¹ See Robbins, K.G., Munich 1938, (London, 1968).Google Scholar

² Wiskemann, E., Czechs and Germans, (London, 1967), p. x.Google Scholar

³ Brügel, J.W., Tschechen und Deutsche, (Munich, 1967), especially chap. 12.Google Scholar

⁴ It seems that Christie was also working for the British Intelligence Service. He was also referred to as Col. Christie.

⁵ Wiskemann, p. 246.

⁶ Seton-Watson, R.W., A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (London, 1943), pp. 393–4.Google Scholar

⁷ The Slavonic Review, (July 1935), p. 72.

⁸ The Labour Party, Labour and the Peace Treaty, (London, 1019), p. 65.Google Scholar

⁹ Brügel, pp. 238–9.

¹⁰ Whiteside, A.G., Austrian National Socialism before 1918, (The Hague, 1962), pp. 40–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Whiteside, pp. 51–3

¹² Wiskeman, p. 68.

¹³ César, J. and Černý, B., ‘German Irridentist Putsch in the Czech lands after the First World War’, Historica, III, (1961), 224–5.Google Scholar

¹⁴ This gymnastic activity had strident patriotic overtones in the tradition of Jahn. Its counterpart on the Czech side wasthe Sokol movement.

¹⁵ The full title of the group was Kameradschaftsbund für Volks und sozialpolitische Bildung. It was founded in 1924 by two students of Othmar Spann—Walther Heinrich and Heinz Rutha. Its activities were greatly expanded after 1926. Its leadership was drawn from the Wandervogel of Northern Bohemia. It was organized hierarchically and never had more than a few hundred members. The leadership group included Brand, Rutha, Heinrich, Henlein, Kuhn, Köllner, Sebekovsky, May, and Kundt—all young men in their twenties. Members of the organization penetrated into the majority of German political parties, mass organizations and cultural societies. Nevertheless, until the mid-thirties many Germans in Czechoslovakia had never heard of its existence. See Wiskemann, pp. 136–7; César, J. and Černý, B., ‘The Nazi Fifth Column in Czechoslovakia’ in Historica, iv, (1962), 199–204;Google Scholar and Luza, R., The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans (London, 1964), pp. 63–6.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Wiskemann, p. 201.

¹⁷ Spann was Professor of Sociology and National Economy at the University of Vienna. Until 1919, he was on the staff of the German Technical High School in Brunn. His bestknown works were Der wakre Staat and Die Geschichtsphilosophie. The sympathies of Brand, Rutha and Heinrich (all professional men) were initially much nearer to the Austrian corporative regime than the Nazi movement. They regarded the plebeian Nazis as unsuitable for an elite body. For a good exposition of Spann's writings and the general intellectual climate see Diamant, A., Austrian Catholics and the First Republic; Democracy, Capitalism and the Social order, 1918–34 (Princeton, 1960), especially pp. 229–40.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Von Salomon, E., The Answers (London, 1954), pp. 95–9.Google Scholar

¹⁹ DGFP, Series C, 1, 583–4.

²⁰ Bílek, B., Fifth Column at Work. (London, 1945), p. 26.Google Scholar

²¹ Krài, V., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, 1933–47 (Prague, 1964), p. 64.Google Scholar

²² Krebs subsequently declared that he had requested Henlein ‘to found a new movement before the party was officially dissolved…’. Bílek, p. 26 n. 3.

²³ Brand's own testimony in Luza, p. 70.

²⁴ Luza, p. 66.

²⁵ Henlein spoke at an Administrative Training College in Vienna on either the 4th or 5th of March on ‘The Sudeten Struggle of Liberation’ in one of a series of lectures on the Greater German Reich. The speech (and similar remarks made elsewhere) is reproduced in Duff, S. Grant, A German Protectorate: The Czechs under Nazi Rule (London, 1942), pp. 46–7.Google Scholar For a further discussion of the implications of the speech see Luza, p. 71; Laffan, R.G.D., Survey of International Affairs, 1938 (London, 1951) 11, 49;Google ScholarRaschhofer, H., Die Sudetenfrage (Munich, 1953), pp. 162 ff.;Google ScholarCelovsky, B., Das Münchener Abkommen 1938 (Stuttgart, 1958), pp. 117–18;Google Scholar J. W. Brügel, pp. 256–8.

²⁶ DGFP, Series C, 1, 904–6

²⁷ DGFP, Series C, 11, 92–4.

²⁸ DGFP, Series C, 11, 237.

