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¹⁴ See Niethammer, Lutz, ‘Structural reform and a compact for growth: conditions for a united labor union movement in western Europe after the collapse of fascism’, in Maier, Charles S. (ed.), The origins ofthe Cold War and contemporary Europe (New York, 1978), pp. 201–43Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Kimball, Warren F., Swords or ploughshares?: the Morgenthau plan for defeated Mali Germany, 1943–1946 (Philadelphia, 1976)Google Scholar. Roosevelt told this story ofhis German schooidays: ‘When I was eleven in 1893, I think it was, my class was started on the study of “Heimatkunde” – geography lessons about the village, then about how to get to the neighbouring towns and what one would see, and, finally, on how to get all over the Province of Hesse-Darmstadt. The following year we were taught all about roads and what we would see on the way to the French border. I did not take it the third year but I understand the class was “conducted” to France – all roads leading to Paris.’ (Roosevelt to Arthur Murray, 04 March 1940, Elibank papers, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, MS. 8809, fo. 229.)

¹⁶ ‘Record of conversation at luncheon at the British Embassy’, Washington, on 22nd March 1943’. P. 3. w p (43) 233. Cabinet Office papers, CAB 66/37 (Public Record Office, Kew). For fuller discussion of Churchill's attitudes see Reynolds, David, ‘Churchill, the “special relationship” and the debate about post-war European security, 1940–1945’, American Historical Association Proceedings, 1983, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1984)Google Scholar.

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