¹ Since the late sixties there has been a marked resurgence in the study of the nature of the state. A group of Marxist-oriented sociologists breaking away from the vulgarized view of the state as a mere instrument of dominant class coercion have attempted to demonstrate the relative autonomy of the state. The state, being viewed as an entity with certain distinct traits and interests to be safeguarded, remains structurally constrained, however, by the existing mode of production. This constraint is manifested in the limited range of alternatives in the decision making process. A decisive factor in the range of alternatives is the effectiveness of class struggle. For an approach along these lines, see Poulantzas, N., Pouvoir politique el classes sociales (Paris, 1972)Google Scholar and La crise des dictatures: Portugal, Grèce, Espagne (Paris, 1975);Google ScholarMiliband, R., The state in capitalist society (New York, 1969)Google Scholar and Therborn, G., What does the ruling class do when it rules? (London, 1978).Google Scholar For an overall picture, it is necessary to give additional emphasis to the international character of the state and the moulding influences of the pressures exerted upon it as a member of the international system as Skocpol, T. points out in States and social revolutions (Cambridge, 1979). Her characterisation of the state as ‘fundamentally Janus-faced, with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class-divided socioeconomic structures and an international system of states (p. 32) implies a denial of the dialectical nature of the relation between two aspects of the same entity. This is inconsistent with her extremely interesting analysis of the case studies (Russia, France, China) throughout the book. What is involved, I think, is an unfortunate choice of words.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Organic interaction does not imply that the process is based on rational integration. The international system is the product of a dialectical process of development. In that sense its components (nation-states) are continuously being shaped by, as well as shaping, the interacting pattern. The sole and ultimate criterion for this process is not the positive (integration) or negative (rejection) contribution of the member states to the system as a whole. Discontinuities, irregularities and dependent incorporation are by no means rare.

³ It is beyond the scope of this communication to study the legitimation process or to analyse in detail the structure of the Greek state. Rather, it attempts to stress the link in the dynamic relationship of state and foreign policy, and to provide certain guidelines which future research may consider.

⁴ For the concept of hegemony, see Piotte, J.M., La pensée politique de Gramsci (Paris, 1970)Google Scholar and Williams, G.A., ‘The concept of Egemonia in the thought of Antonio Gramsci: some notes on interpretation’, Journal of the History of Ideas, xxi, 4 (1960), 586–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Mouzelis, N., Modem Greece: facets of underdevelopment (London, 1978), p. 142.Google Scholar

⁶ For an analysis of the role of the diaspora bourgeoisie in the economic, social and political life of Greece, see Psiroukis, N., The diaspora phenomenon in modem Greece (Athens, 1975);Google Scholar for the influence of the diaspora communities on the educational system see Tsoukalas, K., Dependence and Reproduction: the social role of the educational apparatus in Greece, 1830–1922(Athens, 1977). (Unless otherwise indicated, works published in Greece are in the Greek language.)Google Scholar

⁷ For a detailed study of the internal strife, see Stamatopoulos, T., The internal struggle before and during the revolution of 1821 (3vols., Athens, 1971).Google Scholar On the defeat of the popular elements and its effects on subsequent developments, see Philias, V., Society and power in Greece, 1800–1864 (Athens, 1974), esp. pp. 52–93.Google Scholar

⁸ For all males over 21 who were employed or possessed property; see Clogg, R., A short history of modern Greece (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 83–4.Google Scholar

⁹ For informative studies on the question of clientism (patronage), see Tsoukalas, K., ‘The patronage question in nineteenth-century Greece’, Greek Association of Political Sciences (ed.) Social and political forces in Greece (Athens, 1977), pp. 75–112; N. Mouzelis, ‘Class structure and Clientism’ (in the same vol.), pp. 115–50.Google Scholar

¹⁰ The political developments in the first post-liberation years are extensively analysed Petropoulos, by J., Politics and statecraft in the kingdom of Greece, 1833–1843 (Princeton, 1968).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Synvet, M., Les Grecs de I’Empire Ottoman, étude statistique et ethnographique (Constantinople), pp. 8, 76, 77;Google Scholar quoted in Psomas, A., The nation, the state and the international system: the case of modem Greece (in English) (Athens, 1978), p. 86. At that time the population in the Kingdom of Greece was less than a third of the total number of non-liberated Greeks. The figures should be treated with some caution especially for areas with large mixed population (Macedonia, Thrace, Epirus, European Turkey).Google Scholar

¹² Expression used by Hobsbawn, E., The age of capital, 1848–1875 (London, 1976), p. 94; see also ch. v, pp. 82–97.Google Scholar

¹³ For an analysis of the nation-state polarization, see Psomas, The nation.

