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² C.P. 64 (34), Cabinet, Imperial Defence Policy, Report of the Defence Requirements Committee 14, Committee of Imperial Defence, Defence Requirements Sub-committee, Report, 28 Feb. 1934, Public RecordOffice (P.R.O.), Cab. 16/110; Wark, Wesley K., The ultimate enemy: British intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 (Ithaca and London, 1985), p. 17Google Scholar, cites the phrase ‘ultimate potential enemy’.

³ Cf. Wark, pp. 108–9.

⁴ Gibbs, N. H., Grand strategy, volume I: rearmament policy (London, 1976), p. 642Google Scholar.

⁵ For this and the following: DBFP 3, II (1949), 683–6Google Scholar; Hoffmann, Peter, The history of the German resistance 1933–1945 (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977), pp. 54–68Google Scholar.

⁶ Theo Kordt, letters to Hans Rothfels 19 Dec. 1948, 24 Feb. 1949, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, NI Rothfels 28/2; Kordt, Erich, Nicht aus den Akten… (Stuttgart, 1950), pp. 249–54, 279Google Scholar.

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⁸ Feiling, Keith, The life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946), p. 360Google Scholar.

⁹ Gibbs, pp. 689–714.

¹⁰ Gibbs, pp. 642–8; Dilks, David, ‘“We must hope for the best and prepare for the worst”: the prime minister, the cabinet and Hitler's Germany, 1937–1939’, Proceedings of the British Academy, LXXIII (1987), 327Google Scholar.

¹¹ Cabinet 37 (38) and 38 (38), Conclusions, 12 and 14 Sept. 1938, P.R.O., Cab. 23/95;memoranda in P.R.O., Cab. 24/278 no. 196; Sir Orme Sargent (deputy under-secretary in the foreign office) to Sir Robert Vansittart (first diplomatic adviser of the government) 20 June 1939, P.R.O., FO 371/22973/55491 (I am indebted to Patricia Meehan for this item): ‘For instance, in the early days of last September, Weizsäcker's advice was, through Burckhardt, to send a strong warning to Hitler. It was largely on this advice that the Cabinet decided to instruct Sir N. Henderson at Nuremberg to deliver the famous message to Hitler. If you remember, Sir N. Henderson demurred, and eventually won the day […]’; Henderson, Nevile, Failure of a mission. Berlin 1937–1939 (Toronto, 1940), pp. 150– 1Google Scholar; Blasius, Rainer, Für Grossdeutschland – gegen den grossen Krieg. Staatssekretär Ernst Frhr. von Weizsäcker in den Krisen um die Tschechoslowakei und Polen 1938/39 (Cologne, Vienna, 1981), p. 64Google Scholar; Thielenhaus, Marion, Zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand: Deutsche Diplomaten 1938–1941. Die politischen Aktivitäten der Beamtengruppe um Ernst von Weizsäcker im Auswärtigen Amt (Paderborn, 1985 edn), pp. 74–5, 123Google Scholar.

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¹³ Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945, Series D (1937–45) (ADAPD), vol. I (Baden-Baden, 1950), no. 31Google Scholar; The Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax. The Life of Lord Halifax (London, 1965), pp. 368–74Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Cadogan, pp. 123–4, 128–9; Cadogan's paper in P.R.O. FO 371/21659/XC155334.

¹⁵ Gibbs, pp. 654–5.

¹⁶ Gibbs, pp. 653–67.

¹⁷ Gibbs, p. 695.

¹⁸ The parliamentary debates fifth series, volume 345, House of Commons, Official report (London, 1939)Google Scholar, col. 2415; Dilks, p. 342.

¹⁹ Debates, 345, col. 13.

²⁰ Gibbs, p. 707.

²¹ DBFP 3, VII (1954), 125–8Google Scholar.

²² Debates, fifth series, vol. 351 (1939), col. 6, 8Google Scholar.

²³ Cmd. 6144, accounts and papers: eight volumes. (7.) State papers. Session 28 November 1939–20 November 1940, vol. XII, 1939–1940 (London, 1939)Google Scholar; publ. in The Times (Royal edn), 26 Aug. 1939, p. 9; publ. again with secret protocol as Cmd. 6616 in accounts and papers: five volumes. (4.) Law, miscellaneous, state papers. Session 29 November 1944–15 June 1945, vol. X, 1944–1945 (London, 1945)Google Scholar.

²⁴ The Times (Royal edn), 4 Sept. 1939, p. 8; 7 Sept. 1939, p. 6; 11 Sept. 1939, p. 8; Stacey, C. P., Six years of war (Ottawa, 1957), pp. 48–9Google Scholar.

