1. 19 Johns. 381 N.Y. (1822).Google Scholar

2. (1889) 17 R.32.Google Scholar

3. That is the view taken, for example, in France. See case commentary on Dlle Courtois c. Dame Faurie by Carbonnier, J., Receuil Dalloz Sirey (1985) J. 20.Google ScholarSee also Carbonnier, J., Droit civil: 4, Les obligations (11th edn, 1982), para.107Google Scholar; Starck, , Roland, and Boyer, , Obligations: 1. Responsabilité délictuelle (5th edn, 1996), paras.428–430.Google Scholar

4. Hodge & Sons v. Anglo American Oil Co. (1922), 12 L.I.L.Rep. 183per Scrutton LJ at 187.Google ScholarThis remark was used by Lord, Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, 595–596Google Scholar as an argument against the creation of a separate category of liability for dangerous things.

5. This is the doctrine of non-delegable duties of care, discussed in pt VI below.

6. E.g. the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (UK), (see Blue Circle Industries Plc v. Ministry of Defence [1998] 3 All E.R. 385).Google Scholar

7. Air Traffic Act 1936.

8. Atomic Energy Act 1959.

9. Medicines Act 1976. Liability cannot be limited.

10. Environmental Liability Act 1990.

11. Law no. 91–1406 of 31 Dec. 1991, Art.47.

12. Law no. 95–955 of 12 Nov. 1965 and Law no. 68–943 of 30 Oct. 1968 as amended by Law no. 90–488 of 16 June 1990.

13. Law no.77–530 of 26 May 1977.

14. Law no.85–677 of 5 July 1985, (Loi Badinter). See Tunc, A. “The Loi Badinter. Ten Years of Experience” (1996) 3 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 329–340.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15. In pt IV.

16. Art. 1079 meets the criticism of its Soviet predecessor. Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation Art. 90, which did not attempt a definition of such activities.

17. Arts 89–90.

18. Art 1908 imposes liability for damage caused by explosives, excessive smoke, and falling trees.

19. Art 2. For the text of the Lugano Convention, see 1993 Yearbook of International Environmental Law, pp.691–712.Google Scholar The Convention has been signed only by Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

20. (1866) L.R. 1 Exch. 265Google Scholar; affd. (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.Google Scholar

21. The rule approved by the House of Lords, was stated by Blackburn J in the Court of Exchequer Chamber at 279: “We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.”

22. Northwestern Utilities Ltd v. London Guarantee Co. [1936] A.C. 108.Google Scholar

23. Humphries v. Cousins (1877) 2 C.P.D. 239.Google Scholar

24. Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co. Ltd [1921] 2 A.C. 465.Google Scholar

25. Hale v. Jennings Bros [1938] 1 All E.R. 579.Google Scholar

26. Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board (1878) 4 Ex.D. 5.Google Scholar

27. A-G v. Corke [1933] Ch.89.Google Scholar

28. Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury Cmnd. 7054 (1978), para.1642.Google Scholar

29. For earlier attempts at law reform in the UK, see Thirteenth Report of the Law Reform Committee for Scotland Cmnd. 2348 (1964)Google Scholar, and Civ'd Liability for Dangerous Things (1970, Law Com. No.32).Google Scholar

30. Ball v. Nye 99 Massachusetts 582 (1868)Google Scholar; Cahill v. Eastman 18 Minnesota 324 (1871).Google Scholar

31. Brown v. Collins 53 New Hampshire 442 (1873)Google Scholar; see also Losee v. Buchanan 51 New York 476 (1873), 484–485Google Scholar, in which the view was expressed that the community should accept exposure to hazard, in that case an exploding boiler, for the sake of industrial progress.

32. The First Restatement had imposed liability on “ultra-hazardous” activities, defined as those which (i) necessarily involved ariskof serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others, (ii) could not be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care, and (iii) were not a matter of common usage.

