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The International Constitutional Order
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 January 2008
Extract
Constitutionalism is a deeply contested but indispensable symbolic and normative frame for thinking about the problems of viable and legitimate regulation of the complexily overlapping political communities of a post-Westphalian world.1
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References
1 Walker, Neil ‘Post-national Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in Weiler, Joseph HH and Wind, Marlene (eds) European Constitutionalism beyond the State (CUP Cambridge 2003) 53.Google Scholar
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3 Fassbender, Bardo ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 573.Google ScholarSee also Tomuschat, Christian ‘Obligations Arising for States without or against their Will’ (1993 IV) 235 Recueil des Cours de l'académie de droit international de la Haye 235;Google ScholarFranck, Thomas ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 85 American Journal of International Law 46 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 Fassbender (n 3) 536.
5 ibid 534.
6 See, eg Beutler, BengDas Staatsbild in den Länderverfassungen nach 1945 (Duncker and Humblot Berlin 1973);Google ScholarRiegler, Johannes JKonflikte zwischen Grundgesetz und Länderverfassungen (Würzburg University Würzburg 1996);Google ScholarMaddex, Robert LState Constitutons of the United States (Congressional Quarterly Washington 1998).Google ScholarSee also Weiler, Joseph HH ‘In Defence of the Statues Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg’ in Weiler, HH Joseph and Wind, Marlene (eds) European Constitutionalism Beyond The State (CUP Cambridge 2003) 9.Google Scholar
7 ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’, reprinted in (2004) 47 Official Journal of the European Union 2004/C 310/01.Google Scholar
8 Weiler (n 6) 9.
9 Maduro, Miguel P ‘Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as Good as it Gets?’ in Weiler, Joseph HH and Wind, Marlene (eds) European Constitutionalism Beyond The State (CUP Cambridge 2003) 82, 85.Google Scholar
10 The author uses the term post-national to refer to all legal orders on the international level. The term is used in a descriptive fashion to describe those legal orders that lie ‘beyond’ the State. It is broad enough to include a supra-national (regional) order with a high level of integration such as the European Union, as well as (universal) international orders with a lesser level of integration such as the United Nations. See also Weiler, Joseph HH and Wind, Marlene ‘Introduction’ in Weiler, Joseph HH and Wind, Marlene (eds) European Constitutionalism Beyond The State (CUP Cambridge 2003) 3. See also Walker (n 1) 34.Google Scholar
11 See also Walker (n 1) 34; Maduro (n 9) 84.
12 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Advisory Opinion ICJ Rep 1996 para 19.
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15 Tomuschat (n 3) 219.
16 ibid 236; Fassbender (n 3) 573.
17 Franck, Thomas ‘The Political and the Judicial Empires: Must there be a Conflict over Conflict-Resolution?’ in Najeeb, Al-Naumi and Richard, Meese (eds) International Legal Issues Arising under the United Nations Decade of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 1995) 627.Google Scholar
18 As is done by Fassbender (n 3) 529. For criticism of this view see Christian Walter ‘International Law in a Process of Constitutionalization’ paper delivered in Amsterdam on 10 July 2005 s II.
19 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 32.
20 Advisory Opinion 9 July 2004 para 155 ff available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
21 See Art 42 and Art 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility available in Crawford, JamesThe International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility (CUP Cambridge 2002).Google Scholar
22 ibid 257.
23 ibid 258.
24 18 May 1961 500 United Nations Treaty Series 95.
25 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran ICJ Rep 1980 3 ff; see also Crawford (n 21) 257–8.
26 Crawford (n 21) 277.
27 Dupuy, Pierre-Marie ‘L'unité de l'ordre juridique international’ (2002) 297 Recueil des Cours de l'académie de droit international 382, 384;Google Scholar Crawford (n 21) 277–8; International Law Institute The Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of Non-intervention in Internal Affairs of States, Resolution adopted during the Session of Santiago de Compostela 1989 Art 1 available at < http://www.idi-iil.org/>. See Human Rights Committee General Comment No 31 [80] Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 of 26 May 2004 para 2.
28 See Kritsiotis, Dino ‘Imagining the International Community’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 967 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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30 See Walter (Amsterdam Paper) (n 18) s II, who correctly points out that by regarding the UN Charter as ‘the international Constitution’, one glosses over the functional differentiation in the international legal order. At the same time, however, one should not underestimate the importance of the UN Charter as connector within the international constitutional order.