²⁵ Hoffmann, , History, pp. 99–144Google Scholar.

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²⁷ Hillgruber, Andreas and Hümmelchen, Gerhard, Chronik des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Düsseldorf, 1978), p. 14Google Scholar; Maier, Klaus A., Rohde, Horst, Stegemann, Bernd and Umbreit, Hans, Die Errichtung der Hegemonic auf dem europäischen Kontinent (Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 2), (Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 126–33Google Scholar.

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²⁹ Domarus, Max, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945 (Neustadt a.d. Aisch, 1963), pp. 1377–93Google Scholar; Woodward, Llewellyn, British foreign policy in the Second World War, I (London, 1970), 13Google Scholar.

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³¹ Fieldhouse, Noel, ‘The Anglo-German War of 1939–42: Some movements to end it by a negotiated peace’, Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, fourth series, IX (1971), 285–312Google Scholar; Feiling, pp. 424–5.

³² Butler, J. R. M., Grand strategy, volume II: September 1919–June 1941 (London, 1957), p. 62Google Scholar; Woodward 1, 284.

³³ Debates, fifth series, vol. 352 (1939)Google Scholar, 12 Oct. 1939, cols. 563–5.

³⁴ Hinsley, F. H., British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations, I (London, 1979), 56–7Google Scholar.

³⁵ Hinsley I, 56–7, having seen documents closed to public inspection until 2015, but with reference to open papers, confirms some points in the account of MacDonald, Callum A., ‘The Venlo Affair’, European Studies Review, VIII (1978)Google Scholar but does not support MacDonald's interpretation that ‘Chamberlain was persuaded by the Hague discussions that the SIS had uncovered a genuine military conspiracy which might take action against the regime’ (MacDonald, p. 455). Since MacDonald does not consider the contact through the Vatican (see below, at note 56), he does not explain how the Venlo incident ‘affected the British response to all subsequent approaches from Germany’ (MacDonald, p. 460). See further Andrew, Christopher, Her Majesty's secret service. The making of the British intelligence community (New York, 1986), pp. 434–8Google Scholar.

³⁶ Hinsley I, 56–7.

³⁷ Hoffmann, , History, pp. 106–9Google Scholar.

³⁸ For this and the following account: [von Trott zu Solz, Clarita], ‘Adam von Trott zu Solz: Eine erste Materialsammlung, Sichtung und Zusammenstellung’, mimeographed typescript ([Reinbek, 1957]), pp. 163–7Google Scholar; Documents on German foreign policy 1918–1945, ser. D (DGFPD), VI (London, 1956), 674–84Google Scholar; Bielenberg, Christabel, The past is myself (London, 1968), pp. 44–6Google Scholar; Astor, David, ‘The mission of Adam von Trott’, The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 7 06 1956, p. 7Google Scholar; Astor, David, ‘Why the revolt against Hitler was ignored: on the British reluctance to deal with German anti-Nazis’, Encounter, XXXII (1969), no. 6, 3–13Google Scholar; Astor, David, ‘The man who plotted against Hitler’, The Mew York Review of Books, 28 04. 1983, pp. 16–21Google Scholar; von Klemperer, Klemens (ed.), A noble combat: the letters of Sheila Grant Duff and Adam von Trott zu Solz 1932–1939 (Oxford, 1988), pp. 354–6Google Scholar; Duff, Sheila Grant, The parting of ways (London, Boston, 1982), pp. 209–10Google Scholar; Home, William Douglas, Half-term report: an autobiography (London, New York, Toronto, 1954), pp. 112–16Google Scholar; Sykes, Christopher, Troubled loyalty: a biography of Adam von Trott zu Solz (London, 1968), pp. 239–51Google Scholar; Malone, Henry O., Adam von Trott zu Solz: Werdegang eines Verschworers (Berlin, 1986), pp. 217–18Google Scholar. The private papers of both Chamberlain and Halifax contain no references to the encounters with Trott: University Library, University of Birmingham (Chamberlain papers), letter 8 Dec. 1988; Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, University of York (Halifax papers), letter 15 Dec. 1988.

³⁹ Trott's report in DGFP D VI, 681 says Wednesday, 8 June, but 7 June was a Wednesday.

⁴⁰ See note 38 above.

⁴¹ Trott, pp. 163–4; Astor, , ‘Mission’, p.7Google Scholar: ‘Every sentence of Trott's official report, now published, had this object of trying to delay theoutbreak of war. This is specially true of his deliberate flattery of Hitler. He discussed these tactics with me in detail as he was staying with me in London during part of his visit.’

⁴² Astor, , ‘Man’, p. 16Google Scholar.

