Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T04:52:42.919Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Moral Reasoning as Perception: A Reading of Carol Gilligan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Abstract

Gilligan's understanding of moral reasoning as a kind of perception has its roots in the conception of moral experience espoused by Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch. A clear understanding of that conception, however, reveals grave difficulties with Gilligan's descriptions of the care perspective and justice perspective. In particular, we can see that the two perspectives are not mutually exclusive once we recognize that attention does not require attachment and that impartiality does not require detachment.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1996 by Hypatia, Inc.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bradley, F. H. 1927. Ethical studies. 2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
de Sousa, Ronald. 1980. Self‐deceptive emotions. In Explaining emotions, ed. Oksenberg Rorty, Amélie. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Freud, Sigmund. [1901] 1961. The psychopathology of everyday life. In The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud. Ed. Strachey, James. Vol. 6. London: Hogarth Press.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Carol. 1987. Moral orientation and moral development. In Women and moral theory, ed. Kittay, Eva Feder and Meyers, Diana T.Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Carol. 1988. Exit‐voice dilemmas in adolescent development. In Mapping the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to psychological theory and education, ed. Gilligan, Carol, Victoria Ward, Janie, and McLean Taylor, Jill, with Bardige, Betty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Carol and Attanucci, Jane. 1988. Two moral orientations. In Mapping the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to psychological theory and education, ed. Gilligan, Carol, Victoria Ward, Janie, and McLean Taylor, Jill, with Bardige, Betty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Carol and Wiggins, Grant. 1987. The origins of morality in early childhood relationships. In The emergence of morality in young children, ed. Kagan, Jerome and Lamb, Sharon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Glaspell, Susan. 1927. A jury of her peers. London: E. Benn.Google Scholar
Herman, Barbara. 1984. Rules, motives, and helping actions. Philosophical Studies 45 (4): 369–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1981. The philosophy of moral development: Essays on moral development. Vol. 1. San Francisco: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Murdoch, Iris. 1956. Vision and choice in morality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 30 (Suppl. Vol.): 3258.Google Scholar
Murdoch, Iris. 1970. The sovereignty of good. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Piaget, Jean. [1932] 1965. The moral judgment of the child. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
Royce, Josiah. [1885] 1958. The religious aspect of philosophy. New York: Harper.Google Scholar
Weil, Simone. 1946. Essai sur la notion de lecture. Etudes Philosophiques 1 (January‐March): 1319.Google Scholar
Weil, Simone. [1952] 1979. Gravity and grace. New York: Octagon.Google Scholar
Weil, Simone. 1986. Simone Weil: an anthology. Ed. Miles, Sian. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.Google Scholar
White, Alan R. 1964. Attention. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical investigations. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar