1. Security Council Resolutions 661 (1990), 666 (1990) and 670 (1990).

2. Security Council Resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992). 820 (1993), 942 (1994), 943 (1994), 988 (1995), 992 (1995), 1003 (1995), 1015 (1995), 1022 (1995) and 1074 (1996). In the wake of the crisis in Kosovo, an arms embargo was imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) by Resolution 1160 (1998).

3. Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). Sanctions were suspended on 5 Apr. 1999 in accordance with the terms of Resolution 1192 (1998).

4. Security Council Resolution 918 (1994). The embargo was partially lifted in relation to sales to the Government of Rwanda by Resolution 1011 (1995).

5. Security Council Resolutions 841 (1993). 861 (1993), 872 (1993) and 917 (1994). Sanctions measures were lifted by Resolution 944 (1994) (see also Resolution 948 (1994)).

6. Security Council Resolution 788 (1992).

7. Security Council Resolution 733 (1992).

8. Security Council Resolutions 1054 (1996) and 1070 (1996).

9. Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997). Sanctions measures were progressively lifted by Resolutions 1156 (1998) and 1771 (1998), which imposed an embargo on arms sales to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone (excluding the Military Observer Group of ECOWAS).

10. Security Council Resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998).

11. Security Council Resolution 1227 (1999).

12. Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999).

13. The sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in the wake of the crisis in Kosovo are an important recent exception. While an arms embargo was imposed by the Security Council under Chapter VII by Resolution 1160 (1998), financial and diplomatic sanctions were imposed by many members of the international community as a result of decisions taken by five members of the six nation Contact Group—France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. Russia's refusal to agree to sanctions measures other than an arms embargo is a reminder of the impotence of the Security Council in the face of a lack of consensus among the five permanent members. The financial sanctions imposed against the FRY by EU member States, the United States, Canada and Japan also raise a separate question as to the extent to which it is possible to effectively financially isolate an offending State by denying it access to the world's major financial centres.

14. Simma, B. (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, (1994), at p.659.Google Scholar

15. During the discussion about implementing the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Collective Measures Committee demanded that both Arts. 49 and 50 should also apply in the case of actions of the General Assembly under that resolution. See B. Simma (ed), op. cit. supra n.14, at p.661.

16. B. Simma (ed), op. cit. supra n.14, at p.625.

17. Other objectives of sanctions may be to seek compliance with international law and to seek to end unlawful behaviour. Apart from sanctions, other example of measures taken by the Security Council under Chap. VII include the establishment of the international tribunal for prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia by Resolutions 827 (1993) and 1166 (1998) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda by Resolution 955 (1994).

18. In this respect, Art.41 draws on Art.16 of the League of Nations Covenant, which provided for the severance of all (but not some) “trade or financial relations”, the prohibition of all “intercourse between [a Member's] nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State”, and the prevention of all “financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.”

19. See Kelsen, H., The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (1951), at pp.744–745Google Scholar. The Security Council may, however, make non-binding recommendations under Art.39 of the Charter in relation to boycott measures if it does not wish to make a binding decision. See B. Simma (ed), op. cit. supra n.14, at pp.627–628.

20. Gowlland-Debbas, V., “Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility”, I.C.L.Q., (1994) 43, p.84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. Art. 48(1) grants the Security Council discretion to determine whether “[t]he action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them”.

22. See, for example, Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) (Libya), Resolution 918 (1994) (Rwanda), Resolution 841 (1993) (Haiti), Resolution 788 (1992) (Liberia), Resolution 733 (1992) (Somalia), Resolutions 1054 (1996) and 1070 (1996) (Sudan), Resolutions 1132 (1997) and 1771 (1998) (Sierra Leone) and Resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173(1998).

23. In a small number of States, Security Council resolutions are considered to be “directly applicable” within the domestic jurisdiction concerned. See for example, the responses of Peru, Tunisia, Uruguay and Surinam to the Secretary-General in relation to the implementation of sanctions against Iraq, reprinted in Bethlehem, D. (ed), The Kuwait Crisis: Sanctions and Their Economic Consequences—Part II, Cambridge International Documents Series, Vol. 2 (1991), at pp.602–603, 623–625, 634–635 and 618–619.Google Scholar

24. See for example, Resolution 661 (1990) in relation to Iraq and Kuwait.

25. Ibid.

26. See for example, J. Carver “Making Financial Sanctions Work: Preconditions for successful implementation of sanctions by the implementing State” paper presented to the Expert Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions hosted by the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs, Department of Economy, 17–19 Mar. 1998, Interlaken, Switzerland.

