¹ This was understood by American and British financial experts from 1941 onwards (if not earlier). Michael D., Bordo, ‘The Bretton Woods international monetary system: a historical overview’Google Scholar and G., John Ikenberry, ‘The political origins of Bretton Woods’, in Michael D., Bordo and Barry, Eichengreen (eds.), A retrospective on the Bretton Woods system (Chicago, 1993)Google Scholar. Ikenberry thinks that the creation of a ‘Keynesian’ view on both sides of the Atlantic contributed to the agreement on the need to promote full employment.

² In his memoirs the American military governor commented that the Russians found it hard to believe that the French, who were so dependent on the United States, could be so obstructive in Germany without American ‘acquiescence’. Clay, Lucius D., Decision Germany (London, 1950), p. 39Google Scholar. For a discussion of various aspects of French policy towards Germany see Werner Bührer, ‘Die französische Ruhrpolitik u. das Comeback der westdeutschen Schwerindustrie 1945–1952, and Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘La politique française à l'égard de la Rhénanie 1944–1947’, both essays to be found in Peter, Hüttenberger and Hansgeorg, Molitor (eds.), Franzosen und Deutsche am Rhein 1789–1918–1945 (Düsseldorf, 1989).Google Scholar

³ Andrew, Shennan, Rethinking France. Plans for renewal, 1940–46 (Oxford, 1989).Google Scholar

⁴ Philippe, Mioche, Le Plan Monnet. Genèse et élaboration, 1941–47 (Paris, 1987)Google Scholar. For an influential interpretation see Jean, Fourastié, Les Trente glorieuses ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975 (Paris, 1979).Google Scholar

⁵ Jean, Monnet, Memoirs (London, 1978), p. 254Google Scholar for the negotiations and the various grants obtained (e.g. a credit line of $650 million from the Export–Import Bank).

⁶ From the vast literature on this subject see Robert A., Pollard, Economic security and the origins of the Cold War, 1943–50 (New York 1985)Google Scholar and ibid.‘The National Security State reconsidered: Truman and economic containment, 1945–50’ in Michael J., Lacey (ed.), The Truman presidency (Cambridge, 1989)Google Scholar; G. John, Ikenberry, ‘Rethinking the origins of American hegemony’, Political Science Quarterly, CIV, 3 (1989)Google Scholar; David, Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe. Western Europe, America and postwar reconstruction (London, 1992)Google Scholar; Michael J., Hogan, ‘The rise and fall of economic diplomacy: Dean Acheson and the Marshall Plan’, in Douglas, Brinkley (ed.), Dean Acheson and the making of U.S. foreign policy (London, 1993).Google Scholar

⁷ Robert J., Donovan, The second victory: The Marshall Plan and the postwar revival of Europe (New York, 1987)Google Scholar provides an admirable and non-technical account. From a different perspective de Long, J. B. and Eichengren, B, ‘The Marshall plan: history's most successful adjustment program’ in Dornbusch, Rudiger et al. (eds.), Postwar economic reconstruction and lessons for the East today (Cambridge, Mass. 1993).Google Scholar

⁸ A(rchivi) S(torici) delle C(omunità) E(uropee) Villa II Poggiolo Florence Fonds Uri No 18 Folder Aide Américane (1948) 29 June 1948 Notes sur les conditions d'emploi…in which Pierre Uri makes it clear that to benefit from the counterpart funds France has to accept American direction over internal policies such as investment and inflation.

⁹ Hervé Alphand, director of economic and financial affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, is credited with being the first to appreciate the change under way. See his note to Georges Bidault, the foreign minister, dated 2 August 1947 in Gérard, Bossuat (ed.), D'Alger à Rome (1943–1957) [Brussels, 1989], pp. 81–8Google Scholar. For the general setting see Gérard, Bossuat, L'Europe occidentale à l'heure Américaine (Brussels, 1992)Google Scholar; Pierre, Gerbet, Le Relèvement, 1944–49 (Paris, 1991) esp. chs. ix–xiGoogle Scholar; René, Girault and Maurice, Lévy-Leboyer (eds.), Le Plan Marshall et le relèvement de l'Europe (Paris, 1993).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Gérard, Bossuat, La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944–1954, 2 vols. (Paris, 1992).Google Scholar

¹¹ Charles S., Maier and Bischof, G (eds.), The Marshall Plan and Germany (Leamington Spa, 1991)Google Scholar and Gerd, Hardach, Der Marshall-Plan. Auslandshilfe und Wiederaufbau in Westdeutschland 1948–1952 (Munich, 1994).Google Scholar

¹² For the Saar and French attitudes towards it Raymond, Poidevin, ‘Robert Schuman et la Sarre (1948–1952)’ in Rainer, Hudemann & Raymond, Poidevin (eds.), Die Saar 1945–1955/La Sarre 1945–1955 (Munich, 1992).Google Scholar

¹³ Archives Nationales [Paris] AJ 81 136, 27 Jan. 1951, Jean-Marie Louvel [minister of industry] to R. Schuman.

