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Competition law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2012

Robert Lane
Robert Lane*
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Edinburgh, [email protected].
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Extract

The period under review (January 2010 – June 2012) has been a time of consolidation (or exhaustion) for the Union generally, as the Lisbon changes are allowed to bed in. The competition sphere is no exception. There has been limited initiative, certainly nothing ambitious to come out of the Commission over the period. At the same time a new Commission took up office—three months late, and by a little-remarked constitutional sleight of hand1—in 2010, and with it came a new Commissioner for Competition (Mr Almunia) and with him a new Director-General of DG Competition (Mr Italianer—Dutch notwithstanding the name), which event sometimes, but not always, marks a reorientation of Union competition policy. Both are economists which, again, may or may not influence the direction of policy. At the same time the Union has been buffeted by a financial crisis not wholly of its own making in which the competition rules must have a significant role to play.

Type
Current Developments: European Union Law
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 61 , Issue 4 , October 2012 , pp. 991 - 1005
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2012

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References

1 The Union was bound by primary (Treaty) law to appoint a new Commission by 31 October 2009 (2003 Act of Accession, art 45(2)(b)). But political events in flux owing to the last minute flurry of Lisbon ratifications it failed to do so, the existing Commission simply staying in office, by grace, it claimed, of a principle of continuity of public service, competent to ‘deal with current business’ (expédier des affaires courantes). The (fortuitous?) delay allowed the new Commission to be appointed (in February 2010) in accordance with the new (Lisbon) procedure prescribed for the 2009–14 term of office and not by the immediately previous scheme which would have required cutting the number of Commissioners (Protocol [annexed to the pre-Lisbon TEU, the EC and Euratom Treaties] on the Enlargement of the European Union, art 4(2)–(3)) contrary to promises made—without Treaty authority—by the heads of state and government (Brussels European Council, 11/12 December 2008, Presidency Conclusions, Bulletin EU 12-2008, p 8, para I.4.2) to the Irish in order to coax them into voting ‘yes’ in the second Lisbon referendum.

2 Ecofin Council of 7 October 2008, Conclusions, Council Doc 13930/08.

3 Memo/08/757.

4 Decision 84/380 (Synthetic Fibres) OJ 1984 L207/17; Decision 94/296 (Stichting Baaksten) OJ 1994 L131/15.

5 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society and anor [2008] ECR I-8637.

6 See the opinion of A-G Trstenjak who suggests (at para 86) that production levies limited in time (to one year) ‘may possibly be taken into account under Article [101](3)’.

7 Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L1/1.

8 The Supreme Court accepted the Court of Justice finding that the agreement was one which distorted competition by object but remitted the case back to the High Court to hear argument on whether art 101(3) was joined: Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society and anor [2009] IESC 72, [2010] 1 IR 767. The BIDS eventually withdrew its claim and the High Court entered judgment for the Competition Authority in January 2011.

9 See the Commission submission to the OECD in the latter's Global Forum on Competition: Crisis Cartels, DAF/COMP/GF(2011)11, pp 112-120.

10 Case COMP/39.258, decision of 9 November 2010; under review as Cases T-36 etc/11 Japanese Air Lines and ors v Commission, pending.

11 Case COMP/39.309, decision of 8 December 2010; under review as Cases T-91 etc/11 Chimei InnoLux Corp and ors v Commission, pending.

12 Case COMP/39.092, decision of 23 June 2010; under review as Cases T-362 etc/10 Duravit and ors v Commission, pending.

13 Cases COMP/39.740 (Foundem/Google), COMP/39.768 (Ciao/Google) and COMP/39.775 (1plusV/Google); investigation initiated in November 2010.

14 See Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ 2006 C210/2, point 35. Case COMP/38.866 (Animal feed phosphates cartel), OJ 2011 C111/19 (summary publication).

15 Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht Conference, Brussels, 14 March 2012, Recent Developments regarding the Commission's cartel enforcement, p 3.

16 Regulation 139/2004 OJ 2004 L24/1.

17 Case COMP/M.4439 (Ryanair/Aer Lingus), OJ 2008 C47/9 (summary publication). A subsequent petition by Aer Lingus inviting the Commission to require Ryanair, under art 8(4) of Regulation 139/2004, to divest its existing control of Aer Lingus (some 30 per cent of shares) was rejected by the Commission (Decision C(2007) 4600 of 11 October 2007, unpublished), the refusal upheld by the General Court in Case T-411/07 Aer Lingus v Commission [2010] ECR II-3691.

