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Dialogical Answerability and Autonomy Ascription

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 March 2022

J. Y. Lee Open the ORCID record for J. Y. Lee [Opens in a new window]
J. Y. Lee*
Affiliation:
Department of Public Health, Centre for Medical Science and Technology Studies, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, 1014Copenhagen, Denmark
*
Corresponding author. [email protected]
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Abstract

Ascribing autonomous status to agents is a valuable practice. As such, we ought to care about how we engage in practices of autonomy ascription. However, disagreement between first-personal experiences of an agent's autonomy and third-personal determinations of their autonomy presents challenges of ethical and epistemic concern. My view is that insights from a dialogical rather than nondialogical account of autonomy give us the resources to combat the challenges associated with autonomy ascription. I draw on Andrea Westlund's account of dialogical autonomy—on which autonomy requires a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external critical perspectives—to make my case.

Type
Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , Winter 2022 , pp. 97 - 110
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Hypatia, a Nonprofit Corporation

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