¹⁴ For a useful review of the period and the themes, Roseman, M, ‘Division and stability: recent writings on post-war German history’, in German History (Oxford), XI, 3 (1993), 363–90.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Alan S., Milward, The reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51 (London, 1984).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Pierre Uri stressed the crucial part played by Bernard Clappier. The latter realized that Schuman's career to date had been undistinguished, that the government was about to fall, and that Schuman might not keep his portfolio in a future cabinet. The plan would either sink or save the foreign minister. ASCE Florence Fonds Uri Dep 9:5 178: 13–178: 16 17B 6 part of entretien avec Pierre Uri à Paris, 13 Oct. 1980 (Antoine Marès).

¹⁷ The sequence of events is usefully described in Bernard, Clappier, l'Europe en marche (Lausanne, 1985)Google Scholar as quoted in 9 mai: naissance de l'Europe {La Documentation Française} (Paris, 1987), pp. 27–9Google Scholar. For the general background a useful account can be found in Géard, Bossuat, Les Fondateurs de l'Europe (Paris, 1994)Google Scholar, ch. 7, ‘Les Peres de 1'Europe en 1950’.

¹⁸ Two collections of essays have a bearing on the discussion: Raymond, Poidevin (ed.), Histoire des débuts de la construction Européenne (Brussels, 1986)Google Scholar and Klaus, Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schuman–Plans 1950/51 (Baden-Baden, 1988)Google Scholar which contains Frances, Lynch, ‘The Role of Jean Monnet in Setting up the Coal and Steel Community’.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Monnet's thoughts were first presented to the French government in a three page letter which he sent to George Bidault and Schuman on 28 April 1950. This is reproduced in L'Europe de Yalta à Maastricht, 1945–1993 (Le Monde. Numéro spécial. Paris, 1993), pp. 28–9Google Scholar. The text was then reworked on 3 May and sent to Bidault and Schuman on the following day. This version has been published as ‘Le mémorandum Monnet’ du 3 mai 1950 in Rieben, Henri et al. , La Greffe européenne (Lausanne, 1973).Google Scholar

²⁰ Handelsblatt (Düsseldorf) Nr 54, 12 May 1950, p. 1 for the comment …sicher ist, daß der Vorschlag Robert Schumans vorwiegend von politischen Gesichtspunkten ausgegangen ist.’ The first two drafts of Monnet's proposal had envisaged just the two countries, France and Germany. For a recent review of the Schuman Plan and its genesis Ulrich, Lappenküper, ‘Der Schuman-Plan. Mühsamer Durchbruch zur deutsch-französischen Verständigung’ in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 42 Jahrg. (3) Juli 1994.Google Scholar

²¹ René, Massigli, Une comedie des erreurs [Paris, 1978], pp. 227–8Google Scholar. Massigli (the French ambassador in London) commented in relation to supranationality ‘ce mot même qui avait tant effrayé les Britanniques et au nom duquel la croisade pour le Plan avait été lancée, figure seulement à l'article 9, oú il ne marque rien de plus que l'indépendence des membres de l'Autorité à l'égard des gouvernments qui les ont nommés.’ Massigli also observed (p. 228) ‘La supranationalité c'est en realité un état d'esprit, 1'affirmation de la possibility d'étudier dans un esprit communautaire les problèmes que pose la vie de six pays.’ The Quai d'Orsay had little enthusiasm for Monnet's scheme; and the latter for his part thought the foreign ministry out of touch and too anglophile, ASCE Florence Int No 21 François Valéry p. 3. Valéry, a civil servant (and son of the poet), acted as the liaison between the Quai and the Commissariat for the Plan.

²² In his memoirs Armand Bérard [Deputy French High Commissioner in Germany, 1949–55] stated that Monnet wished to see agreement on the treaty by the end of June. J'ai ensuite le souffle coupé de la rapidité avec laquelle il [sc. Monnet] compte progresser. II veut que soit adopter avant la fin du mois le traité dont il a fait établir le projet par Reuter…et qu'il n'a encore montré à personne, je crois, en dehors de Schuman'. Un ambassadeur se souvient, vol. II. Washington et Bonn, 1945–55 (Paris, 1977), p. 325Google Scholar, Lundi 12 Juin [1950].

²³ B[undesarchiv] (Koblenz) B102 3217 T(ages) N(achrichten) Nr 810, 14 Sept. 1950 ‘Die Pariser Sechsmächteverhandlungen über den Schumanplan sind jetzt in ihr letztes, reintechnisches Stadium eingetreten.’

²⁴ Nr 193 19 Aug. 1950 in BA B102 3224.

²⁵ BA B 102 3217 TN Nr 826 3 Oct. 1950 (Paris) (VWD 2 Oct. 50) ‘Auf amtlicher französischer Seite herrscht hinsichtlich eines baldigen Abschluβes der Montanverhandlungen ausgesprochener Optimismus.’

²⁶ Ibid.Handelsblatt 20 Oct . 1950, Hallstein quoted as still confident of an early signing.

²⁷ Ibid. TN Nr 846, 27 Oct. 1950. The same source was quoted as saying ‘das Abkommen ist bereits zu 80% fertiggestellt.’

²⁸ Ibid. TN Nr 850, 2 Nov. 1950.

