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² Macquarrie, John, Mary for All Christians, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 16.Google Scholar See First Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith (Dei Filius), chap. 4.

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⁴ Johnson, , Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, ix.Google Scholar

⁵ For example, McGrath, Alister, A Scientific Theology, vol. 3, Theory (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 97–132Google Scholar; Pannenberg, Wolfhart, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, trans. Bromiley, G.W. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 621–22Google Scholar; Norris Clarke, W. SJ, The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 44–58Google Scholar; Gunton, Colin, The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 21–52Google Scholar; Davis, Caroline Franks, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 10–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jenson, Robert, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, The Works of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 36–39Google Scholar, esp. 39 n. 41; and Osborne, Grant R., The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 299–303.Google Scholar

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⁸ González, Justo maintains that “all language about God is metaphorical” (Essential Theological Terms [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005], 109)Google Scholar, yet also asserts that “all language about God is analogical” (23), without explaining how these claims are related.

⁹ Pinnock, Clark H., Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God's Openness (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001), 63.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Boersma, Hans, Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross: Reappropriating the Atonement Tradition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 18Google Scholar; see also 48.

¹¹ Haught, John F., Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation (New York: Paulist, 1995), 43.Google Scholar In his earlier work, What is God? How to Think About the Divine (New York: Paulist, 1986), Haught treats “analogous” and “metaphorical” as synonymous (2), but in the bulk of the text, restricts “metaphor” to language about God (32–33, 46, 115, 130), and “analogy” to human actions (44).

¹² LaCugna, Catherine Mowry, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 359Google Scholar. Elsewhere, LaCugna appears to attribute a form of this view to Aquinas. See “God in Communion with Us,” in Freeing Theology, ed. LaCugna, Catherine Mowry (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 101.Google Scholar

¹³ Haight, Roger, Jesus: Symbol of God (New York: Orbis, 1999), 11Google Scholar; see also idem, Dynamics of Theology (1990; reprint, Maryknoll: Orbis, 2001), 144–45.

¹⁴ This must be distinguished from the claim that talk about God is mostly metaphor. The logical primacy of analogical speech (for which I argue below) is compatible with the obvious predominance of metaphor in religious predication. See Hughes, Gerald, The Nature of God (London/New York: Routledge, 1995), 62–63, 187–88.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For example, Duck, Ruth C., Gender and the Name of God: The Trinitarian Baptismal Formula (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1991), 13, 22Google Scholar; Keller, Catherine, On the Mystery: Discerning the Divinity in Process (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008), 16.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hick, John, “Transcendence and Truth: A Response to D.Z. Phillips,” in Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. John, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Avis, Paul, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol, and Myth in Religion and Theology (London/New York: Routledge, 1999,) 102.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Huyssteen, J. Wentzel Van, Theology and the Justification of Faith: Constructing Theories in Systematic Theology, trans. Snijders, H.F. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 133, 135.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Brümmer, Vincent, “Metaphor and the Reality of God,” in Comparative Theology: Essays for Keith Ward, ed. Bartel, T.W. (London: SPCK, 2003), 85.Google Scholar

²⁰ Indeed, McFague ups the ante with the claims that metaphor is “the way language and, more basically, thought works” (Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982], 37). Her most recent work, A New Climate for Theology: God, the World, and Global Warming (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), reaffirms this (108–10). This claim is discussed in the following section.

²¹ Hick, John, The Metaphor of God Incarnate: Christology in a Pluralistic Age (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1993), 101Google Scholar; idem, A Christian Theology of Religions (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1995), 93–95.

²² The Metaphor of God Incarnate, 105.

²³ Ibid., 99.

²⁴ But see “Literal and Metaphorical Christologies,” in Jesus Then and Now: Images of Jesus in History and Christology, ed. Meyer, Marvin W. and Hughes, Charles (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2001), 144–45Google Scholar, where Hick abandons this view.

²⁵ See Soskice, Janet Martin, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 26–31.Google Scholar

²⁶ Hick, John, “Is the Doctrine of the Atonement a Mistake?,” in Philosophy and Theological Discourse, ed. Davis, Stephen T. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 77.Google Scholar

²⁷ Her views are adopted tout court by several thinkers. See Brümmer, Vincent, The Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Johnson, Elizabeth, Quest for the Living God: Mapping Frontiers in the Theology of God (New York: Continuum, 2007), 18–21Google Scholar; Roy, Stephen C., How Much Does God Foreknow? A Comprehensive Biblical Study (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 159–62Google Scholar; Boersma, , Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross, 99–108.Google Scholar

²⁸ McFague, Sallie, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 15.Google Scholar

²⁹ McFague, , Metaphorical Theology, 46, 50, 125Google Scholar; idem, Models of God, 33; idem, Speaking in Parables: A Study in Metaphor and Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 44; Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 59. For criticism of this view of metaphor, see Soskice, , Metaphor and Religious Language, 41–43, 88–90.Google Scholar

³⁰ Metaphorical Theology, 16–17.

