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A Hasty Retreat From Evidence: The Recalcitrance of Relativism in Feminist Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Sharyn Clough
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Abstract

While feminist epistemologists have made important contributions to the deconstruction of the traditional representationalist model, some elements of the Cartesian legacy remain. For example, relativism continues to play a role in the underdetermination thesis used by Longino and Keller. Both argue that because scientific theories are underdetermined by evidence, theory choice must be relative to interpretive frameworks. Utilizing Davidson's philosophy of language, I offer a nonrepresentationalist alternative to suggest how relativism can be more fully avoided.

Type
Research Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 13 , Issue 4: Special Issue: Border Crossings: Multiculturalism and Postcolonial Challenges, Part 2 , Fall 1998 , pp. 88 - 111
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 by Hypatia, Inc.

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