31 See Dupuy, Pierre-Marie ‘Some Reflections on Contemporary Interantional Law and the Appeal to Universal Values: A Response to Martte Koskenniemi’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 133.Google Scholar
32 The author does not deny that a variety of non-legal ethical norms could also serve as important yardsticks for post-national decision-making. However, the aim of the present contribution is to focus on those ethical norms that simultaneously amount to a legal yardstick for international decision-making.
33 See Nowak, ManfredIntroduction to the International Human Rights Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2004) 73 ff.Google Scholar
34 See extensively Wet, Erika de ‘The prohibition of torture as an international norm of Jus Cogens and its implications for national and customary law’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 97 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
35 See Johnstone, Ian ‘The US–UN Relations after Iraq: The End of the World (Order) as We Knot It?’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 824.Google Scholar
36 ibid.
37 See S/RES/827 of 25 May 199, para 1 ff; and S/RES/955 of 8 Nov 1994 para 1 ff. In S/RES/1315 of 14 Aug 2000 para 1 ff. The Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to negotiate with the Government of Sierra Leone the creation of a tribunal for the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law. The prosecution of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity in East-Timor was regulated by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTEAT) in UNTAET/REG/2000/11 of 6 Mar 2000.
38 See Human Rights Committee (n 27) para 18.
39 See Art 5 of ICC Statute available at <http://www.un.org/law/icc/>.
40 Reprinted in (1969) 8 International Legal Materials 679 ff. Art 53 reads as follows: ‘For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.’
41 For example, a treaty between States allowing for the transfer of detainees from one country to another in order to facilitate torture practices during interrogation would be null and void, as it would violate the prohibition of torture. See Kornicker, EvaIus Cogens und Umweltvölkerrecht (Helbing and Lichtenhahn Basel 1997) 105.Google Scholar
42 See also the Barcelona Traction decision (n 19) and its implications.
43 Dupuy, Pierre-Marie ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’ (1997) 1 Max Planck Yearbook of International Law 10–11, 31;Google Scholarsee also Frowein, Jochen A, ‘Ius Cogens’ (1995) 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 67.Google Scholar
44 Thürer, Daniel ‘Internationales “Rule of Law”—innerstaatliche Demokratie’ (1995) 5 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Internationales and Europäisches Recht 457;Google ScholarSee also Lorinser, BarbaraBindende Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates (Nomos Berlin 1996) 87. Cf Fassbender (n 3) 548, 554, 574; Tomuschat (n 3) 216.Google ScholarSee also Byers, Michael ‘Conceptualizing the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules’ (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 212.Google Scholar
45 Walter, Christian ‘Die Europaische Menschenrechtskonvention als Konstitutionalizierungsprozess’ (1999) 59 Zeitschrift fuer ausländischs öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 979–80.Google Scholar
46 ibid 980.
47 , Waite and , Kennedy Germany Judgment of 18 Feb 1999 RJD 393 (1999-I) 393.Google Scholar
48 See also Walter (Constitutionalization) (n 14) 198.
49 Walter (n 45) 981.
50 According to the normal conflict rule applying between parties later treaties prevail over earlier ones. See Vienna Convention (n 40) Art 30(3) and Art 30(4). It remains to be seen, however, whether the EctHR will develop a consistent line of jurisprudence in this regard. In relation to sovereign immunity the EctHR has thus far been more reluctant to emphasize the availability of alternative and adequate legal protection as a pre-condition for the recognition of immunity. See for example Al Adsani v The United Kingdom, Judgment, 21 Nov 2001, para 52 ff, available at <http:/cmiskp.echr.coe.int>. The EctHR regarded the recognition of Kuwait's immunity by the English courts in civil proceedings as a legitimate and proportionate restriction to article 6 ECHR—without considering whether any alternative and adequate standard of legal protection was accessible to the applicant. The EctHR took a similar approach in Fogarty v The United Kingdom, Judgment, 21 Nov 2001, para 32 ff, available at <http:/cmiskp.echr.coe.int>. In this instance the EctHR upheld the sovereign immunity of the United States of America in civil proceedings in the English courts. However, the issue of alternative and adequate legal protection did feature in McElhinney v Ireland, Judgment, 21 Nov 2001, para 39, available at <http:/cmiskp.echr.coe.int>. When upholding Ireland's recognition of the immunity of the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in civil proceedings in the Irish courts, the EctHR noted that the applicant could have brought an action in Northern Ireland against the United Kingdom secretary of State for Defence. The applicant thus had alternative access to the courts of a party to the ECHR.