33. For a comprehensive analysis of American case law, see Jones, W. K., “Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise” (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 1705–1770 at pp.1715–1751.Google Scholar

34. Pt III.

35. Pt IV.

36. Pt V.

37. Pt VI.

38. Pt VII.

39. Palmer, V., “In Quest of a Strict Liability Standard Under the Code” (1982) 56 Tulane Law Review 1317–1329 at p. 1317.Google Scholar

40. See Cane, P., The Anatomy of Tort Law (1997), pp.49–50.Google Scholar

41. The Second Restatement, para.522. See for example Yukon Equipment Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 585 Alaska P. 2d 1206 (1978).Google Scholar

42. Idem, para.524.

43. In pt II(c).

44. See for example Erbrich Products Co. v. Wills 509 N.E. 2d 850 (Ind.App. 1987), 856Google Scholar: “When deciding to impose para.519 strict liability, we must not look at the abstract propensities of the particular substance involved, but must analyse the defendant's activity as a whole.… If the rule were otherwise, virtually every commercial or industrial activity involving substances which are dangerous only in the abstract automatically would be deemed as abnormally dangerous. This result would be intolerable.” See also Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts(5th edn, 1984), para.78Google Scholar: “When a court applies all of the factors suggested in the Second Restatement it is doing virtually the same thing as is done with the negligence concept, except for the fact that it is the function of the court to apply the abnormally dangerous concept to the facts as found by the jury.”

45. Kress, K., “The Serious of Harm Thesis” in Owen, D. (Ed.), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (1995), pp.277–297 at p.297.Google ScholarSee also Jones, W. K., “Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise” (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 1705–1770 at p.1710.Google ScholarProfessor Jones puts forward suggestions for the reformulation of the Restatement rules at p.1713.Google Scholar

46. Markesinis, B. S. and Deakin, S. F., Tort Law (1994), p.472.Google Scholar

47. Newark, F. H., “Non-natural User and Rylands v. Fletcher’ (1961) 24 Modern Law Review 557–571.Google Scholar

48. Read v. Lyons & Co. [1913] A.C. 263.Google Scholar

49. E.g. Garcia v. Estate of Norton 183 Cal.App.3d 413 (1986).Google Scholar The court held the employer strictly liable for injuries received by his employee in an explosion which occurred while they were working on a waste oil tanker with a blowtorch in the employer's yard.

50. See Buckley, R., The Law of Nuisance (2nd edn, 1996), pp.53–54.Google Scholar

51. Robinson v. Kilvert (1889) 41 Ch.Div. 88Google Scholar; Eastern & South African Telegraph Co. Ltd v. Cape Town Tramways [1902] A.C. 381.Google Scholar

52. E.g. a water supply for both parties (although a claim in negligence may be possible in such circumstances), Carstairs v. Taylor (1871) L.R. 6 Ex. 217.Google Scholar

53. Perry v. Kendricks Transport Ltd [1956] 1 W.L.R. 85.Google Scholar

54. Nichols v. Marsland (1876) 2 Ex.D. 1, 280.Google Scholar In modern times the availability of technology with the capability for such prediction or protection narrows the scope of this defence.

55. Supra n.20, at 338–339.Google Scholar Non-natural was denned as “introducing into the close that which in its natural condition was not in or upon it”.

56. Brearley, J. S., “Public Welfare v. ‘Natural Use’ of Land as the Basis for Liability in Environmental Damage Cases” (1995) 7 Journal of Environmental Law 119–136 at p.125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57. [1913] A.C. 263.Google Scholar

58. Idem, per Lord Moulton at 280.

59. Para.520 lists a number of factors for the determination of whether an activity is abnormally dangerous. Factors (d) and (e) correspond to (i), and factor (f) to (ii).

60. [1994] 2 A.C. 264, hereinafter “Cambridge Water Company”.Google Scholar

61. In Cambridge Water Company, idem, the defendant company was an important employer in the local, largely rural community. Nevertheless, Lord Goff held, at 309, that it could not escape liability on this basis. Despite its benefit in employment terms, this “small industrial complex” could not be deemed to be making a natural or ordinary use of land.

