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The Power of Systematic Doubt in Historical Enquiry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 October 2013

Jan Vansina
Jan Vansina*
Affiliation:
Katolieke Universiteit te Leuven
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Many readers have probably noticed that the manuals of historical method which deal with verbal societies are primarily concerned with the sources available and the application of a critique to them. This is true for McCall's or Gabel and Bennett's works on Africa. But what is to be done with the sources once they are ready for evaluation remains vague. How does one reconstruct the past? How does one explain, or eventually interpret, history? Of the two works mentioned, only the first pays some attention to the question of “historical synthesis.’ McCall lists three possibilities: (a) that the sources support each other; (b) that they contradict each other; and (c) that they have no common reference or meeting point. This last situation is the most common in African history and indicates merely that not enough is known and that eventually new data could lead to new interpretative situations-either (a) or (b). The manual stresses that sources should be classified by discipline so that comparison of sources yields either confirmation or contradiction, with obvious and known data reinforcing the validity of the result. Once this is achieved it would seem that the job is finished, except for the warning that historical reconstruction requires a certain type of mind: imaginative yet disciplined.

Yet the job is not finished. By comparing we have only established the degree of validity of reported events or situations. We have only verified how the observation, to borrow a term from the scientific experimental method, is correct. The impression remains that historical research is fairly mechanical: to find sources, subject them to a critique, assemble them. Reconstruction follows, with suitable use of imagination. That is the craft. Yet anyone who works with historical materials knows that that is not the practice of the craft. Josephine Tey's novel The Daughter of Time features a police sergeant who more nearly exemplifies historical practice–he guesses, ponders, backtracks, and finds sources almost by intuition. If he had made a few more mistakes he would have been a recognizable historian at work. A recent volume, The Historian's Workshop, though impressionistic, also yields a more realistic picture. In the real world historians start out with a hunch, an idea which leads them to an interest in documents or in oral traditions. Then the data suggest what Popper calls a historical interpretation – “untestable points of view.” The practitioner feels that the interpretation is not enough. It should be doubted and controlled by reference to more data until the point is reached at which no more control is possible. Then the historian feels satisfied with the result–even though it still remains an interpretation, because there remains the selective point of view implicit in the idea that initiated the research.

Type
Research Article
Information
History in Africa , Volume 1 , 1974 , pp. 109 - 127
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 1974

References

Notes

1. McCall, D.F., Africa in Time Perspective: A Discussion of Historical Reconstruction from Unwritten Sources (Boston, 1964)Google Scholar; Gabel, C. and Bennett, N.R., eds., Reconstructing African Culture History (Boston, 1967).Google Scholar These works are not alone; all treatises we know of have neglected this aspect of historical method. They give a few hints or leave the matter to philosophers of history. See such works as Goff, J. Le and Nora, P., eds., Faire de l'histoire, 3 vols. (Paris, 1974)Google Scholar, or the older Samaran, C., L'histoire et ses méthodes (Paris, 1961).Google Scholar The latest (15th) edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macrapaedia, 8:958Google Scholar, recognizes that “the critical operations on the sources are merely preliminaries and the work of the historian proper only begins when he attempts a synthesis of his materials.” But the prescription given only repeats that historians must muster up sympathy with the subjects under study (debatable!), mentions imaginative insight, and concludes that “ideally, a historian must display capacities akin to those of a poet or an artist.” This kind of conclusion is both common and obnoxious. The ‘art of healing’ hampered scientific, i.e. experimental, medicine considerably. The ‘art of history’ may well prevent further methodological elaboration of the whole process of enquiry. There will always remain an imaginative part to historical research, just as there is in all sciences, but that truth should not be used to cut off all further discussion, as so commonly happens.

2. McCall, , Africa in Time Perspective, pp. 145–55.Google Scholar

3. Tey, J., The Daughter of Time (London, 1951).Google Scholar

4. Curtis, L.P. Jr., ed., The Historian's Workshop: Original Essays by Sixteen Historians (New York, 1970).Google Scholar

5. Popper, K., The Poverty of Historicism (London, 1957), pp. 150–1.Google Scholar The general point that ideas oi theories always precede observation is accepted by all philosophers of science and by historians. There cannot be a ‘pure’ inductive method.

6. Bernard, C., Introduction à l'étude de la médicine expérimentale (Paris, 1966 [original edition, 1865]), pt. I, pp. 29–93.Google Scholar This section is divided into two parts: “Observation and Experiment,” and “A Priori Ideas and Doubt in Experimental Reasoning.” A typical example of compromise is the famous article by Oliver, R., “The Problem of the Bantu Expansion,” JAH, 7 (1966), pp. 361–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which conciliates two apparently contradictory linguistic theories. Despite its ingenuity and brilliant insights its major weakness now appears clearly to have derived from the simple juxtaposition of these theories.

7. Bernard, , Introduction, p. 234.Google Scholar Bernard explains that if we can be certain on the one hand that determinism exists we can on the other hand never be certain that we have found it.

