¹ Especially by biographers of Asquith. See Spender, J. A., Life of Asquith (2 vols. London, 1932), 11, 248–51:Google Scholar and Jenkins, Roy, Asquith (London, 1964), pp. 422–3, noticing how later historical accounts ‘lean heavily, with or without attribution, upon Beaverbrook's version’, while Beaverbrook's ‘facts’ may have been ‘only a surmise’.Google Scholar

² Beaverbrook, Lord, Politicians and the war, 1914–1916 (2 vols. London, 1928, 1932).Google Scholar

³ Taylor, A.J. P., Beaverbrook (London, 1972), pp. 102–3.Google Scholar

⁴ Taylor, Beaverbrook, pp. 48, 11 in, 113, 116, 122–5, 480–1, 630, etc. See also McEwen, J. M., ‘Lord Beaverbrook: historian extraordinary’, Dalhousie Review, iix, 1 (1979), 129–43, for further cases of his ‘inaccuracies, biasses, disregard of fact, [and] elevation of fancy to the level of truth’.Google Scholar

⁵ Beaverbrook, Politicians, I, 277.

⁶ The notes are printed in full in Taylor, Beaverbrook, pp. 106–7. Two errors of date are mentioned, and one of location. Other details are questionable.

⁷ Donald's memorandum of 27 Feb. 1917 is printed in Taylor, H. A., Robert Donald (London, 1934), PP. 137–42.Google Scholar Montagu's memorandum (Montagu papers, Trinity College, Cambridge) dated 9 Dec. 1916, has been largely but somewhat carelessly quoted in Waley, S. D., Edwin Montagu (London, 1964) pp. 102–30 with some of Waley's comments inadvertently merged with Montagu's.Google Scholar

⁸ Beaverbrook papers, House of Lords Record Office, G. 8/F. v. Bonar Law's narrative is in Bonar Law papers, House of Lords Record Office, 85/A/1, dated 30 Dec. 1916, and is extensively quoted in Blake, Robert, The unknown prime minister (London, 1955), pp. 304–40. The author gratefully acknowledges permission to quote from original sources granted by the Beaverbrook Foundation and the Clerk of the Records, House of Lords: and also by Lord Blake, Mr Mark Bonham Carter, the Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge, the Director of the Massachusetts Historical Society, and the University of Birmingham.Google Scholar

⁹ ‘ Report on cabinet crisis 1916 part II’, Beaverbrook papers, G. 10/F xxiv. Taylor, Beaverbrook, pp. 107–8 seems to confuse this with the ‘History of the crisis’ in G. 9/F xxi which is a later draft and already manifests some of Beaverbrook's refurbishing. Thus ‘ I sent the editor of the Express to sound Carson’ becomes ‘I sounded Carson’; and ‘George went off- and so did Bonar Law’ becomes ‘George then went off- and I returned home with Bonar Law’. Such minutiae could not have been ghosted by another writer, and I can find no basis in the Beaverbrook papers for Mr Taylor's assertion that Maurice Woods produced these drafts. The ‘many extended passages…in his unmistakable handwriting’ are not to be found, and in any case the drafts in question can hardly be said to have ‘literary form’. They are barest factual statements, and if they are not Beaverbrook's the framework of the later book becomes spurious.

¹⁰ Compare for example Law's narrative cited above:’… the P.M. immediately told me… that he had come to a complete understanding with Lloyd George as to the status and function of the committee, but that they had not entirely agreed as to the personnel. He added that Lloyd George was at Downing Street, and suggested he should come in. He did so, and the PM again repeated...’ etc., with Beaverbrook, Politicians, 11, 229, which is almost verbatim.

¹¹ Beaverbrook, ‘Report on cabinet crisis’, p. 13. It seems that this first draft was written in January 1917, for its first dating is 1917 by error for 1916, yet it was finished before Lloyd George sent his copies of correspondence on 31 Jan. 1917. Lloyd George papers, F/4/8/3 and text, p. 20: ‘long attachment when got from George to be inserted here’.

¹² Beaverbrook, ‘Report’, pp. 21–2.

¹³ The ‘conclave’ was an informal meeting in Austen Chamberlain's room. Chamberlain challenged Beaverbrook's account in 1931, saying that Cecil, Curzon and he himself only saw Asquith when ‘he sent for us on Tuesday afternoon’, and he thought the India Office conclave was Tuesday evening, i.e. after Asquith had resigned. Asquith had no intention of resigning until Tuesday afternoon. It was Lloyd George who sent in his resignation on Tuesday morning, but Asquith found, to his surprise, that the Unionists including Balfour would not allow him to accept it.

¹⁴ Bonar Law's narrative goes: ‘Next day, I spoke to the P.M. for a few minutes in his room at the House of Commons, before he went to answer questions, and I was disturbed to find that he was not quite so decided as to the appointment of the small war council as he had been the previous evening. We had not time to finish our conversation, and immediately after questions I followed him to Downing Street in order to finish it. Waiting outside the cabinet room I found Lord Grey, Mr Harcourt and Mr Runciman, and I at once went in to Bonham Carter's room and asked whether he would request the P.M. to see me for a few minutes only, before he saw his Liberal colleagues. He agreed to do so, and I went into the cabinet room. Mr McKenna was with him, but he immediately left. I only remained a few minutes, and during that time urged the P.M. not to fall between two stools the position had become extremely difficult, partly through the action of the press, and partly through his own delay...’ Cf. Beaverbrook, Politicians, 11, 248 ff.

¹⁵ Beaverbrook, Politicians, 86. The words in Hansard have been revamped to make much clearer sense.

¹⁶ Ibid. 11, 87.

¹⁷ Ibid., ii, 99.

¹⁸ Lord Lee of Fareham to Beaverbrook, 1 Sept. 1928 enclosing marked proofs. Beaverbrook papers, G. 8/F. v.

¹⁹ Taylor, Beaverbrook, pp. 125–6. McEwen, J. M., ‘A Churchill story: dinner at F. E. Smith's, 5 Dec. 1916’, Queen's Quarterly, LXXXIII, 2 (1976); also J. M. McEwen, ‘Lord Beaverbook’, pp. 140–1.Google Scholar

²⁰ Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 125.

²¹ See e.g. McEwen, ‘Lord Beaverbrook’, p. 141.

²² Beaverbrook papers, G. 9. Proofs with Churchill's corrections. Cf. Beaverbrook, Politicians, 11, 290.

²³ Beaverbrook to Churchill, 25 Dec. 1930. Beaverbrook papers, G. 8/F. v.

²⁴ Brade to Beaverbrook, 12 Sept. 1928. Beaverbrook papers, G. 8/F. v.

²⁵ Ibid. Cf. Beaverbrook, Politicians, 11, 124.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Beaverbrook, Politicians, 1, 168.

²⁸ Beaverbrook papers, G. 8/F. v. Press excerpt by Maxwell dated 10 May 1928 and draft replies. Reference was made to Sir G. C. Arthur's Kitchener, 111, 186ff., which shows that Kitchener and Maxwell were pressing London to authorize forward positions and a landing in the gulf of Alexandretta. Beaverbrook's story is wrong in essence as well as in particulars.

²⁹ Two months before the occasion of Beaverbrook's story Lord Esher noted that a deputation of businessmen and officials arrived by appointment at 10 Downing Street and were kept standing in the hall for a quarter of an hour. A door opened as someone passed in or out, and they glimpsed Asquith ‘ chatting to two ladies, who were smoking cigarettes, and buttoning the glove of one of them’. Fraser, P., Lord Esher (London, 1973) p. 311.Google Scholar

³⁰ Beaverbrook, Politicians, 1, 215.

³¹ Blake, Unknown prime minister, pp. 289–90.

³² Beaverbrook papers, G. 5/F. x. Also The Times of 9, 17 and 20 Jan. 1956, correspondence.

³³ Blake to Tom Blackburn, 31 Oct. 1955, Beaverbrook papers, G. 5/F. x.

³⁴ Beaverbrook to editor, The Times, 8 Feb. 1956, saying that he had not seen the notes attributing the story to him before publication, nor been consulted over the alterations in Blake's second edition.

³⁵ Beaverbrook to Blackburn, telegram, 7 Nov. 1955. Beaverbrook papers, G. 5/F. x.

³⁶ Tom Blackburn to Beaverbrook, 20 Jan. and 28 Feb. 1956. Beaverbrook (Nassau, Bahamas) to Blake, 17 Feb. 1956. Beaverbrook papers, G. 5/F. x.

³⁷ Beaverbrook, Politicians, 1, 112–13: ‘“Of course”, he said, “we must have a Coalition, for the alternative is impossible”, and, taking Bonar Law by the arm, he led him through the private passage which runs from the back of the Treasury to Nos. 10 and 11 Downing Street, and brought him to Mr Asquith.’

³⁸ Ibid. p. 112.

³⁹ Memorandum dictated by Austen Chamberlain on 18 May 1916, covering events from 14 May, Austen Chamberlain papers, Birmingham University, AC 2/2/25. This has been cannibalized by Petrie, Sir Charles without acknowledgement in his Austen Chamberlain (2 vols. London, 19401939–), II, 20ff. in a free paraphrase which makes some deceptive alterations. The morning compact was abrogated through lack of Unionist support, and Asquith resumed his reconstruction de novo on Tuesday morning. It took a week of strenuous bargaining to complete, precisely because the agreement of Monday to replace Kitchener by Lloyd George at the War Office and give the vacated office of Chancellor of the Exchequer to Bonar Law was found to be politically impracticable.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Beaverbrook papers, G. 8/F. v.

⁴¹ Ibid., Beaverbrook's notes of a conversation with Lloyd George on 13 Aug. 1928.

⁴² George, David Lloyd, War memoirs (2 vol. edn London, 1938), 1, 136. The plagiarism is careless, however, for ‘a marked cutting’ becomes ‘an unsigned letter’.Google Scholar

⁴³ See Chamberlain, memorandum, Chamberlain papers, AC 2/2/25. For Lloyd George the munitions muddle was the great issue, and he went, having got Law's support, to confront Asquith with the threat that if Kitchener was not removed from his responsibility for munitions he would resign. The ultimate solution, unforeseen at this juncture, was the creation of a Ministry of Munitions by statute which incidentally removed the responsibility from the Secretary of State for War.

⁴⁴ Lloyd George, War memoirs, 1, 136.

⁴⁵ Ibid., i, 586, 589 and 597.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 1, 586 and 597: ‘It is frankly told not from my point of view, but as a vindication of MrBonar Law’: ‘His account presents the story from the point of view of himself and of MrBonar Law.’

⁴⁷ Taylor, Beaverbrook, pp. 112–13, where in addition it is conjectured that Beaverbrook also drafted Lloyd George's final proposal to Asquith of 1 Dec. 1916. This even Beaverbrook denies.

⁴⁸ Beaverbrook, Politicians, 11, 144—5 and illustration.

⁴⁹ Beaverbrook,’ History of the crisis’, p. 34. Beaverbrook papers G. 9/F xxi. Bonar Law claims the proposal as his own in his interview with Robert Donald on 29 Dec. 1916, for which see H. A. Taylor, Donald, pp. 128ff.:’ We had a meeting with Carson. By this time I had got a scheme sketched out. My idea was…’

⁵⁰ Beaverbrook, ‘Report on cabinet crisis’, p. 26, Beaverbrook papers, G. 10/F. xxiv.

⁵¹ Beaverbrook, ‘History of the crisis’, p. 37.

⁵² Beaverbrook, Politicians, ii, 149. Mr Taylor in Beaverbrook, p. 157, emphasizes the’ remarkable stroke that an obscure backbencher should draft a statement to be imposed on the prime minister’, and renders Beaverbrook's original note for that day as (p. 150):’ BL… telephones me not having disclosed to G and C conversation with PM’. I read the ‘not’ as ‘viz’ in the original pencil notes, in Beaverbrook papers G. 10/F. xxiv.

⁵³ Blake, in Unknown prime minister, p. 308, brackets Aitken along with Carson and Lloyd George as having ‘acted’ with Bonar Law.

⁵⁴ Beaverbrook, ‘Andrew Bonar Law’, Daily Mirror, 8 Nov. 1922.

⁵⁵ Beaverbrook,’ History of the crisis’, p. 42, under 2 7 Nov. 1916 and referring to the subsequent days.

⁵⁶ Quoted in Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 116. The earliest draft (‘Report on cabinet crisis’, p. 9) goes: ‘As a matter of fact George had asked me earlier in the day [2 Dec. 1916] to direct the newspaper campaign but I declined the responsibility.’

⁵⁷ Beaverbrook, Politicians, 11, 194, 196.

⁵⁸ McEwen, J. M., ‘The press and the fall of Asquith’, Historical Journal, xxi, 4 (1978), 877.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ ‘Mr Harry Jones's notes’, Beaverbrook papers, G. 8/F. v.

⁶⁰ H. A. Taylor, Donald, pp. 109–11, 114–15. Law suggested that Carson's inclusion would be necessary and ‘ objected’ to the suggestion that Balfour be included - ‘ he was too much like Mr Asquith; indecisive’. Donald's retention of the names of Asquith and Balfour was not due to misinformation.

⁶¹ Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 114.

⁶² Ibid. pp. 159–60.

⁶³ E. Hislop Bell to Beaverbrook, 21 Aug. 1928, Beaverbrook papers, G. 9/F. xxii.

⁶⁴ Note by E. A. Perns of Daily Chronicle, concerning Friday 1 Dec. 1916, Beaverbrook papers, G. 8/F. v.

⁶⁵ Edwin Montagu's narrative, p. 5. Also Public Record Office, Cab 42/26/6. Montagu explains that Runciman turned up at the war committee and protested against the previous day's decision ‘for a levée en masse in answer to the German proposal. Asquith reminded him that he was not a member… but apparently added something which I did not over-hear, which gave George and Robertson to believe that he was going back on the decision of the day before.’ Montagu was drafting the appropriate national service bill and continued doing so, but that evening he found Lloyd George ‘very disturbed and distrait’.

⁶⁶ Note by E. A. Perris, Beaverbrook papers, G. 8/F. v. Also accompanying note by Mr Harry Jones. Perris remembered the time as ‘about 7.30–7.45 p.m.’.Jones as ‘about seven o’clock’.

⁶⁷ Lloyd George had proposed four names to Asquith that morning, but Montagu had withdrawn his, leaving Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Carson. Before Asquith's formal reply reached him, Lloyd Goerge on the evening of 1 December had been hauled away from a dinner table for the meeting with Bonar Law in Beaverbrook's rooms at which Law told him he ‘did not feel justified in dictating to the Prime Minister precisely the way in which that committee should be constituted’. According to Bonar Law, ‘Lloyd George agreed to this…’, saying ‘he himself had not made the names a condition in his conversation with the Prime Minister’. Montagu's narrative, p. 5: Bonar Law's narrative, Bonar Law papers, 85/A.

⁶⁸ Note by E. A. Perris cited above.

⁶⁹ Robert Donald to Blumenfeld, 27 Feb. 1917, Beaverbrook papers, G. 8/F. iii and iv.

⁷⁰ Ibid. Also Harry Jones's notes, Beaverbrook papers, G. 8/F. v.

⁷¹ Beaverbrook, Politicians, ii, 195.

⁷² See e.g. Morning Post, 2 Dec. 1916, leader, ‘The need for a new government’; The Times, 2 Dec., p. 9, ‘Critical days for ministers. The coming week’; and Manchester Guardian, 2 Dec., p. 6, ‘London, Friday night. Likelihood of Government Changes’, mentioning rumours in the Lobby of an interim Bonar Law premiership followed by a ‘final settlement’ of Lloyd George as prime minister. It seemed likely that the defection of the Liberal parliamentary war committee from coalition to opposition war policies as propounded by Carson would bring down Asquith, who would lack the requisite backing from Lloyd George and Bonar Law even if these had not resigned.

⁷³ The Times,2Dec, 1916, leader:’ The ideal Government for War is a very small, harmonious, resolute body of Ministers, an “inner Cabinet” authorized by their colleagues… to take every final decision, themselves as far as possible exempt from departmental routine, and meeting daily…Mr Asquith has many great qualities, but initiative and prompt action are admittedly not among them… and, though we think it conceivable that he might be willing, under sufficient pressure, to undertake any imaginable system of Government, we can have no confidence whatever that there can be any real break with the present methods so long as he presides.’ See also Morning Post, 1 Dec, p. 6,’ A constitutional dictator’ by Frederick Harrison, and same paper, 2 Dec, leader: ‘… nothing is to be hoped for as long as Mr Asquith remains Prime Minister’.

⁷⁴ See especially P.R.O., Cab 42/23–6, papers and minutes of the war committee in Nov. 1916, listed in P.R.O. Handbook No. 9 (H.M.S.O. 1966).

⁷⁵ At Curzon's instance the names of those attending the war committee were given to the press (see Cab 42/19/3, minutes of 5 Sept. 1916) and the public was surprised to see that it was approaching the dimensions of a full cabinet though officially its membership was seven.

⁷⁶ P.R.O., Cab 42/26/4.

