¹ For a detailed study of the immediate post-war period, see Graham, B. D., The French socialists and tripartism, 1944–47 (London, 1965).Google Scholar For more general interpretative discussions see Ligou, D., Histoire du Socialisme en France, 1871–1962 (Paris, 1962)Google Scholar and Quilliot, R., La SFIO et l'Exercice du Pouvoir, 1944–58 (Paris, 1972).Google Scholar

² This was manifested most clearly in the 1950 Congress (26–30 May). See ‘Motion de Politique Internationale’, voted almost unanimously in Rapport de Congrès, 11–14 mai 1951, PP. 49–51.

³ See, for example, the ‘Resolution Politique’ and ‘Plan d’Action Socialiste’ adopted by the Congress of Issy-les-Moulineaux, 12 July 1969. Extracts are quoted in Hurtig, C., De la SFIO au Nouveau Parti Socialiste (Armand Colin, 1970), pp. 85–9.Google Scholar

⁴ Indeed he is still quoted with approval even by those who now condemn SFIO policy at times when his influence was at its height. (See, for example, Michel Charzat's Preface to Le CERES Par Lui-même, Christian Bourgois, 1979). For the latest and most complete study of Blum, see Lacouture, J., Léon Blum (Seuil, 1977).Google Scholar

⁵ Michel, H., Les Courants de Pensée de la Résistance (PUF, 1962),Google Scholar Part 4; Mayer, D., Les Socialistes dans la Résistance (PUF, 1968).Google Scholar

⁶ For example, during the last stages of the crisis over the European Defence Community, Mollet drew precisely the same distinction as Blum between ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘national independence’ (speech to National Assembly, 31 August 1954, quoted by Quilliot, p. 511) and in 1977 a principal exponent of the Socialist Party's European policy again cited Blum on this point against left-wing critics. Pontillon, R., ‘Les Socialistes et L'Europe’, Nouvelle Revue Socialiste no. 23, 14–15.Google Scholar

⁷ A l' Echelle Humaine (Gallimard, 1971), p. 70.

⁸ Ibid. p. 141.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 143.

¹¹ ‘Notes d'Allemagne’, L'Œuvre de Léon Blum, 1940–45, v, 513. (All subsequent references to L’Œuvre, V-VII Albin Michel, 1955–63, will be indicated only by volume and page numbers. Thus ‘Notes d’Allemagne’, v, 513.)

¹² A I’Echelle, p. 148.

¹³ He had been the focus of attacks by the PCF since the Tours Congress of 1920 and, in the post-war period the communists continued to aim many of their attacks on socialist policies at him although he occupied no official position in the party. See, for example, the extracts of Thorez's report to the Central Committee, 29 October 1947 in Cahiers du Communisme (Nov. 1947), esp. p. IIII; and Guillon, J., ‘Blum, Agent de la Réaction Internationale’, Cahiers du Communisme (Feb. 1948), p. 268.Google Scholar

¹⁴ ‘Le Proces de Riom’, v, 328.

¹⁵ P. 160.

¹⁶ Ibid. pp. 162–4.

¹⁷ Ibid. P. 161.

¹⁸ Ibid. pp. 142–55. The clandestine SFIO explicitly called for a United States of Europe as a preliminary to the eventual world super-state. ‘Projet d’un Programme Commun’, 11 Dec. 1943, reproduced in Mayer, op. cit. pp. 229–38.

¹⁹ A l'Echelle, pp. 63, 65, 170.

²⁰ Letter to Félix Goun, 21 Oct. 1942, v, 371.

²¹ A I’Echelle, p. 110.

²² Ibid. pp. 153–5.