²⁹ As late as 28 Dec. an American official was reporting that the treaty was nearly complete. F(oreign)R(relations) of U(nited) S(tates) 1950, vol. III: Western Europe (Washington, 1977), p. 766, 28 Dec. 1950 {Washington} Perkins to Acheson. The assistant secretary of state thought that anti-cartel provisions and ‘the interim protection of high-cost Belgian coal mines’ represented the sole remaining obstacles.

³⁰ Hans-Peter, Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Aufstieg: 1876–1952 (Stuttgart, 1991 ³)Google Scholar and the same author's, ‘Adenauer u. Europa’ in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Jhrg. 27, 1979Google Scholar. For another view of the Federal Chancellor's policies Henning, Köhler, Adenauer: eine politsche Biographie (Berlin, 1994).Google Scholar

³¹ For excellent introductions see Josef, Foschepoth (ed.), Adenauer u. die deutsche Frage (Göttingen, 1988)Google Scholar and Ludolf, Herbst, Option für den Westen. Vom Marshallplan bis zum deutschfranzösischen Vertrag (Göttingen, 1989)Google Scholar. Wilfred, Loth, Der Weg nach Europa (Göttingen, 1991 ²) is also relevant.Google Scholar

³² When Adenauer met Monnet in Bonn on 23 May 1950, the chancellor seized on the proposal not just for its economic implications but because ‘il s'agit d'une tâche… morale, continuation de la mission de civilisation qui échoit à l'Europe et devoir des hommes d'Etat européens à l'égard de leurs peuples.’ Armand, Bérard, Un Ambassadeur, p. 318Google Scholar, Mardi 23 mai [1950].

³³ A decade of American foreign policy, 1941–49 (Washington, 1950)Google Scholar (Item 17: Berlin [Potsdam] Conference), p. 38, B. Economic Project 12.

³⁴ A useful introduction to the subject can be found in Adolf M., Birke and Eva A., Mayring (eds.), Britische Besatzung in Deutschland (London, 1992)Google Scholar. Rolf, Steininger, ‘Großbritannien u. die Ruhr’ in Walter, Först (ed.), Zwischen Ruhrkontrolle u. Mitbestimmung (Stuttgart, 1982).Google Scholar

³⁵ A good account of these confusing early years can be found in Gillen, J. F. J., Deconcentration & decartellization in West Germany, 1945–53 (Historical Division of the Executive Secretary. Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1953).Google Scholar

³⁶ Archives Nationales AJ 81 157, Folder 2, 29 Dec. 1951 for a full historical account. The French were remarkably well briefed, mainly thanks to Pierre Uri.

³⁷ Ulrich, Sahm, ‘Die internationale Kontrolle des Ruhrgebietes’. Europa Archiv 5, 1950, 04, pp. 2957ff.Google Scholar

³⁸ Archives Nationales AJ 81 142, Folder 49, has details on the DKBL and List ‘C’ companies – those firms which did not represent ‘excessive concentration’ and could not be automatically expropriated.

³⁹ Günther, Göhler, Wirtschaftliche Zeittafel des westdeutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus, 1923–1964 (Essen, 1965)Google Scholar provides, as its title indicates, a useful chronology.

⁴⁰ Military government gazette. Germany. British zone of control, p. 631Google Scholar Ordinance No. 112 18 Nov. 1947.

⁴¹ Archives Nationales AJ 81 153 Pierre Uri's testimony to the conseil économique. Commission des affaires économiques et du plan.

⁴² A(uswärtiges) A(mt) [Bonn] P(olitisches) A(rchiv) Schuman plan Bd. 114, pp. 154–5, 19 Jan. 51 Gespräch mit Herrn Uri im Planungsamt.

⁴³ AA PA Schuman plan Bd. 142, pp. 110–16 Deutscher Kohlen-Verkauf (Essen), 12 Mar. 1951 for an official briefing on the subject.

⁴⁴ An extensive literature exists. Kurt, Weidenfeld, Das Rheinisch-Westfälische Kohlensyndikat (Bonn, 1912)Google Scholar; Ernst, Storm, Geschichte der deutschen Kohlenwirtschaft von 1913–1926 (Berlin, 1927?)Google Scholar; Volker, Muthesius, Ruhrkohle 1893–1943. Aus der Geschichte des Rheinisch-Westfälischen Kohlen-Syndikats (Essen, 1943)Google Scholar are just some titles.

⁴⁵ As a technique dual pricing could be used in one of two ways. The German consumer could be charged higher prices than overseas purchasers of German coal. The difference represented an export subsidy. Or, as in times of a world shortage, the export price could be more than the domestic one. In the second example German manufacturers would benefit from a basic cost (coal) which would be lower than that which their foreigner competitors would have to pay if they bought German coal.

⁴⁶ Archives Nationales AJ 81 139, 12 July 1951 for another lengthy account of this redoubtable institution.

⁴⁷ Archives Nationales AJ 81 140 P3/VII (in English) Report to the Ruhr coal industry as to whether the joint marketing of Ruhr coal is admissable according to the Schuman plan, by Frederick Haussman, Geneva, 10 Sept. 1951. The French took a keen interest in the American experience for reasons that soon became apparent.