27. Art. 103 of the Charter provides that “[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”

28. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, loc. cit. supra n.20, at pp.87–90 and B. Simma (ed), op. cit. supra n.14, at pp. 1116–1125.

29. See. for example, UN Document L/2821, 7 Feb. 1997.

30. See B. Simma (ed), op. cit. supra n.14, at p.660.

31. See, for example, the legal advice provided by the UN Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council established to give effect to Resolution 661 (1990) (UN Document S/AC.25/SR.2,22 Aug. 1990, reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.774–780).

32. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Lybian Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures) Order, 1992, ICJ Rep. 3, at p.61 (Judge Weeramantry, Dissenting Opinion).

33. This is reflected in the Charter, which grants an extremely wide discretion to the Council to determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression under Art.39. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, loc. cit. supra n.20, at p.53 and M.N. Shaw, “The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and Judicial Function” in Muller, A.S. et al. (ed). The International Court of Justice: It's Future Role After Fifty Years (1997) p.219, at p.226Google Scholar. Although it has been questioned whether the same “wide latitude” applies to all enforcement measures deployed as a consequence of an Art.39 determination, considerable leeway has been granted to the Security Council by those who framed the Charter. In deciding upon enforcement measures the Security Council is not constrained by elaborate procedural requirements or by the conditions which have been said to apply to unilateral countermeasures, which would arguably hamper the Security Council in the exercise of its enforcement responsibilities. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, loc cit. supra n.20, at p.62.

34. Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) was adopted on 6 August 1990.

35. Report of the Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former Yugoslavia, held at Copenhagen on 24 and 25 Jun. 1996. The Round Table was hosted by the Government of Denmark under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Report was forwarded by the Yugoslav Sanctions Committee to the President of the Security Council for the attention of the Security Council. See UN Document S/1996/776,24 Sept. 1996.

36. Arts1 and 2 of the UN Charter.

37. In imposing economic sanctions under Art.41, the Security Council has provided exemptions for services considered to be necessary for the free flow of information (including telecommunications, postal services and legal services) and for certain goods and services necessary for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes, subject to the approval of the relevant Security Council Committee. See. for example. Resolutions 661 (1990) (Iraq), 986 (1995) (Iraq), 841 (1993) (Haiti), 1132 (1997) (Sierra Leone) and 967 (1994) (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). See also V. Gowlland-Debbas, loc. cit. supra n.20, at p.92.

38. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.3,27 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.781–785.

39. See Report of the Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former Yugoslavia, supra n.35.

40. As discussed below in relation to sanctions against Iraq, the Security Council Committee established under Resolution 661 (1990) provided Jordan with a de facto exemption from the sanctions regime, allowing it to import quantities of Iraqi oil. In relation to Yugoslav sanctions, the Security Council Committee established by Resolution 724 (1991) also authorised limited exceptions from the sanctions regime at the request of adversely affected States.

41. Art. 49 of the Charter provides that UN member States shall “join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council”.

42. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter), ICJ Reports (1962) pp.151, 169.

43. Memorandum of the Legal Staff of the UN, 15 Jun. 1976, United Nations Juridical Yearbook (1976) pp.204et seq.Google Scholar

44. A similar issue was raised in January 1999, when a US State Department spokesman proposed that funds held in the UN Compensation Fund for victims of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait should be used or “borrowed” in order to relieve suffering within Iraq. The proposal was abandoned.

45. Art. 31 of the Charter provides for a member State to participate without vote in the discussions of the Security Council if the Council considers that the interests of that member are specially affected.

46. For example, the first application under Art.50 was received from Jordan within two weeks of sanctions being imposed on Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to Security Council Resolution 661 (1990). A further five applications were made within three weeks of sanctions being imposed and almost all of the remaining applications were made in the next few months. Most of the States which made applications under Art.50 did so on more than one occasion; initial requests for consultation have typically been followed up by further letters outlining the ways in which the special economic problems faced by such States have changed over time.

47. See, for example, the legal advice provided by the UN Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council established to give effect to Resolution 661 (1990) (UN Document S/AC.25/SR.2,22 Aug. 1990, reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed). op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.774–780).