51 See Waite, and Kennedy, (n 47) para 67. See also Loizidou v Turkey Judgment of 23 Mar 1995 Series A No 310 para 75, where the Court described the Convention as ‘a constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public)’.Google ScholarSee also Wet, Erika De and Nollkaemper, André ‘Review of Security Council Decisions by National Courts’ (2002) 45 Germany Yearbook of International Law 189 ff.Google Scholar
52 Barcelona Traction decision (n 19) 32.
53 ibidFrowein, Jochen A ‘Collective Enforcement of International Obligations’ (1987) 47 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 71;CrossRefGoogle ScholarZemanek, Karl, ‘New Trends in the Enforcement of erga omnes Obligations’ (2000) 4 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 6–7.Google Scholar
54 Frowein, Jochen A ‘Obligations Erga Omnes’ (1997) Encyclopedia of International Law Volume III 757.Google Scholar
55 Dupuy (L'unité de l'ordre) (n 27) 385.
56 Those rights in the ICCPR and ICESCR which have not yet acquired customary status would nonetheless have erga omnes partes effect towards other States parties. Given the fact that the ICCPR now counts 154 ratifications and 67 signatories and the ICESCR 151 ratifications and 66 signatories, the erga omnes partes effect of the rights in these Covenants effectively covers two-thirds of the State members of the international community. See Dupuy (L'unité de l'ordre) (n 27) 382 n 762; Human Rights Committee (n 27) para 2. See also Seiderman, IanHierarchy in International Law (Intersentia Antwerp 2001) 145.Google Scholar
57 See above (n 27).
58 For a recent overview of international jurisprudence concerning the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of genocide and torture, see Dupuy (L'unité de l'ordre) (n 27) 295–9. The relationship between jus cogens and erga omnes obligations has been debated extensively in literature. These inter alia include Byers (n 44) 112 ff; Bassiouni, Cherif ‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes’ (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 63 ff;CrossRefGoogle ScholarHoogh, André De ‘The Relationship between Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: Peremptory Norms in Perspective’ (1991) 42 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches und Völkerrecht 183 ff;Google ScholarAnnacker, Claudia ‘The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law’ (1994) 46 Austrian Journal of Public International Law 131 ff.Google Scholar
59 Cottier, Michael ‘Die Anwendbarkeit von völkerrechtlichen Normen im innerstaatlichen Bereich als Ausprägung der Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts’ (1999) 9 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Internationales und Europaïsches Recht 432 ff.Google Scholar
60 ibid.
61 See Redgwell, Catherine ‘International Environmental Law’ in Evans, Malcom DInternational Law (OUP Oxford 2003) 664;Google ScholarBeyerlin, UlrichUmweltvölkerrecht (Beck Munich 2000) 18.Google Scholar The nature of sustainable development remains a controversial issue. For support of its customary erga omnes nature, see separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry Case concerning Gabíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), Judgment 25 Sept 1997 available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>; see also Sands, PhilippePrinciples of International Environmental Law (CUP Cambridge 2003) 254.CrossRefGoogle Scholar However, several authors not only question the customary status of sustainable development, but whether it possesses the normative clarity to become a customary rule. Due to its normative uncertainty, they do not regard it as formulating a legal obligation for states. It would rather constitute a goal or value which can influence the development or interpretation of legal norms. See Birnie, Patricia and Boyle, Alan, International Law and the Environment (OUP Oxford 2002) 656.Google Scholar
62 See below (text leading up to) (n 96).
63 See in particular Pauwelyn, Joos ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 907–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
64 Petersmann, Ernst-Ullrich ‘Time for a United Nations “Global Compact” for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 636 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholarid ‘The WTO Constitution and Human Rights’ (2000) 3 Journal of International Economic Law 19;CrossRefGoogle ScholarCfvon Bogdandy, Armin ‘Law and Politics in the WTO—Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship’ (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 653–6;Google ScholarStein, Eric ‘International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 502.CrossRefGoogle ScholarCottier, Thomas and Hertig, Maya ‘The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 273–4.Google Scholar
65 See, eg Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE of 3 October 1991 Art II para 17.2 reprinted in (1991) 30 International Legal Materials 1670; EC Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union reprinted in (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 1486–7.
66 Most recently see UN Secretary-General In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All in A/59/2005 of 21 Mar 2005 para 148 ff; ibidImplementation of the United Nations Millenium Declaration in A/57/270 of 31 July 2002 para 86; for earlier statements see UN Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace in A/47/277–S/24111 of 17 June 1992 paras 81–2.
