¹ Two points require clarification, one regarding definitions, the other regarding presuppositions. Regarding definitions, the phrases “direct moral concern” and “indirect moral concern” serve as a convenient taxonomy to categorize Aquinas' arguments. The former refers to moral concern in which the subject of that concern has its own intrinsic value. The latter refers to moral concern in which the ultimate end is not the well-being of the subject itself, but rather another subject. Indirect moral concern views the subject in question as a means whose value is predicated upon an end outside itself (as opposed to an intrinsic value). In the present project, the subjects are nonhuman animals and the end outside of them is human happiness. Regarding presuppositions, I hold that direct moral concern is a better approach to animal welfare than indirect moral concern. However, the aim of this paper is not to argue this point, but rather to examine where Aquinas falls between the two positions. I will argue that Aquinas is limited to an “anthropocentric conservationism.” The word “limited” is not meant to imply that this finding imposes an a priori defect or short-coming in his thought. Rather, it merely recognizes that, as far as a scale of concern for the welfare of nonhuman animals is concerned, direct moral concern tends to be more intense than indirect moral concern (e.g. in cases where the welfare of the animal is at risk but no detriment to humanity can be detected).

² Three points arise here. First, my argument is not that Aquinas cannot make a positive theological contribution to ecological ethics (i.e. attempting to prove a negative), but rather that his theological framework is essentially anthropocentric in a manner that denies direct moral concern to nonhuman animals. Second, while I find Aquinas' position unsatisfying, my argument is neither that it is incorrect nor requires revision. Christian theologians and ethicists must decide if such a move is warranted. If so, then Aquinas' theological ethics would require revision. Third, while I find attempts to retrieve Aquinas as a champion of an essentially theocentric ethics unsatisfying, my reading is simply a reading of Aquinas that views his ethics as essentially anthropocentric.

³ White, Lynn, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” in This Sacred Earth: Religion, Nature, Environment, ed. Gottlieb, Roger S. (New York: Routledge, 1996), 189Google Scholar.

⁴ Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: Avon Books, 1975), 193, 201–04Google Scholar.

⁵ Ibid., 203.

⁶ Ibid., 203–04.

⁷ Salisbury, Joyce E., “Attitudes toward Animals: Changing Attitudes throughout History,” in Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, eds. Bekoff, Marc and Meaney, Carron A. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 78Google Scholar. For my critique of this claim, see below.

⁸ Linzey, Andrew, “Religions and Animals: Christianity,” Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 286–87Google Scholar.

⁹ See Kinsley, David, Ecology and Religion: Ecological Spirituality in Cross-Cultural Perspective (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 103–07Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Ibid., 109–10. Given this critique, it is not clear how Kinsley so effortlessly classifies Augustine as a positive ecological voice in Christianity (118–20).

¹¹ Ibid., 109–10.

¹² Ryder, Richard D., Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 27Google Scholar.

¹³ Ibid., 34–36.

¹⁴ Ibid., 43.

¹⁵ Evans, J. Claude, With Respect for Nature: Living as Part of the Natural World (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), viiiGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Linzey, Andrew, Christianity and the Rights of Animals (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 22Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Ibid., 24–25. Linzey does soften his critique of Aquinas by acknowledging Aquinas' context (27).

¹⁸ See Ibid., 36, 56, 141.

¹⁹ Linzey, Andrew, Animal Theology (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 15Google Scholar.

₂₀ See Linzey's comparison of Aquinas and Humphry Primatt (ibid, 17).

²¹ Ibid., 19. On Aquinas' influence, see also 64–65.

²² Linzey, Andrew, Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 10–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ Ibid., 14.

²⁴ Ibid., 14, 170.

²⁵ Santmire, H. Paul, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

²⁶ These tensions include divine immanence and transcendence, creaturely integrity and providence, the goodness of creation and sin, and anthropocentrismand theocentrism; see Santmire, , Travail of Nature, 84–95Google Scholar. That Santmire's view of Aquinas is fundamentally negative is seen in the section heading which charges Aquinas with “the subordination of nature” (84).

²⁷ Ibid., 91–92. Here Santmire contrasts Aquinas with his more positive reading of Augustine.

²⁸ Ibid. 92.

²⁹ Wennberg, Robert N., God, Humans, and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 1201–31.Google Scholar

³⁰ Ibid., 121.