⁴³ David Astor to Halifax 9 July 1939, P.R.O. FO 800/316.

⁴⁴ Cf. Dilks, pp. 346–7.

⁴⁵ Feiling, p. 418.

⁴⁶ Feiling, p. 426; Gilbert, Martin, Winston S.Churchill, VI (London, 1983), 72–3Google Scholar; Andrew, pp. 437–8; Hinsley 1, 56–7; Cadogan, p. 228; W.M. (39), 64th Conclusions, Minute 10, Confidential Annex, 26 Oct. 1939, P.R.O., Cab. 65/3; for Chamberlain's and Halifax's abhorrence towards war, see Ludlow, Peter W., ‘The unwinding of appeasement’, in Kettenacker, Lothar (ed.), The ‘other Germany’ in the Second World War: emigration and resistance in international perspective (Stuttgart, 1977), pp. 20–2, 32Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Gilbert, pp. 52–3, 485.

⁴⁸ Butler, p. 21.

⁴⁹ Gilbert, p. 73; Andrew, p. 438.

⁵⁰ Conwell-Evans, T. P., None so blind: a study of the crisis years, 1930–1939 (London, 1947), pp. xi–xiiGoogle Scholar; Rothfels, Hans, Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler. Eine Würdigung, new expanded edn (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), pp. 154, 228–9 n. 10Google Scholar; Cadogan, p. 59; Andrew, p. 416; DBFP 3, IV (London, 1951), 18Google Scholar; Christie, pocket diary 1940 in P. Ludlow's possession; Deutsch, Harold C., The conspiracy in the twilight war (Minneapolis, 1968), p. 158Google Scholar; Conwell-Evans to Konrad Hoffmann, letter 6 March 1935 in the author's possession; ADAP C, III (Göttingen, 1973), 817–18Google Scholar. Christie and Conwell-Evans had predicted Hitler's coup de main against Czechoslovakia for the week of 12March 1939; Andrew, p. 416 citing Rose, Norman, Vansittart: study of a diplomat (London, 1978), PP. 232–3, 241Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Christie, pocket diary 1940; Simon, letters to the author 31 Aug. and 27 Sept. 1983; information from H. C. Deutsch 12 June 1985.

⁵² Theo Kordt to Rothfels 24 Feb. 1949; Kosthorst, Erich, Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler zwischen Polen- und Frankreichfeldzug, 3rd edn (Bonn, 1957), pp. 82–4Google Scholar.

⁵³ The November date was linked with Hitler's order for an offensive against France; cf. Hoffmann, , History, pp. 128–44Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Kordt, , Nicht, pp. 260–1, 379–83Google Scholar gives the dates of 18 Dec., 27 Jan. and 16 Feb.; Christie, pocket diary 1940 makes it appear that the Feb. meeting took place one or two days before the 16th; cf. Ludlow, , ‘Unwinding’, p. 22 n. 79Google Scholar; Groscurth, p. 311; Kosthorst, p. 90.

⁵⁵ War Cabinet 78 (39), Conclusions, 10 Nov. 1939, P.R.O., Cab. 65/2.

⁵⁶ Ludlow, Peter, ‘Papst Pius XII., die britische Regierung und die deutsche Opposition im Winter 1939/40’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, XXII (1974), 322Google Scholar; Chadwick, Owen, Britain and the Vatican during the Second World War (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 91, 93Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ [SirWheeler-Bennett, John W.], ‘Memorandum’, 28 12 1939Google Scholar, Rothfels, Hans (ed.), ‘Trott und die Aussenpolitik des Widerstandes’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, XII (1964), 307, 316–17Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Hoffmann, , History, pp. 128–72Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Cf. War Cabinet 142 (40), 27 May 1940, 4.30 p.m., Confidential Annex, P.R.O., Cab. 65/13–.

⁶⁰ Kettenacker, Lothar, ‘Zur britischen Reaktion auf deutsche Friedensfühler während des “Phoney War” 1939/40’ in Kettenacker, pp. 157–8Google Scholar; Blasius, Rainer A. (ed.), Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, I. Reihe, 1 (Frankfurt, a.M., 1984), 37Google Scholar; Ludlow, , ‘Unwinding’, pp. 29–30Google Scholar.

⁶¹ SirPhipps, Eric, British ambassador in Paris, to Halifax 23 Oct. 1939, Blasius, pp. 38–41Google Scholar.

⁶² War Cabinet 120 (39), Conclusions of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. I, on Wednesday, December 20, 1939, at 11.30 a.m., P.R.O., Cab. 65/2; Woodward I, 284–8; Butler, pp. 69, 99 does not refer to the ‘peace aims’.