67 S/RES/1031 of 15 Dec 1995 para 6 (Bosnia-Herzegovina); S/RES/1244 of 10 June 1994 para 10 (Kosovo); S/1272 of 25 Oct 1999 para 8 (East-Timor).
68 SC/RES/1483 of 22 May 2003, para 4 and para 8 and S/RES/1511 of 16 Oct 2003 (Iraq).
69 In addition, significant unclarity also still exists in relation to the core content of democracy, as will be illustrated below in s 5.
70 See also Durban Communiqué of the Commonwealth Head of Government Meeting held in Durban, South Africa from 12–15 November 1999 para 18 available at <http://www.thecommonwealth.org/>. See also Franck (n 3).
71 Tomuschat (n 3) 217–18.
72 ibid. The rules on government in the United Kingdom constitute the prime example of a constitution whose relevant components cannot be found in a single document.
73 See also Fischer-Lescano, Andreas ‘Die Emergenz der Globalverfassung’ (2003) 63 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentlichse Recht und Völkerrecht 734 ff.Google Scholar
74 Lorinser (44) 97.
75 ibid 86.
76 See also Fassbender (n 3) 574 ff; also conceded by Lorinser (44) 98. CfGading, Der Schutz grundlegender Menschenrechte durch militärische Massnahmen des Sicherheitsrates—das Ende staatlicher Souveränität? (Nomos Baden-Baden 1996) 55, 57.Google Scholar
77 See extensively Wet, Erika deThe Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart Publishing Oxford 2004) 150 ff.Google Scholar
78 See Prosecutor v Tadic Decision of the Defence Motion for interlocutory Appeal and Jurisdiction Case No IT-94-1-AR72 of 2 October 1995 Appeals Chamber para 27 ff available at <http://www.un.org/icty>.
79 Ever since its first embargo against Southern Rhodesia in S/RES/217 of 20 Nov 1965, one of the underlying aims of the Security Council measures were to address the human rights situation in the territory affected.
80 GA/RES/377(V) of 3 Nov 1950. Its essential feature was an assertion of a right on the part of the General Assembly to act to maintain international peace and security when the Security Council, because of the veto, was unable to do so. See also Seyersted, FinnUnited Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War (Sijthoff Leiden 1966) 42.Google Scholar
81 See Kälin, Walter ‘Humanitäre Intervention: Legitimation durch Verfahren? Zehn Thesen zur Kosovo-Krise’ (2000) 10 Schweizerische Zeitshcrift für Internationales und Europäisches Recht 171;Google ScholarÖsterdahl, Inge ‘The Continued Relevance of Collective Security Under the UN: The Security Council, Regional Organisations and the General Assembly’ (1999) 10 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 133;Google ScholarWhite, Nigel ‘The Legality of Bombing in the Name of Humanity’ (2000) 5 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2000) 10–11.Google Scholar
82 In reality the innovative actions of the General Assembly in this regard has remained very modest. It has, for example, never ventured into the areas of peace-enforcement or even explicit criticism of Security Council inaction.
83 See extensively De Wet (n 77) chs 1 and 2.
84 See in particular Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (n 20) para 36 ff. This advisory opinion recently affirmed that the General Assembly has competence to request an opinion relating to any question within the scope of the Charter. See also Franck (n 3) 631. For a comprehensive analysis of the powers of the General Assembly in terms of Art 96(1) of the Charter, see De Wet (n 77) 42 ff.
85 The only advisory opinion up to date that resulted in review of the legality of a Security Council resolution resulted from the latter's own (and thus far only) request for an advisory opinion, relating to the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa and Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) ICJ Rep 1971 12 ff.
86 Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States (Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Rep 115 ff. See extensively De Wet (n 77) 9 ff.
87 The ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively, have effectively claimed such a competence. See Tadic decision (n 78); The Prosecutor v Kanyabashi Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction Case No ICTR-96-15-T of 18 June 1997 Trial Chamber available at <http://www.ictr.org>.
88 Doehring, Karl ‘Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and theirLegal Consequences’ (1997) 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 91;Google ScholarBowett, Derek ‘The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement Procedures’ (1994) 5 European Journal of International Law 98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
89 See De Wet (n 77) 58 ff.
90 Walter (n 45) 969; Fischer-Lescano (n 73) 739–40.
91 Human Rights Committee (n 38).
92 The text of this Convention is available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>.
93 eg, whereas obligations concerning the protection and preservation of living resources and the marine environment would be of a collective interest nature, obligations concerning innocent passage would constitute bundles of bilateral obligations.