³¹ Steiner, Gary, Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 126CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³² Ibid., 130–31.

³³ Ibid., 131.

³⁴ “Introduction,” in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, ed. Deane-Drummond, Celia and Clough, David (London: SCM Press, 2009), 6–7Google Scholar. This critique is no doubt aimed in part at Dorothy Yamamoto's argument by which she attempts to critique presuppositions in Aquinas' thought regarding both the ability to observe nature purely and objectively and thereby derive universal moral principles, and the establishment of an essential and unproblematic line of demarcation between all humans and all nonhumans. Yamamoto critiques the former from a consideration of the historically-located observing subject, and the latter by acknowledging again the location of the observing subject, the ambiguity in the larger tradition, and deeper understandings of animal life in modern thought. See Yamamoto, Dorothy, “Aquinas and Animals: Patrolling the Boundary?” in Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animal Ethics for Theology and Ethics, eds. Linzey, Andrew and Yamamoto, Dorothy (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 80–89Google Scholar.

³⁵ Deane-Drummond, and Clough, , Creaturely Theology, 7Google Scholar.

³⁶ Berkman, John, “Towards a Thomistic Theology of Animality,” in Creaturely Theology, 24Google Scholar.

³⁷ Ibid. Berkman goes on to offer a fine exploration of Aquinas' understanding of nonhuman animal capacities (25–33).

³⁸ Deane-Drummond, Celia, Eco-Theology (Winona, MN: Anselm Academic, 2008), 122Google Scholar.

³⁹ Ibid., 159.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ See ibid., 103–04, 213–14, n. 23.

⁴² See Clifford, Anne, “Foundations for A Catholic Ecological Theology of God,” in “And God Saw That It Was Good”: Catholic Theology and the Environment, ed. Christiansen, Drew and Grazer, Walter (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1996)Google Scholar.

⁴³ Ibid., 38.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 39.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 40.

⁴⁶ Ibid. Here, Clifford's critique is specifically aimed at Santmire (see ibid., 46, n. 44).

⁴⁷ Schaefer, Jame, Theological Foundations for Environmental Ethics: Reconstructing Patristic & Medieval Concepts (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009)Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 6, 8.

⁴⁹ One example is her affirmation of three concepts: the macro- and micro-evolution of creatures, the notion that each creature acts according to its nature to achieve its divinely intended end (and thus the non-falleness of the nonhuman order), and her acknowledgement that human beings, as rational co-creators, can produce immensely adverse effects in the created order. If humans, through sin, greatly distort the created order and nonhumans adapt to this distortion, is it not true that the nonhuman order is in some sense adapted to sin? Schaefer does not address this tension. See Schaefer, , Theological Foundations, 124–26, 270–72Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 8–9.

⁵¹ Ibid., 9.

⁵² See, for instance, French, William, “Catholicism and the Common Good,” in An Ecology of the Spirit, ed. Barnes, Michael, (University Press of America Press, 1993), 182–83, 191Google Scholar; idem, “Beast Machines and the Technocratic Reduction of Life,” in Good News for Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, ed. Pinches, Charles and McDaniel, Jay B. (New York: Orbis, 1993), 24–43Google Scholar.

⁵³ French, , “Beast-Machines,” 35Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 36.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 37.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 37–39, at 39.

⁵⁷ Wynn, Mark, “Thomas Aquinas: Reading the Idea of Dominion in the Light of the Doctrine of Creation,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, ed. Horrell, David G. et al. , (New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 154–67Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 157.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 162.

⁶⁰ Thus Jenkins's starting point is not (as in many who write in the wake of Lynn White's critique of Christianity) the question of anthropocentrism. Rather, he seeks to couch the question of anthropocentrism in the large scheme of soteriology in order to understand it from the standpoint of grace. See Jenkins, Willis, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 10–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶¹ Ibid., 16–17.

⁶² Ibid., 118.

⁶³ Ibid., 120–21.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 123.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 127.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 142.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 150.

⁶⁸ Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947–1948), IGoogle Scholar, q. 5 a. 3 [hereafter ST; references will appear in the text in parentheses]. Furthermore, creatures are good (and indeed have being) only by participating in God's own goodness (and therefore God's own being). However, for Aquinas all beings participate in God's goodness in diverse ways. This participation determines the level of their perfection. See ST I, q. 44 a. 1; q. 47 a. 2.