²³ He wrote eighteen articles in Le Populaire in the summer of 1945 (VI, 36–64) and delivered an important speech to the Congress rejecting the PCF proposal for fusion with the SFIO (VI, 65–78); he supported the dismissal of the communist ministers from the government (‘Fidélité au programme’, Le Populaire, 8 May 1947, VI, 411); he attempted to form the first ‘Third Force’ government (for his Ministerial Declaration of 21 Nov. 1947, see VII, 124–31); he supported the schism of the CGT (‘Après la Conférence de “Force Ouvrière” - Autonomie et Unité du Syndicalisme’, Le Populaire, 13 Nov. 1947, VII, 73–5) and the government's draconian measures against communist-led strikers (‘Le Gouvernement doit comprendre’, La Populaire, 5 Dec. 1947, VII, 75–7); and even when the socialists resigned from the government in Feb. 1950, he argued that they should not oppose it because of the continuing extremist threat. (Le Populaire, 10, 11–12, 13, 14, 15, 16 Feb. 1950, VII, 263–76.)

²⁴ Lecture on ‘L'Exercice et conquête du Pouvoir’ to socialist students at L'Ecole Normale Supérieure, 30 May 1947, VII, 436.

²⁵ ‘Au cœur de la Question’, Le Populaire, 1 Aug. 1945, VI, 55–6.

²⁶ ‘L’Aspect internationale’, Le Populaire, 4 Aug. 1945, VI 59–60.

²⁷ Radio broadcast, 19 Oct. 1945, VI, 114–15.

²⁸ In a confidential report Robert Blum, son, collaborator and interpreter for the negotiator, stressed the extent to which important personalities approached the question from the perspective of the American-Russian conflict. (Report to Félix Gouin, April 1946, first divulged by Georgette Elgey in La République des Illusions, 1945–51, Fayard 1961, pp. 140–1, also quoted by Lacouture, p. 530.) Robert Blum also claimed that his father emphasized the importance of securing help before the elections and this tends to support the PCF accusation that the SFIO was trying to use the loan as an electoral advantage. (Duclos, J., ‘Notre Politique’, Cahiers du Communisme, May-June 1946, p. 395.) Nevertheless, the PCF ministers had accepted the necessity for a loan and supported the agreement in the National AssemblyGoogle Scholar

²⁹ Speech to Washington Advisory Council, 25 March 1946, VI, 195.

³⁰ For example, Alfred Grosser interprets this passage as: ‘in other words: “help us or communism will triumph in France”‘. La IVe Republique et sa politique extérieure (Colin, 1967), p. 218.

³¹ The Washington Agreement of 28 May 1946 cancelled French war debts to the U.S.A. and also provided an American loan of just under 700 million dollars. The implicit limitation on nationalizations stemmed from Blum's insistence that those already existing had been non-doctrinaire measures taken in extreme circumstances (speech to Washington Advisory Council). An annex to the agreement also eliminated the previous measures of protection by the French film industry against U.S. competition.

³² Press Conference, Paris, 31 May 1946, VI, 201.

³³ ‘Le Problème économique international’, Le Populaire, 16 Aug. 1946, VI, 240–2.

³⁴ ‘Nationalisme économique’, Le Populaire, 31 Oct. 1946, VI, 329. (Blum was discussing agricultural protection in this article, but his attitude towards industrial protection was similar.)

³⁵ In a speech on 8 May 1947 Dean Acheson had foreshadowed the Marshall Aid Plan but had talked of concentrating aid in those countries ‘where it will be the most useful for the political and economic stability of the world, and for the development of human liberty and democratic institutions’. (Quoted by Tartaskowsky, D. in ‘Guerre froide et troisième force’ in H. Claude et al. La IVe République: La France de 1945 à 1958, Editions Sociales, 1972, p. 53.) Although Blum claimed that the U.S.A. was economically disinterested in this proposal (‘Les raisons économiques’, Le Populaire, 21 May 1947, VII, 16–18), he objected to Acheson's implicit political conditions and argued that the offer should be universal. (‘Les conditions politiques’, Le Populaire, 23 May 1947, VII, 18–20). When Marshall's offer subsequently contained no specific political conditions, Blum gave it enthusiastic support (e.g. ‘Le Prêt-Bail de la Paix’, Le Populaire, 8–9 June 1947, VII, 25–6) and claimed that the U.S.S.R. had no justification for refusing it. (‘A qui la faute?’, Le Populaire, 4 July 1947, VII, 31—3.) In fact it appears highly probable that Blum personally favoured the proposal in any case, but realized that it would be far more acceptable to ‘progressive’ opinion in Europe if it contained no explicit political conditions.Google Scholar

³⁶ ‘L’Unité européene’, Le Populaire, 25–6 May 1947, VII, 20–2; ‘L’Europe devant le Plan Marshall’, Le Populaire, 18 June 1947, VII, 26–8.

