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Meaning, Morals and the Existence of God

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2014

Gerald McCarthy
Gerald McCarthy*
Affiliation:
College of the Holy Cross
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Abstract

This essay is divided into two sections. Part I analyzes and compares in detail the arguments of Schubert Ogden and Hans Küng for the existence of God. Essentially, both Küng and Ogden argue that certain characteristic human activities (especially moral choices) presuppose a confidence (Ogden) or a basic trust (Küng) that our lives and reality of which our lives are a part are meaningful. They continue to argue that this confidence or this basic trust are only justifiable on the condition of belief in God. Hence, they conclude that a belief in God is presupposed by our moral choices. Part II critically evaluates the above argument by drawing on distinctions made by analytic philosophers (Baier, Nielsen, Ayer) in their discussions of what conditions are necessary and sufficient to make a life (or life) meaningful. The discussion with analytic philosophy is important because neither Küng nor Ogden take any notice of the arguments raised there.

Type
Articles
Information
Horizons , Volume 9 , Issue 2 , Fall 1982 , pp. 288 - 301
Copyright
Copyright © The College Theology Society 1982

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References

1 Ogden, Schubert, “The Strange Witness of Unbelief,” rpt. in his The Reality of God (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 128–29.Google Scholar All reference to Ogden's works are taken from this volume.

2 Ibid., pp. 131-32.

3 Ibid., p. 133.

4 Ibid., pp. 124-25.

5 Ibid., pp. 21-22.

6 Ibid., p. 22.

7 Ibid., pp. 28-31.

8 Ibid., p. 140.

9 Ibid., pp. 36, 140.

10 Ibid., p. 36.

11 Ibid., p. 139.

12 Russell, Bertrand, “A Free Man's Worship,” in Why I Am Not A Christian (New York, 1959), p. 105.Google Scholar

13 Ogden, p. 37.

14 Ibid., p. 140.

15 Küng, Hans, Does God Exist?, trans. Quinn, Edward (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), p. 430.Google Scholar The argument as presented here is for all purposes identical with the one presented in On Being a Christian (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), pp. 57–88.Google Scholar For the sake of simplicity, I shall refer only to the argument in Does God Exist?.

16 Ibid., pp. 388-89.

17 Ibid., p. 419.

18 Ibid., pp. 443-45.

19 Ibid., p. 438.

20 Ibid., p. 444.

21 Ibid., pp. 460-65.

22 Ibid., p. 466.

23 Ibid., p. 470.

24 Ibid., p. 565.

25 Ibid., p. 566.

26 Ibid., p. 567.

27 Ibid., p. 568.

28 Ibid., p. 571.

29 Ibid., p. 571.

30 Ogden, p. 140.

31 Baier, Kurt, The Meaning of Life (Canberra, University College, 1957), p. 19.Google Scholar

32 Ibid., p. 21.

33 Nielsen, Kai, “Linguistic Philosophy and the ‘Meaning of Life,’” Cross Currents (Summer, 1964), 331.Google Scholar

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., p. 320.

36 On this point, see Britten, Karl, Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 12–15Google Scholar and Hepburn, Ronald, “Questions About the Meaning of Life,” Religious Studies 1 (1965), 128.Google Scholar

37 See Britten, p. 16; Joske, W. D., “Philosophy and the Meaning of Life,” in Klemke, E. D. (ed.), The Meaning of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 255.Google Scholar

38 Wisdom, John, “The Meanings of the Questions of Life,” in Klemke, , p. 208.Google Scholar

39 Brown, Delwin, “Process Philosophy and the Question of Life's Meaning,” Religious Studies 7 (1971), 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Ronald Hepburn, pp. 135-36, make this point.

40 Edwards, Paul, “The Meaning and Value of Life,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy; rpt. in Klemke, , p. 128.Google Scholar

41 Ibid., p. 135.

42 Hepburn, Ronald, “A Critique of Humanist Theology,” in Blackham, H. J. (ed.), Objections to Humanism (New York: Lippincott, 1963), p. 42.Google Scholar

43 In fact, Küng makes moves along these lines. On pp. 578-83, he asserts that the atheist can give no sufficient account of the absoluteness of moral obligations. Unfortunately, (1) this remains at the level of assertion rather than argument, and (2) it presupposes without argument that duty or obligation is the central characteristic of moral actions. But, in view of the fact that this has been called into question by authors as diverse as Nowell-Smith, P. H., Ethics (Baltimore: Penguin, 1954), pp. 185–226Google Scholar and Anscombe, G. E. M., “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 (1958), 1–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar, this cannot be so simply assumed.

44 Such an argument is especially prominent in British philosophy of religion. See, for example, Rashdall, Hasting, The Theory of Good and Evil, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1907)Google Scholar; Taylor, A. E., Does God Exist? (New York: Macmillan, 1947)Google Scholar; Owen, H. P., The Moral Argument For Christian Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).Google Scholar