³¹ So, too, Darwin's theory means exactly the same thing whenever it is invoked as an explanation. The theory does not claim to be describing a thread of similarity among different things, but proposes a single explanation—natural selection—which, without any change in its meaning, applies to different referents, such as the evolutionary histories of mammals and reptiles.

³² E.g., McFague, , Metaphorical Theology, 34Google Scholar: “Seeing the similar number among otherwise disparate entities is a metaphorical act, as in six apples, six moons, six ideas, six generous acts.” Where is the “is not” which makes these sixes metaphorical?

³³ Nor the analogical, as Brümmer, holds. See Speaking of a Personal God (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1992), 45–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁴ McFague, , Models of God, 34.Google Scholar

³⁵ McFague, , Metaphorical Theology, 36.Google Scholar

³⁶ Sometimes quite forcefully dismissive: “Metaphor is primary and embodies insight into the real world. It is not metaphor that is the private language - it is in touch with reality - but literal speech, which is lazy, uninspired and unproductive.” (Avis, 168)

³⁷ Johnson, , Quest for the Living God, 18.Google Scholar Again, examples abound: see, e.g. Rausch, Thomas, I Believe in God: A Reflection on the Apostle's Creed (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2008), 49Google Scholar; Wilson-Kastner, Patricia, “Where Do We Start?,” in Praising God: The Trinity in Christian Worship, ed. Duck, Ruth C. and Wilson-Kastner, Patricia (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1999), 19.Google Scholar

³⁸ Alston, William, “Literal Talk of God: Its Possibility and Function,” in This is My Name Forever: The Trinity and Gender Language for God, ed. Kimel, Alvin F. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 38.Google Scholar See also Alston, , “Irreducible Metaphors in Theology,” in Experience, Reason and God, ed. Long, Eugene Thomas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1980), 129–48.Google Scholar

³⁹ Hick, , An Interpretation of Religion, 352.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ It is worth noting that thinkers who do give careful attention to the rich tradition regarding the unknowability of God tend to endorse the possibility of literal religious speech. See Netland, Harold, Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of Truth (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 1999), 133–41Google Scholar; Alston, William, “Two Cheers for Mystery!,” in God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Dole, Andrew and Chignell, Andrew (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 99–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Whittaker, John H., “Literal and Figurative Language of God,” Religious Studies 17 (1981): 39–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moore, Andrew, Realism and Christian Faith: God, Grammar, and Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 66–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ward, Keith, Religion and Creation (Oxford: Oxford University, 2006), 129–155.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Johnson, Elizabeth, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1993), 105Google Scholar (emphasis added); see also Consider Jesus: Waves of Renewal in Christology (New York: Crossroad, 1990), 25–26.

⁴² Quest for the Living God, 214.

⁴³ She Who Is, 204.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 108.

⁴⁵ Holyoak, Keith and Thagard, Paul, Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 214–23.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Kövecses, Zoltán, Metaphor: A Practical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University, 2001), 4.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1980), 4.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ This question does not presume that the earliest human speech was entirely literal and metaphor came later; but it does reject the idea that speech is, or ever could have been, solely metaphorical. See Barfield, Owen, “The Meaning of the Word ‘Literal’,” in Metaphor and Symbol, ed. Knights, L.C. and Cottle, Basil (London: Butterworths, 1960), 48–63.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ This assumption is common coin. See Stiver, Dan, The Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, Symbol, and Story (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 11, 21–22Google Scholar, passim; Inbody, Tyron, The Faith of the Christian Church: An Introduction to Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), 85Google Scholar; Kreeft, Peter and Tacelli, Ronald K., Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 262Google Scholar; Schneiders, Sandra, The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament as Sacred Scripture, 2nd ed. (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999), 139.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Even Eberhard Jüngel, who devotes no small attention to these matters, comes up short. He recognizes that answering the question “What is literally a literal use of language?” is crucial to understanding how metaphors work. (“Metaphorische Wahrheit. Erwägungen zur theologischen Relevanz der Metapher als Beitrag zur Hermeneutik einer narrativen Theologie,” in Entsprechungen, Gott-Wahrheit-Mensch: Theologische Erörterungen [München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1980], 105). In what follows, however, the word “literal” (wörtlich) disappears, to be replaced with the term “univocity” (die Eindeutigkeit).

⁵¹ Sanders, John, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove. IL: InterVarsity Press, 2007).Google Scholar

⁵² Ibid., 21–22.