⁶³ Woodward I, 284–6; Kettenacker, pp. 159–61.

⁶⁴ , Robert Leiber SJ, ‘Pius XII✠’, Stimmen der Zeit, CLXIII (1958), 81–100Google Scholar; Ludlow, , ‘Papst Pius XII.’, pp. 330–8Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Sir Francis D'Arcy Osborne, British minister to the Holy See, to foreign office 1 Dec. 1939, in Ludlow, , ‘Papst Pius XII.’, p. 328Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Ludlow, , ‘Papst Pius XII.’, pp. 336–7Google Scholar; Schulz, Gerhard, ‘“Dismemberment of Germany”: Kriegsziele und Koalitionsstrategie 1939–1945’, Historische Zeitschrift, CCXLIV (1987)Google Scholar, 39 misquotes Halifax as saying that a decentralized and federal Germany was of interest with a view to France's security requirements.

⁶⁷ Ludlow, , ‘Papst Pius XII.’, pp. 337–8Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Ludlow, , ‘Unwinding’, p. 40Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Ludlow, , ‘Papst Pius XII.’, p. 337Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Woodward, 1, 286.

⁷¹ Debates, fifth series, volume 360 (1940), col. 1501–2Google Scholar.

⁷² Cf. Hoffmann, Peter, German resistance to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass., London, 1988), pp. 95–104Google Scholar.

⁷³ The memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), pp. 88–9Google Scholar. See also von Hassell, Ulrich, The von Hassell diaries 1938–1944 (London, 1948), pp. 186, 189–90 for August 1941Google Scholar; the summary of Dr George Bell, the bishop of Chichester, for 1942, in [Bell], George Cicestr, ‘The background of the Hitler plot’, The Contemporary Review, 10 1945, pp. 206–7Google Scholar; for 1943 see von Kluge's, Fieldmarshal question to Goerdeler in September what foreign-policy conditions could be created for a coup d'état, Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung: Die Kaltenbrunner-Berichte an Bormann und Hitler über das Attentat vom 20. Juli 1944 (Stuttgart, 1961), pp. 410–12Google Scholar; exposé inspired by Moltke's mission to Istanbul in December 1943 in van Roon, Ger, Neuordnung im Widerstand: Der Kreisauer Kreis innerhalb der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung (Munich, 1967), pp. 582–6Google Scholar. Cf. Moltke's letter to Lionel Curtis of 25 March 1943 in Balfour, Michael and Frisby, Julian, Helmuth von Moltke: a leader against Hitler (London, 1972), pp. 215–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Astor, , ‘Why’, pp. 3–4Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ The public papers and addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937 volume: the constitution prevails [ed.] Rosenman, Samuel I. (New York, 1941), pp. 406–11Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ United States No. 3 (1941), Joint Declaration by the President of the United States of America and Mr. Winston Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom known as the Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941, Cmd. 6321, accounts and papers […] 1940–41 publ. in The Times (Late London Ed.) 15 Aug. 1941, p. 4.

⁷⁶ War Cabinet 84 (41), Conclusions of a Meeting of the war cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. I, on Tuesday, August 19, 1941, at 11.30 a.m., P.R.O., Cab. 65/19. Blasius, pp. xliv, 450, refers to a meeting of 26 Aug. 1941 as a war cabinet meeting through a misunderstanding of a diary entry by Dalton, Hugh, The Second World War diary of Hugh Dalton 1940–45, ed. Pimlott, Ben (London, 1986), pp. 273–5Google Scholar where Dalton speaks of a ‘meeting of ministers’, not a cabinet meeting, at which Churchill spoke ina similar vein; cf. Burridge, T. D., British Labour and Hitler's war (London, 1976), p. 29Google Scholar; this led to an incorrect citation by Hillgruber, Andreas, Da Zusammenbruch im Osten 1944/45 als Problem der deutschen Nationalgeschichte und der europäischen Geschichte (Opladen, 1985), p. 23Google Scholar. See also ‘The Atlantic Charter’, radio broadcast speech in Churchill, Winston S., His complete speeches 1897–1963, VI, 1935–42 (New York and London, 1974), 6473–6Google Scholar; Debates, fifth series, vol. 374 (1941) 9 Sept. 1941, cols. 67–8Google Scholar; Debates, fifth series, vol. 376 (1942), 18 Nov. 1941, cols. 187–8Google Scholar; Debates, fifth series, vol. 398 (1944), 22 March 1944, cols. 853–4Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ Foreign relations of the United States 1942 (FRUS 1942), I (Washington, 1960), 1–38Google Scholar; FRUS: the conference at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (Washington, 1968), pp. 362–76Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ Cmd. 6376, accounts and papers: six volumes, (5.) Law, miscellaneous, state papers. Session 12 November 1941–10 November 1942, IX (London, 1942)Google Scholar; The Times (late London edn), 12 June 1942, p. 5.