48. Switzerland, for example, implements UN sanctions as a matter of practice, although, as a non-member of the United Nations, it does not recognise that it is bound by decisions of the Security Council. This is consistent with the principle embodied in Art.2(6) of the Charter, that the United Nations shall ensure that non-member States act in accordance with the principles contained in the Charter to the extent necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security and also with the practice of the Security Council to call upon “all States” to implement UN sanctions.

49. See, for example, the legal advice provided by the UN Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council established to give effect to Resolution 661 (1990) (UN Document S/AC.25/SR.2,22 Aug. 1990, reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23. at pp.774–780).

50. In both Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993), the Security Council recalled the right of Slates, under Art.50 of the Charter, to consult the Security Council where they find themselves confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventative or enforcement measures.

51. In Resolution 917 (1994), which imposed certain additional sanctions on Haiti, the Security Council also decided that the Haitian Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Resolution 841 (1993) should undertake certain additional tasks including the examination of possible requests for assistance under the provisions of Art.50 of the Charter and the making of recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action.

52. In relation to sanctions imposed on Libya, both Bulgaria (UN Document S/23939) and Sudan (UN Documents S/AC.28/1992/COMM.14 and S/24448) reported economic difficulties to the Secretary-General but neither explicitly invoked Art.50 nor directly requested assistance and no specific action was taken by the Security Council. Sec UN Document A/48/573 S/26705. 8 Nov. 1993, at paras. 47–51.

53. Resolution 217 (1965).

54. These commodities were asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, and hide skins and leather.

55. Resolutions 253 (1968); 277 (1970); 333 (1973); 388 (1976) and 409 (1977).

56. See Doxey, M., International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective 2nd edn (1996), at pp.70–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Gowlland-Debbas, V., Collective Reponses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia (1990), at pp.633–639.Google Scholar

57. UN Document S/7781, Annex II.

58. In particular, Portugal cited the severe financial and economic losses suffered by ports in Mozambique, estimated by the Portuguese Government to have reached £10 million by the end of 1966. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, op. cit. supra n.55, at p.633.

59. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc cit. supra n.52, at p.6.

60. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc. cit. supra n.52, at p.7.

61. UN Document S/7720.

62. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705. loc cit. supra n.52, at p.7.

63. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, op. cit. supra n.56. at p.635.

64. See UN Document S/8786/Add.2; S/9853/Add.1, Annex 1. See also V. Gowlland-Debbas op. cit. supra n.55, at p.635.

65. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, op. cit. supra n.56, at p.633.

66. Ibid., at p.635.

67. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc. cit. supra n.52, at p.7.

68. UN Document S/10896/Rev.1 and Add.1.

69. UN Document E/5299.

70. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc. cit. supra n.52, at p.9.

71. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc cit. supra n.52, at p.8–9.

72. For example. General Assembly Resolution 3173 (XXVIII), Resolution 33/131 of 19 Dec. 1978 and Resolution 36/214 of 17 Dec. 1981.

73. Resolutions 1766 (LIV) of 18 May 1973; 1798 (LV) of 24 Jul. 1973; 1832(LVI) of 8 May 1974; 1875 (LVII) of 16 Jul. 1974; 1951 (LIX) of 22 Jul. 1975; 2012 (LXI)of 3 Aug. 1976; 2093 (LXIII) of 26 Jul. 1977; 1978/46 of 2 Aug. 1978; and decision 1979/46 of 27 Jul. 1979.

74. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc. cit. supra n.52, at p.8.

75. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, op. cit. supra n.56, at p.637.

76. S/12350 and Add.1

77. Resolutions 1987 (LX) of 11 May 1976; 2020 (LXI) of 3 Aug. 1976; 2094 (LXIII) of 29 Jul. 1977, 1978/63 of 3 Aug. 1978; and decision 1979/46 of 27 Jul. 1979.

78. Resolutions 31/43 of 1 Dec. 1976, 32/95 of 13 Dec. 1977,33/126 of 19 Dec. 1978, 34/129 of 14 Dec. 1979. 35/99 of 5 Dec. 1980, 36/215 of 17 Dec. 1981, 37/161 of 17 Dec. 1982. 38/208 of 20 Dec. 1983, 39/199 of 17 Dec. 1984. See also UN Document A/48/573 S/26705. loc. cit. supra n.52, at p. 10.

79. V. Gowlland-Debbas, op. cit. supra n.56, at p.637.

80. V. Gowlland-Debbas, op. cit. supra n.56, at pp.638–639.

81. Ibid.

82. Commonwealth Secretariat (1978) “The Front Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle”, cited in M. Doxey, op. cit. supra n.56, at p.73.