³⁷ Speech to an international socialist conference at Stresa, 9 April 1948, VII, 187.

³⁸ See, in particular, his criticisms of the western powers for being precipitous in hastening the division of Germany. ‘L’Unité allemande’, Le Populaire, 6 May 1948, VII, 201–3; ‘La Constitution allemande’, Le Populaire, 11 June 1948; ‘La Convention de Londres’, ibid. 12 June 1948, VII, 211–17; ‘A Berlin’, Le Populaire, 17 July 1948, VII, 217–18. See also note 35 on Marshall Aid.

³⁹ ‘La Troisième force europèenne’, Le Populaire, 6 Jan. 1948, VII, 150–1.

⁴⁰ It also stemmed from French domestic politics, for Blum's attempt to argue that the Third Force differed substantially from both the extremes led him to become more critical of the U.S.A. in order to distance himself from Gaullism. ‘Motion pour un congrès extraordinaire delaSFIO’, lateOctober1947, VII, 112;’DiscoursdedeGaulle - Deux Conceptions’ LePopulaire, 10 March 1948, VII, 173—4.

⁴¹ ‘L'Impossible équilibre’, Le Populaire, 27–8 Aug. 1949, VII, 287–9; ‘A Washington’, ibid. 3–4 Sept. 1949, VII, 322–3; ‘Perspectives d’avenir’, ibid. 19–20 July 1949, VII, 343–8; ‘Productivity et concurrence’, ibid. 8 Dec. 1949, VII, 364–6.

⁴² ‘La Politique internationale’, Le Populaire, 24 Aug. 1945, VI, 174–5; ‘Bilan de Depart’, ibid. 28 June 1946, VI, 225–7.

⁴³ See, for example, ‘Le choc des évènements’, Le Populaire, 24 July 1946, VI, 235–6; ‘L’Affaire de la Sarre’, ibid. 16–18 April 1947, VI, 384–7; ‘L’Offre Marshall et l’Allemagne’, ibid. 6–7 July 1947, VII, 35–7; ‘Les Réparations allemandes’, ibid. 16 Oct. 1947, VII, 98–100. In fact Blum always wanted simultaneously to align France with the western powers and to avoid East-West division.

⁴⁴ ‘Grande-Bretagne et France’, Le Populaire, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 Jan. 1948, VII, 153 67.

⁴⁵ ‘Faire l'Europe avec 1'Allemagne et non pour elle’, Le Populaire, 30 Nov. 1949, VII, 303–5.

⁴⁶ ‘L’Armement de l’Allemagne’, Le Populaire, VII, 305–7.

⁴⁷ In Feb. 1948, he wrote the preface for a new edition of The Communist Manifesto in which he claimed that time had shown Marxist doctrine to be more relevant than ever. However, he also critized the ‘fanaticism’ and ‘fetishism’ of some of Marx's disciples and claimed that Marxist socialism had been ‘dangerously compromised by the doctrinal and tactical deviations of Leninist-Stalinist communism’, VII, 431–5.

⁴⁸ ‘Notes d'Allemagne’, v, 501.

⁴⁹ In fact the theory seems to have stemmed from the secret advice which he received from Emmanuel Monnick, subsequently to become governor of the Bank of France, in 1936 (Lacouture, pp. 325–6). It is, however, doubly ironic that in 1938 Blum defended his government against the Right-wing accusation that its wish to introduce exchange control constituted ‘totalitarianism’. Speech to National Assembly, 17 March 1938, quoted by Lacouture, p. 429.