²⁹ Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1918–45. Documents on German Policies, (Prague, 1965), pp. 88–9.Google Scholar

³⁰ Luza, p. 73. Dr Brügel is right to describe as a legend the view that the Nazis never forgave Henlein for this speech: Brügel, p. 257. On the other hand, the very fact that Henlein made the speech without ‘clearing it’ beforehand, and that it did give rise to some suspicions is evidence that Henlein must have possessed a certain tactical freedom. Indeed, H.-A. Jacobsen states that Hess allowed Henlein tactical freedom in his activities in Czechoslovakia at a meeting near Wunsiedel on 18 September 1934. Just what this involved is another question. Jacobsen, H.-A., Nationahozialistische Aussenpolitik, 1933–38, (Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1969). P. 794.Google Scholar

³¹ Neuwirth's testimony in Luza, p. 74. Jacobsen dates the first meeting between Henlein and Steinacher at the end of April in the Riesengebirge.

³² DGFP, Series C, 11, 351.

³³ DGFP, Series C, 11, 681–2.

³⁴ DGFP.Series C, 11, 617–18.

³⁵ DGFP, Series C, 11, 670.

³⁶ The structure can now be studied in the second section of Jacobsen. The details of the conflicts between the various offices cannot be studied here, but they must be remembered whenever relations between Henlein and ‘Berlin’ are mentioned.

³⁷ Brügel, p. 251.

³⁸ DGFP, Series C, 111, 908–10.

³⁹ DGFP, Series C, 111, 994–5.

⁴⁰ Brügel, p. 259. Eubank, K., Munich (Norman, Oklahoma, 1963), p. 9.Google Scholar

⁴¹ César and Černý, ‘The Nazi Fifth Column …’, p. 226.

⁴² DGFP, Series C, iv, 186.

⁴³ DGFP, Series C, iv, 679–80 and 1026.

⁴⁴ Völkischer Beobachter, 14 December 1935. Brügel, p. 286, believes that the criticism was deliberately made to keep up the fiction that differences existed between Henlein and the Reich. It is impossible to say with any certainty.

⁴⁵ A German Deputy, ‘The German Minority in Czechoslovakia’, The Slavonic Review (January 1936), ironically, the author was probably K. H. Frank.

⁴⁶ Sobota, E., ‘A Czech View’, The Slavonic Review, (January 1936).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ DGFP, Series C, v, 796–7.

⁴⁸ For example, Henlein denied all connexion with Hitler in conversation with Seton-Watson in Prague in January 1936. On the other hand, Seton-Watson found the mocking and negative attitude of K. H. Frank in marked contrast to that of the other Sudeten leaders.

⁴⁹ Entries in Steinacher's diary reflect the tension of these months. In November, Henlein was represented as contemplating resignation and the consequent destruction of the Sudeten Party because of the intrigues against him. Student groups in Prague were being stirred up against him by the HJ and the Gestapo. H.-A. Jacobsen, p. 444.

⁵⁰ DGFP, Series C, v, 608–9 and 624–7.

⁵¹ Rönnefarth, H.K.G., Die Sudetenkrise in der internationalen Politik (Wiesbaden, 1961), 1, 128–31.Google Scholar

⁵² Luza, pp. 92–3.

⁵³ Luza, p. 93 and Wiskemann, p. 250.

⁵⁴ Die Deutschen in der Tsckechoslowakei, pp. 102–3.

⁵⁵ Vansittart's comments in his autobiography are unhelpful. ‘One Henlein came into view as their new leader, a dreary gymnast. The Czechs suspected what I discovered later—that he was in Nazi pay. Proof was not easy; he lived meanly because the Germans were mean in such matters. When I did find out, Henlein's monthly subsidy was 15,000 marks, not much to run a movement.’ Vansittart, Lord, The Mist Procession (London, 1958), p. 470.Google Scholar Vansittart neither reveals when he found out nor why he did not have suspicions earlier.

In his customary superior way, Vansittart might well describe Henlein as a ‘dreary gymnast’. Nevertheless, there was clearly something about Henlein's personality which impressed the Englishmen he met. It may well have been his ‘ordinariness’ which was the attraction. The fact that he had a sense of humour was apparently enough to make him an extraordinary German, e.g. ‘Later in the war Henlein was to boast how he had fooled the English, and in the last days of Germany's collapse he was to take his own life. But to do him justice, he had a sense of humour…’ Lockhart, R.H. Bruce, Comes the Reckoning (London, 1947), pp. 61–2.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ DDF, Sér. 2, Tome m, no. 122.