⁶⁹ See ST I, q. 78 a. 1. See also Barad, Judith, Aquinas on the Nature and Treatment of Animals (San Francisco: International Scholars Publication, 1995), 29–30Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Aquinas ascribes three types of power to the vegetative soul: nutritive, augmentative, and generative. See ST I, q. 79 a. 2.

⁷¹ Aquinas acknowledges degrees of gradation within nonhuman animals. See ST I, q. 72. On the lack of rationality of all nonhuman animals, see ST I, q. 78 a. 1; Summa Contra Gentiles ed. Kenny, Joseph (New York: Hanover House, 1955–1957), IIGoogle Scholar.66 [hereafter 1955–57), II.66 [hereafter SCG; references will appear in the text in parentheses]. Here, Aquinas also notes a distinction between sensitive souls with regard to the power of locomotion. Even within the realm of sensation, in which Aquinas considers five exterior and four interior powers, he posits a distinction between humans and nonhumans. Regarding the exterior powers, see the curious explanation for nonhumans excelling humans (ST I, q. 91 a. 3, Ad 1–3). While certain nonhumans have estimative powers, only the human has cogitative powers. Likewise, while certain nonhumans have memory, only the human can reminisce (ST I, q. 78 a. 4). Furthermore, Aquinas holds that retention of universals is proper only to human intellect. Nonhuman memory is limited to particulars (ST I, q. 79 a. 6, ad 1). Finally, the appetite of the human is subordinate by virtue of rationality to the will of the human, which Aquinas labels “the superior appetite” (ST I, q. 81 a. 3). Rationality enables humans to act freely from judgment, as opposed to instinct alone, which is the case with all nonhuman animals (ST I, q. 83 a. 1). These differentiations considered, Barad asserts that Aquinas also holds a high level of continuity between the various levels of hierarchy (Aquinas on the Nature and Treatment of Animals, 41–43; see also chapters 5–7). Barad also offers a helpful chart of Aquinas' divisions of sub-divisions of the hierarchy (ibid., 48).

⁷² The human contains all dimensions of the soul because she is both corporeal and incorporeal, a microcosmic being that “is in a manner composed of all things” (ST I, q. 91 a. 1 and q. 96 a. 2). See also ST I, q. 75 a. 4, q. 77 a. 2; q. 76 a. 4–5, where Aquinas argues that all forms of higher perfection contain the lower forms: “What belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior” (q. 76 a. 5). Following Aristotle's rejection of Plato, Aquinas posits that the different dimensions of the soul are unified (see ST I, q. 76 a. 3; SCG II.58). Furthermore, the unified human soul (vegetative, sensitive, and rational) is substantially unified to the human body as its form (see ST I, q. 76 a. 6; for the order of this soul, see q. 77 a. 4). Even so, “some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will”; in this manner, Aquinas posits that the intellectual powers of the soul do not have the soul-body composite as their subject (ST I, q. 77 a. 5). Hence, when the human body dies, the powers of the soul that depend on corporeal organs become dormant in the soul (see q. 77 a. 8).

⁷³ Aquinas claims that all creatures bear a likeness to God in that they reveal a trace of God's design (ST I, q. 45 a. 7). Even humans, in their physical bodies, bear this trace. For nonhuman animals, the trace is the limit of their likeness to God. For Aquinas, nonhumans bear the trace of the divine “just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect” (ST I, q. 93 a. 6). In humans, only the rational component (the mind) bears the likeness of God as image: “this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind.” As such, “the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures” (ST I, q. 93 a. 6; cf. a. 2).

⁷⁴ Elsewhere, Aquinas defines the ultimate end as “that beyond which the agent seeks nothing else” (SCG III.2.3). See below on the possibility for imperfect happiness in the temporal realm.

