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HUMANITARIAN ACCESS THROUGH AGENCY LAW IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 April 2020

David Matyas
David Matyas*
Affiliation:
Former aid worker and development practitioner, [email protected].
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Abstract

In many conflicts, aid organisations have to navigate the international humanitarian law requirement that parties to the conflict must consent to assistance. In non-international armed conflicts this often frustrates efforts to provide relief, as States refuse to grant consent in order to uphold their claims to sovereignty. Looking at the Syrian Civil War, this article suggests that the law of agency can offer a fresh perspective on the challenges posed by the requirement of consent to humanitarian assistance. It suggests that agency law can provide a legal explanation of seemingly political decisions and a de lege ferenda justification for assistance in instances where consent is either absent or provided by a non-State armed group.

Keywords

public international lawagencyconsentinternational humanitarian lawhumanitarian accessnon-governmental organisationnon-international armed conflictnon-State armed groupsovereigntySyria
Type
Shorter Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 69 , Issue 2 , April 2020 , pp. 451 - 475
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law

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Footnotes

This article was written during studies at McGill University Faculty of Law. The author is grateful for the generous comments of Prof. René Provost and Dr. Barzan Barzani, and to Prof. Evan Fox-Decent for his helpful seminars. The views expressed herein are those of the author in his personal capacity.

References

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55 The Battle of Solferino in 1859, between the Franco-Sardinian and Austrian armies, led to the founding of the Red Cross and efforts, amongst others, to normalise the care of wounded enemy and friendly soldiers.

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62 Akande and Gillard (n 14) 21.

63 ibid.

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69 Akande and Gillard (n 14) 24.

70 Akande and Gillard discuss the lack of clarity concerning the precise legal implications for relief actors where consent is arbitrarily withheld in: D Akande and EC Gillard, ‘Arbitrary Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Armed Conflict’ UNOCHA (21 August 2014) 21–7. In certain circumstances, arbitrarily withheld consent may make it justifiable for a relief actor to violate a State's sovereignty and the integrity of their territory (27). It is unclear that arbitrarily withheld consent establishes any sort of ‘constructive’ consent where consent is deemed to have been given.

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111 See for instance Okimoto (n 53) 140–1.

112 Gal (n 109) 37.

113 N Bhuta, ‘The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation’ (2005) 16(4) EJIL 726; the analogous paradox is that raised in Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia App No 48787/99 ECHR (8 July 2004), and M Milanović and T Papić, ‘The Applicability of the ECHR in Contested Territories’ (2018) 67(4) ICLQ 779, where a territorial State may have sovereign human rights obligations over a territory no longer under its effective control.

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116 ibid.

117 ibid.

118 Ryngaert (n 77) 18.