⁵³ Ibid., 293, n.8.

⁵⁴ Chopp, Rebecca S., The Power to Speak: Feminism, Language, God (New York: Crossroad, 1991).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Huyssteen, Van, Theology and the Justification of Faith, 135–136Google Scholar; see also idem, Alone in the World? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 42.

⁵⁶ Johnson, , Quest for the Living God, 18.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Ibid., 17.

⁵⁸ Hick, , An Interpretation of Religion, 247Google Scholar; idem, The Philosophy of Religion, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 84.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 351.

⁶⁰ The Metaphor of God Incarnate, 100, n.2.

⁶¹ McFague, , Metaphorical Theology, 12–13.Google Scholar

⁶² Lash, Nicholas, “Ideology, Metaphor, and Analogy,” in Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology, ed. Hauerwas, Stanley and Jones, L. Gregory (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 124.Google Scholar

⁶³ Keller, , On the Mystery, 137, 151.Google Scholar The situation is even more confused in Keller's, The Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 98, 192.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Brümmer, Vincent, Atonement, Christology and the Trinity: Making Sense of Christian Doctrine (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 5, 7.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Brümmer, , The Model of Love, 14.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Super Boetium De Trinitate, 1.2, ad 1. All of the English texts of Thomas in this essay, except for Summa Theologiae, are my translations from the editiones operum optimae provided by Enrique Alarcón of Universidad de Navarra at www.corpusthomisticum.org. For Summa Theologiae, the Latin and English texts come from the 60 volumes of the Blackfriars edition (McGraw-Hill: New York, and Eyre and Spottiswoode: London, 1964–76), hereafter cited as ST.

⁶⁷ Torrell, Jean-Pierre OP, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 2, Spiritual Master, trans. Royal, Robert (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 9–12.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ For example, one of Thomas' chief objections to the approach of Maimonides is that it cannot distinguish between analogy and metaphor (De potentia, VII.5, resp.).

⁶⁹ Also, inter alia, ST I.13.5, resp.; I.85.2, obj.3.; I.107.1; Expositio Peryermeneias, lib.1, l.3, n.7; Summa contra Gentiles, I.30.2 (hereafter ScG).

⁷⁰ Sententia Metaphysicae, V, l.22, n. 12; ScG I.59.3; ST I.16.2, resp.

⁷¹ My shift in usage is awkward, but makes for greater clarity. I note, however, that proprie is often translated as “literally” (e.g., ST I.1.13).

⁷² Super Iob, cap.1; also ST I.1.10, ad 3. I sidestep here the question of other senses besides the literal. Umberto Eco suggests that Thomas held only Scripture to have more than a literal sense, because the human authors, moved by the Holy Spirit, said more than they intended. “Poets, by contrast, know what they want to say and what they are saying. Poets therefore speak literally, even when they use rhetorical figures.” The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, trans. Bredin, Hugh (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 154.Google Scholar

⁷³ Peter W. Macky suggests the categories “independent” and “dependent.” A proper use does not depend on another usage, whereas a figurative use does. If I say “That ice cream is cold,” I am using the proper content of “cold,” and this is the only use my listeners need to know to take my meaning. If I say “That was a cold reception,” my audience needs some understanding of the independent use in order to take my full meaning. See The Centrality of Metaphors to Biblical Thought: A Method for Interpreting the Bible (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 32–39.

⁷⁴ Wolterstorff, Nicholas, Divine Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 191.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁵ For a defense of the centrality of usage, and of the (much-maligned) idea of authorial intention, see Evans, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference, ed. McDowell, John (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 67–73Google Scholar; also Wolterstorff, 193–201.

⁷⁶ Super Epistolam ad Galatas, cap.4, lect.7. See Spicq, Ceslas OP, Esquisse d'une histoire de l'exégèse latine au moyen âge (Paris: J. Vrin, 1944), 274–76.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ De potentia, VII.4, ad 3; ST I.13.5.

⁷⁸ In libri Metaphysicae, IV.1.534–543.

⁷⁹ Clarke, W. Norris SJ, Explorations in Metaphysics: Being—God—Person (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 128Google Scholar; idem, The Philosophical Approach to God: A Neo-Thomist Perspective (Winston-Salem, NC: Wake Forest University, 1979), 52.

⁸⁰ This usage is listed as “figurative” in the Oxford English Dictionary (online version, http://www.oed.com/[accessed 21 April 2010]). The paradox of an established figurative use does not invalidate my argument. In describing the dynamics of metaphor, the language of twist and clash, collision and collapse, popularized by Beardsley and Ricoeur, sets up the unreasonable expectation that “unlexicalizable” novelty will be characteristic of every metaphor. See McFague, , Metaphorical Theology, 17Google Scholar, 24, 38, 48.