⁷⁵ While the vision of God is the shared end of all humanity, Aquinas argues that “fellowship of friends is not essential to [perfect] happiness.” However, “fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of happiness” (ST I–II, q. 4 a. 8). Nonetheless, commentators assert that Aquinas understands the ultimate telos of humanity to be a communal affair. See Kent, Bonnie, “Habits and Virtues (Ia IIae, qq. 49–70)” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Pope, Stephen J. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 126Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ “Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence” (ST I–II, q. 3 a. 8). Aquinas goes on to link happiness to “union with God.” On this point, see also SCG III.37. While the Beatific Vision is an appropriate end for humanity's nature, it also requires a surpassing of that nature: “Now man's happiness is twofold…One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead” (ST I–II, q. 62 a. 1). For this “surpassing” happiness, humans require grace by which God infuses the theological virtues. See Porter, Jean, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 53Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ The temporal life of human creatures includes a dependence on their animal bodies, one which mandates that humans meet the needs of their vegetative soul which include nutrition, augmentation, and generation (ST I, q. 79 a. 2). According to Aquinas' redactor, this dependence will cease at the resurrection (ST suppl., q. 81 a. 4).

⁷⁸ Pope, Stephen J., “Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Pope, Stephen J. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 32Google Scholar. Alasdair MacIntyre has provided important contributions to the recognition of Aquinas' teleological view of virtue; see his After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 53, 185Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Like Aristotle, Aquinas understands the cardinal virtues as directed toward temporal ends (SCG III.34–35). He holds that these virtues exist in Christians and non-Christians alike (ST I–II, q. 65 a. 2; see also Kent, , “Habits and Virtues,” 121–22Google Scholar). However, he argues that for Christians infused with the theological virtues, the cardinal virtues are perfected beyond what is possible for those who lack the former (ST I–II, q. 65 a. 2). The perfection of the cardinal virtues occurs because, with the theological virtues, they are redirected from merely temporal ends to humanity's ultimate telos. See Kent, , “Habits and Virtues,” 118Google Scholar; Hollenbach, David, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 123CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The point is that what it means for a person to be virtuous is predicated upon the end proper to that person.

⁸⁰ Cf. Pope, , “Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,” 32Google Scholar. See also Porter, , The Recovery of Virtue, 35–47Google Scholar for a helpful explanation on the distinction between beings as good and the telos of beings as their good.

⁸¹ This theocentric cosmology constitutes a central focus in applying Aquinas' thought to modern ecological concerns. See Berkman, , “Towards a Thomistic Theology of Animals,” 24Google Scholar.

⁸² Aquinas states that “created things are made like unto God by the fact that they attain to divine goodness.” Furthermore, all creatures move toward the likeness of God in their movement toward preservation (SCG III.19; also ST I, q. 4 a. 3).

⁸³ See also Schaefer, , Theological Foundations, 22–24Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ Aquinas is here influenced by Aristotle's understanding of “slave” in which the term denotes that which is by nature at the disposal of another with regard to the pursuit of the good. Thus in Aquinas' view slavery according to nature would not be without moral imperatives of restraint. The point is that nonhuman animals are, by nature, at the disposal of humanity's pursuit of the good. This pursuit must, of course, be informed by the virtues. Thus, the disposal is not without limits.

⁸⁵ Berkman, , “Towards a Thomistic Theology of Animality,” 24Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ Aside from Berkman's too-simplistic reading, see Clifford, , “Foundations for A Catholic Ecological Theology of God,” 40Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ Based on passages such as this one—even contextually considered—I find Schaefer's position untenable. She claims that Aquinas' sacramental view of the cosmos imbues it with intrinsic value. She is certainly correct in noting that all creatures contribute to the fullest perfection of the created order (“Valuing Earth,” 791–92). However, this perfection is always for the sake of humanity. Without humanity, the created order would have no value for anyone (see SCG, III.112.3; ST II–II, q. 64 a. 1, ad 1). In this sense, the value of nonhuman animals in particular is fully predicated on their value for something or someone (in this case, for humanity). This view is an instrumental valuation, but I fail to see how it is intrinsic.

⁸⁸ Santmire, , Travail of Nature, 91Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ Kinsley, , Religion and Ecology, 109Google Scholar.

⁹⁰ Linzey, , Why Animal Suffering Matters, 14Google Scholar.

⁹¹ Steiner, , Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents, 1–2Google Scholar.

⁹² E.g., Wynn, , “Thomas Aquinas,” 158–62Google Scholar.

⁹³ As Aquinas puts it, “reasonable creatures…have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him” (ST I, q. 65 a. 2).