62. (1996)81 B.L.R. 108.Google Scholar

63. Idem, p.119.

64. [1994] 2 A.C. 264.Google Scholar

65. “The Boundaries of Nuisance” at 487–488. Blackburn J's original statement of the rule had referred to any substance “likely to do mischief if it escapes”, and liability was imposed for the “natural and anticipated consequences”. For an analysis of foreseeability in this context, see Wilkinson, D., “Cambridge Water Company v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. Diluting Liability for Continuing Escapes” (1994) Modern Law Review 799–810.Google Scholar

66. See Perry, S., “Risk, Harm and Responsibility” in Owen, D. G. (Ed.), The Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (1995), pp.321–346 at p.343.Google Scholar

67. [1913] A.C. 263.Google Scholar

68. Garcia v. Estate of Norton 183 Cal.App.3d 413 (1986).Google Scholar

69. See also Rickards v. Lothian [1913] A.C. 263Google Scholar and Ellison v. Ministry of Defence (1996) 81 B.L.R. 108.Google Scholar

70. Supra n.20, at 340.

71. [1997] A.C. 655.Google Scholar

72. [1980] Q.B. 485.Google Scholar

73. “On est responsable non seulement du dommage que l'on cause par son propre fait, mais encore de celui que at causé par le fait des personnes dont on doit répondre, ou des choses que l'on a sous sa garde.” Art. 1384.1 was originally read in conjunction with Arts 1385 and 1386 as setting out a strict basis of liability only when harm was caused by an animal or dangerous building under the defender's control. However, as in other systems, the increased hazards of mechanisation raised the question of compensation for those who suffered harm as the result of industrial accidents. In a landmark decision in 1896, the Cour de Cassation ruled that Art. 1384.1 could be interpreted as a general stand-alone provision setting out a presumption of responsibility when damage is caused by things of whatever sort. (See Dalloz Périodique 1897.1.433, and also commentary thereon by Saleilles. Art. 1384.1 was used as the basis upon which to award damages in favour of a widow who sued her husband's employers after he was killed by an exploding boiler.)

74. Arrét Jand'heur, Dalloz Périodique 1930.1.57.

76. Ville de Monligny-lès-Metz v. Sté Cardem et autres, Recueil Dalloz Sirey 1994 J. 80.Google Scholar

77. La Mutuelle du Mans assurance IARD v. Bau Civ.(2) 12 Dec. 1994.Google Scholar

78. Leroux v. Cons. Mauger, Recueil Dalloz Sirey 1966 J. 700.Google Scholar

79. Veuve Castel v. Veuve Douillard, Dalloz Périodique 1939 J. 72.Google Scholar

80. Épx Brière v. CPCAM de Lyon, Civ.(2) 8 June 1994.Google Scholar

81. Electricité de France v. Chiaramonti, Civ.(2) 13 April 1995.Google Scholar In his enthusiasm after the famous ruling in Jand'heur, Josserand observed that accidents are almost always due to the agency of a thing, Dalloz Periodique 1930 Chronique 25–28, while Ripert responded that, if that were the case, fault-based liability was as good as reduced to collisions between nudists, Dalloz Périodique 30 1.57 at p.59.Google Scholar

82. Ledore c. Gilbertas, CAA Lyon 10 May 1985Google Scholar: “Le gardien d'une chose ne peut s'exonérer de sa responsabilité qu'en rapportant la preuve d'un événement imprévisible et irrésistible.”

83. See Amos, M. S. and Walton, F. P., Introduction to French Law (3rd edn, 1967), p.205.Google Scholar

84. Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury Cmnd. 7054 (1978), para.366.Google Scholar

85. See Bell, J. et al. Principles of French Law (1998), pp.377–378.Google ScholarA separate set of rules now operates for road traffic accidents since the Loi Badinter of 1985, supra n.14.Google Scholar