⁷⁹ Terry, Sarah Meiklejohn, Poland's place in Europe: General Sikorski and the origin of the Oder–Neisse line, 1939–1943 (Princeton, 1983), pp. 298, 301–2Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ Balfour, Michael, Withstanding Hitler in Germany 1933–45 (London and New York, 1988), P 155Google Scholar.

⁸¹ Terry, pp. 218, 247–8, 252. Terry considers the evidence for Stalin's mention of the Oder uncorroborated; but see Siebel-Achenbach, Sebastian, ‘The social and political transformation of Lower Silesia, 1943–1948’ (Oxford University: Phil, diss., 1987), pp. 63–8Google Scholar, for the period Nov. 1940 to Dec. 1942. Dalton, p. 441, recorded a lunch conversation with Sikorski under 21 May 1942: ‘[…] I impressed on him that he should get the whole East Prussian coast and Danzig. “Yes, and Königsberg,” he said, with an eager look in his eye. I said that, as he knew, Stalin had offered him the line of the Oder. He said that that was “only a provocation”. He could not take over an area containing so many Germans. I said that he can drive them out, but he still seemed to think that this was too large an operation. In East Prussia there were all the Kashubians. He was also quite prepared to take the whole Silesian coalfields, but not, certainly not, the Oder.’ ‘Sikorski's reaction to Stalin's ‘offer’ of the Oder line may account for Terry judging it uncorroborated. Cf. Siebel-Achenbach, pp. 82–3 for Stalin's position on the Oder line in December 1943.

⁸² Siebel-Achenbach, pp. 63–8.

⁸³ Eden to British ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, 1 Dec. 1941, Blasius, pp. 577–9.

⁸⁴ Blasius, p. 579. Schulz, p. 53, cites Rothwell, Victor, Britain and the cold war 1941–1947 (London, 1982), pp. 87–8Google Scholar to the effect that deputy under-secretary Sir Orme Sargent and Cadogan had made this statement; Rothwell ascribes it to Cadogan; Blasius, pp. 577–9, prints the entire document that Rothwell apparently refers to (P.R.O., FO 371/29472/N6893; Rothwell's reference is ‘FO 29472/6893’), where Eden is shown as having made the comment, in writing. Cf. Burridge, pp. 29–30, who quotes Dalton from his 1939 [sic] diary as foreseeing the Red Army getting control of ‘all of Poland, part of Germany and the Czech and Slovak lands, so that there emerged a Polish, a German, a Slovak and a Czech Soviet Socialist Republic’ which Dalton would greatly prefer' to the continuance of Hider Germany with its Protectorates'; in the autumn of 1939, Dalton lobbied the under-secretary of state in the foreign office, R. A. Butler, and Polish embassy officials to persuade them that Poland should accept the Curzon line in the east and receive East Prussia as compensation, and he agreed with the Poles ‘that the transfer of populations, “now that Hitler has taken it up officially”, should be carried much further in any post-war settlement’. Cf. W. M. 43), 135th Conclusions, Minute 4, Confidential Annex (5th October, 1943 - 5.30 p.m.), P.R.O., Cab. 65/40, and below at note 91.

⁸⁵ Terry, p. 253.

⁸⁶ Eden's summary of his talks in Moscow dated 5 Jan. 1942, in Ross, Graham, The foreign office and the Kremlin: British documents on Anglo-Soviet relations, 1941–45 (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 82–3Google Scholar; cf. Dalton, p. 441.

⁸⁷ Molotov had outlined a similar programme of territorial acquisitions to Ribbentrop and Hitler in Berlin a year before, on 12, 13 and 16 November 1940; ADAPD, XI. I (Bonn, 1964), nos. 325, 326, 328, pp. 448–78Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ Eden's telegrams to the foreign office from Moscow No. 13 Hectic and No. 14 Hectic of 17 Dec. 1941 and No. 22 Hectic and No. 24 Hectic of 18 Dec. 1941; War Cabinet, W. M. (41), 131st Conclusions, Minute 2, Confidential Annex, 19 Dec. 1941, P.R.O., Cab. 65/24; Eden's summary of the talks in Moscow, 5 Jan. 1942, Ross, pp. 82–3; The memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon: the reckoning (Boston, 1965), pp. 332–52Google Scholar; Woodward, II, 232, 251, 622, 650–51; Hillgruber, p. 24.