⁹⁴ This point reflects Aquinas' own thought; see SCG IV.97.

⁹⁵ See also ST I, q. 65 a. 1. These passages show that Kinsley is incorrect in claiming that Aquinas excludes the entire “material creation” from eschatological life. He is correct, however, in claiming that “the lower creatures” will be left behind. See Kinsley, , Ecology and Religion, 109–10Google Scholar.

⁹⁶ See also SCG IV.97.5. On humanity's animal life ceasing, see SCG IV.83–86.

⁹⁷ Given Aquinas' definition of the ultimate end as the final aim of an agent (SCG III.2), it may be more appropriate to claim that the ultimate end of nonhuman animals is the sum total of their temporal ends since, in meeting temporal needs, nonhuman animals fulfill their ultimate aim: to continue to live. In other words, an end is good in which its appetite terminates (SCG III.2, 16), and the terminus of nonhumans' appetite is never more than temporal needs.

⁹⁸ Aquinas is explicit on this point: ST I–II, q. 1 a. 8.

⁹⁹ Leget, Carlo, “Eschatology,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Van Nieuwenhove, Rik and Wawrykow, Joseph (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 370Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁰ “All the creatures of God in some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible” (ST I, q. 65 a. 1). Hence there is a sense in which Aquinas posits an eternal telos for nonhumans. However, that telos in no manner maintains their individuality, which for Aquinas is inseparable from their material form. Thus “death comes to both [humans and nonhumans] alike as to the body, but not as to the soul” (ST I, q. 75 a. 6, ad 1; also SCG, II.79). Furthermore, as the human soul contains the vegetative, sensitive, and rational dimensions in a unity, the sensitive dimension of human soul is incorruptible only “by reason of its being intellectual” (ST I, q. 76 a. 3, ad 1). Thus a particular eternal telos is predicated upon rationality.

¹⁰¹ Aquinas does hold that the human soul is united to the body as its form. By the phrase “necessarily and wholly dependent” I mean to say that the soul of nonhuman animals has no excess beyond the corporeal operations of the body. For Aquinas, the difference between nonhuman and human souls is that the latter are self-subsistent (ST I, q. 75 a. 2–3). Hence, while the souls of humans are incorruptible, “the souls of brutes are corrupted when their bodies are corrupted” (ST I, q. 75 a. 6; cf SCG, II.82). Furthermore, the souls of humans and nonhumans differ regarding generation: “[S]ouls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God” (ST I, q. 75 a. 6, ad 1).

¹⁰² Aquinas delineates two further reasons why one should not (or cannot) extend charity to nonhuman animals. First, “friendship is towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good it possesses.” Second, “all friendship is based on some fellowship in life….[and] irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking” (ST II–II, q. 25 a. 3). Therefore, Jenkins', argument (Ecologies of Grace, 140–41Google Scholar)that Aquinas' view demands charitable engagement for the nonhuman creation for its own sake lacks validity. On this point see also Schockenhoff, Eberhard, “The Theological Virtue of Charity,” in The Ethics of Aquinas, 251–54Google Scholar.

¹⁰³ Jenkins argues that Aquinas balances the goodness of creation with the ambiguity of death and suffering by the principle of double effect; that is, God wills the goodness of creatures (e.g., the ferocity of a lion) with the indirect “evil” effect that the lion then devours the gazelle (Ecologies of Grace, 137, 144–45). It is somewhat unclear, though, whether or not Aquinas considers predation evil; he seems to suggest that predation is not a sign of the privation of good in the form and integrity of predatory animals (ST I, q. 65 a. 1). Elsewhere Aquinas addresses the issue that “certain animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been produced at that time.” Aquinas responds that nonhuman animals that are “generated from corruption of animals could not have been produced then [i.e., at the founding of the world] otherwise than potentially” (ST I, q. 72, ad 5). In other words, God did not directly create creatures that derive from the corruption of animals (e.g. from their carcasses); rather, God created the potential for these creatures within other living creatures, a potential that was actualized when other animals died, which is part of the natural order. This interpretation is solidified by Aquinas' rejection of an edenic state of creation without predation (ST I, q. 96 a. 1, ad 2). Even so, Aquinas does suggest some difference in the relationship between nature and humanity before and after sin. In reply to the objection that God created nonhuman animals that are harmful to humanity, he states, “since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have injured him” (ST I, q. 72, Ad 6). Presumably, then, sinless humanity used the nonhuman creation according to a natural order that precluded harm to humanity but not harm between animals. It is not the poisonous snakes that changed, but humanity, a change that elicited the harmful actions of the snake. Oddly, Jenkins claims that Aquinas writes that humanity, in innocence, would not have used animals for food—without, however, providing a reference to Aquinas at this point (Ecologies of Grace, 135). Furthermore, given that Aquinas does not take issue with predation and refers to human use of the world for food and clothing as natural, Jenkins's reading seems quite unlikely. Nonetheless, Jenkins provides a wonderful overview of Aquinas' engagement with natural evil and the notion of a fall (ibid., 144–48).