86. S.N.C.F. v. Papot, Recueil Dalloz-Sirey 1971 J. 690.Google Scholar

87. Starck, , Roland, , Boyer, Obligations; I Responsabilité Délictuelle (5th edn, 1996), paras.453–462Google Scholar: “de toute anomalie on ne peut conclure à l'existence d'une faute”. But compare with Tunc, A. “The Twentieth Century Development and Function of the Law of Torts in France” (1965) 14 I.C.L.Q. 1089–1103 at p.1096: “As a matter of fact, our courts usually discharge the custodian when he can give evidence that he, or the person who was actually in control of the thing, has not committed any fault”.Google Scholar

88. Carbonnier, J.Théorie des obligations (1963), p.428.Google Scholar

89. See Malone, W. S., “Ruminations on Liability for the Acts of Things” (1982) 42 Louisiana Law Review 979–1009 at p.991.Google Scholar

90. Dalloz Périodique 1939 J. 72.Google Scholar

91. Wheat v. Lacon [1966] A.C. 552 per Lord Denning at 578.Google Scholar

92. C.A.A. Lyon 10 May 1985.Google Scholar

93. Loescher v. Parr 324 So.441 (La.1975)Google Scholar, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court found liability against the owner of a magnolia tree when the tree collapsed upon a car. Although the trunk of the tree was found to be 90% rotten, there was no reason that the owner should have known this.

94. Entrevia v. Hood 427 So.2d 1146 (La.1983).Google Scholar

95. Verrett v. Cameron Telephone Co., 417 So.2d 1319 (La.App. 1982), 1325–26.Google Scholar

96. See Maraist, F. L. and Galligan, T. C. Jr., “The Ongoing ‘Turf War’ for Louisiana Tort Law; Interpreting Immunity and the Solidarity Skirmish” (1995) 56 Louisiana Law Review 215–230.Google Scholar There had also been considerable academic debate concerning strict liability for the acts of things. See for example W. S. Malone, op cit., supra n.89 which concludes as follows: “the plasticity of the negligence concept and its capacity to adjust itself to an everchanging world strongly recommends it as a vehicle that should not lightly be cast aside.”

97. See Maraist, F. L. and Galligan, T. C. Jr., “Burying Caesar Civil Justice Reform and the Changing Face of Louisiana Tort Law” (1996) 51 Tulane Law Review 339–412.Google Scholar

98. Malone, W. S., op cit., supra n.89, at p. 1001.Google Scholar

99. See Crepeau, P. A., “Liability for Damage Caused by Things from the Civil Law Point of View” (1962) 40 Canadian Bar Review 222–239.Google Scholar

100. I.e. jurisdictions which display a mixture of common law and civil law.

101. RHM Bakeries v. Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 S.C(H.L.) 17 per Lord Fraser at 41.Google Scholar Lord Fraser's words have been cited several times since in the Scots courts. A Scottish Outer House case decided just after Cambridge Water Company, supra n.60 and just before Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 C.L.R. 520 restates the Scottish position unequivocally.Google ScholarIn McQueen v. The Glasgow Garden Festival (1988) Ltd, 1995 S.L.T. 211Google Scholar, any line of argument “reminiscent of… Rylands v. Fletcher” was firmly rejected by Lord Cullen at 213.

102. It was suggested in RHM Bakeries v. Strathclyde Regional Council, supra n.101 on the authority of a House of Lords case in 1917, Caledonian Railway Company v. Corporation of Greenock, 1917 S.L.T. 67Google Scholar, that the only circumstances in which the Rylands v. Fletcher rule might possibly apply in Scots law was when a proprietor interfered with the natural flow of a stream. In fact, while several English cases including Rylands v. Fletcher were cited in that case, all were distinguished. (See Lord Wrenbury at 74 “To construct a reservoir on your own land is a lawful act To close or divert a natural line of flow so as to render it less efficient is not. It has never been held that in such a case there is not liability.”) Most of the dicta in that case concerning the basis of liability explain it by reference to fault. Lord Finlay, LC concludes, at 70, that “the appellants, in constructing the culvert, ought to have foreseen the possibility of such an occurrence and to have provided against it.” The rule as formulated in that case derives mainly from analysis of the nineteenth century Scots case law.

103. I.e. type A as identified in pt III above in the context of Rylands v. Fletcher.

104. (1876) 3 R. 461, 464.