¹⁴ In 1892 the number of public employees per thousand inhabitants was seven times larger in Greece than the respective number in the U.K.: 744% for the U.K., 500% for Greece; see Dertilis, G., Social transformation and military intervention, 1880–1909 (Athens, 1977). p. 73.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Estimates on industrial figures of this period vary. Figures produced by Mansolas, A. in Survey of the Greek steam-powered industrial establishments (Athens, 1876)Google Scholar and in Survey of Greek industry (Athens, 1893),Google Scholar bring the total number of factories to 210 (total h.p. 1,967) with a workforce of 24,286. Ninety-five of them were registered as steam-powered. The official survey of 1879 brings the total number of workers to 42,966; it seems however that this over-inflated estimate includes workers of handicraft establishments and small shops. But even the so-called steam-powered establishments had a remote resemblance to their western counterparts, most of them constituting an assembly of compartmentalized workshops with limited use of wage labour. Evelpidis, C., Economic and social history of Greece (Athens, 1950),Google Scholar estimates the total number of factories (in 1875) to be 199, 95 of them steam-powered with 1,967 h.p. used (p. 91). Moskof, K. in National and social consciousness in Greece (Athens, 1978),Google Scholar endorses Mansolas’ figures (p. 147) but there is a slight descrepancy in p. 136 when for the year 1880 he produces the figure of 89 (instead of 95) and 1,887 h.p. (instead of 1,967 h.p. for the previous year). The lack of solid industrial structures is also stressed by: Nikolinakos, M., Studies in Greek capitalism (Athens, 1976), pp. 23–40;Google ScholarStavrianos, L.S., The Balkans 1815–1914 (New York, 1965) PP 73–82 and Philias, Society and power, p. 177.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Although it is beyond the scope of this communication, a brief comment on the development of capitalism in Greece is necessary. Most of the recent studies on the subject tend to agree that we cannot seriously talk about capitalist development before the 1920s (Nikolinakos calls the period between 1821 and 1909 one of ‘natural economy’ above, p. 23).

^{page 954 note 1} European Turkey only.

^{page 954 note 2} Hobsbawm has o, i.e. Greece had a total ofless than 1,000 h.p. by 1880; a more accurate estimate however brings the total number of h.p. units to 1,887 (see also note 14).

^{page 954 note 3} Prior to independence.

^{page 954 note 4} Units based on the number of telegraph lines and poles.

¹⁷ Hobsbawm, The age of capital.

¹⁸ See Dobb, M., Studies in the development of capitalism (New York, 1968).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Vergopoulos, K., State and fiscal policy in the nineteenth century (Athens, 1978), p. 191.Google Scholar For a general survey, see Stavrianos, L.S., The Balkans since 1453 (New York, 1959);Google ScholarLanger, W.L., The diplomacy of imperialism (2 vols., New York, 1935),Google Scholar and European alliances and alignments 1871–1890 (New York, 1930).Google Scholar

²⁰ Stavrianos, L.S., ‘Balkan Federation. A history of the movements towards Balkan unity in modern times’, Smith College Studies in History, XXVII, 1–4 (1941–1942), 16.Google Scholar

²¹ Levandis, J.A., The Greek foreign debt and the great powers, 1821–1898 (New York, 1944), pp. 70–4;Google Scholar for a different estimate, see Stefanides, D.S., The place of industry in our national economy (Thessaloniki, 1938), pp. 197ff.Google Scholar

²² This is not to deny that public works did indeed originate; by 1893 Greece had a railway network of 1,591 km. See Vergopoulos, State and fiscal policy, p. 207. We must note however that they were of a very limited nature and could not be of much use when homogeneous growth in other sectors was severely limited.

²³ Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, p. 416.