¹⁰⁴ See also Hollenbach, , The Common Good, 149Google Scholar; he grounds Aquinas' vision of the common good in humanity's “common origin and destiny.” Consider also Hollenbach's strict and repeated exclusion of nonhuman animals from the moral concern predicated on the common good (e.g., 82–83, 130–132).

¹⁰⁵ “Resources,” albeit anachronistic, adequately describes Aquinas' view. This term is further taken up, in line with Aquinas' theology, in the magisterial documents of the Catholic Church. See below.

¹⁰⁶ One should avoid two poles at this point. On the one hand, one should not downplay the significance of the potential for Aquinas' contribution here. Could not a whole host of practices engrained in a modern (post-Cartesian) view of nonhuman animals and the ethics that flow from this view be subject to reform on the basis of Aquinas' position? On the other hand, one should not overstate the contribution to be made here as if it could provide nonhuman animals with rights. After all, regarding the wellbeing of a nonhuman animal for its own sake constitutes a moral concern for Aquinas. For, such regard evinces a wrongly misplaced compassion. In addressing God's commandments against cruel practices to nonhuman animals, Aquinas recognizes the possibility of the passion of pity arising at the suffering of sentient nonhuman animals. He claims, following Maimonides, that God's aim was to “inculcate pity to the Jewish people” in such a way as to benefit humanity (ST I–II, q. 102 a. 6, ad 8). Hence, Steiner claims of Aquinas' position that “we need not concern ourselves for the lives or suffering of animals, expect insofar as this concern makes us better members of the human community” (Steiner, , Anthropocentrism and its Discontents, 131Google Scholar). See also Barad, , Aquinas on the Nature and Treatment of Animals, 40–42Google Scholar. An interesting question of praxis within the tension between these two polar readings of Aquinas is the question of ethical vegetarianism, which I shall address below.

¹⁰⁷ Aquinas argues against the creation of multiple worlds by acknowledging the interconnectedness of all created things: “The very order of things created by God shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself” (ST I, q. 47 a. 2).

¹⁰⁸ Clifford, , “Foundations,” 39Google Scholar; on this point, see also Jenkins, , Ecologies of Grace, 125–27Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁹ Jenkins, , Ecologies of Grace, 131Google Scholar.

¹¹⁰ Salisbury, , “Attitudes toward Animals,” 78Google Scholar.

¹¹¹ See Steiner, , Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents, 131Google Scholar; Wennberg, , God, Humans, and Animals, 121Google Scholar. Wennberg compounds the weakness of his interpretation by claiming that Aquinas provides “no reason whatsoever” to refrain from torturing an animal except that “it might prompt us to mistreat or neglect humans” (ibid., 122). There is no evidence to assume that torture of nonhuman animals provides utilitarian value to humans. In Aquinas' view, such activity, in and of itself, would be an issue of humanity failing to act in accord with the dignity of its nature.

¹¹² See, ST II–II, q. 141 a. 3; SCG, III.129. See also Shaefer, Jame, “Valuing Earth Intrinsically and Instrumentally: A Theological Framework for Environmental Ethics,” Theological Studies 66 (2005): 792Google Scholar. Aquinas holds that God charges the rational human creature with maintenance of the created order (SCG, III.78; ST I, q. 64 a. 4); see Porter, , The Recovery of Virtue, 61, 178Google Scholar.

¹¹³ In my view, Aquinas' position is unsatisfactory. But my dissatisfaction with his position does not amount to judging his position to be false.