83. See for example, B. Simma (ed), op. cit. supra n.14, at p.661, who notes that the special accounts opened by the UN on behalf of Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana were always short of funds.

84. Commonwealth Secretariat (1978) “The Front Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle” cited in M. Doxey, op. cit. supra n.56, at p.73.

85. UN Document S/1996/700,26 Aug. 1996, at p.28.

86. See, for example, UN Documents A/48/573 S/26705, loc. cit. supra at n.52; S/1996/700, loc. cit. supra at n.84; E/1993/47/Add.1, 19 Apr. 1993; E/1994/19, 7 Apr. 1994; E/1995/21,21 Apr. 1995; E1996/18, 22 May 1996. See also, Bethlehem, D. (ed). The Kuwait Crisis: Sanctions and Their Economic Consequences—Part I, Cambridge International Documents Series, Vol. 2 (1991) pp.xliv–xlv.Google Scholar

87. UN Document S/AC25/SR.2,22 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.774–780.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. UN Document S/21620, 24 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.659–664.

92. UN DocumentS/21786,18 Sept. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.727–729; UN Document S/AC.25/SR.3, 27 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.781–785.

93. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.3.27 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.781–785.

94. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.4,11 Sept. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.785–794.

95. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.5, 12 Sept. 1990; UN Document S/AC.25/SR.6, 8 Oct. 1990, UN Document S/AC.25/SR.7, 27 Sept. 1990; UN Document S/AC25/SR.8, 28 Sept.1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.794–835.

96. UN Document S/21786, 18 Sept. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.727–729.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. UN Document S/21826, 26 Sept. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. at. supra n.23, at p.729.

100. UN Document S/21938, 13 Nov. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed). op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.729–748.

101. Ibid., at p.731.

102. Ibid., at pp.741–748.

103. Ibid., at p.731.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., at p.734.

107. Ibid., at pp.731–732.

108. Ibid., at p.733.

109. The World Bank, “Briefing note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis”, 14 Sept. 1990.Google Scholar

110. UN Document S/21938, 13 Nov. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23. at pp.736–739.

111. Ibid., at p.729.

112. See UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc. cit. supra n.52

113. UN Document S/22382,25 Mar. 1991.

114. UN Document S/22548,29 Apr. 1991.

115. UN Document S/AC.25/I990/CRP.4.27 Aug. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.662–664.

116. UN Document S/1996/700, loc. cit. supra n.84.

117. Ibid.

118. Regular reports were submitted by Jordan until Oct. 1994. A more recent report, covering the previous three years, was considered by the Committee at its 151st meeting on 17 Mar. 1997. See UN Document S/1997/672, 28 Aug. 1997, at para.31.

119. Bangladesh (UN Document S/21856, 10 Oct. 1990), Bulgaria (UN Documents S/21573, 21 Aug. 1990; S/21576, 21 Aug. 1990; S/2174,12 Sept. 1990), Czechoslovakia (UN Documents S/21759, 13 Sept. 1990; S/21837. 3 Oct. 1990; S/22019, 19 Dec. 1990), Djibouti (UN Document S/22209, 8 Feb. 1991) India (UN Documents S/21711, 5 Sept. 1990; S/22013. 19 Dec. 1990), Lebanon (UN Documents S/21686, 31 Aug. 1990; S/21737, 10 Sept. 1990), Mauritania (UN Document S/21818,25 Sept. 1990), Pakistan (UN Documents S/21776, 17 Sept. 1990; S/21875, 15 Oct. 1990), Philippines (UN Documents S/21712, 5 Sept. 1990; s/22011, 18 Dec. 1990), Poland (UN Documents S/21808, 21 Sept. 1990; S/21918, 31 Oct. 1990), Romania (UN Documents S/21643,27 Aug. 1990; S/21990, 8 Dec. 1990), Seychelles (UN Documents S/21891, 19 Oct. 1990; S/22023, 20 Dec. 1990), Sri Lanka (UN Document S/21710,5 Sept. 1990). Sudan (UN Document S/21930,6 Nov. 1990), Syria (UN Document S/22193, 4 Feb. 1991), Tunisia (UN Documents S/21649, 27 Aug. 1990; S/22015, 19 Dec. 1990), Uruguay (UN Documents S/21775, 17 Sept. 1990; S/22026, 20 Dec. 1990), Vietnam (UN Documents S/21810, 21 Sept. 1990; S/21821, 26 Sept. 1990), Yemen (UN Documents S/21748, 13 Sept. 1990; S/21748, 13 Sept. 1990), Yugoslavia (UN Documents S/21642, 27 Aug. 1990; S/22014. 19 Dec. 1990).