18 Case COMP/M.5830, decision of 26 January 2011, not yet published.

19 Case COMP/M.5747, decision of 14 July 2010, not yet published.

20 Case COMP/M.6447, decision of 30 March 2012, not yet published.

21 For the (extensive) commitments see pp 164–95.

22 Case COMP/M.6166, decision of 1 February 2012, not yet published.

23 Of 147 mergers cleared following a phase 2 investigation (that is, where a proposed merger ‘raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market’; Regulation 139/2004, art 6(1)(c)) to June 2012, 96 required commitments.

24 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung vom 28. März 2012, Achtes Gesetz zur Änderung des GWB (8. GWB-Novelle); see the proposed § 36 I GWB.

25 Stellungnahme des Bundeskartellamts zum Regierungsentwurf zur 8. GWB-Novelle vom 22. Juni 2012.

26 Respectively, Competition Act, 2002, s 22(3); Enterprise Act 2002, ss 35, 36. Previously the tests had been the far woollier contrary to the common good or against the public interest.

27 Lei n.o 19/2012 de 8 de maio 2012 aprova o novo regime jurídico da concorrência, Diário da República, 1.a série—N.o 89—8 de maio de 2012; in force 7 July 2012.

28 See Communication from the Commission—The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ 2008 C270/8, para 9.

29 OJ 2008 C270/8.

30 OJ 2009 C10/2.

31 OJ 2009 C72/1.

32 OJ 2009 C195/9.

33 OJ 2009 C83/1.

34 OJ 2011 C6/5. See also the Commission Staff Paper, The Effects of temporary State aid rules adopted in the context of the financial and economic crisis, SEC(2011) 1126 final.

35 OJ 2011 C356/7.

36 COM(2012) 209 final.

37 Regulation 800/2008 OJ 2008 L214/3.

38 Decision 2005/842 OJ 2005 L312/67. The decision was more of the nature of a block exemption (see immediately below) and so arguably improperly adopted under art 106(3).

39 Decision 2012/21 OJ 2012 L7/3 on the application of Article 106(2) of the TFEU to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of SGEIs; also Communication on the application of European Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of SGEIs, OJ 2012 C8/4.

40 Decision 2012/21, ibid., arts 2, 3.

41 Decision 1/2003, arts 2(1)(a), 3.

42 European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation, OJ 2012 C8/15.

43 Regulation 360/2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest, OJ 2012 L114/8.

44 Art 23(5); confirmed by the Court of Justice in Case 45/69 Boehringer Mannheim v Commission [1970] ECR 769.

45 See eg Forrester, I., ‘A Challenge for Europe's Judges: The Review of Fines in Competition Cases’ (2011) 36 EL Rev 185Google Scholar.

46 Cases C-628/10 & 14/11P Alliance One International and ors v Commission, pending, at para 95 of her opinion.

47 Case C-97/08P Akzo Nobel and ors v Commission [2009] ECR I-8237, at para 39 of her opinion (‘es sich um einen dem Strafrecht zumindest verwandten Bereich handelt’).

48 Case C-272/09P KME Germany and ors v Commission, judgment of 8 December 2011, not yet reported, at paras 46 and 51 of her opinion.

49 At para 51 of her opinion.

50 TEU, art 6(2).

51 Janosevic v Sweden (2004) 38 EHRR 22, at para 81; expressly recognized by the General Court in Case T-138/07 Schindler Holding Ltd and ors v Commission, judgment of 13 July 2011, not yet reported, at paras 56, 107.

52 See the robust language of the General Court in Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission (Kadi III) [2010] ECR II-5177.

53 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, at paras 87–88; the approach reconfirmed in Case T-301/04 Clearstream Banking & Clearstream International v Commission [2009] ECR II-3155, at paras 93–95.

54 Case C-272/09P KME Germany, fn 48 above; Case C-389/10P KME Germany and ors v Commission, judgment of 8 December 2011, not yet reported.

55 Case C-386/10P Chalkor Epexergasias Metallon v Commission, judgment of 8 December 2011, not yet reported.

56 Menarini Diagnostics v Italy (Application no 43509/08), judgment of 27 September 2011, not yet reported. Cf the earlier Société Stenuit v France (1992) 14 EHRR 509; Dubus v France (Application No 5242/04), judgment of 11 June 2009, not yet reported.