⁷⁷ While Robert Cecil, for instance, called for ‘drastic changes in our civil life’ on the grounds that ‘ The Germans are putting their whole civilian organisation on a war footing, and we must do the same’, Herbert Samuel insisted on the ‘voluntary compulsion’ of labour by suppressing employment in luxury industries rather than by dictating employment in war industries. P.R.O. Cab 37/160/21 and 32, Cab 42/23–26 passim.

⁷⁸ Memorandum by Cecil circulated to cabinet on 27 Nov. 1916, P.R.O., Cab 37/160/21. He proposed that the committee should consist of no more than three members, one of whom should also belong to the war committee.

⁷⁹ P.R.O., Cab 37/160/30, Asquith to King George V, 30 Nov. The ‘two committee’ scheme was approved by the Unionist leaders on 29 Nov. Beaverbrook, Politicians, II, 165 comments that ‘The Home Council…would fall into the keeping of a nabob of the official hierarchy, and the dictatorship of Lloyd George would be avoided’. This he thought would lead to ‘sharp and incessant conflict’, and such was also Lloyd George's opinion. However, Lloyd George claimed to support Asquith's continued ‘ supreme control’ and ‘ power to refer any question to the Cabinet’ (memo, to P.M., 1 Dec, quoted in Beaverbrook, Politicians, 11, 185) which would have invited equally sharp conflicts. This is a problem which Beaverbrook ignores.

⁸⁰ Montagu states that when the cabinet approved Cecil's two-committee scheme Asquith ‘ also agreed that the Cabinet should not meet again during the war, and that the Heads of the Departments should not regard themselves as responsible for policy’. Montagu narrative, P. 5.

⁸¹ Bodleian Library, Milner papers, Milner diary, 30 Nov. 1916. Stevenson, Frances, Lloyd George: a diary (ed. Taylor, A. J. P., London, 1971), p. 130.Google Scholar

⁸² Stevenson, Lloyd George, p. 130. Bodleian Library, Addison papers, vol. 99, Christopher Addison, diary, 4 Dec, referring to 1 Dec, when Lloyd George saw Asquith in the morning and ‘practically delivered his ultimatum’.

⁸³ Milner to Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, 2 Dec. 1916, Bonar Law papers, 53/5/29, calling for ‘ a super-cabinet (the smaller the better)’ acting as ‘ a dictator, a supreme war lord in commission’. It was Milner who a few days later designed the rules and procedure of Lloyd George's war cabinet.

⁸⁴ Montagu's scheme was for a war committee of 3 or 4, chaired by the prime minister, the cabinet being suspended and the domestic committee idea dropped. Domestic policy would be covered by executive committees nominated by the war committee. After being presented with this scheme Asquith went to Walmer hoping to see Carson. (Montagu to Asquith, 2 Dec. 1916, Asquith papers, 31, fo. 8.) At the same time Drummond saw Cecil and reported to Asquith via Bonham Carter that Cecil did not like ‘the heads which we compiled’ because Asquith would ‘not really interfere with the war’ as nominal chairman, and ‘handing over the conduct of the war to L.G., B.L.-A.J.B. and Carson is fatal’. Cecil wanted Chamberlain or Curzon added, but Drummond did not accept that Asquith would be ‘shelved’ and therefore thought ‘the rest of Bob Cecil falls to the ground’. (Note by Drummond, n.d., 2 Dec. 1916 endorsed ‘sent down to Walmer’, Asquith papers 31, fo. 13.) Montagu (narrative, p. 7) says that at their Sunday interview Asquith ‘suggested the Drummond formula to George, who at once accepted it and began to discuss personnel’. For Asquith's jottings during the interview see Asquith papers, 31, fo. 14.

⁸⁵ Reynolds’ Newspaper, Sunday 3 Dec. 1916, article headed ‘Will the coalition cabinet break up? Lloyd George to resign…’ When the proprietor, Sir Henry Dalziel, M.P., a Lloyd George supporter on the Liberal war committee, saw Lloyd George on Saturday the position was that Asquith had finally refused the chairmanship of the new war committee to Lloyd George, whereas Bonar Law was committed to backing Lloyd George's chairmanship. The ‘Drummond formula’ solved the problem by proposing that Lloyd George as chairman should have daily briefings with Asquith. On this basis Lloyd George reached agreement with Asquith on Sunday afternoon. See esp. Asquith's jottings, Asquith papers 31, fo. 14: ‘…to see P.M. every day (as Gulland does)’.