⁵⁷ There is an odd episode recorded by Bflek relating to 1936. An unnamed ‘well-known British personality’ had long discussions in Berlin with Hess and others, dealing exclusively with Eastern European affairs. According to a Czech confidential report, Hess quoted figures and information from a Sudeten Party memorandum. The visitor replied that he himself possessed the memorandum and had discussed its contents with Henlein in London. ‘This remark by Mr — took the participants of the discussion by suprise. They did not seem to have been informed that Henlein had also been discussing matters with Mr — in London.’ p. 219. Bílek himself makes the comment ‘It seems that Henlein did not properly inform even his masters…’. p. 23. It could equally be suggested that the language of ‘masters’ and ‘servants’ was not altogether appropriate. César and Černý, p. 236 add that Henlein had talks with British parliamentarians ‘notorious for their pro-German sympathies’ and, somewhat curiously, instance Leo Amery and R. S. Hudson.

⁵⁸ Die Deutschen in der Tchechoslowakei, p. 19.

⁵⁹ DGFP, Series C, v, 898–9.

⁶⁰ According to the entry in the Protocol Book in the Berlin Chancery, ‘The Ftihrer and Reich Chancellor received the Führer of the Sudeten German Party, Konrad Henlein in an audience which lasted 45 minutes and informed himself on the questions of the German minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic and the latest developments in the party. Konrad Henlein put before the Führer the wishes of the German minority in Czechoslovakia and asked for moral support for the minimum programme of the Henlein Party in its negotiations with the Czechoslovak Government. The Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor reserved his decision …’ Bílek, p. 90. In so far as it is possible to make anything of this entry, it hardly indicates complete mutal understanding.

⁶¹ DGFP, Series C, v, 1054.

⁶² DDF, Sér. 2, Tome III, 505.

⁶³ Luza, p. 96.

⁶⁴ Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, pp. 115–16

⁶⁵ Frank saw the Reichsftthrer S.S. Himmler on 1 March 1937 who told him that the Sudetens would join the Reich in the not-too-distant future. Brügel, p. 319.

⁶⁶ H.-A. Jacobsen, pp. 250–2. Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, pp. 124–5.

⁶⁷ DGFP, Series D, II, 30–1.

⁶⁸ DGFP, Series D, 11, 22–3.

⁶⁹ Luza, p. 103

⁷⁰ DGFP, Series D, n, 1–9.

⁷¹ DGFP, Series D, 11, 49–62.

⁷² DGFP, Series D, II, pp. 64–6. Henlein's reference to ‘as formerly’ is an indication that he was suffering official displeasure from some circles. Hitler himself was receiving letters at this time urging the dismissal of Henlein: H.-A. Jacobsen, p. 351. It is noteworthy that also on 19 November, Halifax told Hitler that he foresaw possible changes in the case of Czechoslovakia. ‘England was interested to see that any alterations should come through the course of peaceful evolution and that any methods should be avoided which might cause farreaching disturbances…’ DGFP, Series D, 1, 62–3. This hint may explain why the campaign against Henlein was not allowed to succeed.

⁷³ Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, pp. 133–5.

⁷⁴ DGFP, Series D, 11, 123.

⁷⁵ DGFP, Series D, 11, 155.

⁷⁶ DBFP, Third Series, I, 68.

⁷⁷ DGFP, Series D, 11, 170.

⁷⁸ DGFP, Series D, 11, 173–4.

⁷⁹ DBFP, Third series, 1, 56.

⁸⁰ DGFP, Series D, 11, 197–8.

⁸¹ DGFP, Series D, 11, pp. 208–9.

⁸² Laffan, Survey, pp. 94–7.

⁸³ The Times, 14 May 1938: DGFP, Series D, 11, 273–4.

⁸⁴ In fact in the end, Henlein did turn out to be rather like Seyss-Inquart. The defence made by Seyss-Inquart at Nuremburg—that he was a nationalist and believer in the Anschluss through natural, evolutionary, historical forces who disliked unnecessary violence—could well have been one which Henlein, had he not committed suicide in 1945, would probably have chosen to adopt. Davidson remarks that Seyss-Inquart ‘was actually, as Schuschnigg said of him, a limited Austrian Nazi; he was cautious, correct, and far removed from the murderers and brawling militant leaders…’. Davidson, E., The Trial of the Germans (New York, 1966), pp. 448–9.Google Scholar Henlein's relations with the Sudeten Nazi extremists were very similar to those Seyss-Inquart had with Captain Leopold. Seyss-Inquart, incidentally, lived until his teens in the German Sprachinsel of Iglau in Moravia.

⁸⁵ See Birkenhead, Lord, The Prof in Two Worlds (London, 1961), p. 173;Google ScholarChurchill, W.S., The Gathering Storm (London, 1948), p. 223;Google Scholar DBFP, Third Series, II, 633–5.

⁸⁶ The Times, 14 May 1938.