⁴⁸ Werner, Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945 (Munich, 1984).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ BA Nachlaß Etzel 236 Verbundwirtschaft als Grundlage künftiger Wirtschaftsgestaltung. The summary of the contents tells all, ‘Verbundwirtschaft im weitesten Sinne ist die anlage-und betriebsmäßige Verbindung von Rohstoffwirtschaft u. Energiewirtschaft. Sie ermöglicht ein optimales Gesamtergebnis durch Verwertung aller Abfälle.’

⁵⁰ Archives Nationales AJ 81 136, 5 July 1951.

⁵¹ Archives Nationales AJ 81 137 contains sharp exchanges between Monnet and the French steel industry in which, inter alia, Monnet accuses his compatriots of submitting false figures for output. AJ 81 162 & 164 contain more on the French steel industry.

⁵² ASCE Florence Int No. 21 François Valéry (recorded 22 Nov. 90), p. 22. He remarked: ‘Au fond, le plan Schuman était une sorte de complément international du plan Monnet parce que pour rendre l'économie françhise compétitive, il fallait éliminer les vieux rafiots qui n'allaient pas au train du convoi…’ According to this same source at least one senior official in the Quai d'Orsay, Olivier Wormser, although initially sharing the foreign ministry's scepticism, came to support the project as a way to break French protectionism and promote the modernization of French industry.

⁵³ BA 102 5134(1) press cutting from L'Usine Nouvelle. Nr 14 6 Apr. 1950.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ BA 102 3217 TN Nr 609 13 Sept. 1950.

⁵⁵ Ibid.Le Monde 21 Sept. 1950, René Dabernet: Le sort du Plan Schuman dépend de l'Allemagne dont le réarmament a renforcé la position.

⁵⁶ Ibid.Rheinische Zeitung 27 Oct. 50.

⁵⁷ Archives Nationales AJ 81 157, Folder 2, 29 Dec. 1951.

⁵⁸ Archives Nationales AJ 81 137, Note 26, Oct. 1950. It was also decided that France would not oppose the creation of several ‘comptoirs’ for the sale of coal.

⁵⁹ Or so François Valéry claimed, ASCE Florence Int No 21 p. 9.

⁶⁰ ASCE Florence Int No 2 p. 18. Pierre Uni stated (in English) ‘As to the negotiation, apart from that particular problem (=decartellization), so far as I remember, we never received any instructions. It's an absolutely single experience in the whole history that you have negotiators whom the government fully trusted. They thought we were competent. They thought we were disinterested. They thought we were imaginative. And they never intervened. We invented everything, we pushed everything without any interference from the government.’ (He went on to modify this last startling assertion.) If Uri's account is correct, this explains both the frosty relations between the Quai and the rue de Martignac as well as Massigli's frequent and furious phone calls from London.

⁶¹ Some found his style particularly agreeable. ‘Fur alle, die an den Gesprächen in der Rue Martignac, dem Amstitz Monnets, teilnahmen, wird die sachliche, ruhige Atmosphäre, der sich rasch entwickelnde und ständig wachsende Geist der Solidarität und Verständigung, ein unvergeßliches Erlebnis bleiben,’ the comment of Herbert, Blankenhorn, Verständnis und Verständigung (Berlin, 1980), p. 110.Google Scholar

⁶² Armand, Bérard, Un Ambassadeur, p. 327Google Scholar. Mercredi 14 juin [1950]… La manie du secret que manifeste Monnet risque de nous placer en face des Allemands dans une situation très délicate si l'entreprise ne réussit pas pleinement.’

⁶³ AA PA Schuman plan Bd. 21, 12 Dec. 1950. To Hallstein (from DKV?) German coal producers were quick to point out virtually all the conference participants with substantial coal output had an equivalent to the DKV. France had the Charbonnages de France, the Dutch the Staatsmijnen, and the Belgians would shortly have a special organization. There was also the spectacular example of the recently formed British National Coal Board.

⁶⁴ Archives Nationales AJ 81 139, 12 July 1951.

⁶⁵ Archives Nationales AJ 81 142, 8 Jan. 1952. A French proposal, be it noted, in complete contravention to the spirit of the Schuman plan.

⁶⁶ Bullen, R. J. (ed.), Documents on British Foreign Policy, Series 2, vol. 1: The Schuman plan, 1950–52 (London, 1986)Google Scholar. Barbara, Schwepcke, ‘The British High Commissioners in Germany, 1949–55’ (PhD dissertation, London School of Economics, 1991).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ William Adams, Brown, The United States and the restoration of world trade. An analysis and appraisal of the ITO Charter and the GATT (Washington D.C., 1950)Google Scholar; Clair, Wilcox, A charter for World Trade (New York, 1949, reprinted 1972)Google Scholar. Scholarly interest in these two institutions has lapsed in recent years. In the light of current trade problems (1993) they both merit renewed attention.

⁶⁸ Maier, C. S., In search of stability. Explorations in historical political economy (Cambridge, Mass., 1987)Google Scholar for the concept of ‘the politics of productivity’ and Volker, Berghahn, The Americanisation of West German industry, 1945–73 (Leamington Spa, 1986) esp. pp. 84–165Google Scholar for a specific example of its application.