¹¹⁴ On the difficulty of the distinction between human and nonhuman nature, see Yamamoto, , “Aquinas and Animals,” 85–89Google Scholar. Oddly, Alasdair MacIntyre seems to reject the essential distinction between humans and nonhumans; see his Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 57Google Scholar MacIntyre is ultimately unclear on the issue. On the rejection of the strictly human scope of God's redemptive work, see below.

¹¹⁵ The official documents of the Catholic Church move in this direction. The Catechism states that “animals, like plants and inanimate beings, are by nature destined for the common good of past, present, and future humanity. Use of…animal resources of the universe cannot be divorced from respect for moral imperatives. Man's dominion over inanimate and other living beings granted by the Creator is not absolute; it is limited by concern for the quality of life of his neighbor, including future generations to come; it requires a religious respect for the integrity of creation” (The Catechism of the Catholic Church: With Modifications from the Editio Typica [New York: Doubleday, 1995]Google Scholar, no. 2415). Thus it is not wrong to use nonhuman animals for food, clothing, and experimentation as long as all present and future humanity benefit (see no. 2417). See also the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Renewing the Earth: An Invitation to Reflection and Action on Environment in Light of Catholic Social Teaching (Pastoral Statement, November 14, 1991)Google Scholar, esp. III.E, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/environment/renewing-the-earth.cfm. The Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops calls for an “equitable distribution of resources, including sharing land, animals and water.” See You love all that exists … All things are Yours, God, lover of Life (Pastoral Letter, October 4, 2003), 6, http://www.cccb.ca/site/Files/pastoralenvironment.html.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.33.4 http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103.htm; Ephrem the Syrian, , Hymns on Paradise, trans. Brock, Sebastian (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Press, 1989)Google Scholar, IX.1.

¹¹⁷ Lossky, Vladimir, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976)Google Scholar, chap. 5.

¹¹⁸ For example, see John Wesley, “The General Deliverance,” http://new.gbgm-umc.org/umhistory/wesley/sermons; Linzey, , “C. S. Lewis's Theology of Animals,” Anglican Theological Review 80 (Winter 1998): 60–81Google Scholar; McIntosh, Adam, “Human and Animal Relations in the Theology of Karl Barth,” Journal of Melbourne College of Divinity 22 (2009): 20–35Google Scholar; Moltmann, Jürgen, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, trans. Kohl, Margaret (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 69–70Google Scholar; Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology, esp. chaps. 4–5; Webb, Stephen H., Good Eating (Grand Rapids, MI: –Brazos, 2001)Google Scholar, chap. 3; Hauerwas, Stanley and Berkman, John, “A Trinitarian Theology of the ‘Chief End’ of ‘All Flesh’,” in Good News for Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, eds. Pinches, Charles and McDaniel, Jay B. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1993), 62–74Google Scholar; McFague, Sallie, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 198–202Google Scholar. For a collection of writings (including Wesley's sermon) addressing the general issue of an eternal telos for particular nonhumans, see Animals and Christianity: A Book of Readings, eds. Linzey, Andrew and Regan, Tom (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1990)Google Scholar, Part 3.

¹¹⁹ von Balthasar, Hans Urs, Theo-Drama, vol. 5Google Scholar: The Last Act, trans. Harrison, Graham (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1988), 420–21Google Scholar. It is not clear how (or if) von Balthasar would rework the interconnected pillars of Aquinas' theological framework. If Aquinas is wrong in excluding nonhumans from the eschaton, is he then also wrong about their nature? If he is wrong about their nature, is he wrong in refusing them direct moral concern? If he is wrong on all these counts, does his framework begin to unravel under the pressure of the many adjustments necessary to affirm, as von Balthasar does, that animals will participate in the eschaton?

¹²⁰ Such a mutual union of affection would not be possible in Aquinas' thought, for nonhumans lack the capacity. However, certain hagiographies seem to suggest otherwise. For one among many possible examples, see Vivian, Tim, “The Peaceable Kingdom: Animals as Parables in the Virtues of Saint Macarius,” Anglican Theological Review 85/3 (Summer 2003): 477–91Google Scholar.

¹²¹ Yamamoto, , “Aquinas and Animals,” 80Google Scholar.

¹²² Schaefer, , “Valuing Earth,” 789Google Scholar.