105. See for example Nautilus Steamship Co. Ltd v. David Henderson and Co. Ltd 1919 S.C. 605Google Scholar (use of oxyacetylene flame by repairers); Fitzpatrick v. Melville 1926 S.L.T. 478 (storing of poison near public area)Google Scholar; Gilmour v. Simpson 1958 S.C. 477 (use of blow lamp).Google Scholar

106. 1932 S.C(H.L.) 31, 65.

107. E.g. Devine v. Colvilles Lid 1969 S.C.(H.L) 67Google Scholar; D. McIntyre &. Son Ltd. v. Soutar 1980 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 115.Google Scholar

108. Samuel v. Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway Company (1850) 13 D. 312.Google Scholar

109. Idem, 314.

110. (1857) 20 D. 298.Google Scholar

111. “I never saw a case of such water-works in which the maker had less to say in order to free himself from liability,” idem, per Lord Justice Clerk Hope at 303.

112. Ballard v. North British Railway Company 1923 S.C.(H.L.) 43.Google ScholarA similar approach was adopted in Potter v. Hamilton and Strathaven Railway Company (1864) 3 M. 83.Google Scholar

113. 371 So.2d 810 (La.1979).Google Scholar

114. 1995 S.L.T. 211.Google Scholar

115. Contrast McQueen idem, with the French case of Ghirardi v. société Ruggieri, Civ.(2) 30 Oct. 1989Google Scholar, in which Ruggieri were presumed liable when fireworks stored in their premises exploded prematurely and damaged the Ghirardis' property. See also Ourliac v. Comité des Fétes du Farel, Civ (2) 1 April 1987Google Scholar in which a young boy found an unexploded firework after a fireworks display and was injured when he set it off. The Cour de Cassation overturned the Cour d'appel's ruling that the boy had become the keeper at the relevant time, and that the presumption of Liability had therefore shifted from the fireworks organisers.

116. [1902] A. C. 381.Google Scholar

117. Price, T. W., “Is the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher part of Roman-Dutch law?” (1953) South African Law Journal 381–386Google Scholar; van der Walt, J. C., “Strict Liability in the South African La w of Delict” (1968) 1 Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 49–83 at pp.66–67.Google Scholar

118. E.g. Actio de effusis vet deiectis; actio positi vel suspensi; interdictum quod vi aut clam.

119. E.g. Nuclear Energy Act 1982.

120. McKerron, R. G.The Law of Delict in South Africa (7th edn, 1971), pp.11–12Google Scholar; Neethling, J. et al. Law of Delict (2nd edn, 1994), p.341.Google Scholar

121. Supra n.101, at 556, (hereinafter “Burnie Port Authority”). For commentary on this case, see Heuston, R. F. V. and Buckley, R. A., “The Return of Rylands v. Fletcher” (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 506–509Google Scholar; Dziobon, S. and Mullender, R., “Formalism Forever Thwarted: Rylands v. Fletcher in Australia” (1995) Cambridge Law Journal 23–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

122. Supra n.101, at 547.

123. Their lordships were aware of the decision of the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Company, supra n.60, but did not refer to Lord Goff's restrictive interpretation of “non-natural” use in that case. Indeed, the two dissenting judges in Burnie Port Authority supra n.101, who favoured retaining the Rylands v. Fletcher rule would not in the end have found the Port Authority liable under the rule, for the reason that they deemed the use of the premises which the defendant had authorised to be an ordinary one, and not a “non-natural” one.

124. Idem, at 540.

125. Idem, at 544.

126. Idem, at 591.

127. McLaughlan v. Craig 1948 S.C. 599per Lord President Cooper at 611.Google Scholar

128. Hughes v. Lord Advocate 1963 S.C(H.L.)31. (This Scots House of Lords case was not cited in Cambridge Water Company, supra n.60.)Google Scholar

129. That was already the case in the (now rejected) Australian version of Rylands v. Fletcher. See Benning v. Wong (1969) 122 C.L.R. 249.Google Scholar

130. Burnie Port Authority supra n.101, at 557Google Scholar: “It is unnecessary for the purposes of the present case to express a concluded view on the question whether the duty of care owed, in such circumstances, to a lawful visitor on the premises is likewise a non-delegable one. The ordinary processes of legal reasoning by analogy, induction and deduction would prima facie indicate that it is.”