⁶⁹ ASCE Florence Int No 16, p. 1 Robert Bowie. Interviewed in 1989 Bowie was almost Jeffersonian in the summary of his achievements. ‘I was in Germany with McCloy and I was his legal adviser and was responsible for Law 27’, New York Times 18 Feb. 1951, 23:1Google Scholar refers to Bowie as [McCloy's] ‘legal adviser who has been the United States' chief observer and expert on the Schuman plan.’

⁷⁰ Thomas Alan, Schwartz, America's Germany. John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass., 1991) esp. ch. 4Google Scholar, ‘Monnet and the Schuman plan’ and ibid.‘Dual containment: John J. McCloy, the American high commission, and European integration, 1949–52’ in Francis H., Heller and John R., Gillingham (eds.), NATO: the founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the integration of Europe (London, 1993).Google Scholar

⁷¹ New York Times 16 Nov. 1950, 14:4 ‘United States officials here are regarded as fanatics on the subject of anti-trust legislation.’

⁷² Tomlinson was quite non-partisan in his denunciations. He told the German legal expert Hans Ulrich von Marchtaler that the French economy was backward because of cartels, AA PA Schuman plan Bd. 114, pp. 4–6, Paris, 13 Nov. 1950 Aufzeichnung.

⁷³ This was the view strongly espoused by James S., Martin in his All honourable men (Boston, 1950)Google Scholar. His remarks may not have represented the historical truth of 1941 but they did represent the emotional reality of 1945–6. On I July 1947 Martin resigned from his post as chief of the decartellization branch attached to the American military government in Germany alleging as his reason the failure of the US government to break the German trusts. His book was much quoted, even in American official publications – and had the distinction of being translated immediately into Russian (1951).

⁷⁴ So Martin claimed.

⁷⁵ Handelsblatt, Nr 107, 15 Sept. 1950, p. 9Google Scholar, Kartelle in der Europa Integration. According to this report ‘Seit dem Krieg neigt man in Europa zunehmend der Auffassung zu, daß Kartelle ein brauchbares Werkzeug zur Verstärkung der wirtschaftlichen Dynamik bildeten, die man von der europäischen Integration erhofft. Demgegenüber haben die Amerikaner früher ihrer Kartellfeindlichkeit mit dem gleichem Argument begründet und die kartellfreundliche Haltung Europas als Ausdruck der Stagnation und Unternehmermüdigkeit zu kennzeichnen versucht.’

⁷⁶ The Times 2 Aug. 1950, 3d.

⁷⁷ FRUS 1950 III, p. 749, 21 Sept. 1950 David Bruce (Paris) to Acheson noted the change in atmosphere. And more fully ibid. p. 760, 25 Oct. 1950 Bohlen (Paris) to Acheson.

⁷⁸ AA PA Schuman plan Bd. 71, pp. 77–88 for the speech entitled Die Bedeutung der Stahlindustrie für die europäische Wirtschaftsunion. Evident similarities exist between Robert Lehr and Hugo Stinnes, a former leader of the Ruhr ‘barons’. See Hans-Peter, Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Aufstieg, pp. 257–8.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ AA PA Schuman plan Bd. 85, p. 42 Ausruf aus Paris um 11.20 Uhr 20 Oct. 50, von Marchtaler rang through to report on the bad impression caused and the unfavourable article in the previous day's Le Monde. H. C. Lehr was on the executive board of Vereinigte Stahlwerke, a point picked up by Armand Bérard in his Un ambassadeur se souvient, p. 243.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Archives Nationales AJ 81 138 with a clip from Stuttgarter Nachrichten 19 Oct. 1950 in which Monnet is reported to have threatened resignation unless the federal government disassociated itself from Lehr.

⁸¹ New York Times 18 Oct. 1950, 17:1.

⁸² BA B 102 3217 TN Nr 841, 21 Oct. 1950.

⁸³ Ibid. TN Nr 884, 12 Dec. 50, ‘Vor einer Unterzeichnung müßten aber noch einige Fragen geklärt werden, wie der Dekartellisierung u. der Verbundwirtschaft.’

⁸⁴ ASCE Florence Int No 2, pp. 6–7 Pierre Uri recalled how closely Monnet had already worked with the Americans. He maintained that as commissioner of the plan Monnet had informed Washington how best the counter-part funds (from the Marshall plan) could be used. That is, Monnet, a French civil servant, had advised the Americans on the instructions they should issue to his employer, the French government.

⁸⁵ Archives Nationales AJ 81 138, 21 Dec. 1950.

⁸⁶ Archives Nationales AJ 81 137 & 138, 22 Dec. 1950.

⁸⁷ Archives Nationales AJ 81 137, 22 Dec. 1950 as Monnet graphically put his case, failure to break the cartels ‘consacrererait la domination sur l'ensemble de l'Europe de ces pouvoirs concentrés de la Ruhr’. He was equally forceful in his testimony to the Conseil de la République on 19 July 1951. (Re- articles 65 & 66). ‘C'est le seul moyen à notre disposition d'empêcher la Ruhr de se reconstituer plus tard, car la souveraineté allemande reconquise, les occupants partis, la reconstitution de la concentration de la Ruhr est une chose absolument inévitable et certaine.’ ASCE Florence Fonds Uri Dep 9:5 178: 13–178: 16 11 A 13ff.