8. This is true of any concrete situation, whether it be in physics, economics, or history. Hence the deterministic principles advanced cannot apply totally and all the factors involved in bringing about the concrete situation cannot be anticipated.

9. E.g., Einstein, A. and Infeld, L., Die Evolution der Physik: von Newton bis zur Quantentheorie (Hamburg, 1956)Google Scholar for a classic exposition. Confirming the point is Benison, S., Tom Rivers: Reflections on a Life in Medicine and Science (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).Google Scholar

10. Vansina, J., Geschiedenis van de Kuba van ongeveer 1500 tot 1904 (Tervuren, 1963).Google Scholar

11. The Bushoong language is spoken by the central group of the central Kuba languages, all of which are dialects of it or closely related to it. The Bushoong ruled the kingdom conventionally labelled ‘Kuba’.

12. Vansina, , Geschiedenis, pp. 246–7Google Scholar; Daeleman, J., “Vergelijkende studie over enkele Noordwestelijke Bantoetalen” (unpublished diss., Leuven, 1956).Google Scholar

13. Vansina, , Geschiedenis, pp. 110, 135, 251–2.Google Scholar

14. Evrard, E., Etude statistique sur les affinités de cinquante-huit dialectes bantous: statistique et analyse linguistique (Strasburg, 1966), pp. 85–94.Google Scholar

15. J. Vansina, “Les langues bantoues et l'histoire: le cas Kuba” in A. Mérrier, ed., Melanges offerts à Hubert Deschamps, in press.

16. Vansina, J., “Traditions of Genesis,” JAH, 15 (1974).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. Miller, J.C., “Kings and Kinsmen: The Imbangala Impact of the Mbundu of Angola” (unpublished diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971).Google Scholar

18. The impact of theories in social sciences, especially anthropology, is to be expected, as is the influence of colleagues and friends. Inspiration derived from other historical works is not so evident, but every man is an imitator; furthermore, other works often grapple with similar problems. Hence Roberts, A.D., A History of the Bemba (London, 1973)Google Scholar is the latest of a series of works which have acted as stimuli to revise the Kuba case.

19. On the same grounds as the age-area hypothesis in biology and anthropology; for the latter see Hickerson, H., The Chippewa and Their Neighbors: A Study in Ethnohistory (New York, 1970), pp. 21–4.Google Scholar

20. Torday, E. and Joyce, T.A., Notes ethnographiques sur les peuples communément appelés Bakuba, ainsi que sur les peuplades apparentées, les Bushongo (Brussels, 1910), pp. 32, 37, 43, 109, 255–7.Google Scholar

21. McCall, , Africa in Time Perspective, p. 144.Google Scholar

22. Douglas, M., “Lele Economy Compared with the Bushoong: A Study of Economic Backwardness” in Bohannan, P. and Dalton, G., eds., Markets in Africa (Evanston, 1962), pp. 211-33, esp. 219–21.Google Scholar

23. Henige, D.P., The Chronology of Oral Tradition (Oxford, 1974), pp. 34–6.Google Scholar

24. Bontinck, F., “Histoire du royaume du Congo (ca. 1624),” Etudes l'histoire Africaine, 4 (1972), pp. 5-145, esp. 63, 133.Google Scholar For the date see pp. 21-3.

25. Fehderau, H.W., The Origin and Development of. Kituba (Lingua Franca Kikongo) (Kisingani, 1967).Google Scholar

26. Vansina, J., “Probing the Past of the Lower Kwilu Peoples (Zaïre),” Paideuma, 19/20 (1973/1974), p. 351.Google Scholar

27. Popper, , Poverty of Historicism, pp. 93–4Google Scholar, points out that even when experimenting in physics “other things are usually not equal.” He argues (p. 62) that social science can establish hypotheses analogous to those in the natural sciences. See also pp. 59-62.

28. For archeology compare Finley, M.I., “Archeology and History,” Daedalus, No. 100 (1971), pp. 169–74Google Scholar, and L. and Binford, S., eds., New Perspectives in Archeology (Chicago, 1968), pp. 16–27.Google Scholar The most extreme position in the laxest sense may still be Flannery, K.V. and Coe, M.C., “Social and Economic Systems in Formative Mesoamerica,” in Binford, and Binford, , eds, New Perspectives, pp. 267–83.Google Scholar This wide-ranging kind of interpretation has become fairly common recently but the strictures of Finley have yet to be refuted successfully.

29. Bernard, , Introduction, pp. 91, 182.Google Scholar

30. Ibid., p. 182-5, would call this comparative experiment. At pp. 253-6 Bernard cites examples showing that the comparative experiment is ordinarily used as a counterproof. For control groups in medicine see Benison, Tom Rivers, passim.