⁸⁹ Eden's report on his trip to Moscow in W.M. (42) 1st Conclusions, Minute 4, Confidential Annex (1 January, 1942, 12 Noon), P.R.O., Cab. 65/21.

⁹⁰ Churchill, Winston S., The second world war, iv (Boston, 1950), 327Google Scholar; Churchill, and Roosevelt, , The complete correspondence, 1, ed. Kimball, Warren F. (Princeton, 1984), 394–5Google Scholar; cf. Blasius, pp. 498–500; Ross, pp. 108–9, 112–14; Lord Gladwyn was influential among thosefavouring dismemberment of Germany and wrote briefs; Gladwyn, pp. 111–24; Schulz, p. 65, says incorrectlythat cabinet approved Gladwyn's draft, ‘The Four Power Plan’ envisaging dismemberment of Germany; nor did cabinet approve a ‘short summary’ of it; according to Gladwyn, p. 118: ‘It was clearly going to be a difficult matter to get our policy paper through the Cabinet, essential though that was for the purpose of influencing the future action of the American Administration. Though no Cabinet decision was therefore available, the fact that the Cabinet had at least been consulted meant that we were now to come up against tough and intelligent opposition from outside the Foreign Office.’ But the concept of annexations and some form of division of Germany was gaining ground gradually; Dalton, p. 441. On 22 May 1943, Churchill expressed to Roosevelt his desire for the creation of a Danubian federation with Bavaria, a Balkan federation, anda Prussia containing 40 million Prussians divided from the rest of Germany; Churchill and Roosevelt, II (1984),222–7.

In 1941 and 1942 the British government gave the Polish government in exile several assurances that Britain didnot propose to conclude with the Soviet Union an agreement confirming the Soviet-German demarcation line of 1940, and that the British government did not recognize any territorial changes effected in Poland since 1939. A[nthony] E[den], War Cabinet, Western Frontiers of the U.S.S.R., W.P. (43) 438, 5 October 1943, P.R.O., Cab. 66/41. But the British position did not extend beyond ‘non-recognition’ of theterritorial changes affecting Poland since 1939. The American position was identical in effect. The United States never intended to recognize Polish territorial integrity in the boundaries of 1939 and shared Britain's disposition to consider the Curzon Line as properly or legitimately Poland's easternmost frontier. Eden said that Poland's territorial losses to Russia would not affect her economically, and Roosevelt told Eden in March 1943 the great powers would decide what Poland was to have. Terry, pp. 283–4.

⁹¹ War Cabinet 137(43), Conclusions of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. I, on Friday, 8 October 1943, at 11.30 a.m., P.R.O., Cab. 65/36 and W.M. (43), 137th Conclusions, Confidential Annex, P.R.O., Cab. 65/40.

⁹² W.M. (43), 135th Conclusions, Minute 4, Confidential Annex (5 October 1943 – 5.30 p.m.), P.R.O., Cab. 65/40; there is nothing in the minutes to support Kitchen, Martin, ‘Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union during the Second World War’, Historical Journal, XXX (1987), 427Google Scholar, who says that Churchill announced in cabinet on 5 Oct. 1943 that Germany would have to be strengthened after the war as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, although, of course, changes of mood were not uncommon.

⁹³ A[nthony] E[den], War Cabinet, Western Frontiers of the U.S.S.R., W.P. (43), 5 October 1943, P.R.O., Cab. 66/41.

⁹⁴ A[nthony] E[den], War Cabinet, Anglo-Czechoslovak Relations, W.P.(42) 280, 2 July 1942, P.R.O., Cab. 66/26; Brandes, Detlef ‘Grossbritannien und die Exilregierungen Polens, der Tschechoslowakei und Jugoslawiens vom Kriegsbeginn bis zur Konferenz von Teheran’, (Habilitationsschrift, Freie Universitat Berlin, 1984), pp. 352–5Google Scholar; cf. de Zayas, Alfred M., Nemesis at Potsdam: the Anglo-Americans and the expulsion of the Germans. Background, execution, consequences (London, Henley and Boston, 1977), p. 7Google Scholar; see also FRUS 1943, I (1963), 542 (for 5 Oct. 1943); FRUS: the conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945 (1955), pp. 159–63 (for Oct. 1944), pp. 612–6 (for Yalta, Feb. 1945). Cf. Churchill in the house of commons, 22 Feb. 1944, in Churchill, , Speeches, VII (1974), 6893Google Scholar: ‘I cannot feel that the Russian demand for a reassurance about her Western frontiers goes beyond the limits of what is reasonable or just. Marshal Stalin and I also spoke and agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense of Germany both in the North and in the West.’;

⁹⁵ Siebel-Achenbach, pp. 79–81; FRUS. Diplomatic papers. The conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943 (Washington, 1961), pp. 594–6Google Scholar.