⁸⁸ Many years later this came about for reasons which none could foresee. By 1993 it was claimed that ‘Schonjetzt arbeiten einige auslandische Stahlschmieden effizienter. Durchschnittlich 4.8 Stunden braucht ein deutsches Stahlwerk, um eine Tonne Rohstahl herzustellen, eine franzbsische Anlage schafft es in 4.1 Stunden. Hinzu kommt: mit Arbeitskosten von rund 49 Mark sind die Deutschen Spitze in der EG. Die Konkurrenten aus Großbritannien und Frankreich produzieren mit Beträgen von 38 und 32 Mark deutlich billiger…’ Wirtschaftswoche [Düsseldorf] 19 Feb. 1993, p. 107. Stahlindustrie: Zuletzt absaufen.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ For a general introduction to the Adenauer ‘style’ Kurt, Sontheimer, Die Adenauer–Ara. Grundlegung der Bundesrepublik (Munich, 1991)Google Scholar and for a notable aspect of it, Hans-Peter, Schwarz, ‘Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie und Regierungstechnik’ in Aus Politik u. Zeitgeschichte 6 Jan. 1989, B. 1–2.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Official Gazette of the Allied High Commission for Germany, No 20, 20 May 1950.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Archives Nationales AJ 81 138, 24 Sept. 1950, report from André François-Poncet.

⁹² AA PA Schuman plan Bd 67, pp. 99–101, 13 Dec. 1950 Industriegewerkschaft to Adenauer pleading for the retention of both vertical integration and the DKV.

⁹³ Archives Nationales AJ 81 153 Pierre Uri to Conseil Économique.

⁹⁴ Heinrich Kost, the director of the DKBL, was particularly eloquent on the benefits of the DKV. It also preserved the mines from reckless exploitation – Raubbau. See BA B102 3235 letters to Adenauer dated 2 Dec. & 18 Dec. 1950; and AA PA Schuman plan Bd. 71, pp. 146–7 Kost to Adenauer 11 Jan. 1951.

⁹⁵ P(ublic)R(ecord)O(ffice) Kew FO 1028/270 3B, 7 Feb. 1951 Statement concerning the Question of Joint Sale within the Purview of the Schuman plan. This provides a summary of the argument in favour of the DKV.

⁹⁶ The memory was potent. When unemployment in the Federal Republic exceeded 5 million the Wirtschaftswoche 29 Jan. 1993 carried on its cover ‘Arbeitslosigkeit: Das Gespent von Weimar’ and discussed the subject at length.

⁹⁷ Archives Nationales AJ 81 148, 21 Nov. 1950 reporting a discussion with Hallstein who stressed the point.

⁹⁸ Archives Nationales AJ 81 138, 4 Oct. 1950 for just one example of François-Poncet's advice on the subject.

⁹⁹ e.g. Archives Nationales AJ 137, 15 Jan. 1951.

¹⁰⁰ Hans-Peter, Schwarz and Reiner, Pommerin (eds.), Adenauer u. die Hohen Kommissare 1949–1951, I (Munich, 1989), 177Google Scholar, 5 April 1950 General Sir Brian Robertson stated ‘Die Organisation, die für die Ausarbeitung der Pläne der Umorganisation verantwortlich ist, wird die DKBL sein.’ This was restated by François-Poncet on 23 Sept. 1950 loc. cit. p. 245.

¹⁰¹ Archives Nationales AJ 81 139, 9 Nov. 1950 & 30 Dec. 1950.

¹⁰² Archives Nationales AJ 81 165 & 166, 9 Nov. 1950.

¹⁰³ The Times 17 Jan. 1951, 4d.

¹⁰⁴ AA PA Schuman plan Bd. 315, pp. 114 cutting from NYHT 8.1.51.

¹⁰⁵ Archives Nationales AJ81 138, 24 Feb. 1951 from André François-Poncet. If true, the mood was untypical of McCIoy.

¹⁰⁶ New York Times 25 Feb. 1951 17:1 for an accurate report. Le Figaro's coverage of these same events (as preserved in Archives Nationales AJ 81 138) is garbled.

¹⁰⁷ Archives Nationales AJ 81 138 cutting from Deutsche Zeitung 28 Feb. 1951.

¹⁰⁸ Klaus, Gotto, Hans-Otto, Kleinmann and Reinhard, Schreiner (eds.), Im Centrum der Macht. Das Tagebuch von Siaatssekretdr Lenz 1951–1953 (Düsseldorf, 1989), p. 52Google Scholar, 2 Mar. 1951… ‘sie sollten abwarten, bis die Aufrüstung in Gang komme…’

¹⁰⁹ New York Times 19 Jan. 1951, 8:3Google Scholar Harold Callender [Paris]. ‘It is not only the Germans who balk at the ban on cartels. Industrialists in Germany and Belgium are reported to be the most stubborn defenders of cartels, but with the French and Luxembourg steel associations running them a close second and the Italian industrialists taking the same attitude.’