57 Case T-56/09 Saint-Gobain Glass and ors v Commission and Case T-286/09 Intel v Commission, both pending.

58 Case COMP/39.326 (E.ON Energie), decision of 30 January 2008, unpublished, upheld in Case T-141/08 E.ON Energie v Commission, judgment of 15 December 2010, not yet reported.

59 Case C-89/11P E.ON Energie v Commission, pending, at paras 116–120 of his opinion (delivered 21 June 2012).

60 Regulation 622/2008 OJ 2008 L171/3.

61 Case COMP/38.511 (DRAMS cartel), OJ 2011 C180/15 (summary publication).

62 Case COMP/39.611 (Water management products cartel), decision of 27 June 2012.

63 Case COMP/38.866 (Animal feed phosphates cartel), OJ 2011 C111/19 (summary publication).

64 Regulation 267/2010 OJ 2010 L83/1. See also Communication from the Commission on the application of Article 101(3) of the TFEU to the insurance sector, OJ 2010 C82/2.

65 Regulation 461/2010 OJ 2010 L129/52. Also Supplementary guidelines on vertical restraints in the sale, repair and distribution for motor vehicles, OJ 2010 C135/8.

66 Regulation 1217/2010 OJ 2010 L335/36 and Regulation 1218/2010 OJ 2010 L335/43 respectively. Also Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101(3) of the TFEU to horizontal cooperation agreements, OJ 2010 C11/1 (applicable to both).

67 Regulation 330/2010 OJ 2010 L102/1. Also the (very useful) Guidelines on vertical restraints, OJ 2010 C130/1.

68 Regulation 330/2010, art 3(1).

69 Regulation 2790/1999 OJ 1999 L336/21, art 3(1).

70 Art 2(4)(a).

71 See the Guidelines on vertical restraints, paras 51–55.

72 Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique v Président de l'Autorité de la concurrence and anor, judgment of 13 October 2011, not yet reported.

73 Regulation 772/2004 OJ 2004 L123/11.

74 Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672 final.

75 Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 final.

76 Proposal for a Council Directive on rules governing actions for damages for infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, unpublished.

77 See discussion in [2010] 59 ICLQ 489.

78 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt, judgment of 14 June 2011, not yet reported.

79 Bundeskartellamt, Entscheidung vom 21. Januar 2008 (Dekorpapier); Pressemeldung vom 5. Februar 2008.

80 Amtsgericht Bonn, 18. Januar 2012 (Pfleiderer II), EuZW 2012, 193.

81 Case COMP/38.889 OJ 2008 C5/7 (summary publication).

82 National Grid Electricity Transmission plc v ABB Ltd and ors [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch), [2012] All ER (D) 92.

83 Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie and ors, pending.

84 1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról (as amended by 2009. évi XIV. törvény), 88/D. §.

85 Case 155/79 AM&S Europe v Commission [1982] ECR 1575.

86 Case C-550/07P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and anor v Commission [2010] ECR I-8301, per A-G Kokott at para 1 of her opinion (‘abhängig beschäftigter Syndikusanwalt’).

87 Case C-550/07P Akzo Nobel Chemicals, ibid.

88 At para 45.

89 Case T-18/10R Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament & Council [2010] ECR II-75*.

90 See TEU, art 1, 2nd para; TFEU, art 15.

91 Case C-404/10P Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob, judgment of 28 June 2012, not yet reported.

92 Case C-477/10P Commission v Agrofert Holdings, judgment of 28 June 2012, not yet reported.

93 Case C-506/08P Sweden v MyTravel & Commission, judgment of 21 July 2011, not yet reported.

94 Case T-59/09 Germany v Commission, judgment of 14 February 2012, not yet reported.

95 Case T-437/08 CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims (CDC Hydrogene Peroxide) v Commission, judgment of 15 December 2011, not yet reported.

96 See Commission Staff Working Document, Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC(2011) 173 final.

97 Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1284, [2011] Ch 345.

98 BGH, 28. Juni 2011 (SD-Papier-Kartell), WuW 2012, 57.

99 1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról (as amended by 2009. évi XIV. törvény), 88/C. §.