120. UN Document S/21872, 12 Oct. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at p.645.

121. UN Document S/21882, 16 Oct. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.674–681.

122. See for example, UN Documents S/22021, 20 Dec. 1990 and S/1996/700, loc cit. supra n.84.

123. Although at the 142nd meeting of the Sanctions Committee, on 8 Aug. 1996, Turkey made a request to resume the import of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq for domestic purposes given the serious economic difficulties it had suffered as a result of the sanctions against Iraq.

124. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc cit. supra n.52, at p.35.

125. UN Document E/1991/102, 24 Jun. 1991, at pp.10–11.

126. See D. Bethlehem, ed., op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.643–725.

127. UN Document E/1991/102, loc. cit. supra n.124, at pp.3–7.

128. Ibid., at p. 12.

129. Ibid., at pp.7–9.

130. Ibid., at pp.3–7.

131. Ibid.

132. UN Documents S/AC.25/SR.U, 5 Oct. 1990; S/AC.25/SR.15, 12 Oct. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.871–904.

133. UN Document S/AC.25/SR.16,29 Oct. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.905–915.

134. See UN Documents S/AC25/SR.18, 7 Nov. 1990; S/AC.25/SR.19, 8 Nov. 1990, S/AC.25/SR.20,3 Dec. 1990; S/AC25/SR.21, 20 Dec. 1990; and S/AC.25/SR.22,7 Jan. 1991 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at pp.921–968.

135. See UN Documents S/22193,4 Feb. 1991; S/22209, 8 Feb. 1991.

136. In addition, prior to the establishment of the Working Group, a number of affected States were invited to address the Iraq Sanctions Committee, including Bulgaria (UN Document S/AC.25/SR3, 27 Aug. 1990), Yugoslavia, Romania (UN Document S/AC.25/ SR.6, 8 Oct. 1990), Yemen (UN Document S/AC.25/SR.7, 27 Sept. 1990).

137. UN Documents S/22021,20 Dec. 1990; S/22021/Add.l, 21 Dec. 1990, S/22021/Add.2, 19 Mar. 1991.

138. See Burci, G.L., “The Indirect Effect of United Nations Sanctions on Third States: The Role of Article 50 of the UN Charter”, African Yearbook of International Law (1995) p. 157, at p. 162.Google Scholar

139. UN Document S/22033, 21 Dec. 1990 reproduced in D. Bethlehem (ed), op. cit. supra n.23, at p.771; UN Document S/22398, 22 Mar. 1991.

140. See UN Document S/1996/700, loc cit. supra n.84.

141. UN Document S/22382, 25 Mar. 1991.

142. UN Document S/22548, 29 Apr. 1991.

143. See UN Document S/1996/700, loc cit. supra n.84.

144. See. for example, G. Burci. loc cit. supra n.138, at p.162.

145. UN Documents S/1997/672, 28 Aug. 1997; S/1998/1239, 31 Dec. 1998.

146. See UN Document A/48/573 S/26705. loc cit supra n.52, which cites responses from Australia, Austria, Canada (UN Document S/22713, 17 Jun. 1991), Belgium (UN Document S/22537,30 May 1991), Denmark (UN Document S/22538,26 Apr. 1991), France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan (UN Document S/22368, 20 Mar. 1991), Liechtenstein, Luxembourg (UN Document S/22541, 26 Apr. 1991), Luxembourg on behalf of Member States of the EC (UN Document S/22542, 26 Apr. 1991), Netherlands (UN Document S/22553, 29 Apr. 1991), New Zealand (UN Document S/22296, 1 Mar. 1991), Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia (S/23058) Spain (UN Document S/22539, 26 Apr. 1991), Sweden (UN Document S/22586,10 May 1991), Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Former USSR.

147. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc cit. supra n.52, at p.36.