¹¹⁰ New York Times 5 Feb. 1951, 4:4.

¹¹¹ In a sense they were merely formalizing an informal presence. According to one eye witness report the Americans hung around the corridors as the French and Germans negotiated. This could lead to complications reminiscent of the Marx brothers. Tomlinson knew French; but Bowie could not speak a word. All discussions had to be translated for him, presumably by officials discreetly absenting themselves from the conference room as circumstances permitted. On one, if not two, occasions the Americans had to be bundled out unceremoniously (from the building?). ‘Et comme on négociait officiellement avec les Allemands, les Américains était là, dans la coulisse. Je me rappelle qu'une fois ou deux on a fait sortir précipitamment les Américains pour qu'ils ne recontrent pas les Allemands.’ Entretien avec Maurice Lagrange le 23 Septembre 1980 á Paris ASCE Florence Fonds Pierre Uri Dep 9:5 178:13–178:16 17 C 6ff. At the outset the American ambassador in Paris recommended that ‘The US Government…should have no official association or even observers with the working committees engaged in the elaboration of this plan at this stage’. FRUS, m, 705, 23 May 1950 David Bruce (Paris) to Acheson. It is not clear when the policy of non-intervention was abandoned.

¹¹² Hans-Peter, Schwartz and Reiner, Pommerin (eds.), Adenauer unddie Hohen Kommissare, p. 308Google Scholar 14 Dec. 1950. ‘Form u. Inhalt sind so, daß sie in Kreisen der DKBL einhellige Empbrung ausgelost haben…Aus den Mustersatzungen ist zu entnehmen, daB praktisch die Verbindung zwischen Kohle and Eisen grundsatzlich unterbunden werden soil.’

¹¹³ ASCE Florence Int No 21, p. 27. Valćry observed, ‘il (sc.Monnet) était bien capable de téléphoner peut-être à Adenauer, en tout cas à Hallstein, en cours de negociations d'une façon qui encore une fois supposait que déjà, on était dans une atmosphère communautaire où finalement, il n'y a pas de joueurs qui sont autour de la table, opposés les uns aux autres, mais des joueurs qui jouent le méme jeu et qui échangent leurs cartes d'une certaine façon…’

¹¹⁴ AA PA Schuman plan Bd 84, pp. 199–202, 27 Jan. 1951 Niederschrift. ‘In der Frage der Verbundwirtschaft hatte man sich im wesentlichem geeinigt u. dabei etwa 75 % der Wiinsche der deutschen Stahlindustrie erfiillt, die damit etwa 75 % ihres Koksbedarfes aus eigen Zechen decken kbnne.’

¹¹⁵ BA B136 2458, Received 12 Feb. 51 McCloy to Adenauer. McCloy said ‘Meiner Auffassung nach ist der vereinbarte Vorschlag für die Integration von Kohle und Stahl die absolute Grenze.’

¹¹⁶ FRUS 1951, Vol. IV Europe. Pt. 1 [Washington, 1985], p. 91, 19 Feb. 1951 McCloy to Acheson. ‘I explained to the Chancellor how far our compromise proposals had come… I pointed out that deep desire to bring about Schuman plan on part of French and ourselves had led us to propose, and enabled us to induce French to accept, compromises going far beyond what would otherwise be conceivable.’

¹¹⁷ BA B 136 2458 McCloy to Adenauer, 17 Feb. 51 letter in English.

¹¹⁸ New York Times 18 Feb. 1951, 23:1 Jack Raymond [Bonn].

¹¹⁹ BA B136 2458 the printed report is included in booklet entitled Wiederaufrichtung der Herrschaft des Rechts.

¹²⁰ As noted in Archives Nationales AJ 81 138, 22 Feb. 1951 Lesch (sic) Evans to Dow Jones.

¹²¹ New York Times 25 Feb. 1951, IV 5:3. W. M. Tomlinson had to insist that Patterson did not speak for the US, nor had the administration changed its line on cartels.

¹²² New York Times 25 Feb. 1951, 17:1.

¹²³ Loc. cit.

¹²⁴ Archives Nationales AJ 81 138, 27 Feb. 1951 (copy AJ 81 151) François-Poncet's narrative.

¹²⁵ BA B136 2458, 28 Feb. 1951, Telegramme (Patterson's words in English) C. C. Schmid to [Konrad] Kaletsch (Managing Director of Friedrich Flick AG).

¹²⁶ Archives Nationales AJ 81 139, 9 Feb. 1951 (in English) Monnet to T. H. White. Monnet added ‘My best regards to Nancy and the baby’.

¹²⁷ Archives Nationales AJ 81, 138, Feb. 1951 cutting of T. H. White's article entitled ‘Europe's Cartels Strike Back’.

¹²⁸ Archives Nationales AJ 81 138, 23 Feb. 1951, Monnet to Patterson. The message ended ‘I hope that you will come through Paris and give me a chance of explaining these views.’

¹²⁹ FRUS, IV, 97, 3 Mar. 1951, McCloy to Acheson.

¹³⁰ New York Times 8 Mar. 1951, 16:2.

¹³¹ New York Times 9 Mar. 1951, 9:1.