⁹⁶ Churchill in the house of commons on 22 Feb. 1944, Debates, fifth series, volume 397 (1944), cols. 698–9Google Scholar; FRUS 1944, I, 517–18; Woodward, II, 638, 657–62.

⁹⁷ Russia herself appears not to have adhered strictly to this principle, but thus far only contacts, not negotiations, during the years 1941–4 between German government agents and Soviet agents, mainly in Stockholm, have come to light; see Mastny, Vojtech, ‘Stalin and the prospects of a separate peace in World War II’, American Historical Review, LXXVII (1972), 1365–88Google Scholar; Martin, Bernd, Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik im Zweiten Welktrieg 1939–1942 (Düsseldorf, 1976 edn)Google Scholar; Martin, Bernd, ‘Verhandlungen Über separate Friedensschlüsse 1942–1945’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (1976), no. 2, pp. 95–113Google Scholar; Fleischhauer, Ingeborg, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens: Deutsch–sowjetische Geheimgespräche 1941–1945 (Berlin, 1986), passimGoogle Scholar. At least some of the contacts between Russian agents and German official or semi-official agents must have served to exert pressure on the western allies to agree to concessions to Russia, an d to establish a second front in Europe.

⁹⁸ P.R.O., FO 371/26542/[C 610], FO 371/26543/C10855, PREMIER 4/100/8, also for the following; the first two items were printed partly in Blasius, p. 269; see also Kettenacker, p. 59.

⁹⁹ W.M. (41) 120th Conclusions, Minute 5, Confidential Annex (27 November 1941 – 5.0 p.m.), P.R.O., Cab. 65/24; Kitchen, p. 422, misread this source: neither Hess nor ‘a separate peace with the Germans’ were raised in the cabinet meeting he cites.

¹⁰⁰ Fleischhauer, pp. 173–220. The evidence that has come to light about these contacts is tenuous as regards their substance and seriousness on both sides; cf. Mastny, pp. 1369–72; see also William J. Donovan to President Roosevelt, 20 March 1944, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's File Box 6, Safe File OSS; Martin, , ‘Verhandlungen’, pp. 101–3Google Scholar appears to accept the alleged peace offers at face value.

¹⁰¹ The Times (late London edn), 23 July 1943, p. 3; Scheurig, Bodo, Free Germany: the National Committee and the League of German Officers (Middletown, Connecticut, 1969), pp. 32–77Google Scholar; FRUS 1943, I, 687; FRUS 1344, IV (1966), 805, 872 note 62Google Scholar. Fleischhauer, pp. 195–6 offers inconclusive speculations without reference to the material in FRUS; for a further Russian denunciation of peace feelers in September 1943 see Fleischhauer, p. 199.

¹⁰² FRUS 1943, I, 680, 687, 737, 752–4.

¹⁰³ See FRUS 1944, I, 510–13; Fleischhauer, pp. 221–3.

¹⁰⁴ Eisenhower, to Smith, 20 05 1944, The papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, III, ed. Chandler, Alfred D. Jr, [ et al. ] (Baltimore and London, 1970), 1872–6Google Scholar; FRUS 1944, I, 507–9.

¹⁰⁵ FRUS 1944, I, 493–4, 501–2, 510–14; FRUS: The conference at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (1968), pp. 362–76; also Allen Dulles' cables from Berne where he was European resident of the American Office of Strategic Services, OSS files, National Archives, Washington, D.C., e.g. no. 1890–3, 27 Jan. 1944; no. 1913–4, 29 Jan. 1944; no. 1965, 3 Feb. 1944.

¹⁰⁶ FRUS 1944, I, 517–18.

¹⁰⁷ FRUS 1944, I, 519.

¹⁰⁸ Balfour and Frisby, pp. 184–5.

¹⁰⁹ Cicestr, pp. 206–8; Bishop Bell's memorandum reporting Bonhoeffer's views in Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, Gesammelte Schriften, I (Munich, 1958), 373Google Scholar; ibid. p. 320; Bethge, Eberhard, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologe, Christ, Zeitgenosse (Munich, 1970 edn), pp. 824–35, 732–7Google Scholar; Hooft, Willem Visser't, Die Welt war meine Gemeinde (Munich, 1972), pp. 185–6Google Scholar; Arvid Brodersen (Norwegian resistance leader), interview with the author, 13 Jan. 1985.

¹¹⁰ Balfour and Frisby, p. 185.