148. Doxcy, M.P. “United Nations Sanctions: Current Policy Issues”, unpublished working paper, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University (1997), at p.7.Google Scholar

149. Financial Times, “Survey of Egypt”, 21 01 1992.Google Scholar

150. See M. Doxey, op.cit. n.56 at p.7, fn.5. Yemen and Cuba were the only members of the Security Council not to vote in favour of Resolutions 661 (1990), 665 (1990) and 666 (1990); they abstained in relation to the first two resolutions and voted against Resolution 666 (1990). In relation to non-sanctions related resolutions. Yemen did not participate in the vote on Resolution 660 (1990), abstained in relation to the votes on Resolutions 674 (1990), 686 (1991), 687 (1991), 688 (1991), 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), and voted against Resolution 678(1990).

151. UN Document S/22368, 20 Mar. 1991.

152. UN Document S/22542, 26 Apr. 1991.

153. UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc. cit. supra n.52, at pp.40–41.

154. M. Doxcy, loc. cit. supra n.147, at p.8.

155. UN Documents E/1993/47/Add. 1, loc. cit. n.85; E/1994/19,7 Apr. 1994; E/1995/21, 21 Apr. 1995; E1996/18, 22 May 1996.

156. UN Document E/1996/18, 22 May 1996.

157. Ibid.

158. UN Documents E/1993/47/Add.1, loc. cit. supra n.85; A/48/573 S/26705, loc cit. supra n.52.

159. Including oil and petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals and minerals, chemicals, vehicles and aircraft.

160. The Security Council decided that any vessel in which a majority or controlling interest was held by a person or undertaking in, or operating from, the FRY should be considered a vessel of this Republic, regardless of the flag under which the vessel sailed.

161. The suspension was extended by Resolutions 970 (1995), 988 (1995) and 1003 (1995), 1015 (1995).

162. See Resolutions 1021 (1995) and 1022 (1995). The measures imposed on the Bosnian Serbs were suspended indefinitely starting on 27 Feb. 1996, after the Security Council was informed by the IFOR commander that the Bosnian Serb forces had withdrawn from the zones of separation established in the Dayton Peace Agreement.

163. UN Documents S/24963 and S/25743 (Bulgaria); S/24147 and S/25683 (Hungary); S/24142 and Add.1 (Romania); S/25894 (Slovakia); S.AC.27/1993/COMM.3396 (Macedonia); S/25630 (Ukraine); S/AC.27/1993/COMM.5024 (Albania) and S/AC.27/1993/ COMM.2530 (Uganda).

164. UN Document A/49/356, 9 Sept. 1994, at p.8.

165. UN Document A/49/356, loc cit. supra n.162, at pp.8–12.

166. Ibid.

167. UN Document A/49/356, loc. cit. supra n.162, at p.11.

168. Ibid., at pp.11–12.

169. UN Document A/52/535, 27 Oct. 1997.

170. See, for example, UN Document S/26040, 8 Jul. 1993.

171. The Working Party recommendations with regard to the applications by Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Uganda and Ukraine were adopted at the 73rd meeting of the Committee on 2 Jul. 1993 (UN Document S/26040, 8 Jul. 1993). The Working Party recommendation with regard to the application by Albania was adopted at the 81st meeting of the Committee on 4 Aug. 1993 (UN Document S/26040/Add.1, 10 Aug. 1993). The Working Party recommendation with regard to the applications by Slovakia and Macedonia were adopted at the Committee's 91st meeting on 9 Nov. 1993 (UN Document S/26040/Add.2, 14 Dec. 1999).

