¹ Gómez-Centurión, , La Invencible, p. 16Google Scholar.

² Recently reissued as: Froude's Spanish story of the Armada and other essays, ed. Rowse, A. L. (Gloucester, 1988)Google Scholar.

³ Ibid. pp. 201–2; Duro, C. Fernández, La Armada Invencible (2 vols., Madrid, 1884–1885)Google Scholar.

⁴ Oria, E. Herrera, La Armada Invancible. Documentos procedentes del Archivo General de Simancas (1587–1589) Archivo Histórico Español, vol. 2 (Valladolid, 1929)Google Scholar; idem, Felipe II y el Marqués de Santa Cruz en la empresa de Inglaterra (Madrid, 1946); Gamazo, G. Maura y, El designio de Felipe II y el episodio de la Armada invencible (Madrid, 1957)Google ScholarLaughton, J. K., State papers relating to the defeat of the Spanish Armada (2 vols., Navy Records Society, 1895Google Scholar, reprinted 1981); Calendar of letters and state papers relating to English affairs preserved in, or originally belonging to the archives of Simancas (CSP Sp) (4 vols., London, 1892–1899)Google Scholar, in particular vol. IV, ed. M. A. Hume, Elizabeth, 1587–1603.

⁵ The trend is not limited to Spain as can be seen in the recent works of Martin, C. J. M. and Parker, G., The Spanish Armada (London, 1988)Google Scholar and Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. et al. , Armada. The official catalogue of the National Maritime Museum's exhibition (London, 1988)Google Scholar which have used a great deal of unpublished and new documentation.

⁶ Froude's Spanish story, p. 201.

⁷ A brief statement of the aims and conclusions of the project is to be found in the introductory letter in each volume by Admiral Nárdiz Vial (23 November 1987). The best description of the multiple questions the project intended to answer can be found in the Introduction to Gross, Jorge Calvar, Hierro, José Ignacio González-Aller, Fontán, Marcelino de Dueñas, M^a del Campo Mérida Valverde La Batalla del Mar Océano, vo. I: Génesis de la Empresa de Inglaterra de 1588 (28 Junio 1568–30 Enero 1586) Ministerio de Defensa – Armada Española, Ediciones Turner (Madrid, 1988), esp. pp. xxiii–xxviiiGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Ibid. This is the first volume.

⁹ Pierson, , Commander of the Armada, pp. 80–1Google Scholar repeats the error because he has re-translated the Fernández Duro version, rather than looked at the original in A(rchivo) G(eneral de) S(imancas) E(stato) 455 fos. 174–5. See also Génesis de la Empresa de Inglaterra de 1588 p. xxii.

¹⁰ Pierson tried to make sense of it by translating it as ‘soupbones’ (op cit. p. 112). Rivas, Gracia, La Sanidad, p. 243Google Scholar makes no comment, but later cites another document rightly saying cheese!

¹¹ Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J., ‘Pilotos y navegación en la Gran Armada de 1588’, Revista de Historia Naval, Madrid no. 23 (1988), pp. 37–71, esp. 50–6Google Scholar.

¹² See p. 465, n.13 below.

¹³ His picture largely agrees with that of Croft, P., ‘Trading with the enemy 1585–1604’, The Historical Journal, XXXII, 2 (1989), 281–302CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Her book on The Spanish company (London, 1973)Google Scholar is a useful supplement to this partial account of Anglo-Spanish trade. Simon Adams is preparing an article to clarify the controversial 1585 embargo.

¹⁴ The best study of Philip's Mediterranean policy is still F, Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II (2nd edn, 2 vols., Paris, 1966; English trans. London, 1972)Google Scholar. I have studied the tensions between the northern and southern fronts during the 1550s in: The changing face of empire: Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg authority, 1551–1559 (Cambridge, 1988)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Op. cit. La Invencible, p. 133, from Zamora, J. Ma Jover and Cortezo, Ma V. López-Cordón, ‘La imagen de Europa y el pensamiento pohítico-internacional’ in El Siglo del Quijote (1580–1680), vol. XXVIGoogle Scholar of the Historia de España, dir. Pidal, Ramón Menéndez (Madrid, 1986), p. 384Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 133.

¹⁷ War and government in Habsburg Spain 1560–1620 (London, 1976), esp. chs. iv and vGoogle Scholar on recruitment and the nobility. The book is essential for all military and naval matters.

¹⁸ Note also the use of incorrect versions of documents, p. 463 above.

¹⁹ Philip's, reaction to this plan is cited in Los sucesos de Flandes, p. 297Google Scholar. Medina Sidonia was told not to do this because Parma's ships were incapable of making the journey to the island unless protected by the Armada.

²⁰ Pierson, P., ‘A commander for the Armada’, Mariner's Mirror, LV (11, 1969), 383–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thompson, I. A. A., ‘The appointment of the duke of Medina Sidonia to the command of the Spanish Armada’, The Historical Journal, XII (1969), 197–216CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Rodríguez-Salgado, , Armada, introduction, p. 29Google Scholar.

²² AGS 594, fo. 8.

²³ The most notable recent contribution on guns and gunnery is Martin and Parker's book on the Armada.

²⁴ Some of these issues are discussed by Goodman, D. C., Power and Penury. Government, technology and science in Philip II's Spain (Cambridge, 1988), especially ch. 3 on shipbuildingGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Historians almost invariably take the details of ships in the Armada from the figures published in Lisbon in May 1588, that is: 130 ships and c. 57,000 tons. Quite independently, Casado Soto and I chose not to do this, because the fleet which left La Coruña in July was rather different from that in May. Our methods were similar: collating and comparing the partial and confusing documents, and we have arrived at very similar figures. He adds one hulk more which accounts for the slight difference in tonnage. My figures (Armada catalogue, pp. 154–5 details of ships, p. 31 evolution of the fleet and tonnage) are: 126 larger vessels, 10 caravels and 7 falúas; tonnage c. 58–59,000. Both in the catalogue and in Casado Soto's account, there are places where (through carelessness and the constant changes in the documents) somewhat different figures are offered, but one should take the figures here cited as final.

²⁶ Again his figures differ slightly on p. 245, and p. 248 where he gives 60.50 per cent of tonnage saved. Fernández Duro had thought 63 ships were lost; Parker and Martin that 60 had returned; I identified only 58 returns, and calculated 52 losses.

²⁷ Thompson, I. A. A. disagrees, and has stated his conviction of the inadequacies of the campaign with some force in ‘The invincible Armada’, Royal Armada. 400 years (London, 1988), pp. 160–9, 172–9Google Scholar. It is perhaps no more than a restatement of the old conundrum: is a bottle half full or half empty? No one denies that there were many deficiencies, the worst perhaps – the shortages and bad quality of food – are not dealt with in any of these books. But given the means available to them, and the force that eventually set sail, the organization of the campaign was surely a major achievement.

²⁸ The final figures are given in Los Tercios, pp. 193–4; the long and contradictory estimates in La Sanidad, especially pp. 290–1, 313–4, 319–20.

²⁹ Thompson, War and government; Parker, G., The army of Flanders and the Spanish road 1567–1659 (Cambridge, 1972)Google Scholar; Redlich, F., The German military enterpriser and his workforce. A study in European and social history (2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1964)Google Scholar.