94 See Beyerlin (n 61) 113.
95 The role of ITLOS in this regard could also be strengthened through its enforcement of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 4 December 1995, as foreseen in Art 30 of this Agreement. Text available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>. The objective of this Agreement (as stated in Art 2) is to ensure the ‘long-term conservation and sustainable use’ of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
96 See Cottier (49) 430.
97 See also Art I-III (4) of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (n 7), which commits the EU to ‘strict observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’.
98 South West Africa Second Phase (Judgment) [1966] ICJ Rep para 88.
99 South West Africa case (n 98) para 44. The Court was unwilling to assume that a State may have a legal interest in vindicating a principle of international law, even though it has not suffered material damages—unless this was explicitly provided for in an international text or instrument.
100 See also Crawford (n 21) 279; Pellet, Alain ‘The Draft Articles of the International Law Commission on the Respssonsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Requiem for States' Crime?’ (2001) 32 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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103 Judgment of 3 Sept 2001 available through <http://www.isdc.ch>.
104 See De Wet and Nollkaemper (n 51).
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110 Stein (64) 491.
111 Alvarez (n 101) 410; Allott, Philip ‘The Emerging International Aristorcracy’ (2003) 35 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 309;See generally Maduro (n 9) 83 ff;Google ScholarWeiler, Joseph HH ‘Does Europe need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 219 ff;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMény, Yves ‘The People, the Elites and the Populist Challenge’ European University Institute Jean Monnet Chair Paper RSC 98/47; id ‘De la démocratie en Europe’ (2003) 41 Journal of Common Market Studies 1 ff;Google ScholarCurtin, Deirdre ‘Civil Society and the European Union: Opening Spaces for Deliberative Democracy’ in Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Kluwer Law International The Hague 1999) 185 ff;Google Scholarvon Bogdandy, Armin ‘Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization and International Law’ 2005 15 European Journal of International Law 885 ff;CrossRefGoogle ScholarClosa, Carlos ‘Constitution and Deomcracy in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ (2005) 11 European Public Law 145 ff.Google Scholar
112 Allott (n 111) 309. See also von Bogdandy, Armin ‘Demokratie, Globalisierung, Zukunft des Völkerrechts—eine Bestandsaufnahme’ (2003) 63 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 858–9.Google Scholar
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115 Maduro (n 9) 83.
116 Alvarez (n 101) 411.
117 ibid 410–11; see also Bodansky (n 114) 617 ff.
118 See also Maduro (n 9) 85.
119 Maduro (n 9). 85.
120 But see Bodansky (n 114) 600 who denies the existence of a global ‘demos’. Cf Cottier and Hertig (n 64) 287 ff.
121 Bodansky (n 114) 613. He, inter alia, questions whether the principle of sovereign equality of States could serve as a justification for the translation of the concept of ‘one person one vote’ into ‘one State one vote’, as it would grant a disproportionate influence to small States representing only a fraction of the world's population.
122 Cottier and Hertig (n 64) 309–10; see also Bodansky (n 114) 617 ff.
123 Alvarez (n 101) 411.
124 See Kumm (n 106) 926.
125 Hathaway, James ‘America, Defender of Democratic Legitimacy?’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
126 ibid 125
127 See Koskenniemi, Martti ‘International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law (2005) 115, 117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
128 See Dupuy (Some Reflections) (n 31) 135, 136. See also von Bogdandy, Armin ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: A Proposal from Germany’ (2005) Harvard International Law Journal (forthcoming) s 6.Google Scholar
129 BVerfGE 89, 155 (12 Oct 1993); and BVerfGE 73, 339 (22 Oct 1996) available at <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/>.
130 See also Peters (n 13) s 4.
131 See ‘Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements’ available at <http://www.iccnow.org/ documents/USandICC/BIAs.html>.
132 SC/RES/1422 of 12 July 2002 and SC/RES/1487 of 12 June 2003 (expired on 30 June 2004).
133 See ‘American Service Members' Protection of 2002’, entered into force on 2 Aug 2002 ss 2002 and 2004. Reprinted in (2002) 27 Human Rights Law Journal 275; see also Peters (n 13) s 4.
134 Johnstone (n 35) 826. He describes, inter alia, the active role the United States has played during the 1990s in creating the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights and in sponsoring the resolution of the Commission of Human Rights on the right to democracy.
135 BverfG, 2 BvR 1481/04 2004 para 36, available at <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/>.
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