172. See UN Document S/1996/946, 15 Nov. 1996, at p.13.

173. Ibid.

174. See UN Document S/26O40/Add.2, 14 Dec. 1999.

175. See UN Document S/1996/946, loc cit. supra n.170, at p.13.

176. UN Documents S/26056, 8 Jul. 1993; S/26282. 10 Aug. 1993; S/26905, 20 Dec. 1993.

177. UN Document A/49/356, loc. cit. supra n.162.

178. UN Documents A/RES/48/210, 21 Dec. 1993; A/RES/49/21A, 2 Dec. 1994; A/RES/50/58E, 12 Dec. 1995.

179. UN Document S/1995/313, 18 Apr. 1995.

180. UN Document A/50/189, S/1995/412, 24 May 1995.

181. UN Document A/50/259, S/1995/517, 28 Jun. 1995.

182. UN Document A/51/226, S/1996/595, 24 Jul. 1996.

183. UN Document A/51/330, S/1996/721, 6 Sept. 1996.

184. UN Document S/1996/946, loc cit. supra n.170.

185. Ibid., at p.34.

186. UN Document S/1996/776, loc cit. supra n.35, at p.13.

187. UN Documents A/52/535, loc cit. supra n.167, at p.3.

188. UN Document A/52/395, 26 Sept. 1997.

189. UN Document A/52/535, loc cit. supra n.167, at p.4.

190. UN Document A/54/534, 8 Nov. 1999, at p.2.

191. In 1993, responses to the initial request were received from Antigua and Barbuda, Belgium, Denmark, Ecuador, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malawi, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Turkey and the United Kingdom (UN Document A/48/317, 8 Nov. 1993, at para.46). By 1 Aug. 1994, responses to the initial request for information had also been received from Argentina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Malaysia, Norway, Togo and Switzerland (UN Document A/49/356, loc cit. supra n.162, at para.35). In response to requests for updated information in May 1995, responses were received from Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom (UN Document A/50/423, 12 Sept. 1995, at para.26) A further request in 1996 elicited responses from Germany, the Russian Federation, Syria, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States (UN Document A/51/150, 13 Sept. 1996, at para.16). Five responses were received to the request for information following the lifting of sanctions in Mar. 1997: Ecuador, Estonia, France, Germany and Japan. The observer of the Holy See also addressed the Secretary-General in relation to the humanitarian and ethical aspects of sanctions (UN Document A/52/535, loc cit. supra n.167, at paras. 15–20). Only one response was received from Germany in 1999 (UN Document A/54/534, loc. cit. supra n.188, at para.6).

192. See UN Document S/1996/776, loc cit. supra n.35.

193. UN Document A/52/535, loc. cit. supra n.167, at p.9.

194. UN Document A/52/217,1 Jul. 1997.

195. UN Documents A/49/356, loc cit. supra n.162; A/50/423,12 Sept. 1995; A/51/356,13 Sept. 1996; A/54/534, loc cit. supra n.188.

196. UN Document A/49/356, loc. cit. supra n.162, at paras. 64–67.

197. UN Document A/52/535, loc cit. supra n.167, at pp.9–11; A/54/534, loc.cit. supra n.188, at pp.10–13.

198. UN Document A/50/189, S/1995/412, 24 May 1995.

199. UN Document A/51/330, S/1996/721, 6 Sept. 1996.

200. UN Document A/51/226, S/1996/595, 24 Jul. 1996.

201. Ibid.

202. UN Document S/1996/946, loc. cit. supra n.170, at p.20.

203. Ibid.

204. UN Document S/1996/946, loc. cit. supra n.170. at p.18.

205. To borrow from the words of the Secretary-General, see UN Document A/49/356, loc. cit. supra n.162, at para.14.

206. In the case of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the underlying security crises severely disrupted economic relations between neighbouring Slates independently of the impact of sanctions.

207. In many cases, economic sanctions have highlighted pre-existing structural weaknesses in the economy of the non-target Stale: inadequate foreign reserves, undeveloped transport and communications infrastructure, over-dependency on remittances from migrant workers, a single export or a single source of a crucial import and an undeveloped financial sector have all contributed to the pain caused by sanctions measures.

208. UN Document A/49/356, loc. cit. supra n.162, at para.14.

209. UN Document A/RES/52/162, 15 Jan. 1998.

210. UN Document A/52/308, 28 Aug. 1997.

211. See UN Document A/53/312,27 Aug. 1998. The expert group identified the following categories of potential economic effects: (a) as a result of trade embargoes, loss of foreign exchange earnings required to finance imports, exports of goods and services forgone, outstanding orders for contracted future delivery for which progress is already in progress, suspended sales of services, imports of goods and services forgone, loss of imports on concessionary terms, and outstanding orders for future imports for which payment has been made; and (b) financial difficulties resulting from lost profits on investments or other income, confiscation, seizure or conversion of savings and assets; loss of concessionary loans, credits or grants, investment forgone and tourist revenue forgone. The expert group cautioned that offsetting factors, such as the value of redirected exports and savings on the imports required to produce exports, should be properly accounted for. Apart from the economic effects of sanctions, the expert group identified social costs, such as those resulting from the return of large numbers of migrant workers, the influx of refugees and the loss of employment or income, all of which require additional public expenditure on social services. In the longer term, the expert group considered the diversion of limited resources from development objectives to cover sanctions-related costs to be a collateral effect of sanctions. A miscellany of secondary effects were also identified by the expert group as arising from particular features of the sanctions regime, geographical factors and monitoring and enforcement requirements.