⁸⁶ Beaverbrook, Politicians, II, 21 1ff.

⁸⁷ Ibid. 11, 215. Beaverbrook seems unaware that the Unionists wished to abolish the cabinet. Their position was aptly stated by Austen Chamberlain, who told Curzon on 2 Dec. that he had ‘long held the view that the War Committee should be the Cabinet’, and that he would ‘serve under the proposed Committee if he (Curzon) were added to it’, but not as a member of an impotent cabinet. Chamberlain to Neville Chamberlain, II Dec. 1916, Chamberlain papers, AC 15/3/7.

⁸⁸ Beaverbrook, Politicians, 11, 217. The publicity clause quoted above does not make any accusation except the obvious point, already public knowledge, that somehow Lloyd George had allowed his intention to resign to be leaked. Since the Unionist press and most of the Unionist parliamentary party thought that Lloyd George was indispensable to winning the war, Beaver-brook's supposition about the motive of the Unionist resolution, even on the basis of ignorance, reveals an extraordinary lack of acquaintance with the background of the situation.

⁸⁹ See esp. Balfour's narrative of the crisis, 7 Dec. 1916, British Library Add. MS 49692 fos. 179ft., largely quoted in Blanche E. C. Dugdale, Balfour, 11, I7iff.

⁹⁰ Curzon to Lansdowne, 3 Dec. 1916, Lord Newton, Lansdowne, p. 452. Lord Robert Cecil to Asquith, 5 Dec. 1916, Asquith papers, 18: ‘Please forgive me if I venture to ask you to consider if it is at all possible for you to accept office in a Lloyd George Ministry... Nothing else can preserve the unity of the country or the respect of Europe.’ Also Balfour to Asquith, 4 p.m. 5 Dec. 1916: ‘ I still think a. that the break-up of the Government by the retirement of Lloyd George will be a misfortune, b. that the experiment of giving him a free hand with the day-to-day work of the War Committee is well worth trying, and c. that there is no use trying it except on terms which enable him to work under conditions which, in his own opinion, promise the best results.’ Dugdale, Balfour, 11, 174.

⁹¹ Montagu pleaded convincingly that Lloyd George believed that Asquith was’ the right Prime Minister’, Montagu to Asquith 2 Dec. 1916, Asquith papers 31, fo. 8, and believed that he ‘yearned for Asquith's confidence’, Montagu narrative, p. 3.

⁹² TLS, 17 May 1928.

⁹³ Beaverbrook, Politicians, II, 17.

⁹⁴ TLS, 26 May 1932.

⁹⁵ Beaverbrook entertained the editor of the Atlantic Monthly, Mr Ellery Sedgwick, in London in 1918 and showed him the Asquith-Lloyd George letters during an afternoon visit to Cherkley, suggesting that’ if it seems desirable to publish these documents’ he would ‘ remember the Atlantic‘. In due course someone appeared in Boston with the letters asserting that ‘while Mr Asquith did not desire to be privy to the transaction... he thought it of advantage that the papers be published’. The connecting narrative is manifestly inspired by Beaverbrook, with his characteristic errors and misplaced reliance on Robert Donald's version of Montagu's statement. The editor was surprised by the outcry that followed the unauthorized publication of Asquith's letters, led by Asquith himself who denounced it in the New York papers as ‘a breach of the sanctities’. Beaverbrook assured him that ‘over here you are envied for bringing off a big journalistic scoop. There is no doubt that Asquith was not consulted about publication... and, if he had been, he would certainly have not agreed to it.’ With a nonchalant disregard of rules Beaverbrook had used Sedgwick as a catspaw to promote his own legend. Sedgwick to Beaverbrook, 14 Feb. 1919, and Beaverbrook's reply, 1 March, Ellery Sedgwick papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

⁹⁶ ‘E.T.Raymond’ pseud. (Thompson, Edward R.), Mr Lloyd George (London, 1922), pp. 21 off., 216, citing the Atlantic Monthly as a source. Neither Sedgwick nor Beaverbrook mentions the name of the anonymous contributor, but Beaverbrook corrected Sedgwick's impression that he was ‘a very old friend and follower of Mr Asquith’ by replying: ‘He is not a firm friend of anybody. He was George's friend when Asquith fell and he intended to be Asquith's friend when he thought George was about to fall in May 1918.’ It is certain that some of his information could only have been supplied by Beaverbrook.Google Scholar