31. The comparative method is still a major point of debate in anthropology. Can true comparibility be achieved and, if so, how? Narroll, R. and Chen, R., eds., A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology (New York, 1970) devote pp. 581–1003Google Scholar to this problem. See. J.F. Köbben, “Comparitivists and Non-Comparativists in Anthropology,” ibid., pp. 581-96, for a discussion of the various positions.

32. Bernard, , Introduction, pp. 253–1Google Scholar, speaks of a “consigne” and illustrates how a counterproof seemed to be completely superfluous, yet when the experiment was concluded the results were entirely unexpected. The counterproof by reasoning is perfectly valid. Popper, , Poverty of Historicism, p. 95Google Scholar, speaks of an “experiment in imagination.” He shows the crucial role of the counterproof in establishing theory (ibid., pp. iiin and 131-6). “Precisely because it is our purpose to establish theories as well as we can it is imperative that we test them as severely as possible. We must try to find fault with them and to falsify them. Only if we are unable to falsify them despite our best efforts can we say that they have stood the test. This is why instances confirming a theory mean little if we have not tried (and failed) to discover refutations” (ibid., pp. 133-4).

33. Clavier, H., “Remarques sur la méthode en théologie biblique,” Novum Testamentum (1972), p. 182Google Scholar, recalls the necessity for such scholars to “suspend judgment,” to put personal conviction aside for the duration of the research, to practice the Epoche of the phenomenologists. See also ibid., p. 189.

34. Genicot, L., Critique historique (Louvain, 1964), p. 49Google Scholar, considers it as a last resort. The hypothesis must represent “the only conceivable explanation today of the established facts.” This clearly is impossible and too positivistic.

35. Popper, , Poverty of Historicism, p. 151Google Scholar, admits the possibility of formulating true hypotheses in history but argues that most historical “approaches” or “points of view” cannot be tested. At the descriptive level one must disagree but at the level of historical causal understanding he may well be correct, especially since, for him, history deals only with the unique (p. 143)–a point of view we cannot accept. Therefore we do not believe that historical causal explanation will always remain as vague and untestable as it often is now. Carr, E.H., What Is History? (New York, 1961), pp. 75–6Google Scholar, feels that the status of the hypotheses used by the historian is remarkably similar to that of those of the scientist.

36. Bury, J.B., Selected Essays (Cambridge, 1930), p. 52.Google Scholar

37. Popper, , Poverty of Historicism, p. 141.Google Scholar For Popper the zero method assumes complete rationality and estimation of deviations. The second operation is required in principle only in economics where the first is assumed by the hypothesis (‘rational’ being defined by the model).

38. Sahlins, M., Stone Age Economics (Chicago, 1972), pp. 87-92, 102–22.Google Scholar

39. McCall, , Africa in Time Perspective, pp. 144–55Google Scholar, differs considerably from this approach. I know of no other specific discussion on this matter except for general statements about teamwork and interdisciplinary support.

40. Alagoa, E.J., “Oral Tradition and Archaeology,” Oduma, 1 (1973), pp. 10–2.Google Scholar

41. Schmitz, C.A., Historische Völkerkunde (Frankfurt, 1967)Google Scholar is an excellent reader, especially on the German schools. See Hickerson, , Chippewa, pp. 18–33Google Scholar, for a discussion of the American schools of thought.

42. The prescription is easily uttered. Only the production of actual articles and monographs which stress the impact of these biological factors will in fact develop our awareness. When will we have an African analogue of Zinsser, H., Rats, Lice and History (Boston, 1935)Google Scholar? Only a bestseller of this kind can help us break through, especially in the field of medicine.

43. All philosophers of history and historians who write handbooks argue that history explains by showing recurring and/or unique causes. Beyond this opinions differ sharply as, for instance, can be seen by comparing Popper, , Poverty of Historicism, pp. 143–52Google Scholar and Carr, , What Is History?, pp. 113–43Google Scholar (to take two recent examples). At the level of small regularities of the type that follows, agreement still obtains, but broad generalization is primarily a function of philosophical conviction. The ‘meaning of history’ remains the a priori philosophy of the historian.

44. Douglas, “Lele Economy”; Sahlins, , Stone Age Economics, pp. 130–48.Google Scholar The position of Sahlins presupposes the acceptance of his definitions of ‘state’, which in turn are dependent on the acceptance of a multilinear evolutionary theory. Needless to say, his proposal clashes with standard Marxian thought. Yet on this point it would seem that a worldwide study including counterproof or refutation analysis should be able to come to more than a vague ‘interpretation’.

45. Popper, , Poverty of Historicism, pp. 144–6Google Scholar, stresses the reliance on other disciplines but does not grasp how truly frequent and general this is, even at the simplest level of descriptive history. Other philosophers of history maintain a similar position.

46. Harlan, J.R. and de Wet, J.M.J., “On the Quality of the Evidence for the Origin and Dispersal of Cultivated Plants,” Current Anthropology, 14 (1973), p. 54CrossRefGoogle Scholar, discuss the probabilities regarding “items of dubious quality.”