212. See General Assembly Resolution 53/107 of 8 Dec. 1998. A note verbale circulated by the Secretary-General to all States on 21 Apr. 1999 inviting their views regarding the report of the ad hoc expert group meeting, elicited replies from only five States (Belarus, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovakia and Ukraine), which were generally supportive of the methodology proposed (UN Document A/54/383, 23 Sept. 1999, at paras. 6–31).

213. Zambia, Mozambique and Jordan.

214. See Report of the Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former Yugoslavia, supra n.35.

215. UN Document A/53/312, loc cit. supra n.209, at paras. 54–57. It was recommended that the Special Representative should put in place an inter-agency arrangement or taskforce, with subgroups to evaluate the economic, trade and financial effects of sanctions, to deal with the social and humanitarian effects of sanctions and to address the secondary effects of sanctions, by recommending appropriate amendments to sanctions regimes, partial or limited exemptions under exceptional circumstances and other non-financial measures in order to maximise the political impact of sanctions and minimise their collateral damage.

216. Information provided by donor States has, in a number of cases, been supplemented by further direct appeals from the adversely affected States; however, such appeals have naturally focused on the continuing assistance needs, rather than on the effectiveness of the assistance provided.

217. UN Document A/49/356, loc. cit. supra n.162, at p.6.

218. UN Document S/24111, 17 Jun. 1992, at para.41.

219. In 1993, the Secretary-General noted that measures to ease the economic impact of sanctions depend on “the political will of countries that arc in a position to provide assistance or on the capacity of the financial and other organisations of the United Nations system to respond adequately and swiftly.” UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc cit. supra n.52, at para.151.

220. The Special Committee considered a number of working papers calling for the establishment of a fund, either in the form of a permanent fund to be established by the General Assembly which would operate automatically on the imposition of sanctions or in the form of individual trust funds which would be established under the terms of the Security Council resolution imposing sanctions. See for example the following working papers: A/AC.182/L.73 introduced in Feb. 1992; A/AC182/L.76/Rcv.1 and A/AC.182/L.77 introduced in Mar. 1993; and A/AC.182/L.79 introduced during the 1994 session. See also recent reports of the Special Committee: UN Documents A/53/635, 24 November 1998; A/54/614, 30 November 1999; and A/54/33, 12 May 1999, at paras13–33, as well as draft resolutions A/C6/53/LJ/Rev.1, A/C.6/54/L.3 and A/C.6/54/L.3/Rev.1.

221. See, for example, UN Documents GA/L/2887, 10 Nov. 1995; GA/U2888, 13 Nov. 1995; A/51/33; A/51/317, 30 Aug. 1996; GA/L/3002, 26 Sept. 1996; L/2821, 7 Feb. 1997; GA/U3038, 8 Oct. 1997; GA/L/3040, 13 Oct. 1997; L/2852, 6 Feb. 1998; A/52/33.

222. See UN Document A/48/573 S/26705, loc cit. supra n.52, at para. 152.

223. UN Document A/47/277,17 Jun. 1992, at para.41.

224. Resolution 47/120 B of 20 Sept. 1993.

225. UN Document A/53/312, loc cit. supra n.209, at para.44.

226. UN Document A/52/308, loc. cit. supra n.208, at para.5.

227. See, for example, UN Documents L/2756,29 Feb. 1996; A/51/33; L/2821, 7 Feb. 1997; GA/L/3038, 8 Oct. 1997; GA/L/3039. 13 Oct. 1997; GA/L/3040, 13 Oct. 1997; A/52/33, 26 Feb. 1998.

228. See for example, the economic sanctions imposed on Sierra Leone, Angola (UNITA), Libya and Afghanistan.

229. UN Document A/50/6O, 3 Jan. 1995.

230. UN Document A/53/312, loc. cit. supra n.209, at para.39.

231. For example, in relation to sanctions against Iraq, it is unclear why Jordan was permitted to resume limited imports of Iraqi petroleum whereas Romania's request to do the same was denied. See G. Burci, loc cit. n.138, p. 162. This issue has also been considered in the course of the 1994 and 1995 sessions of the Special Committee on the UN Charter, sec for example UN Document A/50/361, 22 Aug. 1995.

232. This type of assistance has been used on an ad hoc basis by several UN agencies, such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UN Document A/52/308, loc cit. supra n.208, at paras. 27–29.

233. UN Document A/52/308, loc. cit. supra n.208, at para.5.

234. UN Document S/1999/92, 29 Jan. 1999.