/BGR/CO/4-5, para 11) and Spain ((2012) UN Doc E/C.12/ESP/CO/5, para 8). See further Nolan (n 51) 51–2.

59 M Barnett and R Duvall, Power in Global Governance (CUP 2004) 15.

60 Scheuerman (n 11) 1871.

61 Letter to States (n 1) Annex I, paras 5, 3 (emphasis added).

62 CESCR, ‘General Comment 2: International Technical Assistance Measures’ (1990) UN Doc E/1990/23.

63 The Committee merely ‘takes into account’ (‘Concluding Observations: Solomon Islands’ (1990) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.33, para 9) and ‘acknowledges’ (‘Concluding Observations: Mongolia’ (2000) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.47, para 9) the effects of the Asian financial crisis; ‘recognises’ Togo's economic crisis (‘Concluding Observations: Togo’ (2001) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.61, para 7); ‘notes’ the economic difficulties in Mexico (‘Concluding Observations:Mexico’ (1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.41, para 12), Algeria (‘Concluding Observations: Algeria’ (1995) UN Doc E/C.12/1995/17, para 12) and Suriname (‘Concluding Observations: Suriname’ (1995) UN Doc E/C.12/1995/6, para 7). It additionally highlights the economic difficulties in Belarus and Cameroon, but appears to offer no flexibility to those States (‘Concluding Observations: Belarus’ (1996) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.7/Rev.1, para 10; ‘Concluding Observations: Cameroon’ (2012) UN Doc E/C.12/CMR/CO/2-3, para 14).

64 CESCR, ‘General Comment 19’ (n 3) para 42.

65 Letter to States (n 1) Annex I, para 6.

66 Developed in CESCR, ‘Social protection floors: an essential element of the right to social security and of the sustainable development goals’ (2015) UN Doc E/C.12/2015/1.

67 B Toebes, ‘The Right to Health’ in A Eide, C Krause and A Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 176.

68 Although non-discrimination and non-derogable standards are also hallmarks of emergency derogation clauses. J Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights during States of Emergency (University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 61–2, 63–6.

69 ICCPR (n 33) art 4.

70 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 04 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 3 1953) 213 UNTS 222 (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), art 15(1). cf the European Court of Human Rights case of A v United Kingdom (App no 100/1997/884/1096 (ECHR, 23 September 1998)); F de Londras, Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (CUP 2011) 200–2.

71 American Convention on Human Rights ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’ (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123 (ACHR) art 27. Notwithstanding the similarities between the ACHR and ICCPR, many of the constitutions of South American countries set out separate regimes for a diverse range of emergencies, including economic emergencies; Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 42; B Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America (University of Pittsburgh Press 1993) 25. See further Negretto, GL and Rivera, JA Aguilar, ‘Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship’ (1999) 21 CardozoLRev 1797Google Scholar.

72 Greene, A, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 GermanLJ 1764, 1782Google Scholar; Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 171.

73 Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency’ (n 72) 1765; Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 174–5. Although these authors do not explicitly endorse this view.

74 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4)’ (2001) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add11; ECHR (n 70) art 15(1); ACHR (n 71) art 27. All of these regimes require proportionality by reference to the ‘exigencies of the situation’.

75 Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency’ (n 72) 1766.

76 ibid.

77 Letter to States (n 1) Annex I, para 5.

78 ibid, Annex I, para 6. The two other conditions listed in para 6—the requirement of non-discrimination and respect for the minimum core of the rights—might be thought of as ‘absolute’ or non-derogable provisions.

79 Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 58.

80 ibid eg Nicaragua, Portugal, South Africa, Peru.

81 ICCPR (n 33) art 4(2).

82 Letter to States (n 1) Annex I, para 3 (emphasis added).

83 ibid para 4.

84 ibid para 6.

85 Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 9) 173.

86 Hartman, JF, ‘Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4 Derogation Provision’ (1985) 7 HRQ 89, 91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

87 Letter to States (n 1) Annex I, para 6.

88 The CESCR has abbreviated the full version of the Letter's test to simply require the measure to be ‘necessary and proportionate’; CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations: Iceland’ (2012) UN Doc E/C12/ISL/CO/4, para 6.

89 An interpretation justified under Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 56) art 32.

90 For example, the acceptance that ‘a lack of growth, impede[s] the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights’; Letter to States (n 1) Annex I, para 5.

91 Sunstein, CR, ‘Irreversibility’ (2010) 9 Law, Probability and Risk 227, 230CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92 See eg MC Branco, Economics Versus Human Rights (Routledge 2009) 8.

93 Rejecting balances between socio-economic rights and neo-liberal economic imperatives does not necessarily preclude the balancing of those rights against other referents, including (sustainable) economic referents of a different kind. This will especially be the case where the referent can be shown to genuinely represent ‘the legitimate interests of the community’ and can thus be accommodated under art 4 ICESCR; Alston and Quinn (n 30) 194.

94 O'Connell, P, ‘On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-Liberal Globalisation and Human Rights’ (2007) 7 HRLR 483, 484Google Scholar.

95 Wills, JJ, ‘The World Turned Upside Down? Neo-Liberalism, Socioeconomic Rights, and Hegemony’ (2014) 27 LJIL 11, 28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

96 Gross, O, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?’ (2003) 112 YaleLJ 1011, 1073ffGoogle Scholar; Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency’ (n 72) 1765. The spectre of ‘permanent austerity’ might also be an example of this.

97 The Human Rights Committee notes the examples of ‘a natural catastrophe, a mass demonstration including instances of violence, or a major industrial accident’; Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 29’ (n 74) para 5.

98 This stereotyping is at odds with the UN's various food security and human security initiatives; ‘UN Trust Fund for Human Security’ <http://unocha.org/humansecurity/>14; ‘Global Food Security’ <http://www.un-foodsecurity.org>.

99 This strategy partly mitigates the impact of ‘fear’ upon the decision-maker; Posner and Vermeule (n 9) 639–40.

100 Prior to 2012, the CESCR seems only to have expressly characterized three situations as ‘emergencies’ in relation to water, housing and malnutrition in prisons, but had offered no guidance on the factors that constituted the situations as such; see the Concluding Observations on Yemen ((2003) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.92, para 19), Canada ((1998) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.31, para 46; (2006) UN Doc E/C.12/CAN/CO/4, E/C.12/CAN/CO/5, para 62), Madagascar ((2009) UN Doc E/C.12/MDG/CO/2, para 28).

101 Letter to States (n 1) Annex I, para 5.

102 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 5: Derogation of Rights (Article 4)’ (1981) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev9 (Vol I); Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 29’ (n 74).

103 CESCR, ‘Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents To Be Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/2008/2.

104 UN Doc HRC/NONE/2012/76 (para nos added in square brackets).