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Anti-Competitive Practices by Private Undertakings in Ancom and Mercosur: An Analysis from the Perspective of EC Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Extract

The 1990s have been characterised by the globalisation of markets and the internationalisation of trade. Countries seem to be more interested than ever in creating new trading blocs and strengthening existing ones. As perhaps the most developed integration group in the world, the European Union has been used by framers of many other integration processes as a model on which to design their own institutional and legal structures.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1998

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References

1. Established through the Treaty of Rome, signed 25 Mar. 1957; hereafter EC Treaty.

2. Also referred to as Andean Pact, Andean Group, ANCOM and GRAN. Hereafter Ancom.

3. From its Spanish wording “Mercado Común del Sur”.

4. Single European Act (SEA), signed by the EC heads of government on 17 and 28 Feb 1986, on institutional reform and Treaty on European Union (TEU) signed in Maastricht on 7 Feb. 1992.

5. For a detailed history of Ancom see Morawetz, D., The Andean Croup: A Case Study in Economic Integration Among Developing Countries (1974).Google Scholar

6. Cartagena Agreement or Treaty of Andean Subregional Integration (hereafter Cartagena Agreement), originally signed on 28 May 1969 and codified by Decision 236 of the Cartagena Agreement Commission on 26 May 1979 in Bogotá (Colombia).

7. Chile was a member originally but withdrew in 1976.

8. See e.g. Zelada, C. A. (1993) 196:18 INT AL 56Google Scholar; Vacchino, J. M. (1992) 185:17 INT AL 3Google Scholar; Kisic, D. W. (1992) 186:17 INT AL 13Google Scholar; Ferris, E. (1991) 32 Virginia J. Int L. 271Google Scholar; Avery (1972) 11 J. Common Market Studies 85Google Scholar; Ch. Barros, R. (1993) 196:18 INT AL 30.Google Scholar

9. Chile is an associate member.

10. The history of Mercosur can be traced back to the Iguazú Act of 1985 where Argentina developed the idea of a “preferential association” with Brazil. In 1986 the Declaration of Buenos Aires was signed for Argentinean-Brazilian integration and a broader treaty was signed on 6 July 1990. For a detailed explanation of the history of the creation of Mercosur See Hains-Ferrari, M.. “Mercosur A New Model of Latin American Economic Integration?” (1993) 25 Case W. Res. J.I.L. 413.Google Scholar

11. Providing that “before 31 Dec 1994, Member States will determine the definite institutional structure and decision-making system of Mercosur”.

12. The Economist. 12 10. 1996, p.9.Google Scholar

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17. E.g. the Agreement includes provisions establishing a preferential treatment for the less developed economies of the group, Bolivia and Ecuador.

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22. For an analysis of Decision 230 see Cárdenas, op. cit. supra n.19.

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26. The original Art. in Spanish uses the word “empresa” which is usually identified as meaning “company or enterprise”. However, Spanish-English dictionaries define the word “empresa” as “enterprise, undertaking, company, firm”. Due to the similarities in the wording of Art 3 and Art.85 ECI will use the word “undertaking” as the translation of “empresa”.

27. Even though the literal translation of the Art. from Portuguese would be “and”, the word “or” has been used to preserve the intended meaning of the Art.

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36. Case C–89/85. Ahlstrom Oy v. Commission [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 407, para.64.Google Scholar

37. This was held in Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] E.C.R. 235, para.249.Google Scholar

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43. See Maschinenbau Ulm. supra n 37; VdS, supra n.35.

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54. Op. cit. supra n.51, at pp.4850.Google Scholar

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