¹³² Archives Nationales AJ 81 169 Adenauer to Allied high commission, 14 Mar. 1951 AGSEC (51) 483. This copy, in French, belonged to Etienne Hirsch.

¹³³ Mew York Times 16 Mar. 1951, 14:1.

¹³⁴ BA B136 2458, 26 Apr. 1951. Draft resolution [Formation of Iron and Steel Unit Companies] & BA B136 2494 Staatsekretär Ludger Westrick: Bericht über die Auflösung des DKV zusammenhängen Fragen.

¹³⁵ New York Times 17 Mar. 1951, 3:4.

¹³⁶ New York Times 30 Mar. 1951, 1:2. American coverage of all these events is much fuller than the British.

¹³⁷ New York Times 25 Mar. 1951, IV, 5:1.

¹³⁸ Ibid. iv: 2:2.

¹³⁹ Milward, A. S. (with George Brennan and Federico Romero), The European rescue of the nation state (London, 1992)Google Scholar and the collection of essays in Milward, Alan S., Lynch, Frances M. B., Federico Romero and Vibeke Sørensen, The frontier of national sovereignty. History and theory, 1945–1992 (London, 1993).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Der Volkswirt, December 1957 proudly announced: ‘Mit Ausnahme der Vereinigten Stahlwerke sind heute alle Konzerne wiedergekehrt in mehr oder weiniger vollständiger Form’. Quoted in Isabel, Warner, The deconcentration of the West German steel industry, 1349–55, p. 402 (Ph.D. European University Institute (Florence) May 1991).Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ Archives Nationales AJ 81 143. It was duly noted that two German newspapers were openly calling for the reconcentration of the steel industry, Deutsche Zeitung 11 Nov. 53 & Industrie Kurier 17 Nov. 53. The press officer also included (in a spirit of impartiality?) a feature from Neue Qircher Zeitung 11 Nov. 1953Google Scholar describing reconcentration in the French steel industry.

¹⁴² ASCE Florence Int No 10 Hans von der Groeben. In an interview given on 6 Nov 1989 entitled Die Haltung der Bundesregierung zur Montanunion… (1952–8) von der Groeben declared (p. 7) that Ludwig Erhard and the Federal Economic Ministry disliked all attempts of the High Authority to influence investment decisions taken by the (German) steel industry. Their attitude was probably shared by the other governments.

¹⁴³ Ibid, von der Groeben claimed (p. 5) that all member countries continued to subsidize coal and the French continued to sell theirs through a state monopoly.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 8. ‘Allzu sehr waren die Mitgliedstaaten (of the Coal & Steel Community) darauf bedacht, die Versorgung und Preisgestaltung auf dem Energiegebiet moglichst in der Hand zu behalten, da sie zu Recht oder Unrecht als essentiell für die gesamte industrielle Entwicklung angesehen wurden’. The Federal economics ministry had concluded by 1954 that the ECSC ‘was more or less a failure’. Peter, Weilemann, Die Anfänge der Europäiscken Atomgemeinschaft (Baden-Baden, 1983), p. 27.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Jean-Marie, Palayret, ‘Jean Monnet, la Haute Autorité de la CECA face au problème de la reconcentration de la sidérurgie dans la Ruhr (1950–1958)Google Scholar in Revue dHistoire Diplomatique, nos 3–4 (1991)Google Scholar and William, Diebold, The Schuman plan. A study in economic cooperation, 1950–59 (New York, 1959)Google Scholar, ch. xiv, ‘Cartels and concentrations’.

¹⁴⁶ Early in the negotiations Hirsch had envisaged in conversation with Dean Acheson the possible elimination of 20 per cent of France's coal capacity. Fortunately it never came to that. FRUS, in, 698, 12 May 1950.

¹⁴⁷ In steel the crisis took twenty years to break. When it came, it proved prolonged. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 18 Mar. 1993, p. 1, ‘Das Stahlwerk in Rheinhausen wird geschlossen.’ Die Zeit Nr 9 26 Feb. 1993, pp. 15–18Google Scholar. ‘Tausend Feuer, Ofen aus. Die Stahlkrise im Ruhrgcbiet.’ Die Zeit Nr 12 19 März 1993, p. 31Google Scholar, ‘Steinkohle: Die Krise der Stahlindustrie beschleunigt die Talfhart im deutschen Bergbau.’ Wochenpost [Berlin] 42 14 Okt. 1993, p. 1, ‘Gute Nacht, Kumpel.’Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Merry, and Serge, Bromberger, Les coulisses de l'Europe (Paris, 1968), pp. 165–7Google Scholar for the crisis of the late 50s and the malpractices of the 60s. De Gaulle's view was that ‘supranational’ institutions were fine as long as no problems occurred. When they did, only sovereign states mattered. Acheson had a premonition of such ideas. The secretary of state believed that ‘broad decisions re defense measures affecting coal and steel must rest with the member states rather than Auth (sic)’ –a rather sweeping limitation on its powers. FRUS, in, 745, 3 Aug. 1950.

¹⁴⁹ For a mordant contemporary analysis Stanley, Hoffmann, ‘Goodbye to a United Europe?’ in New York Review of Books, 27 May 1993, pp. 27–31.Google Scholar