100 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation on Options for Reform, April 2012, paras 4.40–4.43.

101 Gerechtshof te Amsterdam, kenmerk 06/00252, uitspraak van 11 maart 2010, which followed loyally the submissions made by the Commission to it under art 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003.

102 Case T-138/07 Schindler Holding Ltd and ors v Commission, Cases T-141 etc/07 General Technic-Otis and ors v Commission, Case T-144 etc/07 ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs and ors v Commission and Case T-151/07 Kone and ors v Commission, judgments of 13 July 2011, not yet reported. The Court reduced the fines within the ThyssenKrupp Group by between 1 and 40 per cent for the Commission misapplying an increase in fine for recidivism to members of the group.

103 Cases C-493, 494, 501, 504, 505, 506, 510, 516 and 519/11P, pending.

104 The general rule is that the Commission acts for the Community/Union in legal proceedings in which the latter's interests are in issue except in matters relating to the operation of an institution, in which case, owing to a principle of administrative and operational autonomy, the institution acts for itself (TFEU, art 335 (ex art 282 EC)). The latter proviso was added by Lisbon, prior to which authority was required to be delegated by the Commission, as to which see Case C-137/10 European Communities v Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, judgment of 5 May 2011, not yet reported.

Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L1/1, Art. 23(1)(e).

105 Regulation 1/2003, art 28(1). An exception is made for (‘without prejudice to’) the transmission from the Commission of information in its possession relevant to matters before a requesting national court (art 15) but this does not solve the problem of the Commission's direct interest in the case.

106 Eg, Kress v France (Application no 39594/98), judgment of 7 June 2001, 2001-VI.

107 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-3816, esp at para 66; Case C-404/07 Katz v Sós [2008] ECR I-7607.

108 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap (optredend via de Europese Commissie) v Otis and ors, pending.

109 Case COMP/37.990 (Intel), OJ 2009 C227/13 (summary publication), under review as Case T-286/09 Intel v Commission, pending.

110 Case 1935/2008/FOR, decision of 14 July 2009.

111 DPP v Manning, judgment of the Central Criminal Court of 9 February 2007, unreported.

112 See inter alia DPP v Durrigan & Doran, guilty pleas in circuit criminal court in May and October 2008; DPP v Duffy [2009] IEHC 208.

113 DPP v Hegarty, judgment of Galway Circuit Court of 2 May 2012, not yet reported.

114 R v Whittle, Allison & Brammar [2008] EWCA 2560, [2008] All ER (D) 133; discussed in previous comment at (2010) 59 ICLQ 489.

115 OFT, decision of 1 August 2007 (BA/Virgin Atlantic), not yet published.

116 See United States v British Airways, plea agreement in the District Court, District of Columbia of 23 August 2007.

117 Case COMP/39.258, decision of 9 November 2010; under review as Cases T-36 etc/11 Japanese Air Lines and ors v Commission, pending.

118 United States of America v Packer, plea agreement in the District Court for the District of Columbia of 7 November 2008.

119 IB v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, [2009] All ER (D) 90, at para 27. See also R v George and ors [2010] EWCA 1148, determining that the offence did not require mutual dishonesty.

120 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Growth, Competition and the Competition Regime, March 2012, paras 7.7 – 7.11.

121 OFT, decision of 15 April 2010 (Tobacco), not yet published.

122 Imperial Tobacco Group and ors v OFT [2011] CAT 41, judgment of 12 December 2011, not yet reported.

123 Decision 2007/53 (Microsoft) OJ 2007 L32/23 (summary publication).

124 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601.

125 Decision 2007/53, art 5.

126 Case COMP/37.792 (Microsoft), decision of 10 November 2005, unpublished.

127 Case COMP/37.792 (Microsoft), decision of 12 July 2006, unpublished.

128 Case COMP/37.792 (Microsoft), decision of 27 February 2008, OJ 2009 C166/20 (summary publication).

129 Case T-167/08 Microsoft v Commission, judgment of 27 June 2012, not yet reported.

130 Case T-201/04R Microsoft v Commission [2004] ECR II-4463.

131 Regulation 1/2003, art 24(1).

132 Case T-167/08 Microsoft, at para 203.

133 Regulation 17/62 JO 1962, p 204, art 16(1).

134 Case T-167/08 Microsoft, at para 91.