Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2014
Certain proposals to construe American Catholic public theology as civil discourse assume that public theological discussion needs to be disciplined to prevent “interest groups” from imposing their agendas on all participants. These proposals urge that all parties be required to employ the language of natural law, which is to be taught to all by theological experts.
Though American Catholic public theology traditionally seeks to avoid sectarianism by employing the philosophical language of natural law, and though civil discourse would presumably reinforce this anti-sectarian tendency, it has a significant shortcoming. Requiring public religious discourse to prescind from all specific interests would rule out prophetic contributions to public theology. Prophets always speak perspectivally and reflect the interests of their historical situations. The interests of religious speakers need scrutiny, but this scrutiny should not exclude from hand prophetic discourse arising out of experiences of oppression.
The essay provides a foundation for this thesis by examining what is at work in prophetic speech. It locates prophetic discourse at the intersection of the prophet's need to proclaim and the community's need to control. The argument of the essay moves to the conclusion that American Catholic theologians need to give more attention than previously to the rhetorical dimensions of public theological discourse.
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21 My argument here parallels Carter's, Stephen in The Culture of Disbelief (New York: HarperCollins, 1993).Google Scholar Carter maintains that American liberalism's stress on cold rationality yields procedural rules for dialogue in the public square that are neither welcoming nor just. These rules require that participants in public dialogue “bracket” their particularity and “remake themselves” in liberal images before they enter the public square (54-55). In Carter's view, American liberalism needs to develop a respect for “epistemic diversity” that fosters respectful listening: “What is needed, then, is a willingness to listen, not because the speaker has the right voice but because the speaker has file right to speak” (230).
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26 The soft underbelly of post-Enlightenment progressivist, Utopian ideology is its tendency to repress others in the name of progress. As an example: though I find Richard Rorty's description of a liberal Utopia dominated by contingency, irony, and solidarity in some respects enormously seductive, I also have strong suspicions about its curious homelessness. I wonder who lives there in liberal Utopias except those whose social interests are apotheosized as progress tout simple, and who repress the cultural particularity of others in order to fabricate utopia (see Rorty, Richard, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989]).CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a very different, nonliberal, imagination of Utopia, one noting that the culturally marginal do not find terms such as “community” and “home” hopelessly aprogressive but who envisage a Utopia that does not demand detachment from cultural particularity (see Williams, Raymond, What I Came to Say [London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989], 59–60).Google Scholar
27 On the prophet as one who faces a “coalition of callousness and established authority” in the community confronted by prophetic speech, see Heschel, Abraham Joshua, The Prophets: An Introduction (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), I:16.Google Scholar
28 In this analysis, authentic prophecy would be akin to what Frank Kermode calls powerful textual criticism: in Kermode's view, the powerful critic is one who moves from the margins to the center, and successfully shows us that what we have taken as the center is less illuminating of the text than the margins (see Kermode, Frank, Forms of Attention [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985], 36Google Scholar). If we pursued this analogy, we might conclude that authentic prophecy is not that which purports to be prophecy, but which engages the classic text in a way that, without departing from the text, makes us see what we have not seen in it previously. On the classic as the norma normans of all theological conversation, see Tracy, David, The Analogical Imagination (New York: Crossroad, 1981).Google Scholar
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30 On the prophet as one who proclaims a hope that activates a possible imagination in a society, one not fully future or present, see Brueggemann, , Prophetic Imagination, 66.Google Scholar See also Benoit, , “Prophet,” 470–71.Google Scholar
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32 The phrase “epochal thinker” is from Adams, , Prophethood of All Believers, 100.Google Scholar
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36 The Sharon Olds statement is from a recent unpublished lecture to writers in Charlotte, NC.
As the unsigned editorial preface to Concilium, vol. 37 entitled “Prophets in the Secular City” notes, for Martin Buber the prophet is unlike the apocalypticist in that the former is “constantly in an attitude of dialogue,” whereas the latter is involved in monologue: see Concilium, vol. 37, Prophets in the Church, ed. Aubert, Roger (New York: Paulist, 1968), 141Google Scholar, citing Buber, Martin, “Prophetie und Apokalyptik” in Werke II (Munich, 1964), 930–36.Google Scholar
37 In his plenary address to the Catholic Theological Society of America in 1992, Gustavo Guttiérrez noted the dangers that Jesus' coherence posed for the privileged of his social milieu; Gutiérrez argued that Jesuanic theology must always aim at coherence, at keeping together, via hermeneutic bridge, orthodoxy, and orthopraxis. This argument parallels my argument about prophecy in the preceding paragraph. See Gutiérrez, Gustavo, “Theology from the Experience of the Poor,” CTSA Proceedings 47 (1992): 26–33.Google Scholar
38 Dussel, Enrique, “Discernment: A Question of Orthodoxy or Orthopraxis?” trans. Burns, Paul, in Concilium, vol. 19, Discernment of the Spirit and of Spirits, ed. Floristán, Casiano and Duquoc, Christian (New York: Seabury, 1979), 48.Google Scholar On prophets as those who do not employ concepts and construct systems, but avail themselves of symbols and deeds that have ideological import and arise out of ideological stances, see Chenu, M. D., “Un peuple prophétique,” Esprit 35 (1967): 602–11.Google Scholar