²⁴ Hinsley, F.H., Power and the pursuit of peace (Cambridge, 1978), p. 257. The alliances concluded during this period were: the Three Emperors’ League (1873), the Austro-German Alliance (1879), the Three Emperors’ Alliance (1881), the Triple Alliance (1882), the Reinsurance Treaty (1887) and the Franco-Russian Alliance (1982–4).Google Scholar

²⁵ Loiseau, C., Le Balkan slave et la crise autrichienne (Paris, 1898), pp. 275—6; quoted in Stavrianos, Balkan federation, p. 16.Google Scholar

²⁶ For a general account, see Driault, E. and Lhéritier, M., Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours (5 vols., Paris, 1925–1926), iv, 226–46.Google Scholar

²⁷ On this occasion, the powers involved were: France, Britain, Russia, Austria, and Italy; see Driault and Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique, pp. 367–92.

²⁸ The inability of the Balkan countries to form stable alliances was a product of great power diplomacy and deep-rooted mutual distrust of the Hellenic, Moslem and Slav communities. The Hellenizing policy, for example, of the Greek Orthodox Church, following the Ottoman conquest of the peninsula and reaching its height during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, met with strong reaction from the Slav element. The Slavs tended therefore to view Greek irredentism as an attempt to resurrect the cultural, spiritual and financial hegemony of the Greek element in the Balkans. Panslavism was another example of a movement considered as a vehicle of expansionist aspirations. For a general survey, see Stavrianos, Balkan federation, pp. 5–83; also Stoianovich, T., ‘The conquering Balkan Orthodox merchant’, Journal of Economic History, xx, 2 (1960), 234–313 (esp. 306–13).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁹ See Mouzelis, Modern Greece, pp. 134–48.

³⁰ The contention of Karolides, P., Modern History of Greeks (Athens, 1927–1929), that the Greek people were unprepared for Tricoupis’s grand mission simply begs the question. It commits the fallacy of placing all responsibility for the subsequent shortcomings on the people, ignoring the government’s responsibility in its failure to alleviate some of the most burning social problems. It is true that under Tricoupis certain preconditions were created for the subsequent capitalist development and his policies were not characterized by the sheer irresponsibility which proved to be the hallmark of his main rival, Deliyiannis. This development was achieved however, at the expense of the lower strata (the peasantry in particular) whose income was squeezed to intolerable levels by the transfer of surplus (via heavy taxation) from the countryside for the financing of indigenous industry.Google Scholar

³¹ For the currant crisis, see Vergopoulos, State and fiscal policy, pp. 102–8.

³² International control of Greece’s finances was imposed so as to administer the service of her public debt. With this humiliating intervention public finance control was surrendered to the Great Powers for a period of 44 years. The sectors included under the control were the state monopolies, stamp duties and the custom duties of the ports of Piraeus, Volos, Corfu, Lavrion and Patra. The total sum amounted in 1898 to 46,800,000 gold drachmas; see Moskof, National and social consciousness, pp. 96–7. For a general treatment of the public debt question, see Dertilis, P., Le problème de la dettepublique des ètats balkaniques (in French) (Athènes,1936).Google Scholar

³³ See G. Dertilis, Social transformation, pp. 201–26.

³⁴ Although tons of ink have been shed on Venizelos, we still lack a balanced evaluation of the man and his achievements. The polarization - for over a quarter of a century - in Greek political life between the Venizelist and anti-Venizelist elements has deeply affected Greek historiography. Most of the works range from hagiographies to outright condemnations. See, e.g. Vendiris, G., Greece 1910–20(2 vols., Athens, 1930);Google Scholar Karolides, Modern history; Alastos, D., E. Venizelos (London, 1942).Google Scholar E. Forster’s remark that ‘anyone who writes about the events in Greece during the years following 1914 has to make up his mind whether he supports the Royalist or the Venizelist party’, in A short history of modem Greece 1821–1956 (London, 1958), p. vi, clearly misses the point. The biblical good-bad dichotomy should give way to a re-examination of Venizelos’ contribution in the light of a critical reappraisal of his ideology and the peculiar brand of ‘liberalism’ which his party projected; and the nature of the articulation of the party’s ideological perspectives with the socioeconomic exigencies of Greece. A recent work containing some highly informative essays on facets of the Venizelist period is Dimitrakopoulos, O. and Veremis, T. (eds.), Studies on Venizelos and his time (Athens, 1980).Google Scholar