⁸¹ Thomas explicitly argues that love and joy are said of God proprie, as opposed to grief and desire (ST I.20.2, ad 2).

⁸² Scriptum super Sententiis, I.19.5.2, ad 1.

⁸³ Also Super Sent., I.22.1.2. Thus, Thomas asserts that “Word” is a literal name (proprium nomen) for the Son (ST I.34.2, resp.). Despite this, it is still put about that Thomas denied proper predication of God: for example, Kaufman, Gordon, God, Mystery, Diversity: Christian Theology in a Pluralistic World (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 146.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Super Sent., I.24.1.1, ad 4., also Prol.1.2, ad 2; ScG I.31.2; De potentia, VII.6, resp.

⁸⁵ ScG I.80.5 (emphasis added).

⁸⁶ Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus, l.3; Super Hebraeos., cap. 1, l. 2. See Riesenhuber, Klaus, “Partizipation als Strukturprinzip der Namen Gottes bei Thomas von Aquin,” in Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, ed. Beckmann, Jan P. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 969–82.Google Scholar This is not the same as claiming that all speech about God is justified through the analogical similarity of things to their creator. Nevertheless, “however much we are raised by revelation to the knowledge of something which would otherwise be unknown to us, still we do not know this in any way except through sensible things” (Super Boeth. De Trinitate, 6.3, resp.).

⁸⁷ ScG I.29.2.

⁸⁸ Super Sent., I.22.1.2, ad 3; ST I.13.3, resp. and 13.6, resp. See Wippel, John, “Thomas Aquinas on Our Knowledge of God and the Axiom that Every Agent Produces Something Like Itself,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 152–71, esp. 155–61Google Scholar; and Richard, Jean, “Analogie et symbolisme chez saint Thomas,” Laval Théologique et Philosophique 30 (October 1974): 379–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁹ De potentia, VII.7, resp.

⁹⁰ Super Boeth. De Trinitate, 6.4, ad 2. This ban includes “esse.” See Te Velde, Rudi A., Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 188–94.Google Scholar

⁹¹ De virtutibus, II.9, ad 1.

⁹² Stephen Holmes provides another useful schema, distinguishing several categories of divine perfection: condescension, governance, goodness, self-sufficiency, and glory. See “The Attributes of God,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. Webster, John, Tanner, Kathryn, and Torrance, Iain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 69–70.Google Scholar

⁹³ The centrality of this distinction to Thomas' thought is laid out by Wippel, , “Quidditative Knowledge of God,” Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 215–41.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ The relationship of ratio propria and res significata is debated in scholars of Thomas. In order to avoid a rather technical discussion for which there is neither space nor necessity, I treat them as synonymous, which certainly simplifies Thomas' thought, but, I hope, does not falsify it.

⁹⁵ De potentia, VII.2, ad 7.

⁹⁶ Ibid., VII.5, ad 1.

⁹⁷ ScG I.30.3; also De potentia, VII.5, ad 2.

⁹⁸ Super Sent., I.22.1.2.

⁹⁹ If Thomas is not always as explicit about this as might be desired, his actual practice reflects it. For example, in the same article of the Summa Theologiae, he calls God's manner of existence both “existence itself” and “an infinite ocean of being” (ST I.13.11, resp.).

¹⁰⁰ “Even the most speculative diaphor must have some analogy in order to be under stood as a metaphor, and it is this modicum of similarity that guarantees an expression of truth in metaphor” (MacCormac, Earl R., A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985], 208).Google Scholar See also Scheffler, Israel, In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions (New York: Routledge, 1991), 45.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Pace Hughes, Gerald, “Aquinas and the Limits of Agnosticism,” in The Philosophical Assessment of Theology: Essays in Honour of Frederick C. Copleston, ed. Hughes, Gerald J. (Kent: Search Press, 1987), 56–57.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., Kittay, Eva F., Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Radman, Zdravko, ed., From a Metaphorical Point of View: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Cognitive Content of Metaphor (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996)Google Scholar; and Gibbs, Raymond W. Jr., ed., The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Berrgren, Douglas, “The Use and Abuse of Metaphor, I,” The Review of Metaphysics 16 (1962): 237–58, at 237.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 243.

¹⁰⁷ Camp, Elisabeth, “Metaphor and that Certain ‘Je ne sais quoi’,” Philosophical Studies 129 (2006): 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁸ As an example of a thinker who does see this view as a disservice to metaphor, see Hazelton, Roger, “Theological Analogy and Metaphor,” Semeia 13 (1978): 155–76.Google Scholar