131. “Although the doctrine of extra-hazardous acts is sometimes treated as an exception to the general rule that a principal is not liable for the negligence of his independent contractor, it is in truth an instance of strict liability for breach of duty of care which the principal personally owes to the plaintiff”, Stevens v. Brodribb Sawmilling Co. Pty Ltd (1986) 160 C.L.R. 16 per Mason CJ at 29–30.Google ScholarSee also Stoneman v. Lyons (1975) 133 C.L.R. 550.Google Scholar But while Mason CJ concluded in Stevens that the doctrine “had no place in Australian law”, he was a member of the later court which accorded it recognition in Burnie Port Authority, supra n.101.

132. Noble's Trs. v. Economic Forestry (Scotland) Ltd. 1988 S.L.T. 662.Google Scholar

133. Langley Fox Building Partnership (Pty) Ltd v. De Valence 1991 1 S.A.1(A).Google Scholar

134. See Fisher, E., “Risk, Justice and Independent Contractors: The Demise of the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher in Australia” (1995) 7 Journal of Environmental Law 199–223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

135. 72 Cal.App.3d 516 (1977 Cal.App.).Google ScholarThis case invites comparison with McQueen v. The Glasgow Garden Festival (1988) Ltd, 1995 S.L.T. 211, discussed earlier.Google Scholar

136. Para.423 of the Second Restatement reads: “One who carries on an activity which threatens a grave risk of serious bodily harm or death unless the instrumentalities used are carefully constructed and maintained, and who employs an independent contractor to construct or maintain such instrumentalities, is subject to the same liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in construction or maintaining such instrumen- talities as though the employer had himself done the work of construction or maintenance”. Another example of para.423 liability is Maloney v. Rath 69 Cal.2d 442 (1968), 40 A.L.R.3d 1 (motorist liable for negligence of independent contractor in failing to maintain brakes). Improperly maintained vehicles were said to create “a grave risk of serious bodily harm or death”.Google Scholar

137. In Burnie Port Authority, supra n.101, at 558–559Google Scholar the duty was non-delegable when “the combined effect of the magnitude of the foreseeable risk of an accident happening and the magnitude of the foreseeable potential injury or damage of an accident does occur is such that an ordinary person acting reasonably would consider it necessary to exercise special care or to take special precautions in relation to it”.

138. See Honeywill & Stein Ltd v. Larkin Bros Ltd [1934] 1 K.B. 191per Slesser LJ at 199Google Scholar: “If a man does work on or near another's property which involves danger to that property unless proper care is taken, he is liable to the owners of the property for damage resulting to it from the failure to take proper care, and is equally liable if, instead of doing the work himself he procures another, whether agent, servant or otherwise, to do it for him.” See also Bower v. Peate (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 321Google Scholar, and McKendrick, E., “Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors—A Re-examination” (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 770–784.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

139. In Alcock v. Wraith, The Times 23 Sept. 1991Google Scholar, Neill LJ suggested that the “crucial question” in such cases is in fact whether the activity involved “some special risk or was it from its very nature likely to cause damage”.

140. Langley Fox Building Partnership (Pty) Ltd v. De Valence 1991 1 S.A. 1(A) per Goldstone AJA at 12.Google Scholar

141. Starck, Roland and Boyer, op cit., supra n.3, at paras.500ff.

142. Recueil Dalloz 1960 J. 609.Google ScholarSee also case note by Tunc in 1962 Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 647–650.Google Scholar

143. Civ.(2) 25 March 1998.

144. I.e., under Art. 1382 of the Code, discussed in pt IV(a) above.

145. See Faure, M., “Economic Aspects of Environmental Liability: an Introduction” (1996) European Review of Private Law 85–110 at p.93.Google Scholar