¹¹¹ Balfour and Frisby, pp. 184–6, 271–7; von Moltke, Freya, Balfour, Michael and Frisby, Julian, Helmuth James von Moltke 1907–1945: Anwalt der Zukunft (Stuttgart, 1975), p. 285Google Scholar; Steltzer, Theodor and Gerstenmaier, Eugen, both members of the ‘Kreisau Circle’, to Anderson, Ivar, ed. of Svenska Dagbladet on 6 10 1943Google Scholar, Anderson diary 17 Sept., 6 Oct. and 30 Oct. 1943, Royal Library, Stockholm, Ivar Anderson papper L 91:3.

¹¹² R[othfels], H[ans] (ed.), ‘Zwei aussenpolitische Memoranden der deutschen Opposition (Friihjahr 1942)’, Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, V (1957), 388–95Google Scholar; Visser 't Hooft, pp. 182–200; Gerstenmaier, Eugen, ‘Der Kreisauer Kreis: Zu dem Buch Gerrit van Roons “Neuordnung im Widerstand”’, Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgesckichte, XV (1967), 236–7Google Scholar; Bell, George K. A., ‘Die Okumene und die innerdeutsche Opposition’, Vierteljahrshefte Jiir Zeitgeschichte, V (1957), 362–78Google Scholar; Bonhoeffer, pp. 372–89. See also Malone, passim.

¹¹³ Political memorandum, Germany No. 41, 23 March 1944, for Political Intelligence Department, P.R.O., FO 371/39059 139936; Hoffmann, , History, pp. 230–1Google Scholar.

¹¹⁴ By the summer of 1944, the leaders of the conspiracy generally, with the exception of Goerdeler, accepted surrender on all fronts; Trial of the major war criminals before the international military tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1345–1 October 1946, XXXIII (Nuremberg, 1949), 423Google Scholar; Dulles, Allen Welsh, Germany's underground (New York, 1947), p. 140Google Scholar.

¹¹⁵ Copy of Goerdeler's draft in Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nl. Goerdeler 23; printed in Dulles, , Underground, pp. 144–5Google Scholar.

¹¹⁶ People's Court judgement of 17 Jan. 1945 against Captain (Res.) Hermann Kaiser, Bundesarchiv, EAP 105/30; Spiegelbild, pp. 126–7, 410–12; Goerdeler, , ‘Unsere Idee’, typescript, n.p. [11 1944], pp. 33–40Google Scholar, Bundesarchiv, Nl. Goerdeler 26; cf. Hoffmann, Peter, Widerstand, Staalsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler (Munich, 1969), pp. 749–51, note 104Google Scholar.

¹¹⁷ H[ans] B[ernd] G[isevius], memorandum for A[llen] W[elsh] D[ulles], July 1944, typescript in the author's possession; Gisevius, Hans Bernd, To the bitter end (Boston and Cambridge, Mass., 1947), p. 493Google Scholar.

¹¹⁸ Lamb, Richard, The ghosts of peace 1935–1945 (Wilton, 1987), pp. 250–4Google Scholar, 262, 265, 270, 301–2; cf. Fieldhouse, passim.

¹¹⁹ Colonel Truman Smith to Allen Dulles 25 Apr. 1947, Allen W. Dulles papers, Princeton University Library; Smith names Colonel Vorys H. Connor, the Chief of the Mediterranean Division of Operations in the Pentagon at the time, and General J. E. Hull, Connor's superior in the Operations Division who for a time at least supported Connor's view; Wedemeyer, Albert C., Wedemeyer reports!. (New York, 1958), p. 238Google Scholar; on the second front, see Churchill, , Second world war IV, 267–71Google Scholar and passim.

¹²⁰ Dulles, passim; Dulles' cables from Berne in National Archives, Washington, Record Group 226 and in FDR Library, PSF box 170 and 171; cf. Bryant, Arthur, Triumph in the west, 1943–1946: based on the diaries and autobiographical notes of Field Marshal The Viscount Alanbrooke, K.G., O.M. (London, 1959), p. 242Google Scholar: in the interest of the balance of power General Sir Alan Brooke suggested converting Germany to an ally against a future Russian threat rather than dismembering her.

¹²¹ Lamb, pp. 256–86, 296–303.

¹²² Quoted in Lamb, p. 257. Elizabeth Wiskemann served in the British Legation in Berne; her name is misspelled in Harrison's minute as ‘Wiskeyman’.

¹²³ P.R.O., FO 371/39087 010.

¹²⁴ Quoted in Lamb, p. 283.

¹²⁵ Quoted in Lamb, pp. 296–7.

¹²⁶ Debates, fifth series, vol. 402 (1944), 2 Aug. 1944, col. 1487.