⁸⁷ Nicolson, H., Diaries and Letters, 1930–39, (London, 1966), pp. 340–1.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ DBFP, Third Series, I, 630–3. I. Colvin, , Vansittart in Office (London, 1965), pp. 208–9Google Scholar, comments: ‘It is impossible to avoid the criticism that Vansittart and the Secret Service ought to have known of Herr Henlein's close association with Ribbentrop and Hitler, though Sir Alexander Cadogan tells me that ‘Van was soon cured of his illusion’. Cadogan's vague assurance does not enable us to settle the important question of the point when Vansittart became certain of the German connexions. In any case, he had been dealing with Henlein for some years by May 1938. His behaviour and the strange incuriosity or incompetence of the Secret Service remain among the most puzzling aspects of the whole question.

⁸⁹ Templewood, Lord, Nine Troubled Years (London, 1954), pp. 293–5.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ FRUS, 1938, 1, 498–500.

⁹¹ DBFP, Third Series, I, 630–3.

⁹² Masaryk to Krofta, 14 May 1938. Cited in Wallace, W.V., ‘The Making of the May Crisis of 1938’, Slavonic and East European Review (June 1963), p. 371.Google Scholar

⁹³ DBFP, Third Series, 1, 635.

⁹⁴ The Times, 16 May 1938; Wheeler-Bennett, J.W., Munich, Prologue to Tragedy (London, 1963), p. 54. Sir John, commenting on Henlein's May 1938 visit to Britain, says (p. 53): ‘He had been there twice before, the last time in the spring of 1937…’ Henlein never came in the spring of 1937 and had previously paid three visits to Britain.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ The Times, 16 May 1938.

⁹⁶ Churchill, W.S., Step by Step (London, 1939), pp. 255–8.Google Scholar In conversation with Bruce Lockhart Beneš apparently made a similar point. ‘He admitted that the Nazi triumph had strengthened the Henlein Party…Already, any German-Bohemians who had belonged to the Activist Parties were switching over to Henlein in order to ensure for themselves immunity from persecution in the probable event of a Henlein victory. At the same time many members of the Henlein Party might well be alarmed by what was happening to the Austrian Nazis, who from the first moment were being superseded by Reich Germans in all the important posts.’ Lockhart, R.H. Bruce, Guns or Butter (London, 1938), pp. 285–6.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Boothby, R., I Fight to Live, (London, 1947), pp. 153–4.Google Scholar Even though exclusive guilt has been wrongly placed upon Frank by those who would exonerate Henlein, it cannot be denied that it was Frank who had the position of real power in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia compared with the prestigious but vacuous position of Sudeten Gauleiter held by Henlein.

⁹⁸ Boothby, p 158.

⁹⁹ There is no space in this article to discuss the ‘May Crisis’. How far Henlein's London visit played a decisive part in Hitler's plans depends in part on when and how Henlein reported his visit. Wallace, ‘The Making of the May Crisis’, p. 387 says ‘By 15 May Henlein had reported to Hitler’. He quotes DGFP, Series D, II, 310 n.12 as his source. But this somewhat puzzling note says: ‘Henlein, on his return on May 14 from his visit to London went to Berchtesgaden; he was back in Prague on the 23rd when he re-opened negotiations with the Czechoslovak Prime Minister.’ But The Times report makes it clear that Henlein arrived back in Berlin on the night of 14 May, caught the train from Berlin on the afternoon of 15 May, and arrived at his home in Asch that same evening {The Times, 16 May 1938). Celovsky, p. 226 merely says that nothing is known of Henlein's interview with Hitler. Luza, p. 125 says: ‘On his return from London on May 14, Henlein visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden. He returned to Aš[Asch] on May 15, but went back again to Germany to have a fundamental conference with Hitler.’ But his source is exactly the same note in the German Documents. Watt, D.C., ‘The May Crisis of 1938: A rejoinder to Mr Wallace’, Slavonic and East European Review (July 1966), p. 479Google Scholar, notes that the Jodl Diary appears to put Henlein's meeting with Hitler on the 22 May. Bflek, p. 39 says ‘Henlein left for a “holiday” in Germany on May 19, although it was just before the municipal elections in which the Henlein Party was intensively engaged…Hitler instructed Henlein to return to Czechoslovakia and continue the negotiations with the Government…Henlein returned and on May 23 was received by the Czechoslovak Prime Minister.’ The exact sequence of events needs further clarification.

¹⁰⁰ Die Deutschen in der Tschechosloivakei, pp. 255–7.

¹⁰¹ Schellenberg, W., The Schellenberg Memoirs (London, 1956), pp. 54–5.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Vansittart in The Times, 15 June 1953, wrote that ‘Henlein was brought over here so that he should be disillusioned from any idea that England was not interested in the Czech crisis … Never at any time did Henlein receive anything but warnings against any violence or encroachment anywhere…What Henlein said to his paymaster is of no account, because he was probably too frightened to say anything else.